









The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 
























DEPARTMENT OF HISTORICAL STUDIES 
 
 
CONTESTATIONS OVER CAPRIVI IDENTITIES: FROM PRE-
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT. 
 
Thesis presented in fulfillment of the requirements  
























PLAGIARISM DECLARATION  
   
1. I know that plagiarism is wrong. Plagiarism is to use another’s work and pretend that it 
is one’s own.  
   
2. Each contribution to, and quotation in, this thesis from the work(s) of other people has 
been attributed, and has been cited and referenced.  
   
3. This thesis is my own work.  
 
4. I have not allowed, and will not allow, anyone to copy my work with the intention of 
passing it off as his or her own work.  
   
   














Once again, a generous financial grant from the Carl Schlettwein Foundation of Basel, 
Switzerland, made the writing of this thesis possible. I am highly indebted to the 
Foundation for this and previous awards over the years at a time when scholarships to 
study history seem to dry up. 
 
My supervisor, Prof. Chris Saunders, was unrelenting in his encouragement for the 
completion of the thesis and his belief in the important contribution this would make to 
Namibian historiography. Many thanks are due to him for his attentiveness and undivided 
support during the process of writing this thesis. 
 
Many thanks to my friend Mike Nefale and his family, for putting me up on two 
occasions when I visited Johannesburg to utilize the University of Witwatersrand 
libraries and archives.  
 
Thanks are due too, to all the staff of all archives I worked in for assisting me to locate 
material relevant to my topic – the National Archives of Namibia, National Archives of 
Zambia, the Holy Family Mission at Katima Mulilo, and the Archives of the Archdiocese 
of Windhoek, and to Dag Henrichsen of Basler Afrika Bibliographien who kindly put at 
my disposal a transcript of notes by Israel Goldblatt. In these notes Goldblatt recorded his 
encounters with Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye and these proved very useful. My 
colleagues Jeremy Silvester and Werner Hillebrecht, are thanked for bringing 
photocopies of material on the Caprivi from the National Archives of Botswana, and 
pointing out other useful sources on my topic held in that archive. 
 
Special thanks also to Ferozah Jacobs, Staff Housing Officer at UCT Forest Hill 
Residence, for ensuring, even when approached on short notice, that I had a flat to stay in 












Writing this thesis would have been a lonely affair without the wonderful support I 
received from family and friends. Your emails and telephone calls made a huge 
difference. My two uncles, Vincent Mafwila and Clement Mafwila, were almost a core 
study group for we discussed many issues especially related to the liberation war: many 
thanks to you both for allowing me to test some of my theories on you. My kid sister 
Nzila Muhau deserves special thanks for the many coffees she made for me when I 
seemed stressed. Last but not least my heartfelt thanks go to my daughter Mpambo and 
my son Nfwambi for their support and understanding especially for not complaining that 
I neglected you for being away from home several times during the process of gathering 













Contestations over Caprivi identities: From pre-colonial times to the present 
 
This study investigated the hypothesis that Caprivi identities exist; and that they have 
always been contested. These identities  defined as a sense of not belonging to greater 
South West Africa exist in two forms: i) as a spatial or geographical entity usually 
divided into East and West in history for administrative purposes; and, ii) as a people, 
such as Subia, Mafwe, Mayeyi, Mbukushu, Barakwena, Totela, Mbalangwe, and Lozi, 
collectively referred to as ‘Caprivians’. Through utilizing primary sources such as oral 
interviews and archival material as well as secondary sources, the study endeavored to 
establish how Caprivi identities were constructed; what the nature of its contestations are; 
and how ‘Caprivians’ responded to its construction. 
 
It was established that Caprivi identities were the result of administrative neglect in state 
formation that constructed isolation on the basis of difference – that ‘Caprivians’ are 
different from other groups in South West Africa, and that Caprivi was geographically 
remote from Windhoek and hence difficult to administer as part of South West Africa. 
Resultantly, only a primitive form of indirect rule existed in the area for most part of its 
colonial history resulting in constant change of colonial masters. Though it was pushed 
more to neighboring territories administratively, it was not made an integral part of such 
territories but made to stand separate as a geographical entity. Even the provision of 
education and health services was left in the hands of missionaries of the Seventh Day 
Adventists and the Catholic Capuchin Order. With the implementation of the Odendaal 
recommendations, an East Caprivi Bantustan was established that gave ‘Caprivians’ a 
legislative council, and a government with symbols of state such as a flag, coat of arms, 
anthem and constitution. The study argued that this marks the fruition of Caprivi identity 
and the concept ‘Caprivian’ was coined and entered official use. 
 
Because of its strategic location, Caprivi became a contested terrain for Angolan migrant 











liberation movements. During the pre-colonial period, contestation for Caprivi identity 
was in the form of competition for resources and was characterized by conquest, 
resistance, plunder, betrayal and rivalry. 
 
The inhabitants of Caprivi responded to Caprivi identity in two ways. During the colonial 
period this was in the form of the rise of nationalism when the Caprivi African National 
Union was formed to fight for independence. The study concluded that the merger 
between Caprivi African National Union and South West Africa Peoples Organization to 
liberate Namibia was a rejection of isolation and separatism expressed through Caprivi 
identities. The second response is calls for secession from Namibia by certain 
‘Caprivians’ in the present. The study concluded that secession is a product of the South 
African construction of Caprivi identities that emphasized localized notions of identity 
formation.  
 
Bennett Kangumu Kangumu 
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Caprivi is the name of the panhandle (narrow strip of land) protruding from the northeast 
corner of Namibia and toward Botswana and Zambia. It is one of the 13 political regions 
of Namibia and takes its name from the Caprivi Strip. It is named after the German 
chancellor Leo, Graf von Caprivi, who obtained it from Great Britain as part of a general 
settlement (1890) between the two countries. It gave the former Germany colony of 
South West Africa (now Namibia) access to the Zambezi River. 
 
The Caprivi Region is c.300 miles (480 km) long and 50 miles (80 km) wide. It is 
bordered on the north by Angola and Zambia and on the south by Botswana. The Caprivi 
is a heavily tropical area, with high temperatures and much rainfall during the December-
to-March rainy season, making it the wettest region of Namibia. The terrain is mostly 
made up of swamps, floodplains, wetland, and woodland. 
 
It also is home to 450 animal species, including elephants, making Caprivi a popular 
game-watching spot. The wildlife is protected by several nature reserves, such as 
Bwabwata, Mudumu, West Caprivi Game Park, Mahango Game Reserve, and Mamili 
National Park. Animals travel freely across the border with Botswana, where the Chobe 
National Park lies. The strip is also a prime bird-watching area, with almost 70 per cent 











the strip also holds the Kwando River, which marks the border with Botswana. 
Tributaries of the river here go by different names, including the Linyanti and Chobe.  
 
The political geography of Caprivi is not natural, and indeed the Zambezi and Chobe 
Rivers are not natural boundaries. During the pre-colonial times, the Caprivi was of great 
strategic importance, among others being a meeting place of the Kololo, Tawana and 
Ndebele spheres of influence. The Impalila Island in the far east of Caprivi had a strategic 
importance in the 1870s as the terminus of the ‘Old Hunter’s Road’ and the entry point to 
the Lozi Kingdom for white traders, hunters, travelers and missionaries from Panda 




The population size of the Caprivi Region was 79 826 in 2001, comprised of 40 749 
females and 39 077 male.1 In 1991 the population size was 90 422. 44 065 of that number 
were male and 46 357 females. Migration to other regions accounts for the disparity 
between the 1991 a d 2001 population figures. Estimate population records for the 
Caprivi date as far back as 1905. In that year, F. Seiner, a German, was sent on an 
expedition to investigate conditions in the Caprivi and to determine the value of the 
territory to the Germans. Under the heading general survey, Seiner estimated the 
population of the Caprivi to be 4200 persons in 83 villages.2 Seiner went on to state that 
                                                 
1 Republic of Namibia, 2001 Population and Housing Census, Caprivi Region: Basic analysis with 
highlights, Windhoek: National Planning Commission, March 2003, p.4. 
2 “Report of Expedition made by F. Seiner from Katima Mulilo to Libebe, August 1-25 1905”, in Kruger, 











the Masubiya area, under Letia, comprised 34 villages with a population of 1579 while 
under Siluka in the west there were 17 Mayeyi and 10 Mafwe villages with 978 and 432 
persons respectively.  
 
The next estimates are those made by Streitwolf in 1909, 5000 Masubiya and 4000 
Mafwe and Mayeyi.3 The above figures are relatively high and thus put Streitwolf’s claim 
that the territory was deserted in doubt. In fact Kruger shows that it was only some of the 
Masubiya and mostly Malozi who crossed the Zambezi River into Barotseland and also 
the Chobe River into Bechuanaland Protectorate at the news of the arrival of the Germans 
and not those in the west of Caprivi, that is, the Mafwe.4 Streitwolf himself noted that the 
Malozi were “disliked by the Masubia, otherwise they would all have gone across the 
river with the Malozi leaving the Caprivi depopulated in those parts.”5 Streitwolf 
provides slightly higher figures in his book, “Der Caprivi Zipfel” in 1911: “The total 
native population I estimate as follows: 5000 Masubia, 3000 Mafue and Majee, 1,500 
Mambukuschu, 200 Hukwe”.6 The 700 more could be a result of natural population 
increase and also the addition of the categories ‘Mambukushu’ and the Barakwena. 
 
During the war years (both First and Second World Wars) census was not taken. The 
Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration enumerated the population of the Caprivi Strip 
in 1921 as follows: “Males 2003; females 2246; total 4249”7 It is significant to note that 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration did not break down the census according 
                                                 
3 Kruger, C.E., ‘History of the Caprivi Strip, 1890-1984’, (NAN: A.472), Chapter 3, p. 15. 
4 Kruger, 1984, p. 17. 
5 Ibid.:, p. 14. 
6 Ibid.:, p. 22 











to ethnic criteria like during the German and later South African administrations. This 
figure does not include the few European missionaries and traders resident in the territory 
at the time.  
 
Census details are available for each of the years 1930 to 1939 during which period the 
Caprivi was under the South West Africa Administration (SWAA). The 1930 figures 
were probably from an actual census and thereafter estimated. For our purposes, only the 
1930 and 1939 figures will be given below.8 As with subsequent figures, the category 
Mayeyi is dropped, as is with other smaller groups such as Mbukushu. These are now 
incorporated into the broad category of ‘Mafwe’. Significantly, a new category, 
‘children’ is introduced in the census during this period and very interestingly; this 




















 Grand  
Total 
1930 1036 1454 2379 750 936 1469 1786 2390 3848 8024 
1939 1182 1908 3026 906 1251 2151 2088 3159 5177 10424 
 
Table 1: Census figures for 1930 and 1939. 
 
The respective tribal totals were 4869 Mafwe (inclusive of other groups) and 3155 
Masubiya in 1930 and 6116 Mafwe and 4308 Masubiya in 1939. The Union of South 
Africa held its population census after the Second World War in May 1946. To coincide 
with that census and since the Eastern Caprivi Strip was now administered from Pretoria, 












a locally devised population census was held for the territory on the 31 May 19469 and 
the results were received by the Union Director of Census and the Department of Native 
Affairs. The following figures were generated: For the Mafwe (again inclusive of all 
other groups), a total of 9 563 were recorded, broken down as follows: 2173 men; 2865 
women; 2370 boys; and 2155 girls. For the Masubiya, a total of 5548 were recorded, 
broken down as follows: 1432 men; 1549 women; 1378 boys; and 1189 girls. A further 
category, Europeans, was included in this census and counted to 5 men; 1 woman, and 1 
boy with the category ‘girls’ recording none. Altogether the population added to 15 111. 
It can be observed that in this census, the gender aspect of children was taken into 
account. One could continue to list further Caprivi census statistics but perhaps that is not 
necessary for the purposes of this study. In May 1982 for example, the total population of 
Caprivi was given as 39, 500.10  
 
To conclude this section, it is necessary to give brief remarks and observations regarding 
the censuses. While it certainly was the best that could be done under the prevailing 
circumstances, the accuracy of the census results can be doubted based on the officials 
designated to carry the census who were cattle guards and ‘native’ constables. These 
were not properly trained to carry out the task of enumerating people in a population 
census considering their low level or no education at the time. The second is the 
methodology used where each village was required to have four sticks of different 
lengths: the longest for men, the next for women, the next boys and the shortest for girls. 
A short distance from one end of each stick a ring was cut the space below which was for 













people of the Caprivi out of the territory on the night fixed for the count. Village heads 
made the count first thing in the morning and when the notching had been completed they 
waited for the arrival of the constables and cattle guards and simply handed over the 
sticks. 
 
In some instances very significant variations can be observed in the census figures. The 
increase was due not only to natural increase but also to influx from adjacent territories. 
A close look at the detailed figures shows that in the Masubiya area of the eastern 
Caprivi, villages were much smaller than in the Mafwe areas in the west of Caprivi. This 
was because the Masubiya areas are subject to annual flood inundation and villages had 
to be situated on available higher grounds (moulds) in the floodplain. The biggest 
Masubiya village in 1946 held 166 persons as against 406 Mafwe.11 An average village 
figure for the Masubiya was 33 and for the Mafwe were 74. At the time there were 156 
Masubiya villages to 130 Mafwe villages.12 
 
It can be noted that in all censuses referred above taken during the colonial period, there 
is no category for “Lozi” or Lozi speakers. A common error often made even in scholarly 
presentations is reference to ‘Caprivians’ as Lozis, as can be discerned from the 
following report: ‘The Caprivi secessionists are fighting for the independence of the 
Caprivi Strip, where Namibia’s 92 000 Lozi-speakers live’.13 Apart from being a 
generalization, I doubt whether such a high proportion of ‘Caprivians’ speak Lozi. In any 
case, being able to speak Lozi does not make the majority of ‘Caprivians’ Lozis. SiLozi 
became the lingua franca in eastern Caprivi, for historical reasons: with the development 
                                                 
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Namasiku Ilukena, ‘Caprivi secession stirs Barotseland hopes’,  











of Bantustans, the apartheid regime instituted it as the medium of instruction in schools, 
partly because it was close to Sotho (Northern Pedi) and therefore learning materials and 
Sotho-speaking instructors could be imported from South Africa. The spread of Lozi in 
Caprivi is thus due largely to the fact that it is the medium of instruction in schools 
particularly during the early phase of primary education. The language policy of Namibia 
provides that a child should be instructed in his/her mother tongue during the first four 
years of primary education. For the people of Caprivi however, ‘mother tongue’ is taken 
to mean Lozi within education circles. The issue is political because Lozi is seen as an 
agent to help overcome apparent antagonism and tribal tension between the Masubiya 
and the Mafwe.14 The reasoning behind is that this would promote a ‘common Caprivian 
regional identity.’15 On the contrary, it is argued here, it is this regionalism couched in 
Lozi terms and which stresses affinity with a Zambian population and Lozi past that is 
the source of secession in Caprivi and is actually detrimental to Namibian nation-building 
in relation to the Caprivi. Still, evidence suggests that Lozi is not the most widely spoken 
language in Caprivi. I provide below statistics to show ethnic break-down by language in 
Caprivi Region. The statistics are extracted from Chapter 7 of the 2001 Namibia 
Population and Housing Census under the heading Household Composition and 
Characteristics. On page 32 under 7.4 Main language spoken in the household, the 
following observation is made: 
 
“The Census included a question on language usually spoken or most spoken at home. In the 
Caprivi Region several languages were identified….Caprivi languages are the most spoken 
languages in households in the Region, with 88% of the households communicating in these 
languages. Of the Caprivi languages, Sisubiya is used by 38% of the households which speak 
Caprivi languages.” 
 
The distribution of households by Caprivi language spoken in Caprivi in the 2001 Census 
is shown in Table 7.4.2 (p. 32) as follows: 
 
                                                 
14 Cluver 1991: 44, Fosse, 1996, 180. 














Main Language Number of households Percent 
Lozi (Sikololo) 3 254 21.9 
 Sifwe 3 129 21.0 
 Sisubiya 5 720 38.4 
 Siyeyi 1 179 7.9 
 Totela 1 588 10.6 
Total 14 870 100.0 
 
Table 2: Distribution of households by language spoken in Caprivi, 2001 Population Census 
 
It can easily be noted from the above that smaller groups such as Mbalangwe, Mbukushu 
and Barakwena (San) are either left out because of their lesser numerical strength or 
probably are integrated in the category Sifwe or are integrated in the category Lozi. 
Either way this does not impact on the dominance of Sisubiya as the widely spoken 
language in Caprivi at household level.  
 
My interest in the history of the Caprivi grew after I completed a Masters thesis in 
2000.16 Whilst that thesis dealt specifically with the history and evolution of 
administrative control of the Caprivi during the South African colonial occupation, what 
emerged from that study was the pursuance of the policy of neglect17 by its successive 
colonial masters. This neglect seems to have been justified on the basis that the creation 
of the territory was, in the first place, a historical mistake. Geographically, historically, 
                                                 
16 B. Kangumu, ‘A Forgotten Corner of Namibia: Aspects of the History of the Caprivi Strip, c.1939-1980’, 
MA Thesis, UCT, 2000. 
17 Mushinge C. ‘The Impact of Colonial Policies on Ecological Control and African Cattle Production in 
Botswana, 1885-1984.’ EASSRR, January 1991: 5. 












socially and culturally, the territory and its people are different from the rest of South 
West Africa/Namibia and its people had closer affinities to their kin in Zambia and 
Botswana than to others in the country on which they found themselves a part. The 
Caprivi and its people remained peripheral as far as Namibian colonial state formation 
went, and while the inhabitants of the area were depicted largely as Lozi in contemporary 
historiography and ethnographic literature, they were not fully integrated as such. This 
sense of ‘not belonging’ has produced what is referred herein as a separate and troubled 
‘Caprivi identity’.  
 
On an individual level, one feels ‘compelled to continuously ask oneself: In reality, who 
am I’?18: A ‘Caprivian’, Namibian, Zambian, Botswanian, Angolan, or all of the above? 
On the local level, my ethnic background is that my paternal grandfather is Subiya while 
my paternal grandmother is a Yeyi. Both my maternal grandparents are Subiyas. While I 
have surviving relatives residing in the Yeyi area, I consider myself a Subiya, where I 
grew up. I should add that a Subiya of Caprivi, even though I have aunts and uncles who 
reside in and are Subiyas of Botswana. The above would thus make me a ‘Caprivian’, at a 
regional level, and a Namibian, at the national level. My ethnic, regional and national 
identities are not conflicting but live in harmony within me. This identity, the “I” in me, 
is informed by historical and cultural attributes. The problem of personal identity is 
chiefly concerned with what is the “I,” or self, that remains the same from year to year? 
A host of endless questions and debates arise, such as, is there anything in body or mind 
that has the necessary persistence? Does identity lie in the body? Probably not since cells 
                                                 
18 Frantz Fanon, quoted in Birt, E. Robert (ed.). The Quest for Community and Identity: Critical Essays in 












of the body constantly change. Then, does it lie in the mind, probably not since the mass 
of feelings and ideas forming consciousness constantly change. Consciousness itself 
seems to be suspended by sleep every night.  
 
My interest in the topic partly stems from my academic training in history but also a 
desire for self-discovery – wanting to know more about myself, my past and my people 
(meaning the “we-ness” in me). What are the borders of inclusion and exclusion in my 
“I” and “We”? This quest resulted in a Master of Art degree at the University of Cape 
Town on the history of the Caprivi and as reflected in my bibliography I am engaged in a 
number of research projects on various aspects of Caprivi history. The research projects 
benefit in many ways from the fact that I originate from the study area and thus general 
problems concerned with research such as language barriers, lack of trust, networking 
and logistical issues did not present much difficulties in this instance. 
 
This thesis will provide no definitive answer to the above questions, for it is recognized 
that both self-ascription and ascription by others are critical in the processes that produce 
ethnic groups and identities. In other words group identities form in an interaction 
between assignment – what others say we are – and assertion – who or what we claim to 
be (Ito-Alder 1980). What the thesis will do is to provide a ‘Caprivian’ perspective on 
Caprivi’s history, though it is hoped that this thesis, while written by one who comes 
from the  Caprivi, is as objective as it is possible to be. All histories are written from a 
particular perspective and therefore whether a historical work is objective or subjective 











involves value judgment. The shortcomings related to subjectivity are not mine alone. At 
times they are inherent in the nature of the subject and object of research, for example, 
‘researching violently divided societies’19 might present its own difficulties. This fact is 
recognized by Tamar Hermann, who opines: 
 
The problem in the study of socio-political conflicts, as well as finding ways to resolve them, is 
that social scientists, who are themselves members of society and of a specific socio-political 
group, often either take a stand on the conflict they are researching, or are, in one way or another, 
involved in it.20 
 
Being an ‘insider’ though has its own advantages, Hermann continues: 
 
It appears that researchers who belong to one of the sides of a conflict, that is, insiders, are best 
qualified for gathering the hard data on their own side: they are proficient in the language, familiar 
with the socio-cultural and political contexts, have detailed and sometimes first-hand information 
regarding relevant events, and have incomparable access to primary resources and informants.21 
 
Aims and Preview of the Dissertation 
 
A major concern in this thesis is Caprivi identities and their contestations: What is it? 
Briefly, Caprivi identity is herein defined as a totality of feelings, perceptions and actions 
that colluded over time to produce a sense of not belonging: separate, different, isolated, 
                                                 
19 Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson, Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and 
Methodological Issues, New York, United Nations University Press, [n.d.] 
20 Tamar Hermann, ‘The Impermeable Identity Wall: The Study of Violent Conflicts by “Insiders” and 
“outsiders”’, in Marie Smyth and Gillian Robinson, Researching Violently Divided Societies: Ethical and 
Methodological Issues, New York, United Nations University Press, [n.d.], p. 77. 











remote, troublesome and contested. In this analysis it is shown that Caprivi identities 
have always been, and continues to be, a highly contested terrain; and that this 
contestation predates formal colonialism; that it outlived the colonial state, and is present 
in the independent state. It will also be shown that the contestation over Caprivi identities 
took a variety of forms and divergent interests, among others: contested identities and 
rival histories; contested labour and military frontiers; contested regional nationalism; 
and lastly, contested state formation. The above,  when combined, support another 
assertion or aim of the thesis, that is, the argument that Caprivi as a space was not 
situated on the periphery of power, whether that of the Lozi or Kololo empire, colonial 
state, or independent Namibia. In brief, Caprivi might seem geographically peripheral 
when viewed from a Namibian, national perspective, but it could also be seen as 
geographically central if viewed from a more regional African perspective. This thesis 
aims to show this to be the case.  
 
The study is divided into two parts. Section A examines contest in the construction of the 
Caprivi identities; Section B is concerned with attempts to deconstruct Caprivi identities, 
and to re-enforce the identities with calls for secession. Different questions about Caprivi 
identities will be tackled in the various chapters of the thesis. After the Introductory 
Chapter One, the discussion in Chapter Two focuses on the contest to control the Caprivi, 
space and people, during the pre-colonial period, involving outside powers such as the 
Aluyi (Lozi), the Makololo of Sebetwane, the Batawana, and the Matebele (Ndebele) of 
Mzilikazi. For these groups, Caprivi offered a safe haven or refuge because of its natural 











cultivation. While the aim in this chapter is to show the nature of conquest, betrayal and 
rivalry that characterized pre-colonial Caprivi, what emerges also are two equally 
important points, 1) that the depiction of the inhabitants of the Caprivi as ‘slaves’ or 
‘little serfs’, almost to the level of sub-humanity, in contemporary pre-colonial 
historiography is misplaced. The impression created, that the people of Caprivi ‘resigned’ 
themselves to the suffering and disdain allotted to them by the conquering powers, 
especially the Lozi and Makololo, is refuted. It is argued and shown in this chapter that 
the ‘colonized’ attempted to regain their independence at various points in their 
relationship with their masters, even if this meant betraying this master and paying 
allegiance to the other. As Albert Memmi correctly observes, “In all of the colonized 
there is a fundamental need for change.”22 It is shown that it is untenable to think that the 
colonized inhabitants of Caprivi could have been expected to ‘disappear’ into their 
master, to be Lozi. Lozi and Kololo subjugation of the inhabitants of Caprivi was 
tantamount to ‘colonialism’, and should be classified as such. The Lozi regime especially 
was as or even more exploitative and cruel23 than some colonial powers that came later. 
As Jean-Paul Sartre concluded, there are neither good nor bad colonists – there are 
colonists.24 Contemporary historiography on Caprivi does not acknowledge this fact and 
rather concentrates on glorifying the ‘powerful Lozi’ kingdom and its expansion 
southwards. This historiography neglects a basic fact, that where there is a powerful 
entity, there is bound to be a powerless one. Resistance to Lozi expansion is not 
                                                 
22 Memmi, Albert. The Colonizer and the Colonized (Expanded Edition: Introduction by Jean-Paul Sartre; 
Afterword by Susan Gilson Miller). Boston: Beacon Press, 1965, p. 119. 
23 See descriptions in Pretorius, J., ‘The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel: A Study of their Historical and 
Geographical Background, Tribal Structure and Legal System, with reference to the Fwe Family Law and 
Succession’ (MA, University of Stellenbosch, 1975). 












discussed as part of citizenship and subjectivity in the Lozi state. In brief, Chapter Two 
will seek to provide answers to the following questions: whether there were pre-colonial 
or pre-Caprivi identities and what role these may have played in shaping later 
Caprivianness? What was the nature of societal relations in the pre-colonial space that 
became the Caprivi?; And What was the nature of contestations over identities in that 
pre-colonial space that became the Caprivi?  
 
Chapters Three and Four discusses formal colonialism in the Caprivi and how this was 
conducted and contested by European imperial powers during the so-called ‘Scramble for 
Africa’, which resulted in the ‘deals and treaties’ that created the Caprivi Zipfel. The 
chapters discuss the role of state formation both during the German and South African 
colonial periods and how this helped shape Caprivi identities. It is shown how the more 
things changed (in terms of colonial administrations), the more they remained the same, 
in that there was really stagnation, isolation and neglect of the Caprivi administratively in 
the periods 1890-1909, 1909-1914, 1914-1918, 1918-1922, 1922-1929, 1929-1939, 1939-
1964. During all those periods, the Caprivi was administered at the local level by one 
European official with an assistant, while the provision of education and health services 
was the responsibilities of missionaries from the Seventh Day Adventists (SDA) and later 
from the Catholic Capuchin Order. The period 1964 until independence marked a shift 
from neglect to intense focus, with the appointment of the Odendaal Commission and the 
implementation of a roadmap towards Caprivi self-governing status. While a major 
conclusion is that Caprivi identities are a result of neglect, the focus in Chapter Three and 











following questions are asked: What role did state formation play in the construction of 
Caprivi identities? How was the Caprivi administered? Did the nature of the different 
administrations make the Caprivi peripheral or central, firstly, in relation to Namibian 
state formation; and secondly, in relation to central southern Africa? To tackle these 
issues effectively mainly for practical purposes, Chapter Three deals with the period 1890 
to 1939 of colonialism in Caprivi, in which a major characteristic of Caprivi identities are 
the transferability of the Caprivi from one colonial master to the next for administrative 
purposes, and asks  how this aided the formation of Caprivi identities? Chapter Four is 
concerned with the period 1939 to 1982 of colonialism in Caprivi, during most of which 
the Caprivi was administered directly from Pretoria through the Union of South Africa’s 
Department of Native Affairs. This period can usefully be divided into two parts, i) the 
period of the Bantu reserve (1939 -1964) which was characterized by neglect in all 
spheres; and, ii) the Bantustan period (1964 -1980) which saw the implementation of the 
Odendaal Recommendations for Caprivi self government. It is argued that in this latter 
period the Caprivi was the subject of intense focus by the administration, asks how this 
shift, from total neglect to intense focus over a period of less than half a century, affected, 
and helped construct or deconstruct Caprivi identities?  
 
In the main during the early part of the period of Caprivi colonial administration, the 
provision of education and health services was left in the hands of the Seventh Day 
Adventist and, later, Catholic missionaries. The general trend of both missions was to 
apply Northern Rhodesia school curricula in the Caprivi schools. Written examinations 











were from Nothern Rhodesia. In addition, all illnesses of a serious nature were referred to 
hospitals in Northern Rhodesia. The impact that this could have had on the construction 
of Caprivi identities is interrogated. 
 
It was during this period of colonial rule that the Caprivi became a contested frontier. The 
Caprivi was isolated and remote, so why was it that the Caprivi and Caprivi identities 
were continually under contestation, and what was the nature of this contestation? This 
forms the basis of the discussion in Chapter Five, which sets out to describe the Caprivi 
as a contested frontier and asks what the nature of this frontier was, and what its 
constituent elements were. This frontier is described, among others, in terms of labour 
migrancy and militaristic aspects (military frontier). What role did these different aspects 
play in the consolidation of Caprivi identities? Did the routes of migrant labour point: 
towards, or away from, South West Africa/Namibia, and what effect would this have had 
on Caprivi identities. 
 
In Chapter Six, the discussion will move into the question of what form Caprivi identities 
took at the local level: how it was consolidated at the local level; did it create or 
recognize any local identities; did its construction involve loss of local identities, did it 
create competition among local identities, and did this competition evolve into 
contestation? Finally it asks what form this contestation took and over what aspects? All 













The last three chapters of the thesis, Seven, Eight and Nine, are devoted to the African 
responses to Caprivi identities, both past and present. In Chapter Seven the rise of Caprivi 
nationalism is examined, specifically the formation of the Caprivi African National 
Union (CANU). The following questions are asked: was the rise of CANU a direct 
response to isolated Caprivi identities; how was CANU formed; what were the issues the 
nationalists were concerned with; how did this threaten Caprivi identities; and how does 
Caprivi regional nationalism fit into broader Namibian nationalism? Chapter Eight looks 
at how the state responded to the threat to Caprivi identities embodied in the rise of 
CANU. The focus here is on political repression, particularly the arrest, detention and 
disappearance of Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye, founder president of CANU. It asks 
what happened to him after his arrest in 1964; where was he taken; and, if he was killed, 
where was his body taken? Chapter Nine is concerned with Caprivi identities in the 
present: Are they still being constructed and, if so, in what form? It asks whether 
contestation over this present construction is on-going and if such construction 
(secession) is a direct result of the construction of Caprivi identities of the past? Finally, 
it asks whether there is a historical basis for Caprivi secession. The concluding Chapter 
Ten provides a brief summary of conclusions to the study. 
 
This thesis, therefore, seeks to determine how Caprivi identities were constructed in the 
past; and whether such construction still continues in the present; what contestations over 
Caprivi identities emerged; and whether pre-colonial identities laid a foundation that 














In this thesis the terms Lozi, Malozi, Barotse and/or Aluyi are used interchangeably to 
refer to the same group. Similarly, the term Makololo (or just Kololo) also refers to the 
same group of people under Sebetwane. The inhabitants of the Caprivi were classified 
into two main groups for administrative purposes: the Subia (also known as Masubia, 
Subiya, Masubiya, Kuhane or Bekuhane) and the Mafwe (also known as Fwe). The latter 
group, identified as Bafwe (Bayeyi) between 1909 and 1972, included within its ranks, 
smaller groups such as the Mayeyi (also Yei, Yeyi or Bayeyi), Mbukushu (also 
Mambukushu), Totela (also Matotela), Mbalangwe (also Mambalangwe), BaMashi (also 
Mashi or Mayuni people) and Barakwena (also Barakwengo or San). Reference to these 
groups in this thesis will conform to the broad categories of Subiya and Fwe or Masubiya 
and Mafwe when dealing with the colonial period. In the post independent state, 
reference to the Mafwe (or Fwe) excludes Mayeyi (Yeyi or Yei) and BaMashi (or 
Mayuni), since these are now independent chieftaincies. 
 
It is clear from the above that this thesis deals with a multiplicity of ethnic identities and 
in a way with ethnicity in Caprivi. As Royce contends, ethnicity result from the existence 
of more than one ethnic group in a given society and that at times ethnic identity can even 
be the product of increased inter-group interaction.25 It is logical then to begin by 
defining the concepts ethnic identity, ethnic group, ethnicity and national identity as used 
in the thesis. Royce defines ethnic group as a ‘reference group that may share common 
                                                 












values, beliefs, and history. Through the process of interaction members come to identify 
themselves as sharing a certain style.’26 As for ethnic identity, Royce defines it as ‘the 
total of the feeling, beliefs, and history that identify the members as being part of a 
distance past.’27 To accept the above definitions in the context of this study present 
difficulties, such as the risk of reading some of these contemporary identities back into 
the 17th or 18th centuries and negotiating issues related to borders of exclusion and 
inclusion in the construction of identities, from above by the state or from below by the 
people themselves. For Anthony D. Smith, there are two extreme views on ethnicity, 
those who find a primordial quality in ethnicity, which “exists outside time”, and those 
who see ethnicity as “situational”, dependent on the individual’s situation and open to 
instrumental manipulation by competing elites.28 Smith chooses to stress the “historical 
and symbolic-cultural attributes of ethnic identity”.29 In this sense, it is fairly clear that 
there were ‘Subiya’, ‘Mafwe’, Mayeyi and other ethnic groups in Caprivi in the 18th 
century and previously. However, these probably meant different things at different times 
and in different places, as ably put by Mai Palmberg: “Identities are relational, they are 
different at different times, and they are contested, and hence, unstable.”30 
 
An oft-quoted writer on the theme of identities, Benedict Anderson, coined the concept 
‘imagined communities’.31 Are the above identities, one may ask, ‘imagined’ as 
                                                 
26 Royce, 1982, p. 18. 
27 Royce, 1982, p. 18. 
28 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1991, p. 20. 
29 Ibid.: p. 20. 
30 Mai Palmberg, ‘Introduction’, in Palmberg, M., (ed.), National Identity and Democracy in Africa, 
Uppsala, The Human Sciences Research Council of SA, the Mayibuye Centre at the University of the 
Western Cape and the Nordic Africa Institute, 1999, p. 14. 
31 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York, 1992. (The book was first 











according to Anderson? On this point Anderson is largely irrelevant because he dealt 
mostly with national identities as opposed to ethnic identities. It is helpful to remember 
that for Anderson, “imagined communities” did not mean “fabricated” or “invented”. He 
described the nation as “an imagined political community” because the “ members of 
even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or 
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion.”32 For 
Anderson all communities other than primordial villages with face-to-face contact are in 
fact imagined.33 There is a danger of adapting much of what Anderson writes to suit 
circumstances in Africa since his examples are mainly from Asia as observed by 
Palmberg: 
 
On a more general level we have seen how the authorities on national identity, Anthony D. Smith 
and Benedict Anderson, do have much to tell us, but also leave us largely without analytical tools 
when it comes to Africa. More research is needed on ‘the special cases’ represented by Africa. 
 
Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined communities’ can perhaps be better employed in this 
thesis in the context of dismantling ‘Caprivi nationalism’ and secession. According to 
Smith, the central idea of nationalism is that “nations exist from time immemorial, and 
that nationalists must reawaken them from their slumber to take the place in a world of 
nations.”34 Similarly, the Chatham House Report defines nationalism as “a 
consciousness, on the part of individuals or groups, of membership in a nation, or of a 
                                                 
32 Ibid.: p. 6. 
33 Palmberg, 1999, p. 11. 











desire to forward the strength, liberty or prosperity of a nation…”35 Based on the above 
definitions of nationalism and without engaging in in-depths discussion on how new 
nations come to be imagined, it become impractical to think of a Caprivi ‘national 
identity’, as professed by the secessionists. To begin with, the spatial identity of what is 
today Caprivi did not exist since time immemorial. It is a colonial creation just like any 
modern African state, the results of colonial rivalries, partition conferences and 
conquests. National identity for Smith is founded in culture and involves both cultural 
ideas (such as ideas on common ancestry or history), and cultural symbols, (such as 
monuments, poetry, architecture). It is shown in the thesis that history is such a divisive 
and contested element of contemporary Caprivi and with so diverse ethnic backgrounds, 
the issue of common ancestry cannot be imagined. If Caprivi nationalism manages to 
invent a nation where it does not exist, definitely myths of ethnic origin will not form the 
ideological basis of its imagined multi-ethnic state. 
 
Sources of data and methodological considerations 
 
This study is informed by ‘revisionist’ historiography, more especially Marxist social 
history of the 1980s, with its strong emphasis on “history from below”.36  
Such an approach is necessary to break contemporary trends that see the history of 
Caprivi through the lenses of Lozi and Kololo subjugation and portray ‘Caprivians’ as a 
‘Lozi underclass’. Emphasis on social history does not, however, mean ignoring the 
structuralist scholarship of the 1970s, the primary concern of which was with questions of 
                                                 
35 In Thomas Hodgkin, ‘Introductory’, in Hodgkin, Thomas, Nationalism in Colonial Africa, London, 
Frederick Muller, 1956, p. 20. 











theory, of state and capital accumulation. As Nefale correctly observes, “the lives of 
ordinary men are tied by a conflicting relationship with the state, particularly after the 
demise of independent African chiefdoms that led many Africans to flock to the cities 
and their confinement to the reserves”.37 A study seeking to portray ‘history from below’ 
should undoubtedly benefit from the use of oral sources. Curent political conditions in the 
Caprivi are not conducive for oral interviews on sensitive themes such as identities, 
secession, and regional nationalism. Apart from the on-going treason trial, the current 
land dispute between the two main groups in the area, the Mafwe and Masubiya, makes 
oral interviewing very difficult.  
 
However, I have done extensive oral history research, for the present study, and other 
related projects. These were quite beneficial and informative alternative sources of data 
that complement and complete gaps in written materials. This thesis, however, benefited 
tremendously from unrelated field work interviews I conducted in the Caprivi for projects 
on the history of the Caprivi, for it has been easier for interviewees to talk about the past. 
The first is a three phased project on the ‘life history’ of Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye 
which is sponsored by the Archives of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Liberation Struggle 
Project (AACRLS) of the National Archives of Namibia. Phase One of this project 
involved the compilation of a comprehensive literature study of mainly archival sources 
on Simbwaye and the history of regional nationalism in Caprivi, particularly the 
formation of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU). Phase Two consisted of oral 
interviews with family, friends, work colleagues and political acquaintances of Brendan 
                                                 












Simbwaye, mainly in Caprivi and other parts of Namibia. Reports for Phase One and 
Two are filed at the National Archives of Namibia, including tape recordings of the oral 
interviews. Phase Three of this project will commenced in August 2007 and its primary 
aim is to produce a biographical manuscript on Simbwaye (for possible publication) and 
a Mobile Exhibition which will hopefully find a place in the planned Museum in the 
Caprivi Region. To coincide with the 2006 Heroes Day Celebrations, which were held at 
Katima Mulilo in Caprivi Region for the first time since independence, I published my 
research results on this project in New Era of 25 August 2006 in an article entitled 
‘Heroism: A Glance at Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye’. That the celebrations were held 
in Caprivi is significant in the wider debate on the role and place of Caprivi in the 
Namibian liberation war. This forms part of the discussion in Chapter Five which 
examines the military frontier identity of Caprivi. It is shown in that chapter that Caprivi 
was a key operational front for both SADF and PLAN during the liberation war. Apart 
from Chapter Five on the military frontier, material from this research was helpful to and 
informed discussion in Chapter Seven and Eight that deals with African responses, and 
focuses especially on the rise of CANU. 
 
The second project I am involved in concerns the current land dispute between the 
Mafwe and Masubiya Traditional Authorities involving ownership of the Muyako area. 
In early 2007, the head of state Hifikepunye Pohamba issued a Presidential Decree based 
on the recommendations of the Council of Traditional Leaders that the disputed piece of 
land, which includes Lake Lyambezi, was to fall under the Masubiya Traditional 











the right procedures were not followed before the decision was taken and therefore it has 
asked the High Court of Namibia to set aside the decree. As the case involves digging 
deep into history to determine ancient rights to Muyako, I have taken a keen interest in 
following developments both in the High Court and at the traditional courts, where oral 
histories are presented by elderly informants to strengthen the cases on both sides. 
Information from these sessions, which I capture on tape recordings and handwritten 
notes, was very useful on the chapters dealing with pre-colonial Caprivi and on contested 
identities and rival histories. Much of the construction and, especially, the display of 
these oral histories take place during annual cultural festivals held by the traditional 
authorities, at which song and dance is mingled with narrations (mainly triumphant) of 
the past: legends, traditions, heroes and heroines. To put these traditional festivals into 
historical perspective, I published an article, in response to one that appeared earlier on 
the subject, in which I argued that the history of traditional festivals in the Caprivi in the 
form they exist was an imposed initiative of Apartheid South Africa, in celebration of 
Republic Day. The article, entitled ‘Andrew Matjila and Traditional Festivals in the 
Caprivi: The other side of the coin‘ (New Era, 6 October 2006) emphasized that festivals 
in this form were one of many projects undertaken by South Africa to further isolate and 
strengthen Caprivi identities, in being  repackaged to serve its “nation building” project. 
 
The present study also benefited in many ways from focus group and informal 
discussions I engaged in during fieldwork in the  Caprivi while gathering information in 
the course of writing research papers: “The evolution of mission education and health 
provision in the Eastern Caprivi Strip: 1920s to 1960s” is an unpublished joint paper with 











other papers were written in 2006 in conjunction with Wolfgang Zeller of the Institute of 
Development Studies in Finland. One of these, ‘From Apartheid Bantustan to Namibia’s 
Socio-economic Tail-Light: Caprivi Under Old and New Indirect Rule’ is published in a 
book38 edited by Henning Melber, while ‘From Apartheid Garrison to Transnational 
Boomtown: Katima Mulilo Before and After Namibian Independence’ was presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the African Studies Association (ASA) in San Francisco, USA, in 
2006.  
 
The last project I am involved in, from which the present study has benefited in terms of 
oral interviews is the SADC Secretariat Research: Hashim Mbita Project (SSRHMP). 
This is recording the history of the liberation struggle in Southern Africa, and I am 
contracted by the Namibia Chapter of the Project to conduct interviews with participants 
in the liberation war from the Caprivi Region on their behalf. 
 
From the interviews undertaken, it was apparent that a lot of oral histories in the Caprivi 
are diluted by textbook histories. The dividing line between the two has grown very thin 
and therefore over-reliance on oral interviews would affect the credibility of any research 
project. But as Vansina reminds us, the limitations of oral evidence, such as lack of 
chronology, numbers and locality, need to be ‘remedied by recourse to outside sources.’39 
It is to these ‘outside sources’ that I now turn. 
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Most of my archival research was undertaken in the National Archives of Namibia, where 
files related to the Caprivi during the South West Africa Administration (SWAA) are 
held. Among the most useful are Caprivi Native Affairs and Magistrate (CNAM); 
Commissioner Eastern Caprivi (KCA); Magistrate Katima Mulilo (LKM); and the Bantu 
Administration Files (BAD). The last named were particularly useful on the chapter 
dealing with CANU, for they contain letters between Brendan Simbwaye and Israel 
Goldblatt, an advocate who was active in defending political prisoners in South West 
Africa. In addition, and related to the Simbwaye-Goldblatt connection, I received a 
transcript of material related to the two from Dag Henrichsen of Basler Afrika 
Bibliographien, who is working on a project on the Goldblatt papers.  
 
What was of particular importance in the National Archives of Namibia was nine boxes 
of archival material on the history of the Caprivi, recently donated by Mr. Andrew 
Theunissen of the Attorneys Theunissen, Louw and Partners thanks to the good offices of 
Antje Otto-Reiner, who also organized and listed the material. The documents were 
compiled in the context of an intended court case to clarify the issue of the boundary 
between the Mafwe and the Masubiya traditional authorities in the early 1980s. Even 
though the case never went to court, the attorneys managed to put together useful 
documents on the history of the Caprivi that include copies from historical and 
ethnological literature, minutes of meetings, correspondences, statements, photographs 












The National Archives of Namibia has also received material from the South African 
National Archives in Pretoria, dealing with the period when the Caprivi was administered 
directly from Pretoria. Another invaluable resource was private collections, in this case, 
Log Books, in three volumes, of the Holy Family Mission at Katima Mulilo. I made three 
journeys to Katima Mulilo to access this material. It covers the period 1943 – 1994 and 
incorporates the general history of the Caprivi, church history, education and health; and 
most interestingly, church-state relations in the history of the Caprivi. For the pre-
colonial period history of the Caprivi, a trip to the Zambia National Archives in Lusaka 
proved a worthy exercise. I could not make a trip to the National Archives in Botswana, 
but received photocopies of materials on Caprivi held in that archive from my colleagues 
Jeremy Silvester and Werner Hillebrecht. Particularly useful was recently de-classified 
material from the Botswana President’s office that sheds light on the relationship between 
SWAPO and CANU in Lusaka, a subject not often talked about, and the source of 
secessionist attempts in Caprivi. 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
The limitations of a study such as this are apparent. It is limited by the available material, 
which is valuable but patchy. It is limited in scope to certain selected aspects of Caprivi’s 
history. It is limited geographically to what came to be known as the Caprivi Strip after 
the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty: that ignores the fact that the areas of an ethnic group 
straddle the borders of more than one country. Nonetheless the thesis provides a rich 











Simbwaye and Muyongo, the emergence of CANU and its relationship with SWAPO. 
The topic is timely for broader scholarship and to Namibia in view of the current Treason 




There is a general lack of research on the history of the Caprivi region. The bulk of what 
exists is in the form of reports compiled by officials working for the colonial state. The 
information contained in such reports reflects the authors’ intentions and biases and are 
not of scholarly nature. Information available on the pre-colonial period consists of 
travelogues (travel literature) by traders, missionaries and trophy hunters. These are often 
not available in Namibia, but are held by libraries outside the country.  
 
Major works of substance on the history of Caprivi have still to emerge. What does exist 
are studies dealing with isolated aspects pertaining to the history of the area. In 1972 DM 
Shamukuni published a 23 page article on the Subiya entitled ’The Basubiya’, in 
Botswana Notes and Records (4, 1972, pp. 161-184) giving useful insights into the 
history of the Masubiya. Although useful for the present study, he places too much 
emphasis on the Masubiya in Botswana and not enough on those in Caprivi. His article 
does not say much on the politics and local geopolitics in the making of the Caprivi. 
Shamukuni has been accused of being a ‘Subiya historian’, among others by Flint.40 His 
work was followed in 1975 by that of Johan Pretorius. His MA thesis submitted to the 
                                                 
40 See Flint, L., State-Building in Central Southern Africa: Citizenship and Subjectivity in Barotseland and 











University of Stellenbosch focused on the Mafwe people of the Caprivi. He looked at 
their historical and geographical background, tribal structure and legal system. Special 
reference was made to Mafwe family law and succession. Critics41 of Pretorius have 
found fault in the fact that he relies heavily on the narration of a Subiya school principal 
at Kanono in the Mafwe area to relate the history of the Mafwe. In other words, he is 
biased towards the Masubiya viewpoint.  
 
In 1984 C.E. Kruger, the longest serving Native Commissioner/Magistrate in Caprivi 
during the South African period, produced a manuscript on the history of Caprivi, 
entitled: ‘History of the Caprivi Strip, 1890-1984’. Although written from an amateurish 
historical perspective, this contains useful reference material on the history of the Caprivi 
and was quite helpful in the present study. More bulky, and largely incoherent in 
presentation, is a manuscript compiled by Ernest Likando in 1989, entitled: ‘The Caprivi 
Strip: A historical perspective’. Although rich in assertions that are not sufficiently 
substantiated, Likando’s manuscript nonetheless provides important pointers for further 
enquiry into the history of the Caprivi. A major criticism is his over-reliance on Subiya 
oral history, making him biased towards Subiya history.42 Sections dealing with the 
political history of the Caprivi appeared in Pütz, von Egidy and Caplan’s 1989 Namibia 
Handbook and Political Who’s Who, but Caprivi nationalism is still portrayed as an 
appendix or footnote to Namibian nationalism.  
                                                 
41 See Maritz, Chris, ‘The Subia and Fwe of Caprivi: Any Historical Grounds for a Status of Primus Inter 
Pares?’ Africa Insight, (An independent publication which promotes insight into the process of change in 
Africa), vol. 26, no. 2, 1996, pp. 177-185.  
42 See Sehani, M., ‘The Mafwe/Mayuni Crisis: Rival Histories and the Assertion of Identity in the Caprivi’, 













Two scholarly works on Caprivi appeared in 1996: ‘Negotiating the Nation in Local 
Terms: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eastern Caprivi, Namibia’, was the title and theme 
of an MA Thesis submitted by Leif John Fosse to the Department and Museum of 
Anthropology of the University of Oslo. Even though his main concern was how the 
Caprivi is a difficult case for Namibian nationalism, Fosse managed to bring out relevant 
socio-politico-historical issues in the Caprivi,  including conflicting claims to history; 
land disputes, public service appointments and its contestations, and how these are 
products of colonial historical processes and interactions. Fosse’s narrative was more 
anthropological than historical, however, and he failed to critically engage with the 
literature he quotes.  
 
Chris Maritz’s ‘The Subia and Fwe of Caprivi’, published in Insight (26, No. 2, 1996),  
examined whether there was historical cause for the Masubiya to claim ‘indigenousness’ 
in Caprivi. His conclusion was that there was none: that the Mafwe and Masubiya co-
existed in history and that there was no proof of domination of one by the other. A major 
weakness of his analysis is that for him the history of the Caprivi begins in 1909. Before 
then, the people of the Caprivi were just little ‘serfs’ of the Lozi and Kololo. This is not 
surprising since Maritz collected his data during fieldwork in the 1980s, when colonial 
anthropology informed many publications on the history of Caprivi. He was part of the 
team that worked on the Mafwe case. Even though short, Maritz’s paper is very relevant 
for the purposes of the present study. Both Maritz’s work and the present study look at 












The most widely read works on the Caprivi’s history relate to the German period, 
accessible to this researcher thanks mainly to Maria Fisch’s two publications, in English 
which both appeared in 1999. The first, The Caprivi Strip during the German colonial 
period, 1890-1914, is detailed in its focus on the achievements of Kurt Streitwolf and is 
almost a biography. The narration in this book, almost along the lines of ‘Thank God the 
Germans came‘43, credits Streitwolf with ‘giving’ the people of the Caprivi an ‘identity’ 
in the form of more centralized traditional institutions. Fisch is silent on loss of identities 
during this period, especially when the Mafwe ethnic coalition was established, and 
incorporated within its ranks non-Mafwe ethnic groups such as Mayeyi, Mbalangwe, 
Barakwena (San) and Mbukushu. This is despite the fact that by the time of publication 
Fisch knew that in 1993 the Mayeyi community in the Caprivi had already decided to 
break away from the above coalition by not accepting Mamili, the Mafwe chief, as their 
leader.44 The same action was taken by the Mayuni community along the Mashi area.45 In 
both communities traditional authorities were recognized and gazetted by the 
government. A strength of Maria Fisch’s publication is the rich knowledge she 
demonstrates of archival documents in the National Archives of Namibia relating to the 
German period. Since she is a German speaker and, given that most of them are in the 
                                                 
43 Lau, Brigitte. ‘‘Thank God the Germans Came’: Vedder and Namibian Historiography’, in Keith 
Gottschalk and Christopher Saunders, eds. African Seminar: Collected papers, vol. 2 (Cape Town, 1982). 
44 Sasa, D., ‘The Mayeyi Chieftainship’, Paper presented at the ‘Public History: Forgotten History’ 
Conference hosted by the History Department of the University of Namibia, 2000. 
45See Sehani, M., ‘The Mafwe/Mayuni Crisis: Rival Histories and the Assertion of Identity in the Caprivi’, 














German language, the level of engagement with this source material is critically high and 
beneficial to non-German speakers researching on Caprivi history during this period.  
 
In her second publication, The secessionist movement in the Caprivi: A historical 
perspective, which does not draw upon oral interviews, Fisch interprets the above form of 
identity disintegration as partisan politics, particularly on the part of the ruling SWAPO 
party. While Fisch asserts correctly SWAPO benefited in political terms, her argument     
that if SWAPO had not come into power those communities would not have re-asserted 
their independent identities is a limited one. Does that not still show that the colonial state 
suppressed identities? A major weakness of Fisch and other researchers on Caprivi 
history is to make the history and people of the Caprivi extensions of cross-border 
history. In explaining settlement history in the Caprivi, for example, it is suggested that 
the people of Caprivi were Lozi, and by implication, did not exist as separate entities, did 
not have identities of their own. Their histories and cultures are taken to be so 
intrinsically situated in Lozi history and traditions that they do not seem to have 
perceptions of themselves, either in the past or the present. Fisch’s two books were 
followed by Wolfga g Zeller’s useful paper entitled ‘Interests and Socio-economic 
development in the Caprivi region from a historical perspective’, a NEPRU Occasional 
Paper (19, May 2000). This study discussed divergent colonial economic interests in the 
making of the Caprivi and placed these in their historical context. 
 
In 2003, Lawrence Flint published a very useful account of the history of the old Lozi 











Citizenship and Subjectivity in Barotseland and Caprivi’, in the International Journal of 
African Historical Studies, 36, 2, 2003, based on a doctoral thesis on the same subject 
that he submitted to the University of Birmingham in 2002. Even though his PhD is not 
accessible in Namibian libraries, core chapters are posted on his website, which is 
dedicated to the ‘preservation of Lozi culture and traditions’. Flint is the first to argue for 
the centrality and importance of the Caprivi, as a space, to the survival and existence of 
Bulozi, and he shows how the quality of life in Zambia’s western province was affected 
by the excision of the Caprivi from the kingdom in 1909. This is relevant to the present 
study in that it supports the assertion that the Caprivi is strategically located and that it is 
this geographical positioning that had put it under contestation since pre-colonial times. 
 
However, some of Flint’s ideas are challenged in the present study. These ideas include 
his views on subjectivity and citizenship as aspects of state formation or ‘state-building’. 
Yes, the inhabitants of Caprivi were citizens of Bulozi and subjects of Lozi kings. This, 
however, did not make them Lozis, nor did they lose themselves in the category ‘Lozi’. 
To assert, as Flint does in his conclusion to the paper, that people started losing their Lozi 
identity only from the German period, and that it was only then that group identities such 
as Subia, Yeyi and Mbukushu ‘resurfaced’ and took precedence over “Loziness”, is 
misplaced. What Flint neglects in this analysis is the fact that resistance is an integral part 
of subjectivity in state formation. The basic question is how the inhabitants of the Caprivi 
responded to Lozi occupation and expansion. The present study argues that the 
inhabitants of the Caprivi tried at various periods in their history, including while under 











developmental processes made these people choose the above group identities over Lozi-
ness needs further substantiation. What about the Masubiya or Matotela people who still 
reside in Zambia’s western province? Do they regard themselves as Lozis and not Subiya 
or Totela because they have nothing to lose? Can identities be interpreted only in 
economic terms? If that were the case, ‘Caprivians’ would not be fighting to secede from 
Namibia because they have everything to lose economically by such a move.  
 
Flint applies the terms ‘Lozi’ and Lozi-land loosely to ‘Caprivians’ and the Caprivi. The 
present study takes issue with the description of Caprivi as a ‘no man’s land’, in other 
words, to give ancestral rights of ownership to Lozi kings rather than to the inhabitants of 
the Caprivi. I argue that the Lozi royals were occupiers who were bound, just like the 
European colonizers after them, to be overthrown at some point. It is this description of 
the Caprivi as a Lozi land that often leads commentators to equate Caprivi secession with 
separatist tendencies in Barotseland as a ‘Lozi thing’. In fact, Flint describes the two as 
forms of ‘nationalism’, which begs the question: which ‘nation’ in terms of the Caprivi? 
While Lozi might be a more homogenous identity, in the Caprivi opinions are divided 
along ethnic and political lines. Flint’s assertion assumes the people of Caprivi are united 
behind calls for secession. This has not been empirically established and it is not 
surprising to find that he undertook his oral research mainly among refugees of the 
United Democratic Party (UDP) in Botswana and by interviewing the leaders who were 












Thirdly, Flint’s research, just like many others before him, did not break new ground in 
the periodization of Caprivi history. He conforms to the old Lozi, Kololo, Lozi 
restoration, and then European colonization periodization, and again adopts C.E. 
Kruger’s myth that the coming of the Europeans is ‘of the greatest significance to these 
parts...’  This begs the question: most significant to whom in terms of local history? Such 
a periodization fails to recognize that there were social and political formations in the 
Caprivi before its invasion by the Lozi. In this sense, when contemporary 
historiographies speak about local history, this automatically becomes Lozi and Kololo 
history. The rest were just servants but, of course, even servants have a past. 
 
Lastly, the fact that Flint conducted most of his fieldwork in Barotseland and not in the 
Caprivi adds another dimension to what he writes about the Caprivi. Even though he 
states in footnote 56 that he undertook fieldwork in the Caprivi, where village elders 
pointed out Sekeletu’s burial site, he makes simple historical mistakes. He states in 
footnote 48 that Sebetwane’s body was taken to Naliele in Barotseland for burial after his 
death in the Caprivi. The present study shows that Sebetwane was buried on an island in 
the Caprivi. It is surprising that the ‘village elders’ did not point this out to Flint on his 
visit. 
 
Research by students from the Caprivi is emerging very slowly. At the August 2000 
“Public History: Forgotten History” Conference hosted by the History Department of the 
University of Namibia, two student papers from the department were presented. David 











Mayeyi/Wayeyi in both countries re-asserted their autonomy from the Mafwe and 
Tawana dominion, in 1993 and 1999 respectively. Michael Sehani looked at the Mafwe 
breakaway, and the Mayuni community of the Mashi area in the Caprivi. Both papers are 
useful starting points on the political histories of the two communities, but the present 




































It will be established in Chapter Three that colonial administrative control in the Caprivi 
was informed largely by negative perceptions of land and people. While the land was 
imaged as unhealthy, malarial and useless, its inhabitants were classified as neither 
prepossessing nor attractive ‘wandering Bushmen’ who showed no tendency to abandon 
their own customs.1 Clearly, these customs were considered to be primitive, or, at worst, 
as non-existent. In his 1938 Inspection Report, Trollope concluded that tribes that 
inhabited the Caprivi had no any very real background of tradition, sentiments that would 
be reproduced repeatedly over generations, most not bly by Kruger, who added that since 
the people of the Caprivi had until comparatively recently been a subject people, they 
“consequently have no background”.2  
 
The pre-colonial and colonial history of the Caprivi, therefore, is filled with stories of 
servitude in the current historiography, particularly Lozi and Kololo domination. More 
recently, Lawrence Flint has sought to reconstruct the ‘Lozi State’ as it encompassed 
Caprivi. While he emphasized, rightly so, that the Caprivi (space or land) played a 
significant central role in the expansion and existence of Barotseland or Lozi state, Flint’s 
discussion of the inhabitants of Caprivi and their role in the Lozi state is weak. Flint 
seemed too eager to conclude that ‘Caprivians’ were Lozis at this stage, and that it was 
just the advent of European colonization that made them rediscover their separate 
identities. Indeed, most colonial administrative reports on the Caprivi conclude that the 
constitution of tribal groupings in the area only dates back to the arrival of the Germans: 
                                                 
1 Trollope, L.F. Report on the Administration of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, 1940, p.11 ((NAN: 2267, A 503/1-
7). 













“It is true the constitution of the two tribes must be regarded as dating back to the coming 
of the German Administration in 1909”, Kruger emphasizes.3 Therefore, under the Lozi 
and Kololo domination, the subordinate peoples were not even communities. It is argued 
here that even vassals have a history – and as thus have a community of memory, which 
is a shared reflection of past experiences – both painful and celebratory. 
 
There were generally two basic kinds of traditional political organizations in pre-colonial 
Caprivi: centralized states, with political authority vested in the hands of hereditary rulers 
(such as in the case of Itenge), and more egalitarian decentralized communities, where 
political power was regulated by interactions between kinship groups, such as clans or 
lineage, or was maintained by elders in an age-set system. The latter was the more 
dominant. In centralized states leadership was by a select few based on hereditary claims. 
Competition and conflicts for the throne existed. Judicial systems were well established. 
In decentralized societies, the lineage of clan formed the political units. Heads of lineages 
exercised authority in such a way that elders could cooperate and arrive at consensus. 
Judicial and religious authority was with certain people. Despite a slight patrilineal bias, 
kinship in Caprivi is reckoned bilaterally, with relations traced as widely as possible 
through both consanguineal and affinal ties. Cousin terminology is Hawaiian; 
terminology in the first ascending generation is bifurcate merging. Kin terms used for the 
first ascending generation are used for members of the third ascending generation as well. 
In contrast, members of the second and fourth ascending generations are all lumped 
together under a single kin term. 
 
The division of labor in subsistence pursuits largely follows lines of sex. Men are 
responsible for livestock, hunting, most of the fishing, and the more arduous agricultural 
tasks; while women do most of the work in agriculture and collecting, a little fishing, and 
most of the routine domestic chores. Women played dynamic and varied roles. Women 
were essential in religious and economic affairs. Women dominated areas of the economy 
- controlling facets of agricultural production, flow of commerce, a wide variety of 
                                                 













industries and crafts. Women milled flour, preserved food, built houses, manufactured 
clothing and ornaments, brewed beer, established markets -- and composed songs, poetry 
and stories. In previous times, economic exchange was effected through barter and 
redistribution by the king, but the people of Caprivi are now part of a full-fledged cash 
economy with market mechanisms.   
 
This chapter will briefly examine societal relations in the pre-colonial Caprivi and 
essentially argue for the existence of pre-colonial political formations in the Caprivi. In 
this regard due emphasis will be placed on the claim by the Masubiya that an old Subia 
Kingdom they name as Itenge4 existed before Lozi and Kololo domination. This claim is 
very often dismissed by many commentators who argue that it is doubtful whether the 
Subiya had ever entirely independent status in their existence.5 Apart from examining the 
Subia claim, the chapter will also trace the development of other chieftainships in the 
Caprivi: Mamili, Mayuni and Shifu (of the ‘Mafwe’, BaMashi or ‘Mafwe proper’ and 
Mayeyi respectively). Lozi and Kololo domination will also be briefly discussed as far as 
these impacts on events in the Caprivi. 
 
                                                 
4 As expressed elsewhere, the most critical of authors in regard to the origin and existence of the name Itenge is 
Maria Fisch. In her publication The Secessionist Movement in the Caprivi: A Historical Perspective (NSS: 1999), 
Fisch dedicated a whole section to this issue (pp. 46-47), which she claimed was intended to ‘reveal the origin’ of 
the name. However, not much is revealed, apart from the claim that Itenge was not in Caprivi but denoted an area 
regularly raided by the Subiya Chief Nsundano. Fisch does not name the sources of her ‘revelation’, apart from 
‘two very old and respected experts on tribal history’ that keep assuring her. Respected by whom and experts on 
which tribal history, one may well ask. Even then, she does not directly credit these two as the sources on this 
particular issue. She claims that the first mention of Itenge was in Shamukuni’s 1972 publication. This is refuted 
elsewhere in this thesis. While she accuses Shamukuni’s of ‘strong patriotic undertone and being unreliable’, the 
same can be said in respect of her when she appears to suggest that the use of the name Itenge instead of the 
Caprivi is ‘unfortunate’. Since she is of German descent, the preservation of the name ‘Caprivi’, and all it 
represents, also has patriotic undertones to it. It is also a bit offensive for her to describe Nsundano’s raids on 
neighboring communities to capture cattle and people to swell his ranks as ‘theft’; surely any scholar of pre-
colonial times would know this was the order of the day, a kind of survival tactic which defined and strengthened 
societies. When communities in the Caprivi were at the receiving end of such raids from the Lozi and Kololo, the 
same writers ascribe this to the fact that the raided communities were weak and not centrally organized, which 
pointed to the ingenuity of the conquering forces. The fact that Fisch links the name Itenge with Chief Nsundano 
is most telling, regardless of the area it denoted because this is precisely in agreement with the Subiya assertion 
that it was Chief Nsundano who established the Subiya Kingdom of Itenge. Fisch would agree therefore that it is 
difficult to discuss Nsundano without mention of Itenge, and vice-versa. 
5 See among others: Kruger, C., ‘History of the Caprivi Strip, 1890-1984’, 1984 (NAN: A.472)., Kruger, 
C.E., ‘The Eastern Caprivi Strip’, 1963, p. 5 (NAN: P/B0139),and Maritz, Chris, ‘The Subia and Fwe of 














The Subiya-Lozi relations 
 
Not much is recorded about the history of the Caprivi prior to Lozi domination. Apart 
from other factors, such as the late arrival of outside (particularly European6) influence 
and cross border migration, the area’s relatively small size7 meant that its history was 
intertwined with that of surrounding territories. Thus historians have tended to read and 
heavily rely on historiography pertaining particularly to Barotseland in an attempt to 
make sense of the order or disorder of things in the pre-colonial Caprivi. Even when, as 
Kruger rightly observes, the territory and goings-on that such literature discusses hardly 
feature ‘tribes’ in Caprivi and the centre of such goings-on was generally more to the 
north.8 One such key source was a study made by the Reverend A. Jalla, C.B.E. of the 
Paris Missionary Society, which is Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi, translated as The Story of 
the Barotse Nation.9 It is significant to record that Jalla’s work was read to the Kuta 
(Traditional Court) of the Lozi before it was published, and therefore wholly approved by 
the Kuta.10 It is therefore safe to conclude that Jalla’s account, which would form the 
basis of Lozi history and influence other accounts on the subject,11 is a Lozi narrative on 
Lozi. What the work says about events in the Caprivi especially kingships and societal 
relations should thus be critically engaged from such a perspective.  
 
Similarly, it is to this publication that I turn to glean clues on the subject of the relations 
between the Masubiya and the Lozi. What attracted the Lozi to what Flint calls ‘Bulozi 
floodplain’ and eventually to proceed further downstream to conquer the Caprivi was 
                                                 
6 The first recorded significant visit was by David Livingstone in 1851. 
7 The Caprivi Region is c.300 miles (480 km) long and 50 miles (80 km) wide. 
8 Kruger, History of Caprivi, Chapter 2, p. 2, 1984. 
9 See A. Jalla, ‘History: Traditions and Legends of the Barotse Nation’ (1909), an original typescript held, 
according to Lawrence Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa: Citizenship and Subjectivity in 
Barotseland and Caprivi’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, vol. 36, issue 2, 2003, p. 
399), at the Institute of Economic and Social Research (NESOR), Lusaka, 7. 
10 Ibid., p. 3. 
11 See among others, A. Jalla’s later version of this work: ‘History, Tradition and Legends of the Barotse People’ 
(Colonial Office, African No. 1179, 1921); M. Mainga, ‘The origin of the Lozi: Some Oral Traditions’, in E. 
Stokes and R. Brown, eds, The Zambesian Past: Studies in Central African History (Manchester, 1966), pp.238-
47; Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings (London, 1973), and more recently, L. Flint, ‘State-Building in Central 
Southern Africa: Citizenship and Subjectivity in Barotseland and Caprivi’, in The International Journal of 













mainly the availability of grazing pastures, prospects for reed cutting, fishing, and the 
suitability of certain areas for making winter gardens.12 Needless to mention that when 
the Aluyi13 arrived, the Subiya and the other groups were already occupying these parts 
and therefore the Aluyi (Lozi) conquest state effected displacement and to some extent 
forced migration from these parts. The first recorded encounter between the Subiya and 
Aluyi (Lozi) seem to be during the reign of Mwanambinyi, a young brother of 
Mwanasilundu (the first Lozi king, also known as Mboo). Jalla records that 
Mwanambinyi broke away from Mwanasilundu and moved downstream with the 
Zambezi and established his kingdom at Senanga.14 It is reported that Mwanambinyi then 
waged war against the Mbukushu and Subiya at Nakabunze (Katima Mulilo) and at 
Longa Island, causing Chief Liswani of the Subiya to flee to Kazungula, while Cheete of 
the Mbukushu with his followers fled to Butoka.15 It is further reported that it was 
Mwanambinyi’s son, Mulia, who continued his father’s terror campaigns as far as 
                                                 
12 J.H. Venning, ‘Newly acquired country between the Zambezi and Mashi Rivers’ p. 6 (NAN: A. 589). 
13 Now known as Lozi. 
14 In Chris Maritz, The Subia and Fwe of Caprivi, 1996, p. 178., after A. Jalla, History of the Malozi, (a 
translation of the writer’s work Litaba za Sicaba sa Malozi, Cape Town, Oxford University Press, 1921), p. 4.; 
See also M. Gluckman, ‘The Lozi of Barotseland in Northwestern Rhodesia’, in E. Colson and M. Gluckman 
(eds.) Seven tribes of British Central Africa, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1959, p. 2; M. Mainga, 
Bulozi under the Luyana Kings, London: Longman, 1973, p. 24. 
15 Op cit. p. 26. Chief Liswani of the Masubiya and Cheete of the Mbukushu lived together at Nakabunze, where 
the famous Baobab or toilet tree is, now Katima Mulilo. Some historians misconstrue the fact that Chief Liswani 
lived with Cheete of the Mbukushu at Katima Mulilo to mean that Subiyas are of Mbukushu origin. Flint 
(2003:398) actually quotes his ‘Lozi historians’ as stating that Subia people were once part of the Mbukushu 
before they were dispersed by Mwanambinyi. It is argued here that this dispersal may only account for the 
movement of one Subiya splinter group, possibly one under Chief Liswani but does necessarily represent the 
origin of the Subiya as a group; possibly pointing to Liswani as an individual. Even then, there is no conclusive 
evidence to this effect. There are at least two versions pointing to the ‘myths of origin’ of the Subiya, that both 
put them together with the Mbukushu, does not necessarily point to the fact that one originated from the other but 
rather emphasizes co-existence. One version has it that the Subiya, together with the Yeyi (whom they called 
Bezanza) and Mbukushu, lived at Goha Hills (in Botswana) before they migrated to Caprivi and Kavango 
respectively (a version which Flint seem not to consider because it is held among others by Shamukuni whom he 
describes as a ‘Subia Historian’ as a way of discrediting the value of his contribution; and the second version, 
which Flint seem to support, is found in T.J. Larson (‘The Hambukushu Migrations to Ngamiland,’, African 
Social Research, 11[1971], 27-49) and A.St.H. Gibbons (Africa from North to South through Marotseland 
1[London, 1904], 217-18) who state that the Subiya and Mbukushu lived around the Zambezi at or near Katima 
Mulilo, and that their leaders fell out over inheritance of rainmaking rights; that Mwanambinyi wanted to end the 
quarrels and bloodshed and ordered the Mbukushu to leave the Zambezi region from where they migrated to the 
Mashi. Even though Flint admits that Larson and Gibbons’ versions were narrated by Lozi ‘royals’, he does not 
adequately engage with the subject. Was he biased towards a Lozi nationalist agenda?, that evidently presents 
Mwanambinyi in the line of ‘Thank God the Germans came’, otherwise the Subiya and Mbukushu could have 
finished each other off. For another version of Subiya myth of origin see Pretorius, J.L., ‘The Fwe of the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel’ (M.A. thesis, University of Stellenbosch, 1975), 21, where he claims the Subiya lived around the 













Mwandi (old Sesheke) where he conquered the Subiya and brought them with their chief, 
Mwanamwale, to Senanga and settled the Mbukushu on Sitoti and Mbeta Islands.16 Thus 
this encounter between the Subiya and Aluyi (Lozi) was not cordial. Apart from 
effectively subjugating the Subiya, by capturing their chief and taking him prisoner to 
Senanga, the Aluyi (Lozi) were determined to destroy the Subiya chieftainship. There 
appears to have been a deliberate attempt especially on the part of the Lozi royals to 
suppress Subiya history. Flint records how when the British colonial administrators were 
trying to write a history of the region with the help of Lewanika, how the king was most 
anxious that they should not leave out the history of Mwanambinyi’s conquests over the 
Caprivi, ‘in particular over Subia’, which the British had apparently tried to do because of 
the ‘magical’ content in the story.17 This was because, Flint believes, ‘in order to 
eliminate the notion that the Subia had previously exerted influence in Caprivi.’18 It is 
this history with a ‘magical’ content that is taught in schools in Barotseland, and 
willingly reproduced by scholars on the Caprivi as testimonies on the early history of the 
area. Thus when one presents an array of ‘Lozi historians’ as informants on the Caprivi, it 
is difficult to tell how much is oral traditions from their accounts, and how much they 
reproduce from the textbook histories taught in schools. Kruger observed the same point: 
‘…Jallas’ book was freely distributed as a set-work in the schools and one can never 
quite tell when hearing someone relate early history how much came from that treatise.’19 
 
The question still is: did the Subiya exert any influence independent of the Lozi in the 
Caprivi, especially before the Lozi conquest? Evidence presented above that 
Mwanamwale was chief of the Subiya before the Lozi came to take him into bondage, is 
accepted here. In fact, Subiya acknowledge that Mwanamwale was chief at Sesheke but 
name four other chiefs before him, rarely mentioned in oral history: Munitenge20 Itenge, 
                                                 
16 Maritz (1996: 178), after M. Mainga, Op cit., p. 28. 
17 According to Flint, revisions made on the advice of Lewanika are reflected in a revised report: ‘“History of 
Barotseland, ‘Prepared by the Office of the Provincial Commissioner, Mongu, 20 February 1936, KDE 2/44/1, 
NAZ. 
18 Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 2003, 399. 
19 Kruger, C.E. ‘History of Caprivi’, 1982, Chapter 2, p. 6 (A.472, NAN). 












Munitenge Litundu-Lituu, Munitenge Ikuhane and Munitenge Mwale.21 The dynastic 
heritage of the Subiya has been the subject of largely dismissive discussions,22 and is 
certainly not of great concern here. It is to reiterate here what was stated by Pretorius in 
1975 that the Masubiya has ‘…a recognized line of chiefs dating back two and half 
centuries’.23 The fact that the Lozi accepts that Mwanamwale has always been the 
rightful chief of the Subiya24 supports the existence of autonomous status in the history of 
the Subiya. Flint himself states that when Mwanambinyi dispersed the Mbukushu at 
Katima Mulilo, the Subiya became recognized as an autonomous group.25 Indeed, the 
Masubiya, as Kruger has shown, always maintained that before the coming of the 
Makololo under Sebetwane to the Zambezi regions they were an independent 
chieftainship, which was broken down by the Kololo by conquest, and that when the 
Kololo were overthrown by the Lozi the latter simply took ver and ruled as the 
Makololo had done.26  
 
Two issues emerge from the foregoing discussion: First, that Lozi control over the Subiya 
intensified and became more effective only after the ‘restoration’ or second Lozi Empire, 
and, secondly, that the Subiya autonomous status was linked to territorial rights. A 
discussion on how effective Lozi control over the Caprivi was before the Kololo invasion 
should take cognizance of three factors: the spatial distribution of the population at the 
time; the numerical strength of the population; and lastly, mobility and trans-boundary 
nature of societies at the time. All these factors combined mean that Lozi domination of 
Subiya of Sesheke (which is not in the Caprivi) does not necessarily mean domination of 
Subiyas wherever they lived, considering that communities lived in small and 
autonomous clans scattered all over what is now different territories. While it is 
recognized here that the Lozi appointed representatives to supervise the collection of 
                                                 
21 Main Organizing Committee [The], ‘Report and Background Information on the Fourth Masubia Annual 
Cultural Festival held on 30 July 2005, at Munitenge Royal Headquarters (Bukalo Kuta), and prepared for the 
Munitenge Royal Establishment 1652, July 2005’, pp. 22-27. Copy in the possession of the author. Mwanamwale 
literally translates as child of Mwale. 
22 Among others, see Fisch, Maritz, Flint, and Kruger. 
23 Pretorius, J.L., ‘The Fwe of the Eastern Caprivi Strip’, (MA, Univ. of Stellenbosch), 1975, p. 22. Pretorius is 
largely accused of relying on Masubiya informants, particularly a Subia schoolmaster at Kanono School. 
24 See Flint, Op cit., p. 399. 
25 Ibid. 












taxes, I am inclined to argue that communities were largely still free to live according to 
their laws and customs and appoint their chiefs. In other words the work of the 
representatives, as Flint, quoting Mainga, has observed, was mainly economic.27 Cases of 
a serious political nature were referred back to the Lozi capital. It follows then that Lozi 
control over the Caprivi before the Kololo invasion was mainly by ‘remote control’, 
especially through occasional punishment parties sent for that purpose, but also to 
plunder.  
 
One such expedition, in fact of significance as far as the Caprivi is concerned, was 
undertaken by the sixth Lozi ruler, Ngombala (1725-1775).28 Unlike Mwanambinyi and 
his son Mulia who ended their exploits at Sesheke where they captured the Subiya chief 
Mwanamwale and brought him and a section of the Subiya to Senanga (Kaonga near 
Senanga to be precise), it was Ngombala who extended Lozi influence further southwards 
to cover the present-day Caprivi. According to Flint, Ngombala commanded an 
expedition “to put down an apparent rebellion on the part of certain groups south of 
Bulozi, including the Subia”,29 once again showing that the latter were constantly 
resisting being under Lozi rule. Maritz, after Jalla, has it that the regiments of Ngombala 
moved from Nakaywe via Sioma to Sesheke and Kazungula.30 During this campaign, 
Ngombala plundered the Subiya, Toka and Leya on his way past the Victoria Falls to 
Hwange31 in present day Zimbabwe.32 From Hwange Ngombala is reported to have 
descended down the Chobe river past Ngoma as far as the Mbunda in present day 
Angola, subduing all the groups living along the river. This seem to be the first recorded 
passage of any Lozi royal this way, and hence, I argue, is when one can talk of Lozi 
control of the Caprivi. As stated earlier, this control, apart from the representatives or 
Lindumeleti, was largely in the form of raids aimed at plunder of resources and to effect 
punitive measures. Ngombala appointed deputies or representatives to collect taxes and 
                                                 
27 Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 2003, p. 400.   
28 Maritz, after Pretorius (1975, p. 26). 
29 Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa’, 2003, p. 399. 
30 Maritz, 1996, p. 178. 
31 Maritz (p. 178) believes that this is derived from the name of another representative of Ngombala, namely 
Wange/Hwange. 
32 According to Lozi sources of Flint (p. 399), Ngombala remained at Victoria Falls while a contingent of his 












oversee the supply of labour and generally to guard the fords: Linyanti33 and latter 
Mwanangombe at Linyanti (now Sangwali), and others on the Mashi river: Sekau, 
Masiala and Mwambwa Seluka.34 
 
Flint notes that very little is known or preserved (in his words ‘recorded’) of Lozi-Caprivi 
interaction in the period between Ngombala and the arrival of the Makololo in the late 
1820s/early 1830s.35 On the strength of Jalla,36 he further notes that even the four wars 
that were fought for the purpose of plunder and subordination of surrounding peoples 
during the reign of King Mulambwa (1780-1830), none involved the Caprivi.37 One 
assumption, which Flint makes, is that the people of Caprivi continued to pay tribute and 
labour to the Lozi. However, as he hastily emphasizes, this is purely an assumption.38 The 
other assumption would be that Lozi control over the Caprivi and the Subiya during this 
period (well over half a century) was at its weakest. This allowed the penetration and 
conquest of Bulozi by the Makololo from the south, which was through the Caprivi with 
the assistance of Chief Liswani of the Subiya. It was sometime during this period that a 
Subiya kingdom they name as Itenge became consolidated. Itenge was founded by 
Munitenge Nsundano Shanjo, who took over from his brother Mafwira (now Mafwila) 
Shanjo as chief of the Subiya. Munitenge Nsundano Shanjo was reportedly a 
contemporary39 of Mulambwa, a Lozi ruler referred to above. According to Shamukuni, it 
was during the rule of warrior40 chief Nsundano that the Basubiya became identified as 
                                                 
33 While not refuting this assertion (which is itself not supported by other evidence), the researcher is reluctant to 
support the implication that this is the origin of the name, since it will be shown latter that in fact it was the 
Makololo who gave the place the name Linyandi (place where I will suffer and die), later to be known as 
Linyanti. 
34 See M. Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana Kings, pp. 59-60. 
35 Flint, 2003, p. 400. 
36 A. Jalla, ‘History: Traditions and Legends’,1909,  p. 14. 
37 Flint, op cit;  
38 Ibid. 
39 Maritz, after Shamukuni, ‘The Basubiya’, p. 164. 
40 Because of his bravery, Nsundano became known as Liberenge (Libelenge or Lipelenge) Cisunda 
Manyika, wakasundankanda nobuta; The name Liberenge is derived from the Subiya verb ‘bera’ meaning 
to peel. ‘kuSunda’ means to push; ‘Manyika or Inkanda’ means countries in Subiya. ‘Buta’ means an 
arrow; So in praising Nsundano, a Subiya elder or praise singer would say “Nsundano, Liberenge, cisunda 
manyika, wa ka sunda nkanda no buta.” This translates as “Nsundano, the Peeler, and the Pusher of 
countries, who pushed away countries with (by means of) an arrow.” He was so named because he defined 
and defended Itenge. He would die while on one of his war expeditions. See Likando, E., 1989, ‘The 
Caprivi Strip: A Historical Perspective’, Lusaka: UNIN (NAN), p. 30; Also Shamukuni, D.M., ‘The 












an independent tribe.41 The extent of Itenge were as follows (see map below): Sakapani 
south of Goha as the most southern point, Nunga to the southeast, Chungwe Namutitima 
(Victoria Falls) to the east, along the Zambezi upstream as far north as Sioma, and to the 
west downstream along the Kwando, through Kaunga and Singalamwe, past Savute 
(Savuti) and down to Sakapani.42 With the intrusion of the Lozi on his territory, 
Munitenge Nsundano sought to expand his territory eastwards. He reportedly entered into 
an alliance with a Mutoka chief, by the name of Sikute, against Makuni who lived east of 
Chungwe Namutitima (Victoria Falls), the intention being to conquer the territory of the 
Makuni. It was during the expedition against Makuni that Munitenge Nsundano met his 
fate in battle.43 Nsundano was succeeded by his nephew Liswani I. 
 
As stated earlier, Maria Fisch is one critic of the claim that Itenge existed, her argument 
being that it was not in the Caprivi but denoted an area possibly raided by Nsundano in 
the land of the Toka-Leya. Secondly, which is the point of the Mafwe that at no point in 
history did the Masubiya subjugate them? According to this reasoning, Mafwe never paid 
tribute to Subiya chiefs. Fisch does not show support of her assertion that Itenge was not 
in the Caprivi. The fact that she acknowledges Nsundano and his exploits that it targeted 
the Toka-Leya, is itself telling. As for taxes, while we accept that Sebetwane of the 
Makololo subdued the Lozi, whether the latter paid tribute to the Kololo has never been a 
subject for discussion, or is it expressed in historical sources. This, however, does not 
change the fact that the Lozi were subject to Makololo. Similarly, while the Subiya claim  
                                                 
41 Ibid. 163. 
42 Maritz, 1996, p.182. 
43 Main Organizing Committee, The, ‘Masubia Annual Cultural Festival, 2005’, p. 18, (copy in my possession). 
According to Shamukuni (p.165), Munitenge Nsundano was killed by the baLeya after his warriors had refused 
to carry out his orders. It is said that he had been away for over a year fighting the baLeya. His warriors became 
tired and homesick, and asked the Munitenge to return home but he told them that he had decided to fight longer 
than they had fought already. After chasing the baLeya for days the warriors violated Liberenge’s orders 
(Nsundano) and returned to Luchindo (his royal headquarters in the Caprivi). When Liberenge saw that his 
warriors were going home against his orders, he broke the shaft of his spear in rage, sat on his shield and uttered 
the following words: Mubelyowa ciinenkuba, bahikaana benu nibakamisuwe, meaning, ‘Be ye cowardly as 
doves, let thy slaves subdue thee. He was found there by the baLeya warriors who killed him. When some of the 
Basubiya returned to where they had left him, they found that he had already been killed. It is said that the 
baLeya cut off his head, but his mouth kept on opening and shutting itself and his eyes winking as though he was 















Map 1: The extent of Itenge, adapted from Fossé (1996), after Shamukuni (1972). 
 
that Itenge existed, they emphasize simultaneously that within it other groups lived at 
peace with them. Maritz dismisses the existence of Itenge on the basis that there is no 
record to show that the Lozi ceded the Caprivi to Nsundano, that Nsundano’s conquests 
are not recorded, and, finally, that it was the Lozi and not the Subiya who attacked 












by discussing them, it may be pertinent to interject an observation, this being the fact that 
the nature of pre-colonial societies were not defined by ‘land’ and ‘territory’ as much as 
by allegiances among specific groups of people. As Seleti had shown, ‘land occupied by 
pre-colonial governing structures could expand and contract at will, due to relatively low 
population densities and people could migrate according to the need and availability of 
resources’.44 Even Lewanika, Paramount Chief of the Lozi Kingdom, recognized the 
difficulty in defining ‘territoriality’ during pre-colonial times as seen from the following 
quote: ‘When Major Goold Adams questioned King Lewanika asking him to describe the 
boundary of his kingdom, he replied “I do not know what you mean by kingdom, but I 
will tell you where my people live….”’45 Therefore, in the case of Itenge, too much 
emphasis is put on ‘land’ and ‘territoriality’ in interpreting its existence. Rather the fact 
that it existed, and continues to exist in the present, should not be ignored. If anything, it 
represented resistance and defiance to Lozi rule: a refusal to be Lozi, to identify with 





Of the groups that traversed pre-colonial Caprivi, the Makololo of Sebetwane is perhaps 
the better described, possibly after the Lozi. Their migration and settlement in the Caprivi 
and Bulozi has been the subject of many studies.46 Briefly, Sebetwane was a Difagane 
(Mfecane) escapee who belligerently plundered as he moved northwards. After taking 
part in an attack on the Tlhaping great-place, Dithakong,47 he plundered numerous 
Tswana tribes in the Western Transvaal and Botswana and also clashed with his arch-
                                                 
44 Seleti Y. ‘Chapter 1 – State Formation in Nineteenth century SA.’ Turning Points Book 3: 
http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/chronology/turningpoints/bk3/chapter1.htm.   
45 SEC22 (NAZ) 
46 See, for example, E. W. Smith, ‘Sebetwane and the Makololo’, African Studies, Vol. 15, 1956, p. 49; D.F. 
Ellenberger and J. C. Macgregor, History of the Basuto, London: Caxton, 1912 (reprinted New York: Negro 
University Press, 1969), 305; V. Ellenberger (1939); D. L., Livingstone, Missionary travels and researches in 
South Africa, London: John Murray, 1857; I. Schapera, Livingstone’s private journals, 1851-1853, London: 
Chatto and Windus, 1960, pp. 16-28; M. Mainga, Bulozi under the Luyana kings, London: Longman, 1973: 65-
104. 












enemy, Mzilikazi of the Matebele,48  finally arriving on the Chobe River. According to 
the Yeyi sources of David Sasa,49 Sebetwane was helped to cross the river by Induna 
(headman) Kuratau (a Muyeyi) at the Matwatwa crossing point in the Lyashulu area.50  
Sebetwane then brutally murdered Kuratau to prevent him giving further assistance to 
others51 whom might come that way, possibly the Matebele or the Batawana. Kuratau 
thus became Sebetwane’s first victim in a pre-colonial Caprivi where societal relations 
and friendships were not permanent but defined by survival, even if this meant 
assassinate friends to fend off one’s rivals. 
 
Sebetwane moved eastward on the Chobe until he reached the confluence between the 
Zambezi and Chobe Rivers where he met Liswani, at the time chief of the Masubiya.52 
The significance of the meeting between Sebetwane and Liswani is often underplayed 
and presented as one in which the latter did not even have a say.53 This was, for the 
Masubiya, the start of the disintegration of their kingdom of Itenge. Munitenge Liswani 
agreed to cross Sebetwane, first to Impalila Island over the Chobe and from the upper 
part of the Island over the Zambezi to Mambova,54 on two conditions: first that he assist 
him to attack the Leya to revenge the death of Nsundano55, and, secondly, that he promise 
to give them part of the war booty that he would capture from the Toka-Leya and other 
groups that he would conquer.56 While the Lozi reportedly engaged in battle with- and  
lost to - Sebetwane’s general Mbololo on an open plain a few kilometers to the north of 
                                                 
48 Smith, ‘Sebetwane and the Makololo’; Ellenberger, History of the Basuto. 
49 A former student in the History Department at the University of Namibia, Sasa did research in Botswana and 
Namibia (Caprivi) focusing on the revival of the Mayeyi identity in both countries. At the time of his passing 
away, he was a Candidate for a Master’s of Arts Degree in History, on the same topic, at Unam. The 
whereabouts of Sasa’s fieldwork, comprised mainly of oral interviews in Botswana and Namibia, is not known. 
He was a dedicated scholar; May his soul rest in peace. 
50 Sasa, D., ‘The Mayeyi Chieftainship’, paper presented at the ‘Public History: Forgotten History” Conference 
hosted by the History Department of the University of Namibia, 2000, p. 10.   
51 Ibid. 
52 Other sources mention that Sebetwane met Nsundano. 
53 See for example Trollope, ‘Report on the Administration of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel’, 1940, p. 12. 
54 Other sources state that Sebetwane crossed the Zambezi at Kazungula with the help of the Toka of 
Musokotwane. See Maritz, 1996, p. 179. 
55 Most sources just mention that Sebetwane got involved in a tribal dispute at the request of the Subiya. See 
Maritz, ‘The Subia and Fwe’, 1996, p. 179. 












Mazumani (presently Linyanti)57, it can be accepted that the Lozi were unaware of 
Sebetwane’s plans to attack them from the east. One explanation would be that their 
relations with the Subiya were at such a very low point that they (the latter) could not 
warn them of the threat,  the other could be that Lozi control over the Subiya was weak, 
or non-existent during this period. The Subiya therefore showed defiance in helping 
Sebetwane to cross the rivers on his way to attack the Lozi, this being a sign of where 
their allegiances were at the time. Sebetwane comprehensively subdued all the groups he 
came in contact with north of the Zambezi, including the Lozi, and thus became supreme 
chief of all the tribes in that vast region. Sebetwane made his headquarters at Naliele in 
the upper Zambezi, and declared that the Zambezi would henceforth be his line of 
defence. He posted his villages at strategic points along the river’s bank. 
 
Even though Sebetwane became very friendly with the Subiya of Liswani this friendship 
did not last for long. One version has it that Munitenge Liswani was upset by a favour 
shown to Induna Soha Mwanamwale (a Musubiya in the form of a cow sent to him 
probably as a token of preference over Liswani)58 by Sebetwane. So Liswani asked for 
the aid of the Matebele. This which led to an ill-fated attack on Sebetwane by the 
Matebele and their allies, the Masubiya. Even though Liswani fled to his former place at 
Kazungula, Sebetwane called him to Naliele on what the former thought to be a friendly 
visit thinking that all was forgiven, but there he was put to death.59 The other version is 
that Sebetwane, having defeated other tribes in the area, then returned and attacked the 
Subiya at Nyungu on the Chobe. The Subiya, surprised in their sleep, fled and their chief, 
Liswani (son of Nsundano’s sister), went to find refuge with Mzilikazi, chief of the 
Matebele. It is said that the Matebele offered Liswani their assistance and returned with 
him to Nyungu, but found that Sebetwane had gone back to Barotseland.60 Sebetwane 
then treacherously invited Liswani to visit him, promising peace and, to make good on 
                                                 
57 Ibid. p, 32. on the strength of M. Mainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings, 1973, p. 66; A. Schulz & A. 
Hammer, The New Africa: A journey up the Chobe and Down the Okavango Rivers: A Record of Exploration 
and Sport. London: William Heineman. 
58 Could be the same Mwanamwale taken to Kaonga, near Sioma. 
59 Kruger, 1984: p. 6. 
60 Ernest Likando (1989, p. 34) believes that the Kololo attacked the Subiya after the Matebele had left, in a 
battle known in Subiya legend as the ‘Battle of Nabulankoli’, after the manner in which it was fought, using 
mainly spears made out of sticks from wood. He gives the approximate year in which this supposedly took place 












his promise, to share the war booty. Liswani accepted the invitation against the advice of 
his people, and was murdered in Barotseland on Sebetwane’s orders.  
 
The two versions agree on the fact that Liswani was killed by Sebetwane in Barotseland 
at Naliele on the Zambezi River. It is also evident that Liswani was unhappy with the fact 
that Sebetwane had laid claim to the territory that belonged to his people. The request for 
Sebetwane to intervene in local disputes and to attack the Lozi was intended by the 
Masubiya to consolidate their position and ensure stability in their territory. Nevertheless 
they found themselves betrayed by Sebetwane. A slight difference is observed; in the 
second version no attack by a joint Matebele-Subiya force is reported. Evidence shows 
that indeed an attack took place.61 In a pre-colonial Caprivi where things were uncertain, 
betrayal was unfortunately an art of survival. That was what befell the group of Matebele 
warriors on a mission to attack Sebetwane, when a Musubiya man named Simalumba 
agreed to cross them to the mainland but instead deposited them on an Island where they 
died of starvation and or were finished off by the Makololo. The Island became known as 
‘Sioli sa Matebele’ or Island of the Matebele (also Sikachila). It is not known whether 
this is the same group invited by Liswani to assist him attack Sebetwane, or whether it 
was a different group.  
 
Liswani’s death cleared the way for Sebetwane to set up his headquarters in the Caprivi, 
at Linyanti,62 possibly because the Matebele allies, the Masubiya, were now completely 
subdued. The empire of the Kololo was short-lived. Sebetwane died on 7 July 1851 
shortly after he had met David Livingstone and he lies buried on an island named Sheshe 
near Sangwali village in the Caprivi,63 contrary to Flint’s claim that Sebetwane’s body 
was returned to Naliele, his capital in Barotseland, after his death.64 Sebetwane was 
succeeded by his daughter Mmamochisane according to his wishes but she abdicated and 
gave over the chieftainship to Sekeletu, a son (possibly ‘stepson’) of Sebetwane. Sekeletu 
                                                 
61 Trollope, 1940, p. 13. 
62 According to David Sasa (2000:10), Sebetwane named Linyandi (now Linyanti) in the Sangwali area as his 
headquarters in 1850, its name meaning ‘a place where I will stay and suffer’. He was suffering from a wound on 
his thigh that had been inflicted in war and he was apparently coughing badly.  
63 Kruger, 1984, Chapter 2, p. 3. 












did not possess Sebetwane’s leadership qualities, consequently resistance within the 
Makololo and as well as within subordinate groups to his rule started to mount which 
weakened the kingdom. He was reported to have been indecisive, extremely mistrustful, 
appointing only Kololo in positions of authority, and ordered the killing of all rivals.65 
Because of competing claims to the throne particularly from his uncle Mamili, Sekeletu 
lived a secluded life, and according to Pretorius, ‘he took almost no part in affairs of 
state.’66 Commenting on the decay of Makololo prestige, previously feared in the land, 
A.J. Wills remarked: ’The rapid descent from the pinnacle of warrior statesmanship 
achieved by Sebetwane can perhaps be ascribed to a lack of common tradition among the 
Kololo, a heterogeneous group born in disintegration and held together only by the 
personality of a great leader.’67  In 1863 Sekeletu died of leprosy68 for which David 
Livingstone had treated him, leaving an infant son.  A headman called Mbololo was 
appointed to act as regent. Mbololo shifted the Makololo capital from Linyanti in the 
Caprivi to (old) Sesheke or Mwandi an old Subiya settlement, in present day Zambia.  
This did not help as the Kololo were deeply divided, and Mbololo himself became an 
unpopular leader. 
 
Subiya defiance after Lozi restoration 
 
It was during the reign of Mbololo that the Lozi called on Sepopa to return from 
Lukwakwa (the meeting point of refugees outside the kingdom) to lead an invading force 
southwards. Sepopa, a Lozi prince who lived for a while at the royal headquarters of 
Sebetwane and Sekeletu at Linyanti, led a revolution joined by the Masubiya and Toka 
against the Kololo in 1864, with Njekwa, his subsequent Ngambela (prime minister), in 
the forefront. An extermination of all Kololo men by Njekwa ensued69, while children 
and women were distributed among Lozi rulers. Lozi hegemony over the Masubiya and 
Toka was by this time not firm if not lapsed. In fact the two groups indicated that they 
                                                 
65 Maritz, 1996, p. 179. 
66 Pretorius, 1975, p. 29. 
67 A.J., Willis, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa, London: Oxford University Press, p. 63. 
68 He is buried at Malengalenga, from where he ruled. 













had become autonomous with the end of the Makololo authority.70 Sepopa then 
descended on the Subiya and Toka with ruthless vigour in order to subject them. He 
began with the Toka with whom he fought for supremacy, reducing them to submission 
before embarking on a campaign to subdue the Subiya. It was during this time (about 
1876) that an exodus of Masubiya people from the Caprivi took place, led by Chief 
Nkonkwena. They settled at Rakops near the Makgadikgadi Pan on the Botletle River. 
Here the Masubiya were guests of Chief Khama III of the Ngwato, for this was his area. 
After the death of Nkonkwena, the group continued to live at Rakops, now under Chika 
Liswani, until scarcity of food and water forced them to migrate to Mababe where they 
lived until 1902 when the Mababe Pan began to dry up. Here the Masubiya split again:  
one group returned to the Chobe and settled at Munga near what is now called Kachikau 
(otherwise known to the Masubiya as Kachekabwe)71, while a splinter group under Chief 
Nkonkwena’s son, Mafwira (Mafwila), broke away with a number of followers and 
settled at Tlhale near Gomare in Ngamiland, in the area of Moremi, chief of the 
Batawana. A small section remained on the Mababe where old Liswani’s village could 
easily be distinguished in the past by castor oil plants that grew on it. As for the group 
that remained behind in the Caprivi during the 1876 migration to Botswana, they were 
ruled by chieftainess Ntolwa Malyansanzwe, from Isuswa west of Ngoma.  
 
After Ntolwa’s death, a leadership vacuum occurred for the Masubiya in Caprivi until the 
Germans appointed a commoner, Chikamatondo, as regent to Liswaninyana, Ntolwa’s 
young nephew and heir in 1909, after which Liswaninyana took over.  Since then the 
Masubiya chieftainship in Caprivi reverted back to the Liswani dynasty. Thus instead of 
submitting to the Lozi under Sepopa, Chief Nkonkwena of the Masubiya and his people 
showed defiance by simply ‘moving away’. This could be interpreted in the present as 
‘fleeing’, but in those days, it was certainly an act of survival. Commenting on this 
migration and the difficulties that ensued for Sepopa as a result, Holub had the following 
to say: ‘As a consequence of Sepopo’s [Sepopa or more correctly Sipopa) oppression, 
many of the natives have withdrawn from the kingdom, generally going south, and the 
                                                 
70 Maritz, 1996, pp. 179-180. 













difficulty of collecting tribute anywhere has greatly increased.’72 According to Flint, this 
added to Sepopa’s dependence on trade with Europeans and the Afro-Portuguese 
Mambari,73 who traded mainly in slaves, it should be added. Sepopa was a cruel autocrat 
and was driven from power into exile by a force led by his prime minister, and according 
to Flint, ‘Mwanawina II, who obtained much of his support from the Subiya, was 
installed as the Lozi king between August and November 1876.’ 74 Both Mwanawina and 
Sepopa’s mothers were Subiyas.  
 
The 1876 Subiya migration from the Caprivi did not diminish their zeal to influence 
events in Barotseland. Mwanawina II75 did not reign for long, being overthrown shortly, 
with Lubosi (who assumed the name Lewanika76) being installed in his place in 1878. 
Lewanika was himself overthrown in 1884 and forced to flee to the west but regained his 
throne a year later in what is described as the ‘longest and hardest-fought battle in the 
history of Barotseland’77, and in which Lewanika sought the aid of the Mbukushu and 
Mambari mercenaries.78 The Subiya played a pivotal role in the 1884 rebellion that 
overthrew Lewanika. In fact the rebellion, even though it was organized by Mataa, an 
ambitious Lozi commoner who became Ngambela (prime minister) to the new chief 
Akufuna who ruled from Sesheke (also a Subiya area), broke out in the Subiya area in the 
Caprivi. 
 
The discussion has hitherto focused on the conflicts that characterized relations between 
the Masubiya and the Lozi. This was necessary to show that ‘citizenship and subjectivity’ 
has an element of resistance in state formation, and therefore, the Subiyas were not 
‘willing’ Lozis in the state of Barotseland as conventional historiography would make it. 
They constantly sought for ways to free themselves from Lozi bondage. However it 
should be recorded that the Subiya and the Lozi had a mutually reinforcing 
                                                 
72 Holub, p. 146. 
73 Flint, 2003, pp. 408. 
74 Ibid. pp. 408-409. 
75 According to Mainga (Bulozi under Luyana Kings, p. 118), Mwanawina II escaped first to the Mashi, then to 
Sesheke, and finally to the Batoka highlands. 
76 Meaning ‘uniter’, see Flint 
77 See Jalla, ‘History: Traditions and Legends’, p. 54. 













interrelationship. The fact that some Lozi kings such as Sepopa and Lewanika had Subiya 
mothers elevated the position of Sesheke to be one of enormous importance and 
significance to the Lozi, and they, in turn, were accepted as being ‘home’ among the 
Masubiya. As a result, Masubiya enjoyed influential positions in the Lozi state, some 
being appointed as headmen. In fact Subiya legend has it that their name ‘Subiya’ was 
given to them by the Aluyi (Lozi) apparently because of the active part they played in the 
government of the Aluyi and Makololo and that there was a saying: ‘Subiya nokusubalala 
umulonga’, meaning the Subiya are trying to push the kingdom.79 
 
Other Groups in Pre-colonial Caprivi 
 
An impression should not be created that there were only Masubiya in the pre-colonial 
Caprivi. The early history of the Masubiya groups them with Mayeyi and Hambukushu 
(Bantu botatwe80) at Goha Hills in Botswana before they migrated into the Caprivi. Here 
the Mayeyi (whom they called Bezanza – those who are coming), were under the 
following Mashikati (chiefs or leaders): Hankuze, Matsharatshara, Qunku and his brother 
Qunkunyane;81 the Mbukushu under their chiefs Mashambo, Mbungo, Dibebe I, and 
Dimbo I, who was known to the Tawana as Andara,82and of course the Barakwena 
(San).83 Another group that features prominently in early literature on the Caprivi is the 
Matotela, the bulk of whom lived in today’s Zambia, under their leaders Mayuwa, 
Mokwe, and Malala, who was resident on the upper Njoko river.84 The Matotela in the 
Caprivi were an overflow from the main body, and resided eastwards of Sibbinda, 
including the area within a radius of 15 miles of Katima Mulilo.85  
                                                 
79 See Pretorius, J, ‘The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel: A study of their historical and geographical 
background, tribal structure and legal system, with reference to the Fwe family law and succession.’ (MA, 
University of Stellenbosch), 1975, p. 22. 
80 Literally three people; referring to the three groups. 
81 Sasa, David, ‘The Mayeyi Chieftainship’, apaper presented at the “Public History: Forgotten History” 
Conference hosted by the History Department at the University of Namibia in Windhoek, 2000, p. 2. 
82 G.E., Nettelton, ‘History of the Ngamiland Tribes up to 1926’, Bantu Studies Nr. 8, 1934.  
83 Rather known locally as Makwengo, which has a derogatory tone. 
84 NAZ, KDE2417 
85 C.E. Kruger, ‘The make-up (tribal origin) of the inhabitants of the Mafwe Tribal Area, with special 














Map 4: Extract from a map showing tribal distribution in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
compiled in December 1957 by the Department of African Studies, University College of Rhodesia 
and Nyasaland showing Matotela and Subiya, also found in Caprivi, hand drawn by C.E. Kruger on 
13/05/1976 
                           
With the advent of German administration in the Caprivi, these groups collectively 
assumed the identity Bafwe (Bayeyi), and later became known only just as Mafwe. These 
groups are not included in the above discussion mainly because, as it has been repeatedly 
reported by several writers,86 ‘they were not deeply involved in the bloody feuds of the 
two decades…as the politically-minded and ambitious Subiya.’ 87 One reason might be 
that it was because they inhabited areas far removed from the main theatre of activities, 
that is, the Zambezi River, with principal trade routes pointing to the east through 
Impalila, Kazungula and Pandamatenga at the time. Apart from inhabiting remote areas 
away from the Zambezi, Kruger adds that the Mafwe at this time ‘were in any event a 
relatively small and humble tribal group of no contention in the way of things in the 
period with which we are dealing.’88 More research into the pre-colonial history of the 
Caprivi could still paint a different picture. An informal census conducted in 1976 
showed that the make-up or composition of the Mafwe tribal area was as follows:  
 
 
                                                 
86 See Pretorius, ‘The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi’., 1975, p. 29; J. Fossé, 1996, ‘Negotiating the Nation in Local 
Terms: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eastern Caprivi’, (MA Thesis, University of Oslo, NAN),1996, p. 104. 
87 Pretorius, ‘The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi’ 












Ethnic Group  Number of villages out of 
298 
% (±) 
Matotela 95 30 
Mayeyi 75 25 
Mafwe 61 20 
Mbukushu 30 10 
Lozi 14 4.7 
Subiya 13 4.6 
 
Table 3: Informal census showing composition of the Mafwe tribal area in 1976.89 
 
 
Very little is known, comparatively, about the origin and history of the Mafwe. 
According to Pretorius, ‘they are historically also the least known tribe’90 in the Caprivi. 
Pretorius observes that the first reference to the Fwe is to be found in Streitwolf’s report 
about the Eastern Caprivi which appeared in the Deutsches Kolonialblatt in 1910. He 
further states that ‘even the oldest members of the tribe can recall no tradition of tribal 
chiefs prior to Simataa Kabende, who was appointed as representative at Linyanti by the 
Lozi in the 1860s.’ Another writer, John Leif Fossé (1996: 104) contends that the first 
mention of the Mafwe in written sources appears to be in A. Jalla’s ‘Lozi History’ 
extracted from an undated manuscript, which he estimated to be from around the turn of 
the nineteenth century.91   
 
There is no mention of the Mafwe in the entire literature covering the Makololo period, 
except for the name Mamili which is encountered several times.92 This Mamili, whose 
surname was ‘Ncumbe’ (according to Pretorius93) or Bogatsu (according to Schapera94), 
                                                 
89 Extracted from C.E. Kruger, ‘The make-up (tribal origin) of the inhabitants of the Mafwe tribal area, 
with special reference to the Matotela, 13/05/1976 (NAN: A. 871, Box 2, File 2). 
90 Ibid. p. 24. 
91 A.D. Jalla’s book, History: Traditions and Legends of the Barotse Nation (Sefula) appeared in 1939. 
92 See for example, F. Westbeech, Trade and Travel in Early Barotseland, London: Chatto and Windus, 1963, p. 
63; D. Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa, London: John Murray, 1857, p.513; I. 
Schapera, Livingstone’s private journals, 1851-1853, London: Chatto and Windus, 1960, p. 236; M. Mainga, 
Bulozi under the Luyana kings, London: Longman, 1973: pp. 95-96. 
93 Pretorius, ‘The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi’, 1975, p. 30. 












was a Kololo and an uncle to Sekeletu, and should not be confused95 with the Lozi 





Map 5: Sketch map hand-drawn by Native Commissioner A.B. Colenbrander for Caprivi (1953 -61)  
on 8 Nov 1954 showing distribution of tribal groups in eastern Caprivi discussed here 
 
At the close of Makololo rule, Livingstone described Mamili Nchumbe (or Bogatsu) as 
the ‘most influential in the tribe’ and that he tried to take over the reins of power and 
have his son succeed Sekeletu, but faced resistance from the Makololo under Mbololo, 
the Lozi and other groups.96 On the accession of Mbololo to the throne, Mamili Nchumbe 
fled south with his followers to seek refuge from the chief of the Batawana, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
95 See Westbeech. Op cit., p. 63. Flint believes the Lozi Mamili, Simataa Kabende was an uncle to Sekeletu. No 
evidence could be found to substantiate this assertion. Instead it was the Kololo Mamili (Ncumbe or Bogatsu) 
who was an uncle to Sekeletu. 












Letsholathebe. Instead of receiving protection, Mamili Ncumbe and male members of his 
group were reportedly killed by the Tawana on the instruction of Letsholathebe.97 
 
The overthrow of the Makololo consolidated Lozi control over the Caprivi by appointing 
regional representatives in positions in which there had been Makololo before. The 
southern boundary of the Caprivi was the one that needed careful vigilance, to prevent 
attacks from the Matebele, but also the possible return of the Makololo. At Impalila 
Island in the east, the Lozi placed Makumba in control, followed by subsequent 
appointments as follows: Kabuku at Kasenu, Kabulabula at Ibembe (now called 
Kabulabula), and Mutwamezi near Ngoma. Westwards the following representatives 
were put in charge: Imataa or Simataa Kabende (who took over from Mwanangombe, and 
Linyanti before him) at Linyanti, Mwanota, Sekau, Masiala and Mwambwa Seluka who 
was deputized by Mayuni on the Mashi (Kwando) River. The Lozi divided the Caprivi 
into four zones for administrative purposes: The Masubiya were under the direct control 
of the Lozi sub-chief at Mwandi (old Sesheke) who was accountable to the Paramount 
Chief. Perhaps it was because of constant political unrest with repeated attempts to 
become independent that there was need to tightly control affairs in the Masubiya area, as 
opposed to the Mafwe who had some degree of semi-autonomous status under the Lozi 
rule. As related above, the Mafwe were not much affected by the turbulences of the time 
because they lived far from the principal district centres of the south-eastern province of 
Senanga, Sesheke and the island of Impalira (Impalila) or Makumba. Mwanota was the 
leader of the Matotela on both sides of the Zambezi. Even though he resided in what is 
today Zambia98, his area of influence in the Caprivi extended from Katima Mulilo to 
Sibbinda in the west. Mwambwa Seluka controlled the area from Sibbinda to Lizauli but 
through Mayuni, whose mother was a Yeyi, his control stretched up to the area east of the 
Sangwali swamps.99  
                                                 
97 See D.F. Ellenberger and J. C., Macgregor, History of the Basuto, London: Caxton, 1912 (reprinted New York: 
Negro University Press, 1969), 177; Holub, Seven years in South Africa, p.144; and Schapera, Livingstone’s 
private journals, 1851-1853, p.236.  
98 Mwanota’s headquarters were situated north-west of Katima Mulilo, at Silolo. He was called Monawuta 
(Mwanota) or son of the bow because he hunted with a bow and arrow while the Yeyi and Few used only a 
spear (Fisch, Maria, The Caprivi Strip during the German Colonial Period 1890 to 1914 [with a chapter on 
the boundary dispute up to the present], Windhoek:, Out of Africa, 1999, p. 55). 













Simataa Mamili is the best known of the Lozi Indunas (headmen) of the time, probably 
because he inherited the name ‘Mamili’ from the famous Kololo general. Further,  he 
chose to live not very far from Linyanti of the Makololo, and of the three Lozi Indunas 
responsible for the western side, he was the only one resident in the Caprivi. He 
controlled the area in the west, what remained from Mwanota and Seluka inhabited 
largely by Masubiya and Yeyi people with a few Mafwe scattered among them.100 This 
was the state of things when the Germans arrived in the Caprivi in 1909 to set-up 
administrative control in the area. Since Streitwolf failed to convince Liswani of the 
Masubiya at Mababe in Botswana to come back to the Caprivi, and as the only surviving 
member of the Liswani family in Caprivi was Liswaninyana who was still a boy, a 
commoner, Chikamatondo, was installed as regent. Similarly, Streitwolf attempted to 
persuade Mwanota and Seluka to relocate to the Caprivi and assist him to administer their 
people but both declined the offer. He then gave their subordinates the choice to follow 
their leaders or be under Induna Mamili, who was elevated to the position of chief over 
all non-Subiya speaking inhabitants of the Caprivi. Even though composed of different 
ethnic groups such as Mbukushu, Totela, Yeyi, San and Fwe, this group would 
henceforth (1909) be known as Bafwe (Bayeyi). This marked the beginning of the Mafwe 
Chieftainship as it is known today. In 1864 Imataa Kabende101 was posted as Lozi 
representative at Linyanti, and in 1909 the Germans confirmed him as chief until his 
                                                 
100 Fisch (p. 57) believes Simataa Mamili’s control extended from Ngoma in the east to Lizauli in the west, 
and in the north ‘nearly’ up to the Caprivi highway of today. This claim is not supported by any other 
source nor does Fisch indicate support for it.  
101 The only claim that exists to show the dynastic history of Simataa Kabende is a letter to The Windhoek 
Advertiser of 31 May 1996, in which the writer, M. Kozo of Windhoek, states that the Mafwe chieftainship 
dates back to 1760 when the son of Kabainda Muyongo, Imataa Kabende (corruption of Kabainda), was 
installed as chief of the Linyanti district because he was first cousin to King Lewanika of the Lozi. While 
the relationship of Imataa Kabende to the Lozi royals is still to be investigated, the reign of King Lewanika 
was not in the 1700s as the writer would have it.  He was installed in 1878, deposed and reinstated in 1884. 
The coming of Simataa Kabende and his assumption of the title Mamili is well documented elsewhere even 
in this thesis and therefore does not need repeating here. At the very least, to suggest that Simataa Kabende 
Mamili was chief in 1760 is pure ignorance of historical evidence on the part of the writer. Among the 
many historical ‘lies’ in this letter the writer tells readers is that Chancellor Von Caprivi of Germany, after 
whom the territory is named, visited Linyanti. There is no evidence that the Chancellor visited Africa at all 












death in about 1916. The Mayeyi and BaMashi or Mayuni have since re-claimed their 




This chapter examined the contest for the control of the Caprivi during the pre-colonial 
period. It was essentially argued that there were pre-colonial political and social 
formations in the Caprivi which transcended Lozi and Kololo conquests and domination, 
chief among which was the Subiya kingdom of Itenge which has been the subject of often 
dismissive discussions in the current historiography. It was concluded that the existence 
of Itenge should not be interpreted only in terms of ‘land’ and ‘territoriality’ as 
relationships in pre-colonial societies were defined more in terms of allegiances than the 
space of habitation, which expanded or contracted at will.  
 
The advent of Lozi and Kololo domination brought conquest and servitude to the people 
of the Caprivi to an extent that especially colonial historiography depicts the inhabitants 
as having no ‘real’ background, traditions and customs. The belief is that what traditions 
the inhabitants of Caprivi practice is what was bequeathed to them by their Lozi and 
Kololo overlords. On a cultural level, therefore, the contest for Caprivi identities involved 
the loss of cultural practices and values, the gap being largely filled with negative 
depictions of such traditions. It was shown, however, that resistance was an integral part 
of the process of state formation (citizenship and subjectivity) in the pre-colonial Caprivi, 
with especially the Subiya clashing with the interests of their masters and forming 
alliances to consolidate their quest for autonomy. It was, however, not only the locals 
who strove to wrestle the control of the Caprivi away from one enemy or another during 
this period. Sebetwane of the Makololo and his erstwhile arch-enemy Mzilikazi of the 
Matebele ‘played out’ their enmity in the Caprivi, so did the Makololo against the Lozi, 
                                                 
102 For a fuller discussion and description of the re-assertion of Yeyi and Mayuni identities, see M. Sehani, 
‘The Mafwe/Mayuni Crisis: Rival histories and the assertion of identity in the Caprivi’, Public History: 
Forgotten History Conference, University of Namibia, 2000; and Sasa, D., ‘The Mayeyi Chieftainship’, 














and the Lozi against the Batawana. In brief, state formation and social relations in the 















COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE IDENTITY 




The creation of the Caprivi or ‘Absurdity’ has its direct origin in the 'Scramble for Africa' 
when in 1890 Britain conceded to Germany a small corridor of land jutting off from 
DSWA to the Zambezi basin. Since then the Caprivi Zipfel, as it became known, has been 
described variously by different actors in its painful history, as being an 'outrage to 
geography1'; 'a dream frustrated'2; and '...the poorest district that have come under my 
notice'3,  to one of utmost military strategic importance4. Its inhabitants were regarded as 
'little children' by the different colonial administrators, a situation which was often 
justified on the basis that historically they had never been an independent people but were 
for most part a 'subject tribe' especially of the Aluyi. Administrative identity or, more 
broadly, state formation in the Caprivi is regarded as rooted in European colonialism5. As 
stated above, the only recognition during pre-colonial times is that of the Lozi state, and 
then Makololo rule. This is disputed in Chapter Two where it is argued that indeed state 
formation predates Lozi domination, as is shown, among others, by the existence of the 
pre-Lozi Kingdom of Itenge of the Basubiya. 
 
The concern in this chapter is the evolution of colonial administrative control in the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel and how this helped shape Caprivi identities. The nature of 
colonial administration in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was, for most part, not actual and 
direct, but indirect and persuasive. What this meant was that the chiefs and headmen were 
the most important means of controlling mainly rural blacks. With the establishment of 
                                                 
1 Kruger, ‘History of the Caprivi Strip, 1890-1984’, 1984: p. 8 (NAN: A.472). 
2 (Louw: 1979, 155) 
3 Gibbons, in Fisch: 1999, p. 17 
4 A.B. Colenbrander, Native Commissioner/Magistrate of ECZ to the Secretary for Native Affairs, dated 20 
December 1954. 











the Bantustans under the South African administration, chiefs became traditional elites or 
politicians. This pitted them against the rising nationalists or intellectuals (see Chapter 
Seven) for the control of the masses. Since the majority of Africans lived in rural areas at 
this time, and though they understood the fact of their subjugation, they often lacked the 
education and awareness to fully understand South Africa's subtle methods of control. 
Chiefs could therefore collaborate with South Africa’'s colonialism and still manage to 
remain credible in the eyes of the people. The chiefs were under the local supervision of 
one government officer. It will be shown that the Caprivi colonial administrative identity 
was shaped by two related factors: history and geography (remoteness), which arguably 
made it difficult to administer. For this reason it was often off-loaded onto another 
territory. These were either adjacent or far-flung territories and with regard to the 
provision of services such as education and health, the burden was usually transferred to 
missionaries. This, in turn, produced Caprivi identities, which can be described as a 
separate but still forming part of South West Africa’s territorial integrity. It is argued here 
that the Caprivi has produced an identity of separateness and was administered as such. 
In present times this identity of separateness has translated into secessionism (see Chapter 
Nine). 
 
To flesh out all the above issues, the chapter will be sub-divided into the following: a 
discussion of the role, influence and interaction of missionaries, traders and travellers on 
the creation of the Caprivi; the Caprivi as Germany's riparian state on the Zambezi; the 
Caprivi 1914-1939 as a transferable identity; and lastly, the Eastern Caprivi Strip as a 
Bantu Reserve and a Bantustan under South African rule. 
 
 
Informal Colonialism: Missionaries, Traders, and Their Interaction with 
the Caprivi  
 
A considerable number of missionaries and travelers interacted with the Caprivi during 
the pre-colonial period. The best known are perhaps those belonging to the London 











Roger Price. It is believed that Livingstone intended to set up a mission station in the 
southern parts of today's Caprivi.6 The contention here is that rather the idea was to set-
up a mission station among the Makololo envisaged to be situated on the healthy 
highlands immediately north of the Victoria Falls. With the death of Sebetwane, 
Sekeletu, his successor, was persuaded - and agreed - to move northwards to the healthier 
Toka Plateau. This could happen either with or without the indigenous groups of the 
Caprivi shifting with Sekeletu. Sekeletu's desire was for a missionary to be placed at his 
capital to protect him from constant attacks by the Matebele7. A mission station among 
the Makololo was part of Livingstone's twin scheme: of radiating the Gospel to two of 
central Africa's most powerful kingdoms (the Matebele and Makololo), and establishing 
legitimate commerce in the area. How to put an end to the rampant slave trade by Arab 
traders and half-caste (Mambaris), and cruelty within Sebetwane's country was also of 
great concern to Livingstone8.  
 
On his second trip to Linyanti on 23 May 1853 (his first was in early 1851), Livingstone 
(or Munare to the Makololo, probably the same as Moneri - the Sesotho name for doctor 
or missionary) decided to follow one of several established trade routes used by traders 
from the Atlantic coast until he reached Luanda on the west coast, and then retraced his 
steps to Linyanti. He left Linyanti on the 3 November 1855, passing through 
Bechuanaland, accompanied by about 114 Makololo men carrying elephant tusks, to the 
Indian Ocean, where he boarded a ship for England9. Sekeletu accompanied him half-way 
as far as Chungwe Namutitima (Subiya for ’The smoke that thunders’). The 114 men 
who accompanied him were left behind at the mouth of the Zambezi when he went to 
Europe, staying there until he returned in September 1858. Even though some of them 
had died of small pox (about 30 according to Likando) and six others were murdered, 
Livingstone left these men once again when on another journey of exploration on which 
he discovered Lake Nyasa.10 The London Missionary Society approved Livingstone's 
                                                 
6 Pretorius, 1975: p. 31 
7 Seaver, 1957: p.376 
8 Smith, 1957: pp. 22-23, Livingstone, Missionary Travels, p. 508 
9 Likando 1989: 99; Pretorius records 120, 1975: 34 
 











proposal for a mission station among the Makololo even though there were delays caused 
by personal differences between Livingstone and the Secretary of the Society, Dr. 
Tidman11. This resulted in the envisioned mission being deprived of its 'natural leader', 
David Livingstone.12 
 
It was then that in 1859 the London Missionary Society sent out James Helmore and 
Roger Price on a fateful journey to found a mission among the Makololo. They were 
accompanied by their wives and Helmore's three children with a fourth born during the 
journey. When the Helmore/Price expedition set out by ox wagon, they were hoping to 
meet Livingstone at Linyanti (who had returned to the Zambezi the previous year), but 
this was not to be. They arrived at Linyanti at a time when the chief, Sekeletu, had 
become distrustful of 'southerners' and meted out bad treatment to them, as can be 
discerned from the writings of James Chapman, one of the earliest traders to have 
traversed those parts.13 Their arrival without Livingstone was a great disappointment to 
Sekeletu. As a result, it is reported that he offered the visitors no hospitality and allowed 
them to be robbed and maltreated14. Sekeletu reportedly offered poisoned meat to the 
missionaries which led to the death of Helmore, his wife and two of his children. Roger 
Price managed to escape with his wife, only child and the two surviving Helmore 
children, but his wife and baby succumbed on the way. He was later discovered in a 
desolate state at Lake Ngami by John Mackenzie, another missionary who was sent to 
search for Price's party. A variety of theories abound as to the real reasons why Sekeletu 
treated the Helmore-Price in this cruel manner. One is that they were caught up in his 
foreign policy quagmire: He wished to have a missionary of stature, particularly 
Livingstone who was married to a daughter of Robert Moffat, a missionary whom 
Mzilikazi of the Matebele held in high regard, as a restraint for further raids. As Sekeletu 
would latter concede to Livingstone: ‘Had Ma-Robert (Mrs. Livingstone) come, and then 
I should have rejoiced, because Mosilikatse would leave her alone, and us, she being a 
                                                 
11 Pretorius, 1975: p. 33 
12 Smith, 1957: pp. 25-26 
13 Chapman, 1868: pp. 99-100 











child of Moshete (Moffat).’15 The second explanation is attributed to the non-appearance 
of Livingstone and the party of carriers who had accompanied him to the east coast 
several years before16. According to Mr. Conrad Siyanga, a village Induna (headman) of 
Malengalenga (formerly Malimba-Sekeletu's former village), Sekeletu feared that the 
missionaries would rob him of his people because of the way they got attracted to them 
and that he was envious of their possessions.17  
 
Indeed when Livingstone visited Sekeletu shortly after the deaths of the missionaries, he 
found their wagons in the hands of the chief. Lastly, it is also believed that the Makololo 
never forgave Livingstone for failing to save their chief, Sebetwane, from his ailments. 
Sebetwane died on 7 July 1851 shortly after he met Livingstone, from a wound he 
sustained while riding a horse but also from a bad cough. The horse was given to 
Sebetwane by Livingstone as a present. After a few lessons Livingstone suggested that 
the horse be made to run. Sebetwane fell off sustaining an injury to his leg. Induna 
(Headman) Sangwali asserted that the people believed that this injury was the cause of 
Sebetwane's death and that the deaths of Mr. and Mrs. Helmore and others at the hands of 
Sekeletu, Sebetwane's nephew, were in response to Sebetwane's death.18 Apparently 
Sekeletu feared that the missionaries would do him some harm. I tend to agree with 
Kruger's assertion that it is probable that the Helmore-Price mission was diminished by 
malaria, to which they were not accustomed, and given the fact that not only did some 
members of the party arrive in an already weak state, but also during the rainy season 
when malaria is at its peak. Of course they received bad treatment from Sekeletu, owing 
largely to unfulfilled promises made to the Makololo by Livingstone, among others that 
he would open up trade routes to the west and east and bring trade and better prospects to 
their country. It is difficult to establish the source of the story of food poisoning. It 
appears only in Price's letter, even then as a suspicion and a story told to him by someone 
close to Sekeletu. Could it be just a story? It is impossible a task to enumerate all the 
traders and travellers who passed through and got involved in business deals in the 
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Caprivi. A few unknown known within Caprivi hereby follows. It appears that Chalmers, 
a trader, was the first white man to settle in the Caprivi on 2 April 1904 at Impalila Island 
where he was given a permit to farm and conduct his carpentry work. Two months later, 
on 29 June he received a letter from Lewanika of the Lozi demanding his withdrawal 
from the island since it belonged to Barotseland even though legally the 1890 Anglo-
German Treaty was in force. It appears the contention was that Lewanika did not want 
Chalmers to trade with the Masubiya who had defied his orders to supply salt to him from 
the island. Also, the island served as an important ivory trade station with Bechuanaland. 
Another trade station was established at Ngoma in Caprivi in 1906 by Aristotle 
Troumbas, Phelany Moody (Muuti) and Jappe (the last two were mulattos). This trade 
station did not last long because Jappe and Moody murdered Aristotle Troumbas and 
seized his properties.19 In reply to a letter from Kruger enquiring about Moody's estate, 
Brittz20 had the following to say about Moody (dated 27th October 1941): 
 
Well, I will first of all give you what I can still remember about this jig-jaw puzzle of Moody's and 
his many bastard children in the Caprivi Zipfel. From what I was able to gather, Moody arrived in 
the Caprivi about thirty or forty years ago. He appears to have an unquenchable desire to possess 
the largest harem in those parts with the result that every second Native woman in the Caprivi 
Zipfel as well as in the adjoining Territories belonged to his harem. When he added a new wife, he 
usually gave one or two herd of cattle to her. When I arrived in Caprivi Zipfel in 1929, Moody had 
left for Barotseland some years previously. Round about 1934 or 1935, when Moody was about 
dying he wrote a letter to me wherein he mentioned cattle he had left about twenty years ago with 
certain Natives in the Caprivi Zipfel. Then Moody died and in the copy of his will, he self 
appointed me as his executor, protector, etc. of all his children and property in the Caprivi 
Zipfel.... 21 
 
If the Moody22 of the Ngoma trade station is the same as the one mentioned by Brittz, 
then he was an established trader and blacksmith in partnership with a certain H. 
Chipman at Katima Mulilo in 1914, except that the latter is identified as I. Moody. 
Moody and Chipman operated from the site where the Roman Catholic Mission stands 
today. It is here where they had their boat factory. At the beginning of 1921 two more 
people were issued with trading licenses. They were M. Michelson at Linyanti and J.A. 
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Legge at Nsundwa, a place in the Masubiya area not far from Schuckmannsburg. 
Michelson was a Dane from Schleswig Holstein, well educated and spoke German 
fluently.  He had two brothers, both captains in the German-East Africa Line.  It is known 
that he had resided in the Caprivi Zipfel for some 10-12 years, had a good reputation and 
had previously been a trader in Basutoland. Michelson was later given a general dealers' 
license to trade at Kabulabula which became his permanent place of residence in the 
Caprivi. He entered into a union with a Musubiya woman by whom he had two sons. 
Charlie, his elder son, joined the army in the Second World War and became a sergeant 
in the Special Company, Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. Afterwards he entered the civil 
administration in the Caprivi as clerk/interpreter. J.A. Legge was a member of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate Police who had been posted to Schuckmannsburg in 1914. At 
the time he was 57 years of age, single, had formerly been in the South African 
Constabulary and had retired from the Protectorate Police certified as of good character. 
Legge was given a trading site at Impalila Island during the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
administration where he ran cattle and cultivated land. Until recently, the dipping tank he 
built on the island was the only such facility in the Caprivi. In addition to having the 
general dealers' licence, Legge was authorized to deal in arms and ammunition. Kruger 
recalls coming across Legge's son named George (by a Musubiya mother) who had 
abandoned his Caprivi identity for that of Northern Rhodesia. Legge himself left Impalila 
Island in the 1930s to go to Livingstone. 
 
In the out-of-the-ordinary circumstances in the secluded Caprivi frontier, it was believed 
that Europeans could 'go native'. A story is told of the death of two derelicts who had 
'gone native'.  Harris Johns had adopted the name John the Greek because he was a 
Cypriote Greek, and Ben Johnson. This incident took place during the Bechuanaland 
period and actually occurred in Angola, but since the boundary had not then been defined 
it was assumed that the location was the Caprivi Zipfel. The two men lived by poaching 
elephants and hippos and selling ivory, hides and fats. John the Greek bragged to Colonel 
Statham (as stated in Statham’s book: With My Wife Across Africa by Canoe and 
Caravan) that he had killed 500 hippos, mostly by stalking them bare-footed on 











'Mielies' probably because he cultivated a large area with mealies, irrigating his land by a 
canal he had cut from the Kwando River. An argument arose between Johnson and John 
the Greek as to who had shot a certain elephant and this led Ben Johnson (Harris Johns) 
to shoot John the Greek while they were enjoying a sundowner. The native servants, 
concubines and children deserted the camp and the son of the murdered man proceeded to 
Schuckmannsburg to report the matter. Ben Johnson (Harris Johns) fled to Angola but 
was warned off by the Portuguese and returned to his camp where he was joined by his 
hangers-on. Upon hearing that police from Schuckmannsburg where on their way to 
arrest him he collected all his stock and other belongings and destroyed everything, 
throwing metal and other objects which were not consumable by fire into the river. He 
then presented a sovereign to each of those present and to his offspring, stripped and 
burnt his clothing, and eventually stood on the edge of the river stark naked with his rifle 
and one cartridge. He waded as far as he could and blew his head off. Quite a sad side of 
white life in Africa, Colonel Statham concluded.23 
 
Just some 14 miles down the river lived 'Mafoota' or 'Mafuta', Johnson's nearest white 
neighbour. He was nicknamed 'mafuta' by the locals because he was fat. His real name 
was Keys. He had a store and dwelling-place in those parts of the Caprivi, otherwise not 
much is known about him. He is the same man that Seiner had met on the Mashi in 1906 
and whom old Chief Simasiku Mamili mentioned was present when the chief was sent by 
his father to pay respects to Captain Streitwolf in 1909. Close to Katima Mulilo there 
lived another fairly prominent resident of Caprivi, this being Tommy Harris, a son of 
Harris Johns, identified above as John the Greek. Following the suicide of his father his 
mother fled with him, then a baby, to her parental home in the Caprivi. Tommy Harris 
would have been born at the beginning of 1923, Kruger reckons. Tommy Harris 
established his village 8 miles south-east of Katima Mulilo and ran a restaurant in 
Ngweze, a Black residential area of Katima Mulilo during the colonial period. 
(Descendents of the Harris family still live in Katima Mulilo at the present). Another 
European who should be included in this section is Robert da Costa Blake. He was a 
                                                 












eccentric millionaire who lived in Cape Town and was granted a site on lease at the 
Katima Mulilo Rapids by the High Commissioner in the first half of the 1920s. He owned 
race horses and had a farm somewhere in South West Africa which he would 
occasionally visit in his light aircraft which he piloted. From that farm he would fly to the 
Caprivi and stay at his place at the rapids which was used mainly as a base for his 
activities as hunter and, sometimes, capturer of wild animals in Northern Rhodesia and 
Angola. Blake had in his employ as caretaker Mr. Side Mubyana Mabate, who later 
became Induna (village headman) of Sibbinda in the Caprivi. The Katima Mulilo site was 
taken away from him during the war as he had stopped visiting it and had failed to renew 
his annual lease agreement.  
 
This section will be incomplete without the mention of William (Bill) Finaughty24, 
widely remembered in the Caprivi who came there in the 1940s. "Fin", as he was 
affectionately called, hailed from Pietersburg in the then northern Transvaal. His parents 
had a hotel at Chunie' Spoort some 20 miles south of that town. William Finaughty was 
posted to Kazungula in Bechuanaland Protectorate by WNLA, and then to Katima Mulilo 
in Northern Rhodesia. The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association was an organized 
labour hire company that recruited migrant labourers from most southern African 
countries for work on the Rand mines in South Africa. After a year or two in that service, 
he developed interests in trading which resulted in him in 1945 being granted, an 
extensive general dealer’s site at the Katima Mulilo Rapids, immediately below where 
Robert da Costa Blake once had a lodge. His business grew and included a large shop, 
butchery, workshop for repairing motor vehicles (for he was a mechanic and worked as 
such for WNLA), carpentry, stores for goods and produce of all kinds, compound for 
local staff, cattle kraal, and gardens. He also had two tennis courts, for he loved playing 
that sport. As time went by, he acquired other sites scattered across  the Caprivi and as 
well as two outside it , one at Katima Mulilo in Northern Rhodesia and one at Kavimba in 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. While Finaughty's businesses had a slow start, events in the 
country and neighbouring territories turned the tide in his favour largely because of the 
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security situation. The independence of Zambia prevented the movement of people into 
that country to buy goods freely, but later the increased flow of SADF personnel into 
Caprivi and expanded workforce improved money circulation and the buying power at 
Katima Mulilo. The arrival of his nephew, Douglas Finaughty, as manager, and his wife 
Pauline was quite helpful to the business. The Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) came 
to the Caprivi in 1967. It was understood that its aim was to build up local prospective 
businessmen so that in time all enterprises would be taken over by them. William 
Finaughty was to sell everything to BIC to enable it to achieve its objectives. This he did, 
at a fair price which enabled him to retire as a wealthy man to the Victoria Falls about 
1970/1. He suffered a severe stroke and was an invalid until his death in 1975. 
 
The above exposition does not claim to be a complete account of all the Europeans who 
left a mark on the Caprivi in its early history. However, it is a good picture of those who 
imprinted their footsteps in very significant manner in that territory. Two vital issues 
became apparent. One is that mixed marriages were very prevalent and part of the fabric 
of the Caprivi at that time and the authorities did nothing to discourage such unions. 
Many children were born to local women by European men. Probably it was because of 
this that the authorities regarded those whites who resided in the Caprivi as having 'gone 
native'. What this meant really was that their standard of living had deteriorated as has 
their moral fibre, this being the description attached to being native, to being a 'Caprivian' 
at that stage.  The administration, however, could do little since it was not part of its 
policy to encourage whites to settle in the territory. Unlike as in other parts of the 
mandated territory, no incentives were provided to encourage white settlement in the 
Caprivi. Secondly, the mere fact that those few whites albeit being 'derelicts' and 'native', 
managed to settle in the territory and were able to withstand malaria and other diseases, 
challenged the official policy of discouraging whites from settling in the area because it 
was malarial and therefore not suitable for white settlement. All of this contributed to the 













The Creation of the Caprivi Identities: Germany's Riparian State on the 
Zambezi 
 
At the suspension of the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty in 1914 the territory comprising the 
Caprivi had, in principle, been 24 years under German rule. In practice, however, 
Germany's presence in the Caprivi was just five years old. Germanys’ presence in the 
Caprivi is usefully divided into two periods, 1890 to 1909, and 1909 to 1914. This section 
will follow this sub-division in discussing a variety of related themes: the spatial creation 
of the Caprivi identities and, how the Caprivian ‘absurdity’ was administered during the 
German period, until the intervention of World War I. 
 
Creating the Caprivi Identities  
 
The foundation of the Caprivi identities was laid down during the pre-colonial times 
(Chapter Two). During that time, the native inhabitants of the area roamed freely 
throughout their different areas and were conscious of the extent of their spheres of 
influence. However, the scope of the modern Caprivi identities has its roots in the so-
called Scramble for Africa which caused a shrinking of the pre-colonial geographical 
dimensions of this entity. The boundaries of the Caprivi have been defined either by 
treaty, agreement or exchange of notes but only portions have actually been demarcated. 
Two most important treaties that account for the Caprivi are the Portuguese-German 
Convention of 30 December 1886 and the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890. 
According to the Portuguese-German Convention the boundary ran from Andara to the 
Katima Mulilo Rapids. Thus the ’straight line  from Andara to Katima Mulilo no longer 
simply formed an international boundary between South West Africa and Angola, but 
also between South West Africa and Northern Rhodesia from the Kwando to the 
Zambezi.’25. The so-called Protectorate Act of 27 June 1890, which placed King 
Lewanika under the protection of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) at the 
behest of Chief Khama of the Mangwato26 as a deterrence against internal feuds and 
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attacks from the Matebele, and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 11 June 1891, placed 
Barotseland within the British sphere of influence to the north of the Caprivi.  
 
The 1 July 1890 Anglo-German Treaty was a result of protracted negotiations between 
the two imperial powers in which Great Britain recognized an extension of Germany's 
sphere of influence so as to give the latter access to the Zambezi. Zeller has argued that 
the Caprivi Corridor was an insignificant issue in the negotiations for the 1890 treaty, a 
'by-product in the course of a far more important exchange of territory'. He continues: 'the 
islands Heligoland and Zanzibar were central to the German-British agreement, and 
Germany made very far-reaching concessions to the British interests in East Africa to 
regain the small, but symbolically and, at that time, strategically crucial rock in the north 
sea'. 27 This might well have been the case. However, lest it be forgotten, Germany had 
already gained access to the Zambezi some three or four years before this treaty was 
signed via the 1886 Portuguese-German Convention which provided a boundary that ran 
from Andara to Katima Mulilo Rapids at the Zambezi (my emphasis). A close look at the 
wording of the treaty reveals that the key provision was 'free access to the Zambezi', 
which was intended to guarantee access and to prevent an encroachment of English 
territory on the German strip, or rather influence, embedded in the Portuguese-German 
Convention. The dilemma for Great Britain at this time was that this German area of 
influence in central Africa (except access to Zambezi) had not been - and needed to be - 
defined. Whatever it was that Britain intended to do in that region, she felt confined by 
this anomaly. It is because of this that the importance of the creation of the Caprivi is 
recognized here. It is the political, rather than the economic, factors that were crucial in 
the creation of this entity, and this should not be brushed aside. ‘For the time being its 
political value is greater than its economic worth’, Seiner reported.28  
 
This is supported by the thinking of Lord Selborne, then High Commissioner of South 
Africa when the issue of the settlement of the southern boundary of the Caprivi was being 
discussed. The British Colonial Office had received various suggestions from the 
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authorities in Bechuanaland and in South Africa. Most important among these was the 
suggestion of Major H.J. Goold-Adams, Resident Commissioner in Bechuanaland, and 
one by Lieutenant-Colonel Francis W. Panzera, former Resident Commissioner at 
Mafikeng in Bechuanaland. Goold-Adams suggested that Germany should renounce the 
right of 'free access' to the Zambezi and in exchange, the boundary of GSWA between 
the 22° S and 18°S would be extended eastward and run along the 21° 15' E, so as to give 
an equivalent piece of territory to Germany.29 According to Akweenda, this territory 
suggested by Goold-Adams was smaller. Alternatively, Goold-Adams suggested, that 
Britain might agree to a strip of miles south of the 18th parallel extending eastward from 
the 21° E to about 23° 30'' E.30 Panzera disagreed with the suggestion made by Goold-
Adams. On 10 December 1907 he advised the High Commissioner that Britain should 
instead acquire the whole tongue of the country owned by Germany north of 
Bechuanaland.31 According to Panzera, to give Germany a territory north of the 22° 
would interfere with the vested interests of the white farmers. Panzera suggested instead 
that the Caprivi Strip could be exchanged for the territory situated north of the Nossob 
River, south of the 22° S, west of the 21° E, and east of the 20° E. According to Panzera, 
the suggested area was valueless, caused considerable trouble to the British, and had no 
recognized vested interests in it.32 He also feared that if the German interpretation were 
adopted, the boundary would cut about four miles south of the Colonial Administration's 
police camp which was at Muhembo Drift on the west bank of the Okavango River. 
According to Akweenda, not only was the Muhembo Drift the only place where the 
police could cross the Okavango River, but the police camp was extremely important as it 
enabled the Colonial Administration to control the border  and particularly the prevention 
of 'diseased cattle' from entering Bechuanaland.33 It was reportedly built at a cost of 
£575.00.  
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Even though Lord Selborne requested the Colonial Office to propose to the German 
Government either the Goold-Adams or the Panzera solutions, Lord Crewe, former 
Secretary of State for Colonies, advised against communicating the above suggestions to 
the Germans who might evoke a counter-proposal, especially the exchange of the Strip 
for Walvis Bay.34 Indeed on 22 July 1908, the British Ambassador in Berlin presented an 
exchange offer to Germany in the form of an inferior part of the Kalahari in the 
southwestern part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, which was of course unacceptable to 
Germany.35 To revert back to Lord Selborne in regard to the political importance of the 
Caprivi Strip at this time and indeed to re-emphasize that the territory was after all not so 
very insignificant during the negotiations which resulted in the 1890 treaty, let us 
examine what Selborne had to say:  
 
Politically, Caprivi Strip is most disadvantageous to Britain...such a strip, penetrating like a wedge 
between three British Administrations (Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia and Southern 
Rhodesia), is sure to be a source of trouble. Further, the strip could not be delimited without 
causing annoyance and irritation to the Barotse and Batawana Chiefs who lived in that area.36  
 
It is argued elsewhere in the thesis that ultimately, Germany desired to be a neighbour in 
central Africa to Britain, to be ’...a thorn in the English flesh,’37 particularly during a time 
when Cecil Rhodes desired to push northwards, with his grandiose schemes, among them 
the Cape to Cairo rail route. Coincidentally, this would either terminate at or cross the 
Zambezi, over which Germany had gained access. The scheme envisioned an east-west 
link, either by waterways or rail links. This was to be a cross-road. Was the creation of 
the Caprivi Strip an attempt to stem Cecil Rhodes’s push northwards? If yes, would this 
make the Caprivi less important in relation to Germany's other colonial projects? Rothe, 
in his report, viewed the importance of the Caprivi Strip in relation to the Cape to Cairo 
project: ‘Owing to the increased importance of German Barotseland to German S.W. 
Africa, in consequence of the opening of the Cape to Cairo railway to Victoria Falls, I 
decided to make the acquaintance of this little known land and people.’ In fact, he 
                                                 
34Letter No. 1280/1908 from Lord Elgin, signed H.W. Just, to F.O., 10 March 1908, F.O. 367/79 
35Fisch, 1999: pp. 16-17 
36Selborne to Secretary of State, 23 December 1907, F.O. 367/79, Folio 8448, In Akweenda, ibid., p.133. 












suggested an alternative to the Cape to Cairo route, a rail communication by extending 
the Otavi line (GSWA) as far as Katima Mulilo or Sesheke, emphasizing the important 
geographical position of this area in relation to British possessions: 
 
There is no question as to this trans-African line being a financial success, for both passengers and 
mails would undoubtedly elect to shorten the journey by 1300 km by taking this route in 
preference to that of the Cape to Cairo railway. Cape 2640 km to Victoria Falls whereas W. 
African line at most 1300; shorten voyage; more interesting country; further colonization, Rothe 
concluded.38  
 
It is often remarked that the colonial administrators missed an opportunity to reverse 
“‘the outrage to geography and all common sense”’39 when they failed to incorporate the 
Caprivi either into Bechuanaland Protectorate or Northern Rhodesia. As both were under 
British control, it was assumed that this could be done with less difficulty. As Selborne 
correctly argues above, this was equally a Pandora’s Box. The Barotse believed the 
Caprivi rightly belonged to them, as indeed they continued to be given privileges to fish 
and cut reeds in its waters even after the signing of the 1890 Treaty. On the other hand, 
the Batawana Chiefs also had vested interests in the Caprivi Strip. Could an attempt to 
'give back' the strip only have flamed other conflicts, and resulted in a further partition of 
the territory? While it may be argued that Barotseland had a stronger claim in this case, 
there is no basis to exclude Bechuanaland. In fact, as Akweenda reveals, even though the 
independent Government of Botswana did not challenge the southern boundary of the 
Caprivi at independence, maps produced in that country, both official and private, 
indicate otherwise.40 Of interest here is the proposal by Mr. Tsheko, an elected member 
of the Bechuanaland Protectorate Legislative Council. On 22 November 1963, prior to 
the independence of Botswana, he proposed that the government take steps to resume 
responsibility for the administration of the Caprivi Strip.41 Akweenda believes Tsheko 
wished to achieve more than just administrative control, maintaining that Tsheko wished 
Britain or newly-independent Botswana to claim title to the territory in question. Tsheko 
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argued that the Caprivi Strip was part and parcel of Ngamiland administered by the Chief 
and District Commissioner for Ngamiland, and, further, that the indigenous inhabitants of 
the strip are one and the same as the inhabitants of Ngamiland and the Chobe, and the 
‘people of SWA have no interest whatsoever in the Strip because they know it has never 
belonged to them’. For him, the disadvantage of the Strip, which he called this part of 
Bechuanaland, lay in the fact that it cut off Bechuanaland completely from a common 
frontage of two African states - Northern Rhodesia and Angola. Economically, he 
reasoned, the connection of Bechuanaland with Angola is very important because it 
affords Bechuanaland access to the sea coast in Angola for both exports and imports. 
Connection with Northern Rhodesia on a much wider frontage than was the case could 
link Bechuanaland with the rest of the African continent and therefore provide it with an 
outlet to its beef market. The motion was supported unreservedly by Mr. Masire, member 
of the Legislative Council, who declared: ‘Here at any rate we have a territory which is 
wrongly occupied and which is so vital to our economy and...to our defense’.42. Masire 
urged the Council to 'press on Government to do something about this Caprivi Strip'.43 It 
is significant to record that the dispute between Botswana and Namibia over 
Kasikili/Sedudu began during Quett Masire's presidency. The missing equation in this 
contest for the Caprivi is the indigenous people of the territory. Their wishes as to which 
territory they would belong was ignored. It is suffice to reiterate here what is recorded in 
Chapter Seven, during consultations for the incorporation of SWA into the Union in 
1946. The Native Commissioner reported then that the people of the Caprivi looked on 
any return to Barotse rule with fear, in other words, they would not have willingly 
returned to that exploitative regime. 
 
The preceding discussion has illustrated how the Caprivi was created, such a creation 
being best described as a ‘political and geographical freak.’44 It became clear that its 
spatial identity was highly contested and that it was just a corridor - pointing like a pistol 
or dagger at the heart of central southern Africa. Regardless of the shape it was to take 
and the implications of its existence, its foundation was to quench Germany's thirst for 
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water (free access to the Zambezi), human labour and other resources, believed at the 
time to be in abundance, such as coal, diamonds and blue earth. For some, the creation of 
the Caprivi was to serve ‘... as a jumping off place for further territorial acquisitions; and 
if the strip had been all it was believed to be, it certainly might have given Germany a 
strategic advantage, for it points like a pistol at the heart of Rhodesia...’.45 When this 
perception of plenty came to naught, Germany used the Caprivi as a bait for territorial 
exchange, desiring to receive Walvis Bay from the British. Largely, the perception of its 
uselessness had set in, and its inhabitants were in any case being portrayed as just little 
serfs of the Barotse, and being not of much significance. In fact, they are imaged as 
Barotse for most of this time. Indeed, even the territory was not referred to as GSWA, 
and therefore the foundation for separateness from the Mandated Territory was laid 
during this time. Most maps refer to the area as the German Zambezi region or German 
Barotseland or as Deutsch Bechuanaland or Sambezi Korridor.46 Indeed, geographically, 
and on the map, the Caprivi is embedded in the Zambezia region, far removed from the 
rest of SWA. This would confer on it the attribute of a remote and unhealthy place, which 
is a strong constitutive element of the Caprivi identities. 
 
Administering the Caprivi during the German Colonial Rrule 
 
A Sphere of Influence, 1890-1909 
 
It is usually accepted that the area that constituted the Caprivi Strip was a 'no-man's-land' 
between 1890 and 1909. This claim is refuted elsewhere in this dissertation. Rather there 
was no effective European presence or administration but the indigenous people owned 
the land, under effective control of their tribal leaders. Another misinterpretation is that 
Germany lost interest in the area upon realization that the Zambezi River was not 
navigable and that the territory was a useless or poor piece of colonial acquisition. That is 
why, it is believed, it took almost 19 years to establish an administration in the area and 
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even then, only after several complaints from the British. This perception is also not 
entirely correct. Factors which account for Germany's long delay in setting up a presence 
in the Caprivi Strip are recited by Fisch (1999), Zeller (2000), Flint (2003),47 and many 
others who support the theory of ‘uselessness’ or frustrated dreams in this regard. While 
it is recognized here that there was simply no German presence in the Caprivi during this 
time, it is also correct to state that the territory remained a German sphere of influence. A 
sphere of influence described the 'territory exclusively reserved for future occupation by a 
power which had effectively occupied adjoining territories.'48 Contributing to the 
meaning of sphere of influence is Hall: 
 
...[it] indicates the regions which geographically are adjacent to or politically group themselves 
naturally, with possessions or Protectorates, but which have not actually been so reduced into 
control that the minimum of the powers which are implied in a Protectorate can be exercised with 
tolerable regularity. It represents an understanding which enables a state to reserve to itself a right 
of excluding other European powers from territories that are of importance to it politically as 
affording means of future expansion to its existing dominions or Protectorates, or strategically as 
preventing civilized neighbors from occupying a dominant military position.49  
 
It is noted from the above quotation that the purposes of spheres of influence was, firstly, 
to constantly and gradually extend the occupation of the colonizing State into the 
hinterland, and secondly, to avoid conflict with other states. There was no given time 
period for occupation of a sphere of influence from the date of declaration. Indeed, as 
Oppenheim50 and Lindley51 remind us, a declaration of a sphere of influence did not in 
itself vest territorial rights of a legal nature in the State exercising the influence. That is 
why declarations of spheres of influence were normally followed by 'agreements' which 
served to delimit the sphere of influence but also amounted to a 'promise on the part of 
each of the parties to it to abstain from doing anything that might lead to the acquisition 
of sovereign rights within the sphere allotted to the other'52, what Akweenda refers to as a 
contractual right in the nature of forbearance or preclusion.53 It should be noted that 
agreements to respect spheres of influence were only binding on parties to the agreement. 
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Hall maintains that the agreements 'warns of friendly powers' but not 'covert hostility' 
from third parties.54 Hence the British could not intervene or even acquire the Caprivi 
Strip because they were party to the 1 July 1890 Anglo-German Treaty, whereas the 
British  laid claim to the territory situated between Angola and Mozambique even though 
it was within Portugal's sphere of influence recognized in the German-Portuguese 
Declaration of 30 December 1886. The British when laying claim to Mashonaland and 
Matabeleland, which Portugal recognized through the Anglo-Portuguese Agreement of 
11 June 189155, stated that they had a better claim (Agreement with King Lobengula) and 
that there was no effective occupation.  
 
To summarize, the Caprivi Zipfel was administered as Germany's sphere of influence 
only between 1890 and 1909. This accounted for the tardy establishment of a European 
presence in the territory because spheres of influence are, by their nature, demarcations of 
future action or occupation which do not have a time limit. A colonial power could 
decide not to occupy a sphere of influence after all. It is argued here that Germany did not 
loose interest in the Caprivi as often remarked and that it was not legally bound to set up 
an administration in the territory as per British protestations. This is because spheres of 
influence do not by their nature vest territorial rights. Germany considered infrequent 
reports on this sphere of influence (Rothe 1904; Seiner 1905) sufficient administrative 
tool during this period. Of course this was not tolerated by the British who complained 
about the territory being a safe haven for wrongdoers and poachers. Germany's attitude 
was that it was not necessary to incur the expense of maintaining officials in the territory, 
noting that those 'committing misdemeanors were in any case mainly British subjects and 
were, therefore, a British responsibility'.56 While no doubt all sorts of white vagabonds 
inhabited the Caprivi Strip, it appears British concerns were not purely administrative but 
were motivated by a desire to retake the territory. Seiner believed that the British were 
merely piling up evidence to show Germany's incompetence as a pretext to lay claim to 
the Caprivi Strip. Incidentally, he also reported that they were doing the same with the 
Portuguese Government, accusing it of allowing Mambaris (half-castes) to conduct slave 
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trading on its soil. This line of argument is cemented by Zeller who writes that British 
misgivings were situated within a broader international debate of Germany's capability to 
run her overseas territories in a sound manner, sparked by the brutal handling of the 
Nama and Herero uprising, and similar events in Tanganyika.57 
 
Ma-Dostela58 in Der Caprivi Zipfel59, 1909-1914 
 
Germany's attitude to events in the Caprivi Strip promptly changed when German 
nationals began to engage in importing potentially diseased cattle, arms and ammunition 
from Northern Rhodesia and Angola into GSWA through the Caprivi Strip.60  What was 
perceived before as a British problem suddenly became a mutual concern. It was then that 
Captain Kurt Streitwolf (Kambungu to the Masubiya; and Kataramatunga to the Mafwe, 
meaning one who surveys the country) was sent to the territory which did not even have 
an official name (see above). It was only in 1911 that the name Caprivi Zipfel appeared in 
official documents. Zeller has convincingly argued that the name is often wrongly taken 
to have been given to honour Duke Leo von aprivi, the German Chancellor whose 
signature is affixed to the Heligoland-Zanzibar treaty.61 In reality, instead, it bore an 
undertone of ridicule aimed to mock the man whose poor 'state-crafting' had left the 
colony of GSWA with a disgraceful territorial appendix allegedly without value.  
 
Kambungu (Streitwolf) departed Gobabis on 15 November 1908 to arrive at the Zambezi 
River opposite the British station of Sesheke in February 1909.62 Accompanied by 
fourteen Herero and Nama and three whites, Kambungu's expedition travelled through 
Bechuanaland and was equipped with one wagon, one cart, three horses, six mules and 
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thirty oxen. The passage through Bechuanaland was a difficult one, but afforded 
Kambungu an opportunity to familiarize himself through discussions with Lieutenant 
Hanney (British official stationed at Kazungula in Bechuanaland Protectorate), with the 
English approach to native administration in their colonies. Kambungu recorded places 
en route, among others Sebetwane’s Drift, Mababe, Letschuane's (Liswani, of the 
Masubiya, more correctly Chika) - the first of these named after the Makololo leader. He 
crossed the Chobe River at Ngoma after making his way to Kazungula to see Captain 
Eason, the Bechuanaland Protectorate magistrate stationed there. It was at Ngoma that 
Kambungu apparently received the news, for the first time, from three white men he met, 
that all the Malozi had moved out of the Caprivi taking all the cattle, their own as well as 
those of the subject people. From Ngoma Kambungu made for the Zambezi, passing 
Lusese, a Masubiya village, on the way. 
 
The effects of the 1904-1907 Herero-Nama uprising on the turn of events in the Caprivi 
Strip have not yet been fully appreciated. When the arrival of the ma-Dostela (the best the 
old people could make of Deutch) was eminent, so oral history in the Caprivi has it, the 
people were forewarned (probably by the British) that the Germans were cruel and killed 
and ate people. One conclusion could be that the news of the above genocide travelled 
ahead of the Germans. This accounts for why the Lozi fled, and a number of especially 
Masubiya, chose either to cross into Bechuanaland or Northern Rhodesia. Those numbers 
that stayed behind went into hiding in the thickets of the forests or on islands. The choice 
by Kambungu, discussed below, to reconstruct tribal administration, a sort of indirect rule 
which he partly copied from the English in Bechuanaland, should thus be interpreted as 
flowing from a desire to counteract the negative perceptions people had of German rule 
as a result of the 1904-1907 genocidal war. Kambungu reportedly wrote letters to his 
superiors in which he expressed his 'admiration for the English approach and his regret 
about the mistakes the Germans had made in their treatment of the Herero'.63  
 
Kambungu immediately set about establishing a town on a slight elevation, known 
locally as Luhonono (Terminalia Sericea tree), which he named Schuckmannsburg in 
                                                 











honour of Bruno von Schuckmann, the imperial governor of GSWA at the time. 
Schuckmannsburg was ideally located because it was directly across the Zambezi from 
Sesheke (Mwandi), which was the administrative centre of the British in Northern 
Rhodesia. It afforded the ma-Dostela proximity to 'civilization', a post office and the Paris 
Mission hospital. The duties of the Imperial Resident included the establishment of 
effective administration, keeping undesirable immigrants out of the territory, removing 
from there white people of bad reputation64 and clarifying ‘the state of the land and its 
people’.65 Of importance, too, was the need to forge a spirit of harmony with adjacent 
territories. What did the ma-Dostela achieve within such mandate? The most eventful of 
year during the German period in the Caprivi was undoubtedly that of the one year tenure 
of Kambungu (Streitwolf). Fisch describes Kambungu's work as thus:  
 
‘In one brief year, Streitwolf had not only managed to make proposals to his government 
regarding the future of the Caprivi Strip, but had also laid the foundations for a stable, local 
administration. At least 2 000 people had returned from British territory. The population appeared 
to be peaceful and disciplined. They owned only 28 firearms and had no military strength. 
Psychologically, too, the Subiya had broken the link with the Lozi.’66  
 
Four 'achievements' can be discerned from the above: the completion of a report on the 
character of the territory and people; the establishment of local administration through 
chiefs; the establishment of peace both within and without territories; and lastly, the 
overthrow of the exploitative Lozi regime. 
 
I will comment on the advent of local administration and on what has become known as 
‘the Masubiya Cattle Case’ which seem to be the most significant aspect of the German 
period in the Caprivi Strip. As discussed above, Kambungu did not have much option but 
to decide to administer the indigenous population through local leaders in a system 
similar to indirect rule practiced in British territories. In fact, the idea to adopt the policy 
of indirect rule and to appoint local leaders was not Kambungu's. Both Rothe (1904) and 
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Seiner (1905) had recommended this model long before the arrival of Streitwolf. 
Consider the following by Rothe:  
 
Letia's nervous attitude is also shown by the extremely slack discipline prevailing in German 
Barotseland. I am of the opinion that the paramount chief in the German territory, Mamili of 
Mamili, is well aware of this fact. His promotion to the position of head of the German Barotse 
when the country is definitely occupied might, under favorable circumstances, enable us to keep 
those native tribes which are composed of Maijes (Mayeyi) and Masubias (the latter have given 
their name to the country in the native language) but the possibility must be faced, in the event of 
the establishment of German administration, of the kaffirs leaving German territory, if ordered to 
do by Lewanika, actuated, not by hostility towards us, but by their personal attachment to him.67 
 
 The above suggestion was to be repeated by Seiner: ‘In view of the exclusive policy of 
the British, it should be extremely desirable to find some happy solutio  of the question 
of the relations of the German Barotses to those living under British rule by making 
Captain [Chief] Mamili head of the German Barotses; this should be done as soon as the 
administration has been inaugurated. If only he be wisely handled, I have the utmost 
confidence in the tact and ability of this chief. If this was done the question of the natives 
and the security of stock would be settled once and for all, and the support of the 
Barotses...would be of the greatest advantage to German S.W. Africa.’ 68 Clearly, Rothe 
and Seiner's suggestion to appoint Chief Mamili of Linyanti, whom they incorrectly 
describe as paramount chief, was motivated by the fear of a revolt by the Marotse over a 
German occupation of the Caprivi Strip. They reasoned that appointing Mamili, whom 
the Marotse had themselves appointed at Linyanti, would serve to appease them and 
ensure that the Lozi felt they still controlled the people of the Caprivi Strip perpetually. 
This suggestion was taken up by Streitwolf himself at his arrival because he made several 
overtures to the Lozi to come back to the Caprivi, and particularly to Letia,  to assist him 
in administering the territory, which was overturned. He would soon regret having 
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wanted to do that as can be seen from his remarks:  
 
It was as well that this did not happen. It would have been simply impossible to have had a subject 
of Luanika's [Lewanika] in our Territory as quasi-Chief. The clear-cut separation was the only 
correct way and this I strove for while keeping within my rights because Luanika had renounced 
our country.69  
 
The other fear was that the remaining people would all follow Lewanika into Barotseland 
if he ordered them. Indeed, Flint (2003) reports that Letia actively tried to persuade the 
‘remainder of the Caprivians, mainly consisting of the Subia to whom Litia was himself 
closely aligned [his mother and wives were Subia] to follow the cattle north’. This was a 
misplaced fear. Streitwolf himself reported that ‘…the Malozi were disliked by the 
Masubia, otherwise they would all have gone across the river...leaving the Caprivi 
depopulated in those parts’.70 This is why conclusions, such as the one by Flint that the 
Masubiya and other people in the Caprivi shed away their Loziness thanks to the coming 
of the Germans and events such as the Masubiya cattle case, are not entirely correct. As 
shown in Chapter Two of this dissertation dealing with pre-colonial Caprivi identities, 
people never lost their identities regardless of the dominance of the Lozi identity, and in 
fact they never regarded themselves as Lozis. They always sought for ways to shake-off 
the Lozi identity, and German colonialism just aided or gave impetus to those attempts. It 
appears that even Chief Mamili, himself a Lozi, did not want to follow 'Loziness' even 
when he was recalled, partly because of his advanced age but also because of other 
factors, perhaps a dislike of a Lozi identity. This is revealed by his remarks after 
Streitwolf (Kambungu) told him that Lewanika had renounced his authority over Caprivi 
and its people. In expressing his thanks, Chief Mamili is said to have muttered: ‘...At long 
last they [his people] could settle down’.71   
 
Unlike Seiner, Streitwolf did not believe the Marotse posed a danger to the new German 
riparian state on the Zambezi. He wrote in a report: ’They are not a fighting people and 
would scarcely risk a rising, which could, of course, be directed against the Chartered 
                                                 
69in Kruger, 1984, p. 17.  
70In Kruger 1984: p. 14. 











Company only. In such a case, we would be left in peace as the Marotse would scarcely 
be so foolish as to attack two powers simultaneously.’ 72 Such an attack in Barotseland, 
Streitwolf reasoned, had its advantages: ‘A Marotse rising could only mean our gain, as it 
will drive thousands of natives across to us. Should the Marotse actually rise I should feel 
perfectly safe with the 16 Masubia and Matotela Police constables who are now being 
drilled by me.’73 It was not strange for one to pray for an uprising in the neighbouring 
territory if this would benefit oneself. Being administrator over a depopulated area which 
did not bring any income towards its administrative expenses, Streitwolf found himself 
between a rock and a hard place. As an incentive to attract people to re-settle in Caprivi 
he was forced not to impose the Hut Tax which was in place in British Territories. He 
even contacted Mathibe, Chief of the Tawana of Mababe under whom a sizable number 
of Masubiya who escaped from Caprivi were living, to persuade his new subjects to 
return to Caprivi.74 Of course Mathibe did nothing of the sort since he was also benefiting 
from the hut tax paid by the Subia. He was reported to have been very pleased with the 
Masubiya settling in his area as it meant ‘an increase in the Hut Tax in the Batawana 
Reserve...’75 
 
The history of chieftainships in the Caprivi is discussed in great detail in Chapter Two of 
this dissertation. It is enough to mention here that Streitwolf (Kambungu) appointed 
chiefs over two main groups: Chikamatondo (evidently as regent for Liswaninyana who 
was still young) for the Masubiya and Simataa (Mamili) for the Mafwe. For the 
Masubiya, Streitwolf did not 'give them a new administration'76 but rather a foundation 
on which to build anew. Their chiefs, the ruling Liswani family, were almost absent in 
the Caprivi Strip during 1909, having fled either away from Lozi attack or at the 
approach of the arrival of the ma-Dostela. Streitwolf himself records persuading Liswani 
(Chika), chief of the Masubiya in Bechuanaland, to go back to the Caprivi but he refused. 
This lays rest to claims by some scholars that the Masubiya chieftainship begins with 
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Chikamatondo. Indeed, at the passing away of Chikamatondo in 1945, the Masubiya 
chieftaincy reverted back to the Liswani dynasty. As regard the Mafwe Chieftainship, it 
was constructed under German rule and is disintegrating in the present times as illustrated 
by the break-away and the re-assertion of identity by the Mayeyi and baMashi. Noting 
that Seluka and Mwanota were living outside the borders of present day Caprivi, 
Streitwolf experimented with the idea of imposing Simataa Mamili over the Mafwe 
proper, Matotela, Mayeyi, Mambukushu and Mbalangwe, suggested by Seiner and Rothe 
in 1905 and 1904 respectively. They collectively assumed a new identity, Bafwe-Bayeyi. 
This invented identity did not last long.  As early as 1961 there were calls for its 
disintegration as well as in 1972 when Bayeyi was dropped and the ethnic alliance 
became known just as Mafwe. In present times this identity has produced two more 
chieftaincies, Mayeyi and Mayuni (Mashi). What is more, a contest in the form of who is 
the ‘true Mafwe’ has also emerged between the BaMashi (Mayuni) and the remaining 
elements of the ethnic alliance. 
 
An outstanding achievement for Kambungu was perhaps the return of Masubiya cattle 
which were driven across the Zambezi River by the Barotse shortly before his arrival. 
Two claims for the return of cattle on behalf of the Masubiya were lodged. The first was 
by Chief Mathibe of the Tawana in Ngamiland. He sought and was given permission to 
travel through German territory to Sesheke to see Letia. He arrived with 70 men, 50 of 
them armed, to plead on behalf of the Masubiya for the return of their cattle. It seems 
Chief Mathibe represented those Masubiya who moved into Bechuanaland upon the news 
of the approach of the Germans. According to Streitwolf, Letia's answer was that people 
who abandoned their chief forfeited their possessions and Mathibe departed without 
achieving his purpose. Streitwolf went ahead to claim the cattle on behalf of the 
Masubiya. Even though the case came to be known as the 'Masubiya Cattle Case', there 
were also claimants from the Mafwe side. Chief Mamili's subjects who claimed cattle 
included headman Mutumuswana of Kanono, Musisanyani Simataa I, Mufale, Matende, 
Batubadja, Mulawato and Salupeto. The delegation of Chief Chikamatondo consisted of 
Munihango, Muhatalizwi, Silumbu, Likando, Munimahela, Joba Muhulumwe, e.t.c. The 











initially claimed that all the cattle belonged to his father, King Lewanika, and were 
simply lent to Subia chiefs to graze and enjoy the dairy produce on behalf of the chief. As 
both Streitwolf and British officials could have none of this, he was forced to modify his 
statement and stated instead that he confiscated the cattle as an incentive for the people of 
Caprivi to come over to him.77 The verdict was the return of 291 of the 486 disputed 
cattle.78 Only one person, according to Fisch, was unhappy with the outcome of the cattle 
trial: Chief Simataa Mamili.79 According to Fisch, although Chief Mamili lost about 100 
cattle, only forty were recovered, largely due to the cowardice of his Ngambela 
Mutumuswana who dared not open his mouth because he was terrified of Letia. When 
Streitwolf reminded the chief of this, apparently he replied: ‘It is all not that serious, the 
number of cattle will increase again’.  80 The other reason why the chief was hesitant to 
send more witnesses was because he knew Letia won’t give him back the cattle. Consider 
the following words from Letia addressing Chief Mamili: 
 
I do not have a case with Mamili besides eight [8] people from Linyanti who bought the cattle and 
the rest are Lewanika's cattle. Mamili is our man whom we appointed there to represent the Lozi 
State in Itenge. 'You Mamili had no right to be on the Masubiya side because you have no case 
against the Lozi as you are a Lozi and the cattle you are now claiming were given to you by 
Lewanika as a Lozi subject and as a Lozi representative in Itenge.81  
 
Supporting the above statement by Letia is Kruger, who asserts: ‘Simataa [or Imataa as 
the Malozi called him] had been selected by the Malozi regime for the important position 
he was given by reason of good deeds in one or other campaign. It is said that the cattle 
he had accumulated, which were taken away by the Malozi when the Germans came, had 
come from a herd of 10 given to him when he was sent to assume his post at Linyanti in 
recognition of those services.’ 
 
The remainder of German administration of the Caprivi Strip was mainly uneventful. As 
Kruger correctly summarizes: ‘After Streitwolf had laid a good part of the foundation for 
the orderly administration not much time was left for others to build on it in any 
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particular direction"82 Streitwolf was followed by Lieutenant Hans Kaufmann (the locals 
called him Samukosi - one with a thick neck) who served in 1910 as Acting Resident and 
again from 1913-1914. Samukosi (Kaufmann) was followed by Lieutenant Viktor von 
Frankenberg, who was known to the locals as 'Mutatosi' - one who has a strutting walk, 
alternatively also known as 'Sankonko'. Von Frankenberg served from 1911 to 1913, 
during which period he produced excellent maps on Caprivi. He returned to the Caprivi 
on 4 June 1914, only to be removed from office on 21 September by Allied forces. 
German colonial administration of the Caprivi Strip was best summarized in the words of 
Trollope: ‘[the] Administration, largely indirect...did not leave any mark on the strip - it 
was featureless and consisted mainly of preserving the status quo’. 83 It was a laissez faire 
sort of administration. The only reminder left, apart from the Caprivi itself, of the 
German period is a small building of burnt brick with corrugated iron roof at 
Schuckmannsburg believed to have been the armory of German days. German colonial 
administration of the Caprivi is generally remembered by the older generation in the 
Caprivi as being good, even though there were reports of fairly severe physical 
punishment to attain discipline. 
 
The end of German rule in the Caprivi Strip as a result of the outbreak of WWI is quite 
telling from an administrative perspective. It became the first Allied occupation of enemy 
territory and actually Germany's first loss in the war while the rest of GSWA was still 
occupied. A Southern Rhodesia force of the BSAP gathered at Sesheke, occupied 
Schuckmannsburg and formally took control of the Caprivi Strip. A full account of the 
occupation of Schuckmannsburg by a B.S.A.P. contingent is provided by Lieutenant 
Stephens of the B.S.A.P., entitled 'With No. 1 Mobile Troop B.S.A.P. to 
Schuckmannsburg'.84 The BSAP column which occupied the Caprivi Strip was 
commanded by Major Capel, D.S.O and was formed at Palm groove siding in Southern 
Rhodesia. It consisted of No. 1 Troop from Salisbury under Lieutenant Stephens, which 
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was mobilized on 8 August 1914 and congregated in Salisbury on 10 August and began a 
two day train journey to Victoria Falls; No. 4 Troop from Bulawayo under Lieutenant 
Parsons; a machine gun section from the Depot under Lieutenant Tribe; and 40 armed 
Native Police. On 26 August No. 1 Troop was ordered to proceed to Kazungula to erect a 
fort which was completed on 13 September. The column then proceeded to Sesheke in 
Northern Rhodesia opposite the German town of Schuckmannsburg via Livingstone and 
was joined by a garrison from Kazungula on the way, to arrive at Sesheke on 21 
September 1914. Lieutenant Stephens, locally known as 'Sirupula' or 'Chirupula', was 
immediately sent across to ask the Germans to surrender to avoid bloodshed. Sirupula, 
accompanied by Corporal Vaughan and Native Corporal Kapambue, met Sankonko (Herr 
von Frankenberg), the German Resident, and after prolonged discussion it was agreed 
that the camp would be handed over without resistance. The German Resident 
surrendered to Major Capel on 21 September 1914 and the next day, 22 September 1914, 
the troops were assembled in the square for the raising of the Union Jack. Sankonko 
(Frankenberg) and his European Sergeant, Fischer, were sent to Livingstone and the 
Native Guards were held captive for a couple of days and made to dig trenches for the 
British anticipated trouble from the west. They were released when Letia intervened on 
their behalf. 
 
A Transferable Identity: The Caprivi Between 1914-1939 
 
An administrative tool during this period, justified on the basis of the remoteness and 
geographical location of the Caprivi Strip, was the neglect of responsibility by off-
loading the territory onto the next administration. The Caprivi changed hands four times 
during this period-from SWAA to Bechuanaland Protectorate (1921-1929), back to 
SWAA (1929-1939), and then to the Union Department of Native Affairs (1939-1980). A 
second and related administrative aspect which emerged during this period was the 
parceling of the territory into two, the great divide of the West and East Caprivi. West 
Caprivi was controlled by a police post at Andara and administered from Maun during 
the Bechuanaland period and from Rundu during the SWAA, while East Caprivi was 











Kasane) during the Bechuanaland period and from Schuckmannsburg, later Katima 
Mulilo during the SWAA.  
 
 
Military Rule, 1915-1921 
 
The Union forces which invaded GSWA during World War I had sailed back to Cape 
Town by August 1915. A military government was effective in SWA as from 9 July 1915 
and had as advisor on matters affecting the civil population and to exercise direct control 
as would vest in the civil administration in normal times, a Chief Civil Secretary, Sir 
E.H.L. Gorges. Shortly thereafter, in October 1915 the posts of military governor and 
chief civil secretary were abolished and replaced by that of Administrator, who took over 
powers and functions of both. This was the position until the war had run its course, 
which led to the establishment of the League of Nations, the body which concluded that 
the people of South West Africa were not yet ready to govern themselves and that 
another power was needed to safeguard and promote their material, moral wellbeing and 
social progress, and to lead them on the path to self-determination. The Mandate System 
was born, and SWA was placed under the Union Government on behalf of the British. At 
a special session in September 1919, the Parliament of South Africa passed the Treaty of 
Peace and South West Africa Mandate Act, 1919 (Act 49 of 1919), to give effect to the 
Mandate. This was followed by another enactment, the Treaty of Peace Act (Act 32, 
1921). In October 1920, a parliamentary commission was appointed to enquire and report 
on a suitable form of civil administration for SWA, which was virtually under military 
rule until 1 January 1921. 
 
As for the far-removed Caprivi Strip, immediately after the removal of the German 
Resident, a submission was made by Mr. J.H. Venning, District Officer at Sesheke, 
famously titled ‘The Newly Acquired Country Between the Zambezi and Mashi Rivers’ 
in which he pleaded for restoration of Barotse Rule in Eastern Caprivi, concluding:  
 
Although it may be unwise to allow the powers of the Marotsi to spread beyond its present limits, 











the Strip. The Caprivi Strip, at least a portion of it between the Mashi and Zambezi Rivers, could 
be administered in the same way as other districts in Northern Rhodesia outside the Barotsi 
Reserve, and the people of this country could then freely enjoy their former privileges of grazing, 
fishing, reed-cutting and ploughing, without interfering with rights of the present occupiers of the 
land.85   
 
Venning went in great detail to show how the people of Caprivi Strip were just serfs of 
the Lozi and how their claims to sovereignty and independent dynastic rule before Lozi 
subjugation was just a figment of their imagination. This is not surprising, for he was 
serving the interests of his people - the Barotse. Unfortunately Venning's exposition, 
regardless of its context, had been quoted by several scholars over time as proof that there 
were no chieftainships in the Caprivi prior to the arrival of the Lozi (see Chapter Two). It 
is not known under whose instruction Venning's submission was prepared. A copy of it 
was passed over to the SWAA by the Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia when 
discussions for the so-called Barotse privileges were underway. Whether the case was 
presented by Northern Rhodesia or not, is also not known. Venning even went to the 
extent of summoning the people of the Caprivi Strip to explain the change in 
administration and how they should not fear the Barotse anymore, sort of preparing them 
for eventual Barotse occupation. 
 
Venning's attempt was stopped in its track by the designation of Captain Eason, 
Magistrate at Kazungula (Bechuanaland Protectorate), as the authority responsible for the 
control of the Caprivi. It has been difficult to establish why the British, acting on the 
advice of the High Commissioner, decided on this arrangement. It is possible that the 
decision not to transfer the Caprivi Strip to Northern Rhodesia was as a result of South 
African pressure. Also, while there is no evidence to suggest that the people of the 
Caprivi were formally consulted, one might go along with Kruger's conclusion:  
 
But the magistrate at Kazungula, whose seat was close to the Masubia in the east and who had a 
good number of those people in his own district, with fairly free movement both ways across the 
border [Mr. Venning himself reported that many of the people had cleared across to 
Bechuanaland], would have been well aware of Masubia sentiment respecting the talk about 
joining or rejoining Barotseland. That sentiment would have been firmly against, just as there 
would have been strong opposition from the tribesmen westwards, however kindly disposed the 
Malozi may have declared themselves to be.86  
                                                 
85J.H. Venning, [undated]  p. 8.  












Kruger concluded, ‘The Masubia themselves, if not the other inhabitants of the Caprivi, 
may well have made it their business to present a petition of sorts through the Magistrate 
at Kazungula.’87 Captain H.V. Eason resumed his duties as Special Commissioner for the 
Caprivi east of the Mashi River on 20 November 1914 at Schuckmannsburg but retained 
Kazungula as his headquarters since he had the northern district of Bechuanaland under 
his charge. A non-commissioned officer of the Protectorate Police, the first being 
Corporal (later Sergeant) Legge (mentioned above), was posted to Schuckmannsburg and 
was instructed to report regularly to the Special Commissioner at Kazungula and also to 
the Rhodesian Authorities at Sesheke on any matters that affected them. Therefore a kind 
of dual, albeit unofficial, reportage structure existed at the time. The names of the Special 
Commissioners who served the Eastern Caprivi during the period of military rule are: 
Captain H.V. Eason (1914-1915), Captain W. Surmon (1915-1916), Captain F. Garbutt 
(1917) and Captain H. Neale (1918-1920).  
 
The administrative yardstick during this period was that while law and order was to be 
maintained, authority was not to be asserted to an extent than was absolutely essential 
and no revenue was to come from the inhabitants. A couple of decisions and tasks were 
undertaken and implemented during this period. On 28 January 1916 the Barotse in the 
surroundings of Sesheke district were allowed access to the Caprivi for cultivation, 
fishing and reed-cutting for an initial period of one year beginning 1 July 1916. Perhaps it 
is necessary here to clarify the concept of 'Barotse' as it applied to the people of the 
Sesheke district, by merely adding that even though the concept is usually employed in a 
blanket manner, the majority of them were actually Masubia. The fact that Lewanika 
appointed his son, Letia, to govern over those people does not make them Barotse. Of 
course there were small numbers of Barotse among them. It was thus difficult for the 
Masubia in the Caprivi to deny their kin across the river access to natural resources which 
they had shared since time immemorial. In 1918 permission was granted, with the 
blessing of Chief Chikamatondo, to the Zambezi Transport Syndicate to open a store at 













Kabulabula in the Masubia area. On 20 April 1920, the High Commissioner gave 
permission to the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Church to build a mission school at 
Ikaba, believed to have been the principal village in Chief Chikamatondo's area. The 
school was established and a native teacher appointed. He was supervised by a European 
named G. Wilmore whom the Mission had sent to Caprivi and who had his headquarters 
at Kalimbeza near Lifumbela's village. The average attendance at the school was 40 and 
each learner was required to contribute 6d (sixpence) a month.88 This was the first school 
to be established by the SDA Church and, indeed, the first modern school in the Caprivi. 
Apparently a population census was conducted in 1921, giving 2003 males and 2246 
females, a total of 4,249 people. It is not known whether this number includes children 
and since no other census was carried during this period, this figure is repeated in 
successive annual reports. 
 
Under the Bechuanaland Administration, 1921-1929 
 
When the Union Government became the Mandatory Authority over SWA it decided that 
the arrangement whereby the Bechuanaland Protectorate would continue administering 
the Caprivi  was reasonable, the only addition being that the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
now acted as agent of the Union Government, significantly, with due regard to the terms 
and spirit of the Mandate. The formal transfer of the administration of the Caprivi Strip to 
the Bechuanaland Protectorate was expedited by two legal instruments, the Governor-
General's Proclamation 12 of 1922 and the High Commissioner's enactment 23 of 1922. 
According to these proclamations, the laws of the Bechuanaland Protectorate were made 
applicable to the Caprivi Strip as from 1 January 1921. The pattern of administration 
applied in this period continued between 1914-21 and was not affected by the new 
responsibilities introduced by the Mandate. The people were left to their own devices and 
permitted to live in peace and quiet, which was necessarily a distinction between the new 
and the unforgiving hand of the old rulers, the Lozi. A number of traders were permitted 
to engage in activities in the Caprivi (see also above). These were M. Michelson (1921), 
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J.A. Legge (1921), R.F. Sutherland (1926) and Harrington (1927). As regards education, 
the number of schools run by the SDAs was increasing. Whereas there were only three 
schools in 1925 at Ikaba, Katima Mulilo and Linyanti, two new schools were added in 
1926, one at Nsundwa and another at Lusese.89 These were what were then known as 
bush schools, constructed using temporary materials such as thatch and reeds. Their 
continued existence from year to year was not always secure as communities moved from 
time to time due to floods, as occurred in 1925. During April, May and June of that year, 
large tracts of the eastern flood plains inhabited by the Masubia were flooded to a greater 
extent than had been the case for 20 years. A report by the Administration of 1926 
describes this flood as thus:  
 
...flood waters reached the highest level within the memory of the oldest inhabitants...In large 
tracts of the eastern portion of the Strip there was hardly a village which escaped being swamped 
and, in some cases, the inhabitants had to build their huts with the floors raised 3 or 4 feet above 
the ground level in order to escape the water.90  
 
By 1925, the number of schools in the Caprivi h d increased to 14, with the one at 
Katima Mulilo, where the headquarters of the SDA were now situated, being the most 
important one. The 1928 Annual Report reflects a grant of £46 made to the school at 
Kasika, its first mention and the only one in the eastern Caprivi Strip that was not under 
the management of the SDA but of the London Missionary Society (LMS). Kruger 
believes the school could have been established long before 1928, probably in 1921, that 
is, under the LMS banner, but did not survive long after 1928. In any case, the school was 
the only testimony within Caprivi of the efforts of the LMS through the work of 
Livingstone, of Helmore and Price and their families to create a mission station with 
widespread Christian influence in the Kingdom of the Makololo.  
 
It is reflected in the Annual Report of 22 December 1927 how Africans east of the Mashi 
River were flocking in steady streams to Livingstone to sell produce such as fowls and 
skins. Furthermore, even though there was no taxation in German times, free labour to 
the Administration was required, but when Bechuanaland Protectorate people moved to 
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the Strip they were to continue to pay Bechuanaland Protectorate Tax. The taxation of the 
people in the Eastern Caprivi during this time became an issue of control. In a letter dated 
25 November 1927 addressed to the Government Secretary at Mafikeng, the Acting 
Resident/Magistrate of Kasane wrote: ‘The taxation of Natives in the Caprivi Strip has 
become necessary only for the reason that the Basubia have each year become more 
indolent and their Headmen are having difficulty in collecting a crew of paddlers for 
Government work.’91 It appears that since people were being converted into participants 
in a cash economy (through the sale of produce at Livingstone), it was no longer possible 
to work for the Government without pay. What compounded the problem, the Acting 
Magistrate wrote, was because ‘...Nearly every Native...is the owner of cattle and a man 
in possession of 30 head is regarded as a person of moderate means’.92 
 
As to native administration, affairs were regulated by Proclamation 1/1919 of the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. According to this proclamation, the chief's kuta (court) was 
the principal one and its judgments were final except that provision was made for appeals 
against the judgment of a chief, in the first instance to a court composed of the Assistant 
Commissioner or Magistrate of the District and of the Chief, and in the event of their 
disagreeing, then the Resident Commissioner made a final decision. There was no 
evidence found to suggest that matters dealt with in the chief's courts in the Caprivi went 
on appeal during the period under review. Otherwise administration was limited to 
sending a police patrol once a year to the posts which were established at 
Schuckmannsburg, Katima Mulilo, Sambala (presumably Singalamwe), Bwabwata (West 
Caprivi), and west of the Okavango River, at Andara and Mbambi. It should be 
mentioned that during this time, the Caprivi territorial identity included parts of present 
day Kavango, east of the Okavango River. The rating of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Administration in regard to the well-being of the inhabitants of the Eastern Caprivi Strip 
is ranked high and favourably remembered by the inhabitants. Confronting Trollope on 
his inspection tour in 1937, one inhabitant said: ’Then the Bechuanaland government 
took us over and gave us many things including arms, ammunition, stores, schools and 













the sale of our cattle...’93 A full assessment of the impact of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate administration of the eastern Caprivi strip is to be found in the Trollope 
report: 
 
The handing over of the administration of the Strip to the Bechuanaland authorities was 
regrettable, though probably unavoidable at the time. During that period the natives enjoyed all the 
privileges of natives in Bechuanaland, privileges which we did not and could not continue. Stores 
sprung up and their profitable continuance was ensured by their possession of arms and 
ammunition licenses and by the fact that the natives were able to sell their cattle. Schools were 
started by missionary enterprise....So that the local natives when they start comparing their 
conditions, do not compare them with those of South West African natives (in comparison with 
whom they are well off), but with those in Barotseland of which they are really a part, or of 
Bechuanaland which they have experienced..94  
 
It can be noted from the above that even the authorities at the time regarded the Caprivi 
as part of Barotseland and not South West Africa. It is not surprising, therefore, as to why 
the inhabitants of the Caprivi chose to compare their situation with Barotseland and 
Bechuanaland, because they were administered as part of those territories. This aided the 
formation of a separate Caprivian identity. 
 
Appended to SWAA, the Caprivi Strip 1929-1939 
 
Even though Union Proclamation No. 196 of 1929 which transferred the control of the 
Caprivi Strip back to the SWAA expressed the 'expediency' of the move at that time, 
there was in fact nothing 'expedient' or that changed in the position of the territory-
geographically or in its remoteness to the rest of SWA. The reasons for taking back the 
Caprivi Strip are ably expressed by the East London Daily Dispatch of 28 August 1929: 
 
Another explanation, however, is that the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations only 
recently discovered that the Strip, with its few hundreds of Bushman inhabitants, is being 
administered by the wrong authorities. The Union Government, which was entrusted with the 
mandate over South West Africa, has, in the opinion of the Commission, evaded its full 
responsibility by offloading onto Bechuanaland the Caprivi Zipfel, its swamp, its fever and its 
wandering Bushmen. ...The Commission has therefore ordered the Strip to be restored to South 
West Africa and placed under the direct charge of the Administrator of that Protectorate. 
                                                 














Thus the perception of the Caprivi was still remote and unhealthy, pretty much the same 
as it had been seven years before when the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration 
took it over. It was still inhabited by 'primitive savages' as can be gleaned from the above 
description, and not much in the way of change was in the pipeline. Consider the 
following from the same news report: ’The only result will be the stationing there of a 
couple of South West policemen who, if they do not die of fever, will have as much 
game-shooting as they care to indulge in, but little else to occupy their time‘. Was this 
what happened?  
 
The SWAA resumed responsibility of the Eastern Caprivi Strip on 1 September 1929. 
Now that the territory had been incorporated into SWA (Proclamation 196 of 1929), the 
laws of SWA were made applicable (Proclamation 26 of 1929) though in practice nothing 
much changed. The Native Administration Proclamation (which followed the Union 
Native Administration Act of 1927) provided the means for regulating the administrative 
order, tribal organization, appointment and recognition of chiefs, the Administrator of 
South-West Africa being the upper authority and indigenous laws and customs were 
accepted as long as they were not repugnant to 'natural justice and morality'. The 
Criminal Procedure Law was to be followed, and the magisterial jurisdiction was given to 
the Magistrate at Grootfontein, which was a necessary formality. The appointment of 
Brittz as a Special Justice of Peace was also another formality. Higher Jurisdiction lay 
with the High Court of SWA. The Arms and Ammunition Proclamation and the Game 
Laws, too, were applicable. The classification of the territory as outside the ‘Police Zone’ 
or ‘Red Line’ meant that it was officially a prohibited area where persons who did not 
belong there could only enter with a special permit given by the Secretary for SWA and 
only if there was a good reason to enter. It also meant that the ordinary police did not 
operate there, the policy being to rely on tribal authorities in a kind of 'Indirect Rule' 
system. There was a relaxation concerning people from adjacent territories coming on 
friendly or family visits, entries being made subject to the issue of simple 'passes'. The 
arrangement of the 'two Caprivis' from the days of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 











that part east of the Mashi River; and the Western Caprivi Zipfel west of the Mashi and 
taking also the area that lay west of the Okavango River upwards as far as Mbambi, and 
which by definition of the boundary in the 1890 Agreement formed part of the Anglo-
German deal. A post was established at Andara to control the western area and a 
superintendent appointed to control the eastern portion. The above, while not conclusive, 
covers broadly how things were constituted during this period where in ordinary 
administrative matters the submission of periodic reports and direct correspondence 
between the Superintendent and the Secretary for SWA sufficed. Another administrative 
instrument which became important during this time, as will be shown below, was 
Inspection Tours by senior officials in Windhoek to outlaying posts such as 
Schuckmannsburg in the Eastern Caprivi. These, it will be argued, while necessary, were 
not very effective partly because they were very infrequent. Annual Reports under 
prescribed headings were submitted for incorporation as ‘appendices’ in the overall 
report of the Mandates Commission of the League of Nations. In this way, the Caprivi 
Strip was administered as an appendix of or footnote to South West Africa between 1929 
and1939. 
 
Before handing the Caprivi over the Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration had 
impressed on the South West Africa Administration two important issues pertaining to 
the Caprivi Strip, one being that in appointing a magistrate for the area the South West 
Africa Administration should consider an experienced person bearing in mind the 
troubles which resulted from ineffective German occupation, and also the importance of 
the Strip due to its isolation and geographical position adjoining no less than four 
separate governments which included that of Portuguese Angola. The other issue 
concerned veterinary supervision in the Strip and the danger of lung sickness arising from 
cattle movements from both SWA and Angola. The SWAA immediately responded to the 
second issue by stating that they will not provide either a veterinary officer or a stock 
inspector. The standpoint of the SWAA on this issue was that the quarantine of cattle and 
control of lung sickness was maintained principally in the interests of the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate. Indeed, keeping the strip free of stock diseases was important to the 











arrived at Kazungula (some passed through the Strip) and were inspected by the 
government veterinary officer (GVO) before being crossed by barge to Northern 
Rhodesia for use as meat on the copper mines. After these crossings, the GVO of the 
Protectorate would then trek into the Strip making a crossing at Mahundu and travel as 
far as Mohembo to examine all the cattle in the Strip. The cattle found to be infected were 
immediately destroyed as was those suspected to have been crossed illegally from West 
Caprivi which was a quarantine area into or out of which the movement of cattle was 
strictly prohibited under penalty of immediate destruction of cattle without compensation. 
In this way, the introduction of cattle diseases from outside was suppressed. The SWAA's 
interpretation of this issue as in the interest only of Bechuanaland Protectorate was also 
misplaced and unfortunate, for report after report mentions the lack of a market for the 
disposal of surplus cattle from the Strip because of a lack of veterinary control. The 
Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration, seeing that from their viewpoint the issue of 
veterinary control was the most important aspect of the change of administration, offered 
that its veterinary officer stationed at Kazungula should pay two annual visits, and such 
further visits as might be necessary, to the Strip to inspect cattle. The SWAA was asked 
to pay for the travelling expenses thus incurred. This suggestion was gracefully accepted 
by the SWAA and Mr. Webb, then GVO at Kazungula, paid visits to the Strip in 1930 
and 1932, the year in which his services were terminated. What is more, Mr. Webb 
agreed to one of his right-hand men going over to the Caprivi service to assist the new 
administration, particularly in matters related to stock control and employment of local 
tribesmen in the service. That person was Songeya (Songiya) Longone Chaka, briefly 
described in 1929 as follows: 
  
Chaka, 6'5, about 55 years of age, had, after an adventurous career, settled in the Strip some years 
ago. A Zulu of the royal house, he was alleged to have fled on the murder of his father and was a 
man whom the Bechuanaland authorities considered could be implicitly trusted and would be 
suitable for posting on the Mashi River with a Native Constable under him.95  
 
Advice to appoint an experienced magistrate in the Caprivi Strip was not followed. 
Instead Mr. W.S. Chadwick was appointed. His qualifications are not known, apart from 
                                                 











the fact that he was a Native Affairs official and a writer of big game hunting stories. 
Judging from the afore-mentioned article from the East London Daily Dispatch on 
hunting, he had the 'right credentials' for the Caprivi. It appears, though, that his 
appointment was temporary.  In fact, he was sent there before the hand-over, probably to 
ascertain the situation on the ground before hand over. He took up his position, only to be 
withdrawn or resign and was replaced by E.P. Brittz of the SWA Police, whom the locals 
called 'Namatama' (one with big cheeks), and was assisted for a short time by Constable 
Blignaut. For the west, Sergeant Wright was in charge. The instructions given to 
Namatama (Brittz) when he was posted to Schuckmannsburg related to the control of 
movement of stock; to prohibit hunting especially of species classified as ‘royal game‘, 
these being elephant, giraffe, rhino and hippo; restriction on the sale and supply of arms 
and ammunition; and the control of the issue of trading licenses and the hire of 
government land. He was however cautioned not to interfere with the authority of the 
chiefs and their customs more than was absolutely necessary. 
 
One of the very first tasks which Namatama (Brittz) accomplished in 1931 was the 
registration of firearms. This was necessary mainly for two purposes, firstly to determine 
the extent to which the people were armed as a control measure in case of an uprising, 
and, secondly, for observing the Game Laws. It was only those with registered firearms 
who were allowed to buy ammunition and even then, only from the superintendent. This 
was on top of the above provision of not killing royal game. The following tabulation 
indicates the number and make of firearms in the Caprivi in 1931, of course with 







                                                 












Rifle Masubia Mafwe Totals 
Martini/Henry 71 22 93 
Lee-Met fords or Lee-
Enfield 
28 3 31 
Muzzle-loaders 38 208 246 
Shotguns 47 2 49 
Other 5 2 7 
Total 189 237 426 
 
Table 4: Table showing number of firearms owned by tribesmen in Eastern Caprivi in 1931. 
 
The above ethnic classification is what was used at the time, therefore the Mafwe column 
includes those firearms owned by Mayeyi, Mbukushu, Totela, Mbalangwe and other 
groups then embedded in that broad identity. It can be noted from the above diagram that 
a greater proportion of what might be regarded as the more modern firearms of the time 
were in the hands of the Masubia living in the east, whereas the Mafwe and associated 
people in the west had mostly muzzle-loaders - tower-muskets of American manufacture. 
A possible explanation was that most of the arms especially owned by the Masubia were 
acquired during the Bechuanaland period, during which time an ex-Sergeant Legge had a 
license to deal in arms and ammunition on Impalila Island. The records are silent on how 
these firearms of American origin were acquired, surprisingly enough, in high numbers, 
considering that it was only in 1909 that Streitwolf (Kambungu or Katara matunga) 
reported that ‘these natives are practically unarmed‘,  or Seiner's report (1905) that only 
'five chiefs are in possession of firearms'. Could it be that some of these firearms were 
relics left by traders and hunters?  
 
The significance of the variations in type of firearm by ethnic group is to show the period 
of acquisition. The Mafwe had a large number of muzzle-loaders suggestive of an earlier 
period while the Subiya had more .303s and shotguns suggestive of later acquisition, 
which is during the Bechuanaland administration period. Also, it shows that the Subiya 
had proximity to trade routes of the time. The issue of strict observance of no hunting 











administration and the inhabitants,97 particularly since in neighbouring territories the 
same was not done. On the one hand, the inhabitants felt that they were deprived of a 
source of livelihood, and also income since skins and hides fetched good money in 
Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. Whereas the authorities restricted the amount of 
ammunition sold per annum as a control measure, this did not deter the inhabitants who 
turned instead to widespread use of snares as a form of catching animals. The chiefs were 
not happy with this either, even though there was a provision made for them to shoot two 
hippos for the pot per annum. The problem was partly compounded by the fact that 
officials especially from the Union hunted for sport in the Caprivi and were not subject to 
these restrictions.98 Elephants and hippos were also pests which destroyed people's 
gardens while they were not allowed to be killed. As will be shown below and also in 
Chapter Seven, the inhabitants accused the administration of protecting the lives of wild 
animals more than they cared about the people over whom they govern.  
 
While on this issue, it is perhaps approriate to report on the two related incidences 
between Namatama (Brittz) and Chief Simataa Mamili of the Bafwe (Bayei). On 15 
March 1937 Chief Simataa Mamili defied procedure (perhaps he might have lost patience 
with Namatama) and wrote directly to the Secretary for SWA requesting the issue of a 
larger allowance of ammunition and for permission to shoot elephants when they 
destroyed gardens. The response from Windhoek which was sent to the superintendent 
was that the matter was receiving attention and that Chief Mamili should be told to desist 
from writing straight to Windhoek but rather through the superintendent. It is not known 
whether Namatama forwarded this response to the chief. Instead one finds a letter the 
chief wrote to Namatama (Brittz), dated 9 May 1937:  
 
I am very sorry for the letter I received from the Secretary for SWA. You prevented it to come to 
me. Why? I want you to send it here so that I can hear how they did write to me...P.S. If you will 
                                                 
97 It was one of the reasons for the removal of Chief Simataa Mamili from his throne apparently because he 
hunted without permission from the authorities. At the Odendaal Commission public hearings the people 
complained that the government was more interested in preserving wild animals than it was in their welfare 
and demanded that it withdraw from eastern Caprivi. 
98Kruger [1984: 10] reports of a ministerial party accorded hunting facilities by Pretoria that went to excess, 











not send it here I am going to write to Secretary SWA Windhoek again.  99  
 
Another incidence, which occurred immediately following the above, pertained to the 
permit to kill only two hippos per annum. On 5 April 1937 Chief Simataa Mamili wrote 
to the Superintendent intimating that he had shot one hippo and asked for a pass to take 
the hide to Sesheke (Northern Rhodesia) to sell. The pass was duly given. Subsequently 
Brittz (Namatama) received information that Chief Mamili had taken more than one hide 
to Sesheke. On 23 April 1937 the Superintendent wrote to the Chief asking him to state 
how many hippos he had shot and noting that the matter was very serious. Initially no 
reply was received upon which the Superintendent dispatched a reminder. To this an 
evasive reply was given and on 5 May 1937 the Superintendent wrote again pointing that 
his question had not been answered and instructed Chief Mamili to come to Katima 
Mulilo for interrogation. The Chief answered back on 9 May 1937, demanding: ‘if you 
have heard that I am a thief you must also tell me...I also need not to be worried by the 
case which I do not know.’. When the Superintendent persisted in instructing the Chief to 
come to Katima Mulilo and that the question was still not answered, the Chief replied that 
he would come the next week to talk about it. But he never came to Katima Mulilo and 
never informed the Superintendent how many hippos he had killed. What became of 
Chief Mamili (his removal from the throne and subsequent banishment) is discussed in 
Chapter Four. The above should however not be interpreted merely as disregard of 
authority but deep seated resentment and defiance of colonial rule. It was a way, limited 
as it might have been, of showing that the Chief and indeed his people, did not approve of 
the policies under which they were governed. They perceived these policies as 
discriminatory and intended to impoverish them further. They could not sell their excess 
cattle for there was no market; they tilled the fields only for elephants and hippos to 
destroy these; wild animals which they were not allowed to hunt to supplement their diet 
as before. 
 
Chief Simataa Mamili was not the first to show his displeasure with the administrative 
set-up in the Eastern Caprivi. Chief Chikamatondo had earlier written a letter on behalf of 
                                                 












the Masubia to the Chief Native Commissioner for SWA in Windhoek requesting the 
removal of Superintendent Brittz (Namatama) from the Caprivi. According to a response 
from the Chief Native Commissioner addressed to Chief Chikamatondo (dated 18 May 
1938), the Masubia accused Brittz, among others, of lowering the selling price of mealies 
from 10/- to 3/- per bag; of keeping them in the dark as to  what was happening to the tax 
money being collected from them since there was no improvement in schools and no 
provision for shops; and lastly, that he threatened them with what happened to Chief 
Ipumbu would also happen to them if they opposed the administration.100 Chief 
Chikamatondo and his people suggested that the Northern Rhodesian system of leaving 
an officer in charge of an area for a short time only was the better course. It took a long 
time for the Masubia to get their response because the Administration in Windhoek was 
finalizing plans for the Additional Native Commissioner for SWA to undertake an 
inspection tour of the Caprivi Strip in 1937. One of the purposes of his tour was to 
investigate the Masubia complaints, which he duly reported on in his 1938 Report. Even 
though this official reported that the Masubia were ‘…undoubtedly...antagonistic towards 
Sergeant Brittz...’, and recognized the administration's weaknesses, he advised against 
fulfilling the demand for Namatama (Brittz)'s transfer, maintaining: ‘I am, therefore, 
quite unable to support the request for Sgt. Brittz's transfer. To do so now, even on other 
grounds than those advanced by the natives, would be creating a most undesirable 
precedent as such action would undoubtedly be misinterpreted as a pandering to their 
desires.’  101 So Namatama was not transferred, despite all the complaints - as to forbid 
the people from concluding that the administration was weak if it listened to their 
demands.  
 
Taxation was introduced in the Caprivi Strip in 1930 (Government Notice 160/1930), for 
the first time by written law. Each male between 18 and 65 years of age were required to 
pay 5/- per annum as a contribution to the Tribal Trust Fund, the accumulated moneys to 
be used for the benefit of the respective tribes (Bafwe-Bayei and Masubia). Although it 
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may appear that this was the first tribal levy, it was not. Such a limited definition of tribal 
levy does not take cognizance of the fact that tribal law provided and had always required 
tribesmen to contribute to the needs of the chief and the Kuta (court) by means of service 
or produce of the fields or of the hunt. It is the strong view here that the introduction of a 
tribal levy by the Administration succeeded with some ease because it was more or less 
modelled along the lines of the traditional tribal levy structure already existent in the 
Caprivi Strip. In fact, it is the strong belief that this same was applied during the German 
and Bechuanaland Protectorate Administration in the Caprivi where no taxes were 
collected from the inhabitants and, in return, were expected to render services to 
government work at no cost whenever required to do so. A variety of examples abound, 
such as communities providing paddlers for the barge, guides from one village to the next 
whenever the Superintendent was travelling, or the clearing and widening of roads from 
one village to the next. This is contrary to what was happening in neighbouring territories 
at the time where inhabitants were required to pay a hut tax, and this money was, in turn, 
used to pay for services provided to the administration.  
 
Even with the introduction of the modern tribal levy, the inhabitants did not consider this 
as an exemption from the traditional levy. They were still expected, and did, to 
participate in doing work at tribal headquarters and continued to bring food, which was 
not an amount expected to be unduly burdensome. Because of the depression, the two 
tribes were exempted from payment of the levy in the years 1933 (Government Notice 
128/1933), 1934 (Government Notice 78/1934), 1937 (Government Notice 180/1937) 
and 1938 (Government Notice 185/1938). Commenting on the 1936 tax collections, 
Trollope was satisfied: ‘I checked these (Trust Fund Stamps)...[the] cash collections for 
last year [vide Annual Report] shows an average payment of 34% of the total population, 
a very satisfactory position [Ovamboland percentage 5%, excluding corn payments].’102 
Police patrols inspected receipts for defaulters, and where they did not pay, defaulters 
were dealt with summarily by being ordered to work on such work of public importance 
such as aerodromes or roads when and where necessary. The introduction of taxation 
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should also be viewed as a form of administrative control. The two chiefs each received 
annual allowances of £20 from the Tribal Funds in the form of a salary. This reduced 
them to being government employees. As for the general inhabitants, it put them at the 
mercy of being forced into rendering free service to government as they could not afford 
to pay the required annual amount. Secondly, it also put them at the mercy of being 
abused by Tax Collectors who were administration employees. The Native Tax 
Collectors usually took cattle to the value of several times more than the amount of tax. 
They then took the cattle to the stores, sold them and pocketed the balance. In most 
instances villagers feared retribution and never reported this to the authorities thus 
leaving tax collectors who overcharged unpunished. 
 
Schools remained under the SDA Mission. Tuition was based on the Barotseland system, 
and Northern Rhodesia was kind enough to allow their Inspector of Schools for 
Barotseland to take care of the Caprivi schools also. The mission was unable to cope and 
a marked decline was recorded. The decline was mainly in terms of facilities such as 
classrooms which were of a temporary nature and required constant repairs. Furthermore, 
because of the absebce of a government financial subsidy, the mission was unable to 
attract and retain suitably qualified teachers. There were no health facilities in the Strip at 
this time.  
 
A dreaded lung sickness struck the Caprivi Strip in 1937. More than a thousand cattle 
were destroyed in an attempt to render the area non-infectious and the remainder were 
cordoned off and in due time inoculated with serum obtained by air from Kabete in 
Kenya where it was reportedly developed.103 This was an expensive exercise. The SWAA 
sent veterinarian Dr. Schmidt to take charge of the campaign under the guidance of 
Onderstepoort in the Union and with the collaboration of the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Veterinary Service. The campaign would not have succeeded were it not for the 
participation of the South African Air Force (SAAF). The Kabete vaccine had a short life 
span and this necessitated sending it by air at arranged intervals, firstly to Livingstone by 
scheduled air service, then by the SAAF to landing strips hastily prepared at scattered 
                                                 











places in the Caprivi Strip. According to Robert Nchindo, who was on the staff 
establishment of Superintendent Brittz (Namatama) at the time, the landing strips made 
for the Air Force pilots to land their small aircrafts carrying the vaccine were found, 
among other places,  at Singalamwe, Lizauli, Sikanjabuka, Kalimbeza, Mwauluka, 
Kabbe, Kasenu.104  With Robert Nchindo, this would be inconclusive account if no 
mention was made of those from the Caprivi who served the administration during this 
time in various capacities, becoming the very first 'public service' in the territory. The 
following table was drawn in 1937 by Trollope (p.4): 
 
 
Rank Name Appointed Emoluments 
Native Constable Songiya Chaka 
(Longone)
1.12.1929 $75 p.a & $5 uniform
N/Constable Labourer Matali Milinga 1.5.1930 $24 p.a & free uniform
do. Robert Nchindo 1.2.1935 $18 p.a   do.
do. Mumbone Mukendwa 1.12.1935 $18 p.a  do.
do. Silumbu Manwela 1.6.1937 $18 p.a               do 
do. Mubita Ntelamo Probationer $18 p.a                 do.
Herdboy Muyongo Mamili 1.5.1936 15/-p/month (inclusive)
 
Table 5: Table showing the Caprivi public service employees in 1937. 
 
Others, such as Mubyana Simon Simalumba and Mubita Sakutiya followed. The 
unsatisfactory designation of Native Constable/Labourer given to these men was 
apparently to distinguish them from the Native Constables of the SWA Police. There was 
a difference, as Trollope found out, in the salary structure applied in the Caprivi Strip. In 
fact, the workers complained in regard to their pay to him. While Trollope conceded that 
30s.0d per month (10s,0d was in lieu of rations) plus free uniform was a fair wage, this 
was only when compared with the predominant wages in the vicinity at the time. It was 
revealed, however, that the Caprivi wages were much lower than that which was paid to 
the majority of government 'boys' in Ovamboland. Once again, one sees the influence of 
neighbouring territories on what went on in the Caprivi. To rehearse the main argument 
in this chapter, the colonial administrative construction of the Caprivi was dictated 
frequently by events and happenings in neighbouring territories than in greater SWA, in a 
                                                 












sense, the territory was more aligned administratively to Northern Rhodesia and 
Bechuanaland Protectorate.  
 
It should also be recorded that the administrative centre shifted from Schuckmannsburg 
to Katima Mulilo during this time. Sergeant Brittz (Namatama) reported the date of the 
opening of the 'New Station Katima Mulilo as 28 January 1935.’ The centre was less than 
4 miles from the famous Katima Mulilo Rapids which featured prominently in the 1880s-
1890s in the determinations of the Anglo-German Treaty. The actual spot is easily 
identified by the prominent Baobab tree, known as Nakabunze, to the Masubia, who 
assert it to have been the residence for a time of one of their early chiefs’, Kruger 
records.105 Tradition has it that the Katima Mulilo,106 (the name translates as ’tima mulilo 
or quench the fire‘), was used long before to describe the experiences of canoe men who 
had to ‘shoot’ the fast-flowing rapids; At low water especially a particular channel 
towards the left bank had to be negotiated on the route down.. This channel contains a 
particularly mean rock onto which canoes were always swept by the powerful waters 
unless expert care was taken.  The unwary were capsized by the impact and the firebrand 
that they always carried from spot to spot, on going ashore to get their fires lighted (as 
matches were not available), were extinguished.  
 
The starting point to a fair assessment of the administration of the eastern Caprivi Strip 
between 1929 and 1939 should be the inspection reports.  As is stated above, inspection 
tours became an important administrative tool during this period, but how many visits, in 
fact, occurred? What verdict do reports which resulted from inspection tours tell us? 
Surprisingly, the most critical voice regarding the poor administrative set-up in the 
Caprivi Strip is to be found in two inspection reports, one by Trollope (1938) and another 
by Eric Louw (1939). That both reports come at the end of the period under review is, 
                                                 
105 Ibid., p. 17. 
106In a letter of 14 April 1930, from the District Commissioner of Sesheke to the Secretary for Native 
Affairs at Livingstone, the former had it that 'Katima Mulilo' referred only to a small side stream between 
an island named Lusibi and the Northern Rhodesia bank, that the Rapids should properly have been named 
‘Muchilansimba’, meaning the tail of the Sipa Cat (Genet). He claims to have been given that information 
by Induna (Headman) Mukengami, who occasionally visited the Caprivi from his nearby Northern 











however, not surprising. At the time of his tour of the Caprivi Strip Leslie French 
Trollope was the South West Africa Administration’s Additional Native Commissioner 
for the northern territories, including the Caprivi. What he says in the report should be 
viewed from this perspective. He begins his criticism by endorsing Sergeant Brittz 
(Namatama) and the inhabitants’ request for more frequent visits by senior officials to the 
area. During the period under review two inspection visits took place.  The first was by 
Major du Preez in 1929, shortly before the South West Afrca Administration took control 
of the Strip - although Mr. H.P. Smit paid a fleeting visit to Schuckmannsburg (three 
hours only) in 1931. The second and last was the 1937 visit. It is from the report on this 
visit that I am quoting. This meant that there was a gap of nine years without any official 
of significant standing visiting the Caprivi. Two sets of criticisms can be gleaned from 
the reports, one set leveled against the Administration, and the other, against Sgt. Brittz. 
With regard to the Administration, Trollope concluded:107  
 
To the natives themselves the Government at Windhoek is a very nebulous abstraction. Our 
administration in the Strip is largely a negative one - the orders are mainly to what is 'verboten' 
and surveillance to see that those orders are observed. The natives gradually come to the 
conclusion that these restrictions are all Sgt. Brittz's own responsibility with the result that he is 
placed in a very invidious position which more frequent visits of senior officials would help to 
alleviate.  
 
He continued (p.21): ‘When we took over control from Bechuanaland most of the stores 
closed down [none left in 1937], in pursuance of our policy of game preservation...we 
restricted the amount of ammunition that the natives could buy and forbade the purchase 
of any fresh firearms. An indirect result of our assumption of control was the immediate 
collapse of the market for cattle. These had previously been sold through Bechuanaland 
but this avenue was closed to us as we had no veterinary control. So that actually our 
Administration cannot appear in too favourable a light to the natives. The blunt fact is 
that our control of this small territory, remote from SWA to which it is connected by a 
20-mile wide elongated strip of desert, and almost completely surrounded as it is by other 
administrations, is wholly artificial. It is politically anomalous, economically unsound 
                                                 











and administratively well-nigh impracticable.’ 
 
Trollope made two suggestions to remedy the situation: the first was that besides more 
frequent visits, say once every two years, to the Strip, he recommended that three or four 
‘natives’ from there should pay a visit every other year to pay their respects to the 
Administrator and Chief Native Commissioner at Windhoek. Such ‘natives’ could 
proceed at no expense as far as Kachikau in Bechuanaland and then board a lorry 
proceeding to Gobabis. The cost would consist of the lorry fares, train from Gobabis, and 
a small subsistence allowance of 1s.od per day, all met from the Trust Funds. The idea 
was an excellent one because it could have exposed the inhabitants of the territory to 
what was happening in greater SWA. It is not difficult to guess why it was never 
implemented. Its principle was anyway misplaced, for it was ridiculous to suggest that 
people travel all the way from the Caprivi Strip only to pay respects to an 'Administrator' 
of a Government which had taken so much away from them and was doing nothing to 
improve their lot. All this was to be on the visitor's expense, from Trust Funds earmarked 
for developing the areas in the Caprivi. Secondly, and perhaps his most sensible 
suggestion, was: 
 
Insofar as the Eastern Caprivi is concerned, to avoid the taunt of the Constitution Commission's 
criticism of our general native policy would necessitate a permanent minimum staff of an 
administrative official (Native or Assistant Native Commissioner), a veterinary officer (or stock 
inspector) and a doctor -and complementary native staff. All this for about 9, 000 people. These 
services cannot be combined with other areas owing to the geographical position. The expenditure 
involved in administration would be irrecoverable directly or indirectly. The Strip is no labour 
source for us nor an outlet for our products.’ 
 
At least this was one suggestion from Trollope which was implemented in part in August 
1939, when the SWAA offloaded the Eastern Caprivi Strip onto the Union Department of 
Native Affairs. Kangumu (2000) argues that in fact it was not for geographical 
remoteness that the SWAA requested to be relieved of the administration of the Caprivi 
Strip but rather the failure to implement the above suggestions, the expense of the just 











part, the strategic importance of the Strip on the verge of the outbreak of World War II.108 
In regard to Sgt. Brittz, Trollope made the following two observations about him. He 
stated (p. 15) that Brittz had as a strength the attribute of being a 'disciplinarian, a trifle 
insistent on rules and regulations' and  was a man quick to show his displeasure to any 
one who forgot what is expected of him. While conceding that absolute firmness was 
essential, Trollope considered this again to be Sgt. Brittz's weak point. In a setting based 
on indirect rule, Trollope argued, a further quality was essential - the confidence of the 
chiefs and people. That certainly Sgt. Brittz did not possess, so he might have been 
looked at with respect as a representative of a distant Administration, and not as the 
people's counsellor and confidant.  
 
The other inspection report which makes interesting reading was compiled by E.W. 
Louw, then the Union's Chief Native Commissioner for Northern Areas. He undertook an 
inspection tour of the Eastern Caprivi in 1939, shortly before Pretoria took over control 
of the territory. Louw concurs with the above conclusion that the South West Africa 
Administration was prompted to get rid ‘of the incubus of the Caprivi by a growing 
anxiety over its neglect of its responsibilities for the welfare of its people to the League of 
Nations, to which body it is under obligation to report annually’.109 He emphasizes: 
‘Apart from the cost of administration ...and the cost for inoculation which it was obliged 
to pay in connection with outbreaks of lung-sickness, the South West African 
Administration has done next to nothing for the natives during the ten years it has 
administered the territory’.110  As to the administration of the territory between 1929 and 
1939, Louw explains: 
 
There is little doubt in my mind that the Administration was anxious not to incur any expense in 
the control of the territory and left the superintendent to rely on his own initiative to establish what 
measure of control he could (pp.16-17).  It was evidently intended, as with the Instructions in 1932 
                                                 
108‘Useful Bantustan’. Kangumu, B., ‘Forgotten Corner of Namibia’, (MA, UCT: 2000). 
 
109 E.W. Louw, 1939:32. 












on which control is based, to maintain a status quo. (pp.17-18). They [the measures] take no 
account of human development, and should now be expanded to meet the changing circumstances 
of the population (p.4). 
 
While appreciating Sgt. Brittz's work of ten years which he achieved alone and single-
handedly under difficult circumstances with practically no assistance from his 
headquarters in Windhoek, Louw is critical of the system of Administration: 
 
Appreciation of his work need not, however, hide the obvious shortcomings of his system of 
administration and control. It is, in fact, a weak system. Its efficiency depends on two factors, 
firstly the man himself, and secondly, the fear of those ruled of his punishments. The danger to 
any administration which is based on the character of one outstanding individual lies in this that a 
break-down in the administration immediately follows upon his removal at any time or through 
any cause. This is obvious. The people do not like the superintendent. He himself says candidly 
that it is so, so that his position becomes difficult as the people begin to find ways of obviating his 
orders without being discovered (p.17). 
 
What needed to be done was the following:  
 
What is now virtually a dictatorship will no longer meet the case and will needs be replaced by 
more up-to-date methods of administration, which will involve a greater cost than has hitherto 



























COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIVE IDENTITY (CONTINUED) 
A BANTU RESERVE AND BANTUSTAN, 1939-1982 
 
A Bantu Reserve, 1939 -1960. 
 
The question of the control of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel being taken over by the Union 
Native Affairs Department was first discussed in Cape Town between the Administrator 
of SWA and the Prime Minister of the Union, General Hertzog; and was confirmed by a 
minute dated 4 March 1938 from the Administrator to the Prime Minister.1 It is argued 
above that the SWAA chose to off-load a financial burden that was the ECZ onto the 
Union Native Affairs Department, not for geographical remoteness, because, as D.L. 
Smit insisted: ‘the Caprivi strip is even more remote from the Union than from 
Windhoek’2, but an inability to implement recommendations made by Trollope regarding 
the future control of the ECZ, which were deemed to be expensive and unjustified for a 
small population. 
 
 On the Union's side, visionaries saw an opportunity to bring under direct Union control 
an area of high strategic importance, this on the verge of World War II. This section will 
answer the question as to whether there was a transition in administrative systems 
between the preceding periods and after the Union took over control. The two officials 
who authored the critical reports discussed above were both intimately involved in the 
affairs of the ECZ after the transfer, one as Native Commissioner/Magistrate and the 
other as Chief Native Commissioner responsible for Northern Territories. What did they 
change in lieu of the dictatorship which they inherited from Namatama (Brittz) of the 
SWAA? As the sub-heading indicates, nothing much changed, the area was administered 
just as another SA Bantu Reserve, except that this one was situated in central Africa. Of 
                                                 
1Letter from Acting Secretary for SWA to Secretary to the Prime Minister dated 11 May 1938.  
2In a letter dated 22 June 1938 to Mr. Courtney-Clarke of the SWAA; see also Kangumu, 2000: 15, for an 












particular focus in this section would be the provision of education and health services, 
which I argue, the administration offloaded as well to missionaries. The section will 
begin by briefly highlighting the negative perceptions of the land and its people and their 
impact on the evolution of the colonial administrative identity during this time. 
  
Perceptions of Land and People 
 
The perceptions of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel land and people over time can be 
summarized as this: swamps, fever and wondering Bushmen. On the one hand, the land 
was classified as fertile and rich in game, fruit and fish and therefore able to provide for 
every need of its inhabitants. It was spacious, for the few inhabitants could roam from 
one corner to the other, in search of food or security in times of looming danger. 
Droughts and famines were unknown. On the other hand, however, the Europeans 
considered it a useless piece of land, for it did not have mineral resources such as 
diamonds and copper, nor, with its few inhabitants, was it a labour reservoir or even an 
outlet for products. While prospects for agriculture, especially cattle ranching, were good, 
this was not encouraged. The area was classified as not only remote, but also unhealthy 
for European settlement. Unlike in other territories where there was massive resettlement 
of whites, this was discouraged in the ECZ. Because malaria and black water were rife 
this impacted on the selection of administrative officials. For example, we find this entry 
about Sgt. Brittz in one letter, urging for his absorption into Union Administration from 
the SWAA and his retention in the administrative structures of the ECZ: "Sergt. Brittz 
has been there for nine years and has not contracted these diseases - which seems to 
indicate that he has a natural resistance thereto.’3 The ECZ administrative station was 
considered a difficult assignment to be posted to. This was mainly because of its isolation 
and distance from Windhoek and its geographical situation of being surrounded by 
different colonial administrations, where ‘natives’ enjoyed privileges much more 
generous than those offered in the ECZ; Furthermore, all eager to observe and point out 
any diversions or shortcomings in Native Policy and to use these when arguing for the 
                                                 












impropriety of administering the territory either from South West Africa or the Union. 
Officials to be posted to the ECZ were not considered unless married, experienced, and 
also showing resilience against diseases particularly malaria. It was this latter perception 
of the land as unhealthy which led to its declaration and subsequent administration as a 
Bantu Reserve, where the 'natives', it was presumed, would be happy to live under their 
own laws and customs and where 'detribalization' should be kept to a minimal level. This 
was tantamount to maintaining a status quo which was, in all respects, the construction of 
isolation and impoverishment as an administrative mechanism. 
 
The perceptions become more negative when referring to the inhabitants of the ECZ. 
They are referred throughout in the colonial ethnographic and historical literature, 
perfected by colonial administrators, as Barotses or to use a more recent label, of Lozi 
origin. The basis for such claims is not difficult to appreciate since the very literature 
concludes, rightly so, that the inhabitants of the Caprivi, were for a long time subjugated 
by the Barotse, and were thus part of the Lozi Kingdom. However, being thus subjugated 
does not make them 'Lozi'. As late as 2003 Flint unconvincingly argued that it was only 
with the advent of German rule in 1909, citing incidents such as the Masubiya Cattle 
Case that according to him served as catalysts in the process whereby people lost their 
‘Loziness‘, that group identities such as Subia, Yeyi and Mbukushu 'resurfaced' taking 
precedence over ‘Loziness’. These are misplaced assertions regarding identities in the 
history of the ECZ. There is no evidence to suggest that at any point in their history 
people shed away their identities for those of their masters. Flint was over-concerned 
with constructing a Lozi identity in  the Caprivi and in the process put undue emphasis on 
'citizenship' and 'subjectivity' as aspects of state-building but totally ignored another 
equally vital aspect of state-building, which is resistance - how did the colonial subjects 
respond to the expansion of the Lozi state? It leaves much to be desired for if one writes 
about the early history of the Caprivi and neglects resistance, trickery and betrayal as part 
of conquest, for this was a period of endless feuding. The result of this denial of identities 
in the Caprivi led to a paternal benevolence towards them, especially the Masubia, being 
referred to as 'Lewanika's children'.4 The two reports which preceded the Union take over 
                                                 











of control of the ECZ were full of negative descriptions of the inhabitants and their mode 
of life. Some perceptions are drawn from colonial officials serving during this time. 
Trollope, for example, wrote in his 1940 (p. 11) Annual Report: 
 
The people are, with natural exceptions, neither prepossessing nor attractive. As far as money is 
concerned, they are very poor...Except for the desire to adopt European clothing, and a very 
superficial desire for very superficial education, the Natives show no tendency to abandon their 
own customs. 
 
In an earlier report (1938), Trollope concluded the following about the inhabitants of the 
Caprivi: ‘Although we refer to the Strip as being inhabited by the Mafue and Basubia, 
those tribes are not really very distinct nor have they any very real background of 
tradition. They were vassals and hangers-on of other tribes - mainly the Barotse - and 
have little actual tribal organization or authority,...They never have had, therefore, any 
real separate existence.’ The same negative perception is reproduced by Trollope's 
Assistant, Kruger, in his 1940 Report (pp. 11-12) after a tour of Mafwe areas: ‘My 
opinion is that these people need very firm guidance. Until comparatively recently they 
were a subject tribe and consequently have no background. Their laws and customs are 
uncertain and I incline to the view that a written code of laws would be a good thing. 
They live in a land of plenty which state has, in their case, brought about a weak fibre.’  
 
It is not surprising that Kruger reproduces his senior's negative perception. In fact he 
admits to inadvertently using some of the conclusions expressed by Trollope in their 
conversations (p.12), so that what he writes should not be interpreted as what he observed 
during his tour but the 'official' applied to local conditions. Another addition that can be 
made is from the Louw Report (1939), Louw being a Union Chief Native Affairs 
Commissioner who was sent to the ECZ to accept the transfer of control. He was more 
concerned with the physical appearances of the inhabitants, which he used to distinguish 
and condone the difference between Mafwe/Bayeyi and Basubia. He wrote (p. 8):  
 
‘The Masubia people appear to be more industrious and progressive of the two tribes. The men 











cleaner and more intelligent than the Mafwe. The Mafwe were dressed mostly in loincloths only, 
except for the thick coating of dust over their bodies which, judging by the particularly strong and 
overpowering odour they carry with them, must have been unrelieved of any acquaintance with 
water or other cleansing element over a considerable period. The physique of the men, more 
especially the Mafwe, was in many cases strikingly good and showing little signs of malnutrition.’ 
 
The above section serves to show that the Union take over was preceded by negative 
perceptions of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel land and people, and therefore the resultant 
administrative set-up that followed was a product of such perceptions. In short, the 
colonial administrative identity during this time was geared for a primitive people, who 
should not be ‘detribalized’ because although they were poor and living in an unhealthy 
place, they were content in their 'Black man's diet'. Now, how was the Bantu Reserve 
administered? 
 
A place of natural beauty, the ECZ Bantu Reserve 
 
The transfer of control of the ECZ to the Union Department of Native Affairs received a 
fair share of attention from the international community. The transfer was viewed mainly 
as 'mysterious', with an influential Italian newspaper Giornale d'Italia of 2 August 1939 
describing it as an annexation, while the Rand Daily Mail of the same date viewed it as 
illegal. The Star (2 August 1939) headlined its article ‘Caprivi Strip mystery’ in which it 
argued that the official explanation that the takeover was a matter of administrative 
expediency was not convincing but added that there was no satisfactory reason which 
could be visualized at the time. While the British attitude was that the issue was entirely a 
matter for the Union Government and indications were that Britain, on whose behalf the 
Union was administering the Mandate, was not informed of the planned transfer, the view 
expressed in Europe was that Britain had a hand in the affair. Giornale d'Italia compared 
the transfer of the control of the ECZ to Pretoria to the 'heinous barter concluded by 
France to the disadvantage of Syria', all in the frame of the British Commonwealth. In 











Alexandretta by France, which was also done at the request of Great Britain’. 5 For 
Germany the transfer represented a challenge to her colonial rights which were robbed 
from her after World War I, and required a demand for their return. 
 
Although the Permanent Mandates Commission was informed of the intended transfer in 
early 1939, its reply was in the affirmative: ‘The administrative arrangement 
contemplated calls for no observation on its part provided all the provisions of the 
mandate are properly applied in the eastern portion of the Caprivi Zipfel.6 In its 1939 
Annual Report, the League of Nations expressed the hope that with the transfer ‘the 
Government will be able to comply more fully with the terms of the Mandate by devoting 
more attention to the welfare of the Native population.’7 By Union Proclamation No. 147 
of 1939 the Eastern Caprivi Strip was transferred8 to the Union Department of Native 
Affairs as of 1 August 1939. Following the transfer Proclamation 243 of 1939 constituted 
the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel as a magisterial district. By Government Notice 1607 of 1939 a 
Bantu Affairs Commissioner's Court was established while Government Notice No. 1210 
of 1940 provided for the declaration of the territory as a Nature/Bantu Reserve. This 
meant that the disposition of land to others than the inhabitants of the ECZ could only 
take place with specific consent of the Union Parliament.  
 
                                                 
5Rand Daily Mail, 2 August 1939.  
6Permanent Mandates Commission, Session XXXVI, pp. 280-281.  
7U.G. 30 - 1940, p. 175, in Pretorius 1975: 46.  
8 With the transfer, the SWAA handed all files pertaining to the Eastern Caprivi Strip to the Union Native 
Affairs Department. The following files were handed over in 1939: A. 503/1 (Administration); A. 503/2 
(Forests); A. 503/3 (Game); A. 503/4 (Reports); A.503/5 (Boundaries-I & II); A. 503/6 (Transport); 
A.503/7 (Trading); A.503/8 (Education); A.503/9 (Missions); A. 503/10 (Estimates); A.503/11 (Trust 
Funds); A. 503/12 (Lease of Crown Lands); A. 503/13 (Native Affairs); A. 503/14 (Buildings); A.503/15 
(Prospecting); A. 503/16 (Health matters-general); A. 503/17 (Mining Law); A. 503/18 (Implements); A. 
503/19 (Lions-destruction of); A. 503/20 (Permits to enter); A. 503/21 (Annual visit of leading Natives to 
Windhoek); A. 503/22 (Native Staff); A. 503/23 (Barotse Privileges); A. 503/24 (Return of Kaluwe E.F. 
Lewanika to Caprivi Zipfel); A. 215/3/20 (Stocktaking); A. 28/108 (Law Books); A. 470/18 (Stock 
diseases); A. 521/63 (Native Labor); A. 84/12/2 (Customs); A. 342/19 (Medical work); A. 413/8 (Drought); 
A. 326/21 (Malaria); A. 460/23 (Native Chiefs and Headmen); A. 531/23 (Locusts); A. 502/37 (Movement 
of stock); A. 532/24 (Cash Accounts); A. 376/25 (Roads); A. 9/27 (Arms and ammunition). These files, 
kept mainly by the SA National Archives in Pretoria, were only returned to the National Archives of 
independent Namibia in 2005/2006 and can now be accessed from there. In the past, one had to travel to 












On 25 October 1939, Major Leslie French W. Trollope9 assumed duty as Magistrate and 
Native Commissioner with Mr. C.E. Kruger as his assistant in both capacities. The two 
were given written instructions as a basis for administration. These were: to foster the 
operation of ‘native’ institutions and to endeavor to improve them and make them an 
effective instrument of Government; to combat witchcraft; to control stock diseases; to 
preserve the indigenous fauna; and to pay particular attention to the promotion of the 
material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants. These officials, 
in addition to the functions ordinarily required of Native Commissioners and Magistrates, 
became the heads of the police in the area and had to perform the functions of a district 
surgeon and of a veterinary officer. In short, they acted as the fathers of the people and 
were expected to look after their every need. The incorporation of tribal chiefs into the 
administrative system during this time is best described by Kruger10:  
 
The tribal set-up and its chieftainships were accepted and confirmed as the basis for local 
government and arrangement, interference with that order having been insignificant (except for 
elimination of features against natural justice or morality) and development taking a natural, even 
and accepted course, under local supervision, lightly applied, of one government officer.  
 
Thus Pretoria's takeover changed nothing in regard to local government in the territory. 
The divide between the Mafwe (Bayeyi) under Chief Mamili and the Basubia under their 
chief, Chikamatondo dating back to the German period was adopted. Two issues are 
important to record in this arrangement. Firstly, it is often remarked, lightly though and in 
the form of an achievement, that the Mafwe consists within its ranks of subordinate 
groups such as Mayeyi, Mbukushu, Totela and small bands of Barakwengo (San). The 
literature is silent on why the Germans decided to group these identities under Mafwe, 
except to state that they were leaderless at the time and that they expressed their consent 
to be placed under Chief Mamili. But the Masubia did not have a leader too within 
Caprivi at this time. It is remarked elsewhere that instead of viewing this as a great 
German achievement, on the local level, it entailed a loss of identities the consequences 
                                                 
9 The Masubia nicknamed him “ Makabi Kuyenka” due to his manner of shaking his body.  












of which haunt the Caprivi today and expressed in forms of identity disintegration, 
reassertions and often in open and fatal tribal clashes. Secondly, the local administrative 
establishment survived because of the sustained division of the inhabitants of the Caprivi 
into Mafwe and Basubia, this was very much fragmented and contested (see Chapter 
Six).  
 
It was decided during a visit to the Caprivi in 1941 by the Secretary of Native Affairs, 
Mr. D.L. Smit to remunerate not only the chiefs, but also the Ngambelas (prime 
ministers) and the ordinary members of the Kuta (court) – this in order to make tribal 
institutions 'effective instruments' of administration. Before 1941 only the chiefs received 
allowances of £20 per annum, this coming out of the tribal funds. By 1945, however, the 
allowances of the chiefs had increased to £30 per annum, those of the Ngambelas (prime 
ministers) to £18 while ordinary Kuta members received £12. In addition, Kuta 
secretaries were now also paid from the Departmental vote instead of from tribal funds. 
Chiefs, Ngambelas and Kuta members were also paid-out of the same vote. 
 
The administration of justice was tribally organized on the usual 'native' basis of village 
heads responsible for their small communities, larger disputes going to the district 
headman for settlement and, failing such, to the chief's kuta (court) which offered a 
binding judgment. In such event the Native Commissioner/Magistrate could be called 
upon to give assistance in the execution of the judgement. A provision for appeal was 
introduced into tribal law at this stage. A dissatisfied party could lodge an appeal before 
the Native Commissioner's Court that had powers to examine or hear such cases and 
confirm or overturn the chief's judgment. In rare instances parties chose to bypass their 
chiefs and take their dispute to the Magistrate who would summarily deal with it and 
therefore assume powers of a chief-in-council. The Native Commissioner/Magistrate had 
the powers to inspect, on intervals, the judgment records kept by each council and in the 
process, even without appeal, confirm the judgments or give instructions for any matter 
to be reopened or to be brought before him for a re-hearing. The following matters were 












 Persons killed or who had died from unnatural causes, such as murder, drowning or fighting, or 
were killed by wild animals 
 Serious assault cases 
 Rape 
 Witchcraft 
 All cases in which parties belong to different tribes 
 All cases between council members 
 All cases involving the chief himself. 
 
Immediately on the assumption of control by the Native Affairs Department, the 
remuneration of the Native Constable-Labourers was improved and a number of cattle 
guards were appointed to keep a strict watch over the movement of cattle and guard 
against the introduction of stock from neighboring territories where lung sickness 
prevailed. The cattle guards kept stock registers and from 1942 the services of the guards 
was made use of for the registration of births and deaths among the population as well. 
Indeed, the guards were responsible to conduct the population census in the villages. The 
population census of the ECZ was taken in 1921, and then yearly between 1930 and 
1939, in 1941 and again in 1946. During the duration of World War II the census was not 
taken. A step was taken in 1941 to prevail upon the chiefs to pass tribal laws enforcing 
measures for the culling and castration of bull calves in order to improve stock-breeding. 
Interbreeding was discouraged and cattle guards were required to report on the 
availability for sale or lack of good bulls in the herds under their control so that these 
could be better distributed. It was not until 1945 that an official from Pretoria, Dr. H.H. 
Curson, then Deputy Director of Native Agriculture, visited the ECZ. He made a 
comprehensive survey of the agricultural conditions of the territory and made 
recommendations to be implemented. One of Dr. Curson's recommendations was that a 
first grade agricultural officer should be stationed in the territory to give special attention 
to improvement of stock by selective breeding of 'native' cattle, as opposed to the practise 












The cornerstone of the policy of indirect rule applied in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel during 
this period relied on the presumption that the inhabitants should be left largely to their 
own devices, under protection, but in a system that entailed slow evolutionary and natural 
processes in a territory reserved in toto for its inhabitants. In reality local government at 
the time took the form of tribal structures presiding over the majority of the people who 
for the most part lived in rural areas. Apart from occasional trips to outlying areas and 
reports received from cattle guards, the Union control of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel can 
be reduced to the overseeing of an administrative post - Katima Mulilo. For this reason it 
is necessary to examine what was happening at the headquarters.  
 
As is mentioned elsewhere, the administrative centre shifted from Schuckmannsburg to 
Katima Mulilo in 1935, as the former was too far to the east, was affected by annual 
flood inundation and was generally considered unhealthy.  Expenditure of £1,100 was 
authorized for the building of a house, offices, a detention cell and outhouses. The station 
at Schuckmannsburg was demolished save for one stone building from the German 
period  (still standing at present) and the bricks  were transported by barge for the 
construction of Katima Mulilo. All the 1935 buildings were replaced in 1945 by specially 
designed residential and administrative buildings for the Government Headquarters at 
Katima Mulilo. These were a residency, courthouse, gaol and outhouses, as well as the 
installation of a pumped water supply and a power driven maize mill. The Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association (WNLA) camp was in the immediate neighbourhood of 
Katima Mulilo as was the Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) Mission. The mission was the 
only one in the area at the time. Missionary Owen, his wife and their two small children 
and one white person at WNLA were the only Europeans stationed at Katima Mulilo at 
the time. The closest society of Europeans in the strip closest to Katima Mulilo was the 
British station at Sesheke in Northern Rhodesia where the District Commissioner, the 
Stock Inspector, Paris Mission staff and a few traders lived.  
 
In June 1940 both the Native Commissioner/Magistrate and his Assistant applied to be 











transferred yet again and placed under the control of the Northern Rhodesian District 
Commissioner at Sesheke. However, defence authorities of both the Union and Northern 
Rhodesia raised objections to these proposals. Instead, a special company of ‘native’ 
soldiers was formed for service in the strip as part of the general military arrangement for 
the protection of the Victoria Falls bridge. This Special Company is discussed in greater 
detail in Chapter Six. It is enough to mention here that administratively the Native 
Commissioner/Magistrate and his Assistant were appointed as Commanding Officer and 
Second-in-Command, respectively, and were entrusted with the formation and training of 
the Unit, in addition to their civil duties.  
 
The Imperial War Graves Commission and the Caprivi  
 
Three members of the Native Military Corps (No. 5836 Cpl Sihope Mbala; No. 5815 Pte. 
Luniso Silongo; No. 5852 Pte. Machinga Simataa) lost their lives as a result of drowning 
on 6\ April 1941. They were buried in the grounds of the Magistracy at Katima Mulilo. 
The Imperial War Graves Commission sent temporary wooden crosses which were 
erected on the graves. However, because the area was in a termite-ridden country, the 
wooden crosses disappeared within a short time. This raised the question of how the 
graves could be maintained in perpetuity, and what alternative form of commemoration 
could be used to make sure that the graves did not become ‘unmaintainable’. The IWGC 
decided that the ‘native’ Graves at Katima Mulilo were to obliterated along with others in 
certain areas described as ‘inaccessible’, thereby confirming the general characteristic of 
the Caprivi as being inaccessible or remote. As a form of commemoration, it was decided 
to erect an obelisk either at Serowe in British Bechuanaland, or at Tsumeb, SWA. Once 
again, the Caprivi, its people and its history, was to be appended and commemorated in 
far flung areas. Objection to this was raised among others, by Mr. J.A. Smuts of Pretoria, 
previously Adjutant of the Special Company of N.M.C., Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, in 
correspondence to the IWGC, from which the following is extracted: 
 
Major Trollope informs me that it is your intention to erect an obelisk either at Serowe, British 
Bechuanaland, or Tsumeb, SWA, and in this connection I would respectfully point out that neither 











Tribe, to which these deceased soldiers belonged, never have occasion to visit either Tsumeb or 
Serowe. Furthermore, as you will well appreciate the deceased soldiers belonged to quite a 
different tribe to the Natives of Serowe or Tsumeb and to inscribe their names on an obelisk at 
these places would really serve no purpose at all.11 
 
It is not clear from the records whether the obelisks were erected at those places or 
anywhere else. What is known is that the graves might be obliterated at Katima Mulilo, 
for the Magistracy of the time had been overtaken by new buildings. That part of the 
Caprivi and its identies now exists only as an archival record.  
 
Chief Simataa Mamili and the Administration 
 
While the chiefs were the cornerstone of administrative control during this period, the 
authorities were not hesitant to express displeasure and take steps against any chief who 
disobeyed orders. The misunderstanding between Chief Simataa Mamili of the 
Mafwe/Bayeyi and the administration started during the period of the SWAA, and is 
discussed in part above. The administration charged that Chief Simataa Mamili was 
‘…an excessive drinker and endeavours to rule autocratically ignoring the advice of the 
elders of the tribe. [And that] His tribal organization and control are weak.’12 However, 
the real concern was that Chief Mamili frequently violated the prohibition to kill what 
was classified as ‘royal game’ and refused to explain himself to the authorities when 
called to do so. The chief refused to come to Katima Mulilo to meet officials from 
Windhoek sent to enquire into such issues. In 1937, Trollope, then Additional Native 
Commissioner for SWAA, visited the Caprivi on an inspection tour and told Chief 
Simataa Mamili that his behaviour and administration of his tribe were unsatisfactory, 
unjust and ineffective but that he would be allowed to remain in the position for one year, 
at the end of which the Superintendent would report and if it was found to be 
                                                 
11 Letter from J.A. Smuts of P.O. Box 1311, Pretoria to the Officer I/C War Records, Graves Registration 
and Inquiries, IWGC, dated 3 January 1948. 
12 Trollope, 1938, p. 9. It is also alleged that due to his unsatisfactory behaviour, he fled to Bechuanaland to 
escape his father’s anger, remaining there until when he was called to replace him.  Apparently he had fled 
from the Strip as he had been caught by his father interfering with one of his (father’s) younger wives 











unsatisfactory, he would be deposed.13 Chief Simataa Mamili ‘proved an unsatisfactory 
chief and was deposed by the South West Africa Administration in 1938.’14 He was 
removed to Katima Mulilo where he lived under the supervision of the Superintendent. In 
1939, however, and at the request of the Mafwe people, the Chief Native Commissioner, 
Mr. Eric W. Louw, reinstated the chief ‘as an act of grace’ to coincide with the Union 
takeover of the Strip.  
 
In 1944, Chief Simataa Mamili was convicted again and fined for killing royal game. 
This raised the whole question of unsatisfactory conduct over the years and lack of co-
operation. Chief Chikamatondo of the Masubia was told by Superintendent Brittz of what 
happened to Chief Ipumbu (threat of banishment), which was now applied to Chief 
Simataa Mamili, making him the first person to face banishment under colonial rule in 
the Caprivi Strip. By the following Removal Order (reproduced in part) signed by Piet 
van der Byl, the Minister of Native Affairs, Chief Simataa Mamili was dismissed from 
his Chieftainship and placed at a new village outside the Mafwe tribal area: 
 
Removal Order: To Simataa Mamili, Chief of the Mafue (Bayeyi) Tribe, Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel Area.  
Whereas I deem it expedient in the public interest that you should be removed from the 
Chieftainship of the Mafue (Bayeyi) Tribe in that you are addicted to the excessive use of 
intoxicating liquor, that you have been convicted of contravening section four of the Game 
Preservation Ordinance of South West Africa, 1927, (Ordinance No. 5 of 1927), and that you are 
incompetent. 
Now therefore, …I hereby order that you be forthwith removed from your position as 
Chief of the Mafue(Bayeyi) Tribe and that within thirty days from the date of service of 
this order you remove yourself and your family from Linyanti Village in the Mafue 
Tribal Area…to the Masubia Tribal Area…under Chief Chikamatondo, there to reside at 
Kalundu under the supervision and control of Headman Kamwi Folosi on a site to be 
pointed out by the said Headman Kamwi Folosi. 
And I further order you not to leave Kalundu without the written permission of 
the Secretary for Native Affairs, Pretoria, first had and obtained. 
                                                 
13 Trollope, 1938, p.12. 












Given under my hand at Pretoria this Seventeenth Day of July, One Thousand 
Nine Hundred and Forty-Four. 
 (Signed) Piet van der Byl, Minister of Native Affairs, Union of South Africa.”15 
 
Chief Simataa Mamili did not relocate to Kalundu village as ordered but made 
representations to the administration to be allowed to settle at Kalengwe in another part 
of the Masubiya Tribal Area. This was expressed in a communication dated 25 October 
1944 from the Magistrate Eastern Caprivi Strip to the Secretary for Native Affairs:16 
 
 To the Secretary for Native Affairs 
 Re: Mafue Tribe: Ex-chief Simataa Mamili 
 Your letter of 18 July 1944 refers; The Minister’s notice was served on Simataa Mamili 
on 12 August 1944 in the presence of the members of his kuta. Simataa expressed thankfulness at 
being relieved of his duties but stated that Kalundu would be unsuitable place for him to live; I 
told him that if he could tell me where he desired to live, provided it was outside the Mafue Tribal 
Area, I would recommend his request to you; By 12 September 1944 Simataa had not done so and 
had not, indeed, carried out the Minister’s order; He has now however, removed from the Mafue 
Tribal Area and has made application to live at Kalengwe under Headman Muraliswani in the 
Masubia Tribal Area and I recommend that his request be granted; He has not yet transferred his 
belongings to his new residence but I am making arrangements for that to be done. Signed L. 
Trollope, Magistrate Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. 
 
Ex-chief Simataa Mamili was allowed to return to the Mafue (Bayeyi) Tribal Area thanks 
to a permit signed by the Secretary for Native Affairs at Cape Town on 3 September 
1953, then, but only after signing a document embodying strict provisions. Regardless of 
the circumstances under which Chief Simataa Mamili was removed from the 
Chieftainship, this case shows dissent, resistance and defiance of colonial orders. It also 
relates much about state-society relations in colonial Caprivi, much of which still needs 
further enquiry. While this thesis is certainly not a study of cultures of resistance in the 
Caprivi, it is important to emphasize that an important aspect of, regional nationalism in 
the Caprivi, embedded in tribal politics and actually the forerunner of, such regional 
                                                 
15 Removal Order, Signed by Piet van der Byl, Minister of Native Affairs of the Union, dated 17 July 1944, 












nationalism, is the human-wildlife conflict. This is drawn out clearly in the public 
hearings of the Odendaal Commission (see Chapter Seven), where inhabitants accused 
the Administration of caring more for animals than humans. People were not allowed to 
hunt. In fact, the buying of arms and ammunition was highly controlled in an area where 
there was no outlet for the disposal or sale of access cattle, no stores. In short the area 
was impoverished and its economy one of subsistence. The only abundance was in game, 
fish, and fruit, and the very commodities that the authorities were determined to protect 
by hook or by crook, while they had carte blanche to shoot as they wished. While people 
practiced subsistence agriculture, their crops were often destroyed, without 
compensation, by the same elephants and hippos which were protected. These were 
perfect pests which they were not allowed to kill. This was a sore point in state-society 
relations, and with the shift from tribal to political (nationalist) representatives, formed a 
stronger basis for the desire to overthrow the ‘white man’s rule’.  
 
Education and Health 
 
The discussion of the Union control of the Eastern Caprivi Strip has revealed that 
administration continued on the same lines as Sergeant Brittz (Namatama) had evolved 
and established, that is, tribal authority under the supervision of one government officer 
and an assistant. Of course increased visits by senior Department officials were observed 
during this period. The provision of services especially education and health facilities 
was, just as was the case with the control of the Strip, ‘off-loaded’ to the next recipient. 
In this case, these services became the burden of missions. It was discussed above how 
mission education17 in the Caprivi Strip developed under the SDA Mission during the 
Bechuanaland period, from one school in 1921 with an average attendance of 40 to 14 
schools in 1928, with the Katima Mulilo school having an average attendance of 107. The 
tuition at out-schools (or ‘bush schools’) which served as feeders to Katima Mulilo was 
up to Standard II (present Grade Four), and at Katima Mulilo tuition was up to Standard 
IV (present Grade Six). From Katima Mulilo learners would proceed to Lower Middle 
                                                 












School at Rusangu in Northern Rhodesia, from which they would go to Solusi Training 
School in Southern Rhodesia. The curriculum used by the SDA was that laid down by the 
Northern Rhodesian Native Education Department and an official from that department 
inspected the schools. Only one school received assistance from the Administration, and 
later, during the SWAA period, an allowance of £50 per annum was paid to the Mission. 
This was withdrawn by the Union at the time of the transfer of Administration. The 
village where the school was situated was required to contribute communally £3 per 
annum to Mission funds. When a village headmen wanted a school his village was 
required to donate 90 bags of grain annually or £4.10s.0d to the Mission. This excluded 
payments made in respect of books and other school necessities. From 1944 onwards, 
these expenses were met with assistance from the tribal funds. A critical assessment of 
the SDA education project is found in Trollope (1940: 18-19): 
 
The mission has a history of some fifteen years in the Strip but it is gradually retrogressing. The 
number of out-school has decreased year by year. Considering the time the Mission has operated 
in the area the results are extremely poor…On paper the syllabus and educational schemes are 
impressive but in fact the position is the reverse…The Native teachers are on the whole poorly 
educated and not of a high standard otherwise. Last year three out of eight of them were dismissed 
for misconduct. The salaries paid are insufficient to attract any better material. The schools 
themselves are shabby and inadequate. School furnishings are poor. There is a dearth of text 
books. Vocational teaching is, despite pretence to the contrary, non-existence. 
 
The whole SDA educational project was withdrawn in 1943. The above negative 
assessment is a reflection of the Administration’s failure to provide education to the 
people of the Caprivi Strip. In fact the official position was that education was of little 
use to the Strip Natives: ‘The educated natives will have to look beyond their borders for 
employment’.18 It is surprising that even though the demand for education was real, 
officials described this as “…a very superficial desire for a very superficial education’.19 
The Administration was not really in a position to criticize the SDA Mission since it was 
doing nothing itself. 
                                                 
18 Trollope, 1938. 













The withdrawal of the SDA forced many learners to attend school either in Northern 
Rhodesia or Bechuanaland. Learners from the Caprivi Strip on the north bank of the 
Zambezi River went to school at Sichili and also at the Paris Mission School at Sesheke. 
The Roman Catholics – the Capuchin Order, accepted the Administration’s invitation and 
moved across the river into East Caprivi in July 1945 from Sichili in Northern Rhodesia, 
even though their headquarters were at Victoria Falls. The Catholics, who occupied the 
site vacated by the SDA, drastically improved education in the Eastern Caprivi Strip, so 
much so that by 1959 there were 15 schools under their management, subsidized by the 
Government, with a total of 884 learners of whom about 165 were in boarding at the 
Katima Mulilo main school. The curriculum used and the examinations written were still 
those of the Northern Rhodesian Education Department which continued to inspect the 
schools.  
 
There were no medical services in the Eastern Caprivi Strip before the Union took 
administrative control. It should be recalled that one element of the Caprivi identities was 
that the area was an unhealthy place in which malaria, dysentery, scabies, goitre, tropical 
ulcers, sleeping sickness, leprosy and mental illness, were all prevalent. The 
Administration’s instruction to the officials to prohibit and eradicate witchcraft should be 
viewed in this light. People turned to witch-doctors in the absence of medical services. As 
Trollope wrote in 1940 (p.25): ‘…the only way to entirely to supplant witchcraft is, not 
prohibition, but substitution. And by substitution I mean substitution by instruments 
which will perform the variety of functions of the supplanted witch-doctors- i.e. religious 
teaching, doctors and an efficient and enlightened system of administration of justice..’ 
Also, it is difficult to appreciate how the Administration could endeavor to abolish 
witchcraft while at the same time working to maintain and foster the operation of ‘native 
institutions’. This was quite a contradiction since witchcraft was closely interwoven with 
tribal organization. In any case, Trollope found out that there were no excesses of 
witchcraft in the territory.20 
                                                 













Despite the necessity for a medical doctor, the Administration thought it adequate to 
supply the Magistrate with a quantity of drugs to attend to inhabitants who reported at 
headquarters with various ailments. The arrival in 1940 of the Special Company of 
Military Corps, with a South African Medical Corps Orderly on its establishment, 
provided the basis for the introduction of medical services in the Eastern Caprivi Strip. 
The Corps established a clinic at Katima Mulilo where all minor ailments were treated. 
Serious cases were sent either to the Sesheke Mission Hospital or to Livingstone Hospital 
(both in Northern Rhodesia), and the cost was met by an annual stipend to that hospital. 
When the Special Company was disbanded in September 1943, Joshua Ilukena and 
Nathan Mwanga, from the Caprivi who, as members of the Special Company had had 
useful training in the army clinic, inherited a wide range of medical supplies and carried 
on the service of the Administration as Medical Orderlies. Severe cases of leprosy and 
mental illnesses were taken to the Union and iodized salt was distributed to arrest the 
local cause of goitre which was troublesome in certain villages between Katima Mulilo 
and the Mashi River. The clinic at Katima Mulilo was overtaken by the opening of a 
hospital in 1948 by the Roman Catholic Mission. The hospital consisted of over 100 
beds, and offered the services of a resident doctor, matron and qualified sisters (nurses). 
 
The discussion on the provision of education and health in the Eastern Caprivi Strip has 
revealed that the Caprivian identities had been shaped in this regard by adjacent 
territories. People went to schools and hospitals in Northern Rhodesia. As explained 
above the curriculum used, examinations written and school inspectors were those of 
Northern Rhodesia. In a nutshell, as far as services were concerned, these were made the 
responsibilities of the missions which eventually depended on their headquarters in 
adjacent territories. During this period, it is not an exaggeration to conclude that the 
Caprivi and its identities were shaped more by Northern Rhodesia than the Union 
Government. Mention must be made, however, of the fact that Northern Rhodesians and 
even people from Bechuanaland, crossed into the Eastern Caprivi Strip for education or 
health services at certain times. This was typical of border identities. When a school 











simply cross to the south bank (Caprivi Strip) for schooling. If medical services were 
closer across the river, people would simply be attended there. Thus one finds interesting 
‘labels’ or ‘identities’ entering the education vocabulary in colonial Caprivi during this 
period, produced by this interaction between identities. The most common are ‘alien 
learner’, ‘alien teacher’, ‘alien Natives as opposed to Strip Natives’, and ‘WNLA 
parents’. In a letter addressed to the Magistrate of the Eastern Caprivi Strip, dated 3 
March 1955, the Secretary for Native Affairs enquired: 
 
 How it came about that the children of Northern Rhodesia Natives attended schools in the Caprivi 
Strip? 
 How many Northern Rhodesia Natives (with or without children) are residing in the Strip and for 
what purpose? 
 What is meant by the term W.N.L.A. parents? 
 
The ‘identities’ of alien learners, alien natives and W.N.L.A. learners and parents 
described outsiders, not Caprivians. Their’s was thus an exclusive identity. Even though 
all were ‘natives’, administratively a distinction existed between “Strip Natives” or 
“Caprivians today” and those from outside. While there was constant interaction, fusion 
was strictly controlled. The concept ‘alien’ therefore applied to citizens especially of 
Northern Rhodesia who attended school or took up employment in the Eastern Caprivi 
Strip. While figures for the period before 1944 are not available, records show a steady 









                                                 
21 Figures Extracted from a Letter from the Magistrate, Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, Addressed to the Secretary 


















Table 6: Diagram showing the number of those classified as 'alien learners' in Caprivi schools 
 
The increase in ‘alien’ learners in the Strip was due to the fact that there ceased to be any 
school on the Northern Rhodesian side (north bank of the Zambezi River) and that the 
tuition now received at the Caprivi School was superior to that of other Northern 
Rhodesian schools further afield. Perhaps the most important was the fact that a large 
percentage of the labour force in and around Katima Mulilo at the time was composed of 
the so-called ‘alien natives’. Since no ‘Strip Natives’ were qualified to be appointed as 
teachers, Northern Rhodesians were appointed to teach. In 1955, for example, there were 
only nine ‘Strip’ teachers as compared to twenty one ‘alien’ teachers from Northern 
Rhodesia employed by the Roman Catholic Mission at the main school and 13 out-
schools.22 The ‘alien natives’ working in the Eastern Caprivi School in 1955 numbered 
one hundred and twenty seven, broken down as follows:23 
 
Origin Number 
Northern Rhodesians 114 




Table 7: Diagram showing number and nationalities of those classified as 'alien natives' employed in 
Caprivi 
 













The ‘alien natives’ were employed by the WNLA, the Mission and trading stores as Store 
Capitaos (Head Boys), teachers, clerks, drivers, hospital orderlies, lorry ‘boys’, builder 
‘boys’, capitaos for rest camps, on the pontoon, labour gangs, at the compound, and as 
domestic servants. The concept of ‘boys’ is used here not without sensitivity to its 
derogatory nature but simply to conform with the period under discussion. It would be 
observed that the number of outsiders employed in the Eastern Caprivi Strip is relatively 
quite high considering the fact that the Administration considered education as of no use 
to the inhabitants of the territory. The Magistrate at the time, Colenbrander, justified this 
as follows: 
 
Among the employees there are ‘Strip’ natives, but very few in proportions. It may not be realized 
but the natives of the Strip have just began to ‘develop’ and are still very primitive, indeed, very 
few make good servants and none remain at work for any length of time.24 
 
            This shows that the Administration of the Union had failed to transform the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip and its inhabitants, at least to a standard obtained in adjacent territories. 
Educationally they were still backward, and indeed, as the description goes ‘still left 
behind’. However, ‘primitiveness’ should not be taken as the reason why ‘Strip Natives’ 
did not remain at work for length of time. The perceptions of ‘work’ were what differed. 
Most of the inhabitants of the Caprivi at this time regarded work outside their subsistence 
living as ‘piece-work’ or temporary chores, mainly to supplement what they produced in 
their fields. That is what they defined as real work, which could not be classified as 
‘work’ by the Administrative officials. The urge to ‘work’ outside traditional settings was 
regarded as pastime in contrast to their subsistence lifestyle which was able to provide for 
their needs, 
 
Barotse Privileges, Muntunjobuswa25 and the Caprivian Identities 
 
A Northern Rhodesian Native Commissioner fondly known as ‘Hippo’ Francis became a 
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joke when on a station bordering on the Belgian Congo he once sent in an annual report 
headed ‘Foreign Affairs’ to the effect that his relations with foreign powers continued to 
be friendly.26 This applies to the annual reports on the administration of the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip, so much that one gets a feeling that a dichotomous administrative 
arrangement existed, namely tribal organization for internal affairs (indirect rule) on the 
one hand and on the other the Union officials being afforded adequate time to concentrate 
on ‘foreign affairs’. In fact, officials endeavoured to be on friendly terms with 
neighbouring territories and this continued to be an ‘achievement’ resonating in every 
single annual report. This was indeed necessary for two reasons. The first is that 
geographically the Eastern Caprivi Strip was more Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland 
Protectorate than South West Africa. The Strip was hinged on all sides by other 
administrations whose policies were bound to be felt there, yet it had no machinery to 
keep its administration in step with that of South West Africa:  it was bound to develop 
along different lines. This made the Administration vulnerable on two grounds, these 
being the issues of hunting grounds and the fact that it was a target for agitators, and most 
importantly, a butt for external criticism in the United Nations General Assembly in 
regard to the Mandated Territory of South West Africa. Neighbouring territories were 
quick to highlight even small differences in an area not enjoying the same attention as 
other native areas in the Union. Officials were thus naturally inclined to keep in step with 
what was happening in those territories.  
 
The second reason was the vested interests of neighbouring territories in the Caprivi Strip 
because of its geographical position. Lying as it does along the three main rivers of the 
central portion of southern Africa, the Caprivi always exerted an influence quite out of 
proportion to its size on its neighbours. Grandiose schemes were proposed during this 
period: use of the rivers as waterways; schemes for generating electric power or irrigation 
on a large scale which ultimately will make lower ‘riparian owners’ feel the influence of 
the Caprivi;  the role and place of the Caprivi in the construction of a transcontinental 
railway to the West Coast; for the Union, the native policy practiced in the Caprivi and its 
                                                 












impact on the scheme for the incorporation of Bechuanaland; and lastly, the strategic and 
tactical value of the Caprivi Strip in time of war. To replicate Professor Patricia Hayes’s 
wording: ‘Caprivi [was] a kind of threshold or holding space against the rest of Africa.’  
27 
 
For Northern Rhodesia, one such vested interest were the so-called ‘ancient rights’ for the 
Lozi which became part of the Caprivi and were administered as ‘privileges’. Even after 
the advent of colonial rule, Northern Rhodesia continued to occupy a part of the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip five miles wide bordering on the Zambezi from the  Katima Mulilo rapids 
to the point of confluence of the Zambezi and Machili Rivers, about 60 miles in length. 
This area was known as the ‘privileged area’. Barotses were allowed to fish, cut grass and 
reeds, and build huts and cultivate gardens there. The privilege was originally granted for 
one year and was renewed annually and gradually became restricted to Sesheke ‘natives’. 
As stated above, the privileges were granted on the basis that from ‘ancient times’ the 
Barotse had such rights in the Caprivi Strip. The ‘ancient rights’ of the Barotse/Lozi in 
the Eastern Caprivi was challenged in Chapter Two. It is argued here that in fact the 
Barotse did not have any ‘ancient rights’, these, in fact, vested in the people subjugated 
by the former.  
 
Why successive colonial administrators in the Eastern Caprivi Strip continued to grant 
such privileges was not on the grounds of ‘ancient’ anything but rather because of the 
need to maintain cordial relations with Northern Rhodesia. This was important because 
people from the Eastern Caprivi Strip depended on Northern Rhodesia as a market to sell 
at Katombora fish needed in quantities for feeding workers on the copper mines, grain at 
Sesheke and also to seek work in Livingstone, activities which could be prevented by 
Northern Rhodesia. Even though officials knew that ‘the balance is [was] strongly in 
favor of the Barotses’, for they benefited more, not much could be done. It is argued here 
that concessions such as the ‘Barotse’ privileges were just overtures to keep particularly 
Northern Rhodesia ‘happy’.  
                                                 
27 Made as part of an External Examiner’s Report: Bennett Kangumu Kangumu. ‘A Forgotten Corner of 
Namibia: Aspects of the History of the Caprivi Strip, c.1939-1980’. (MA, UCT, 2000). Patricia Hayes is 












If ‘ancient rights’ was an accepted yardstick to parcel away portions of the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip’s territorial identity, then this was applied selectively as the case of 
Muntunjobuswa indicates. In 1950 Chief Chika of the Basubiya (Bekuhane) of 
Bechuanaland filed a complaint against the Native Commissioner/Magistrate of the 
Eastern Caprivi Strip, Major Trollope, who in 1944 arrested certain Bechuanaland 
‘natives’ living on and cultivating Muntunjobuswa,28 an island in the swampy Chobe 
River, brought them to Katima Mulilo and fined them. Apparently the Bechuana 
tribesmen were warned in 1930, 1940 and 1943 to stop cultivating and leave the island 
since it was not Protectorate territory. They however used to return surreptitiously in 
subsequent years and cultivate the lands. It is, perhaps, as well to record that the Chobe 
which is the boundary that separated then Bechuanaland (Botswana) and Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel (Namibia), cuts through the area of the  Masubiya tribe in the Katchikau-Mahundu 
to Ngoma area and there are thus members of the tribe on both sides of the boundary. At 
the prosecution which ensued there was no defence, and convictions followed guilty 
plea.29 For Trollope the whole issue rested on the question of whether Muntunjobuswa 
was in Caprivi or Bechuanaland territory.30 In light of the ‘Barotse privileges’ this could 
certainly not be the major consideration. The question was whether there was any 
assertion of rights?  
 
Though Trollope makes us believe not, Chief Chika’s complaint is enough assertion of 
rights in its own right. The Bechuanaland people were also prevented from fishing in the 
Lake Lyambezi, a depression of the Chobe River in the southern part of the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip. In fact, a few were arrested and their fishing nets impounded by the 
officials of the Eastern Caprivi authorities. The reasons why Northern Rhodesian 
‘natives’ were permitted to have privileges based on ‘ancient rights’, flimsy ones at that, 
which Bechuanaland ‘natives’, on the same basis, did not, are difficult to appreciate and 
                                                 
28 In Lake Lyambezi; at times the Masubiya referred to the whole lake as Muntunjobuswa. 
29 Letter from Trollope, Native Commissioner of the Eastern Caprivi Strip, to the District Commissioner, 













point to the argument above. In fact, the Bechuanaland natives, being descendants of 
Masubiya who fled the Eastern Caprivi Strip due to Barotse subjugation, had a better 
claim to ‘ancient rights’ than did the Barotse.  
 
A South African Bantustan in Central Africa, the Caprivi Strip 1960 – 
1980 
 
The ‘winds of change’31 that swept across the African continent during the late 1950s and 
early 1960s did not by-pass the Eastern Caprivi Strip. An accelerated quest for self -
determination and independence was felt the world over. The UN demanded SA deliver 
on its mandate to propel the inhabitants of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa 
to full self-determination and improved well-being and social progress of its inhabitants. 
In South West Africa, the late 1950s saw the formation of the Ovamboland People’s 
Organization, the forerunner to SWAPO; the December 10, 1959 Old Location Massacre; 
and the formation of the SWANU. In central Africa and territories adjacent to the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel: in Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Tanganyika, Southern Rhodesia and 
Bechuanaland Protectorate, nationalist movements were unwavering in their demand for 
independence. At the International Court of Justice (ICJ), a case against SA in regard to 
the Mandated Territory of SWA was brought by Ethiopia and Liberia. In the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip itself the Caprivi African National Union (CANU), a nationalist movement 
under the leadership of Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye, had already been formed in the 
late 1950s and operated underground (see Chapter Seven). All these conspired to force 
SA to appoint a Commission to enquire into SWA Affairs to avert criticism that it was 
doing next to nothing to honour the provisions of the Mandate. 
 
As a result, fundamental shifts occurred in the history of the Eastern Caprivi Strip during 
this period. Firstly, the perception of uselessness gives way to usefulness as  can be 
observed from increased SADF involvement in the Caprivi and  the fact that Katima 
                                                 












Mulilo houses a ‘sophisticated airbase in an underdeveloped backwater like Mpacha’32 
(see Chapter Seven) to counter the advance of ‘Black Africa’. Secondly, therefore, an 
administrative shift takes place, that is, from neglect to intense focus: increased state 
expenditure; the formation of a planning committee composed of high ranking Union 
Native Affairs Department officials to direct the course of project development; and the 
Government takes over schools, hospital and clinics. Thirdly, with the roadmap to ‘self –
government’ proposed by the Odendaal Commission, ‘Caprivians’ moved from tribal to 
political representation, though characterized by intense local politicking along tribal 
lines. All this over the course of a century should surely rank as a turning point in the 
history of the Eastern Caprivi Strip.  
 
The above shift was characterized by the waning powers of the chiefs, the rise of the 
intellectuals, mainly teachers, and a clash between the two fuelled by the Administration 
which believed that it was protecting ‘duly constituted’ authority (the chiefs)  from being 
overtaken by young men ‘of no consequence’ (see Chapter Seven).The old order was 
being replaced by a new one and Pretoria was forced to advance the pace of 
‘development’, by which I mean an increase in local administrative staff and 
infrastructural extension and not necessarily social progress where the people generally 
benefited. As stated above, all this was prompted by events outside the Eastern Caprivi 
Strip. The independence of Zambia had an immediate impact in the form of the severing 
of local ties and the end of ‘friendly relations’ that so much characterized every annual 
report. The Administration could no longer keep its official bank account in Livingstone 
or continue to use Northern Rhodesian currency. 
 
This section will briefly discuss the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations as they 
pertain to the establishment of the Eastern Caprivi Bantustan; the role of the Planning 
Committee as a relatively more progressive administrative force; the establishment of the 
Caprivi Legislative Assembly (1972); the Caprivi ‘Constitution’ and ‘Government’ 
(1976); the involvement of the ‘Caprivians’ in the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA)  
                                                 












sponsored Multi-Party Conference (MPC); and lastly, the Second-Tier ‘Administration 
for Caprivians”, considered here as the apex of the ‘historical constructions’ of the 
Caprivi Identity.  
 
The Odendaal Recommendation for a Bantustan 
 
South Africa became more determined than ever to implement her racial policies both in 
the Republic and in SWA even after her ‘independence’ in 1961, amidst domestic and 
international pressure. The Odendaal Commission of Enquiry was appointed in 1962 to 
investigate the social, economic and political conditions in South West Africa and to 
make proposals ‘to accelerate the black population’s socio-economic development’.33 
The Commission’s work and recommendations were premised n the policy of ethnic 
fragmentation, firmly believing that ‘mixing [the] groups would adversely affect the 
climate for socioeconomic progress and ultimately lead to discontent and violence’.34 For 
the Caprivi, as for others in South West Africa, the administrative system proposed by the 
Odendaal Commission was a legislative council with limited powers, composed of chiefs 
and elected representatives.35 In the context of this chapter, Odendaal provided a roadmap 
for a Caprivian identity – legislative assembly, a Caprivi Government with symbols of 
state (constitution, flag, coat of arms, national anthem), and eventually the term 
‘Caprivians’ was given prominence. Chapter Seven will discuss the public hearings 
conducted by the Odendaal Commission at Katima Mulilo over two days. Three things 
were observed: that on the whole the commission interviewed more Europeans resident in 
the Strip than ‘Caprivians’. Secondly, that while people still complained generally about 
poor standard of schools and health system; elephants damaging crops; lions, hyenas and 
crocodiles killing cattle; and no new firearms allowed, a concerted call for the withdrawal 
of the ‘white man’s government’ was vocal. Thirdly, that the Odendaal hearings at 
Katima Mulilo was a men’s affair. There was a marked difference between what the 
inhabitants called for and the outcome/content of the Odendaal Commission Report. 
                                                 
33 Du Pisani 1986, p. 159. 
34 Cockram 1976, p. 305f, quoted in Zeller, 2000, p.43. 













The UN, Odendaal and the Caprivian Identities 
 
Both domestic and international reactions to the Odendaal findings were negative and full 
of condemnation. The Organization of African Unity (OAU) decided on a radical 
approach,36 an accelerated support to liberation movements through the Africa Liberation 
Committee, while the UN condemned the Report and its General Assembly protested by 
passing Resolution 2074 in 1965.37 The Eastern Caprivi Strip was the focus of attention 
in the legal battle at the International Court of Justice in the SA versus Ethiopia and 
Liberia Case, as legal teams from both sides wished to make assessments of the state of 
things. The Eastern Caprivi offered better observation reference especially for the UN, 
since it was perceived as neglected and isolated but also because it was surrounded by 
other territories it offered better comparative advantage and opportunity to compare notes 
with such territories. For SA, the Eastern Caprivi was a perfect model of a ‘Native happy 
in his environment’ under his traditions and customs, distinct and with less detribalization 
and contented to subsist on game, fish and fruit. Legal teams from SA visited very often, 
the biggest group being the September 1964 visit by the then Deputy Minister of Native 
Affairs accompanied by a contingent of the Native Affairs Commission, come to acquaint 
themselves with the shape of things.38 It is reported that word of the judgment in favour 
of SA came at the time when Minister Maree of Education was in the Caprivi, and had a 
‘sundowner celebration’ in the guest house at Katima Mulilo upon hearing the news over 
the portable radio he carried.39  
 
Also in the context of the hearing at The Hague, was a visit in April 1965 by General 
Marshall of the United States of America. He asked to have included in his short stay a 
visit to the Roman Catholic Mission where he had a talk with Father Raphael, the priest-
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in-charge.40  Other visitors from the United States were Mr. Charles Burton Marshall and 
his wife during 1965, and, Professor Molnar and his wife in January 1966. At about the 
same time, and not to be outdone, two attempts by the UN to go to the Eastern Caprivi 
Strip are also recorded. The first was to be a visit by the World Court Judges to come and 
see for themselves. The visit did not take place even though SA agreed, probably because 
of the conditions which were attached to the visit, namely, that the Court should first 
examine conditions in Liberia and Ethiopia.41 The second attempt by the UN was at the 
end of 1967, probably triggered by the decision (or failure of it) of the World Court 
which favoured SA. SA intelligence sources reported a possible landing of a UN 
representative on the Mpacha Aerodrome (a military airfield) at Katima Mulilo, in a 
deliberate and unannounced attempt to proclaim, in a symbolic way, its right over SWA.  
 
At this time, an array of SA officials had just left the Caprivi. These were the Prime 
Minister, Mr. B.J. Vorster (3-7 July 1967), the Minister of the newly named Bantu 
Administration and Development department (formally Native Affairs), Mr. M.C. Botha, 
Minister Maree of Bantu Education, and the ministers for Justice and Health, and finally, 
and specifically for the proposed UN visit, an overnight visit by the Minister of Defence, 
General Fraser, then Head of the SA Army, and other top generals. Following this quick 
visit, the Army (SA) sent a contingent of troops to lie in wait for the UN officials and to 
contest their manoeuvre to land at Mpacha should it come about. It did not.42  
 
The above shows a contest, international in dimensions, for the Caprivi. Both SA and the 
UN intended to use this isolated territory, seemingly peaceful and contented for SA, and 
neglected and impoverished for the UN, to prove or solidify their positions at The Hague. 
It would seem for the UN that the best area of the Mandated Territory of SWA to 
proclaim its right over that of SA was the Eastern Caprivi Strip. To repeat the position 
stated above, the Caprivi indeed became a threshold or holding space against the rest of 
the world during this period, way beyond its dimensions of being a corridor. 
                                                 
40 On the way back from the Mission, the General is reported to have remarked in a light-hearted fashion 
about Father Raphael: ’If I had that man’s looks I would rule extensively’. Ibid., p. 44. 
41 Ibid., p. 45. 













The Planning Committee 
 
To bridge the administrative gap between 1963 and 1972 when the Legislative Assembly 
proposed by Odendaal became operational, the Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development (Mr. de Wet Nel), appointed a Planning Committee with fairly wide-
ranging terms of reference to apply itself to the various aspects of ‘development’ in the 
Eastern Caprivi Strip. This period is a transitional phase in the administrative framework 
in that the old order of the chiefs was to be replaced by the elected representatives and the 
powers of the chiefs relegated to advisory capacities. The Planning Committee was 
composed of the following members: The Native Commissioner (Eastern Caprivi) as 
chairman; H.H. (Bill) Harvey, head of the engineering branch f the Department; Jan 
Vorster, a senior member of the agricultural branch of the Department; and Piet Muller, 
accountant. Attached to the Committee in advisory capacity were two senior members of 
the Forestry Department – W.F.J. Immelman and A.E. Sonntag. A geologist, Mr. Wilson, 
was also attached to the Committee. This Committee did not only exclude the chiefs or 
their representatives in its ranks but all, except the Native Commissioner, were based in 
Pretoria. It is significant to underline that whereas in the past, the Native Commissioners 
were left to their own devices in the far-flung Eastern Caprivi and depended on the 
chiefs, this time the affairs of the territory were managed directly from Pretoria. It is 
difficult to discern from the records why this was necessary. 
 
The Committee made a comprehensive tour of the Eastern Caprivi Strip during June/July 
1964, including formal calls on both chiefs and their councils. Even though the main 
direction and content of the findings and recommendations were agreed to in talks at 
Katima Mulilo after the tour, the Committee’s report was drawn up in Pretoria, without 
its chairman. The report was presented on the 7 October 1964 and was approved by the 
Minister on the 20th October 1964, with an estimated expenditure of R576, 000.43 This is 
surely not a lot of money but compare an Eastern Caprivi Strip that was used to the 
                                                 











following administrative expenditure:44  
 




2 cattle guards £36
Total £990
 
Financial Year: 1939 -1940
Acting Superintendent’s Salary £480 - £320
Acting Superintendent’s Allowance £67









Financial Year: 1940 - 1960
Superintendent’s salary £600
Superintendent’s allowance £100




Contingencies from 1 November 1939 £250
Total £2,200 
 
Table 8: Showing Administrative Expenditure in Caprivi from 1929 to early 1960s 
 
While a slight increase in the salaries of cattle guards is noticed, it is not clear whether, in 
fact, it was a rise in salaries or was due to additions in staffing. The salaries of Native 
Police did not improve during this period. It can also be noted that the costs of 
administration does not reflect expenditure expended for services, that is because these 
were transferred to missions, even though later these received annual subsidies from the 
Administration. Also not reflected are the allowances paid to chiefs, ngambelas and 
headmen. Before these allowances were supplied out of the Department’s vote, they were 
met for a considerable period from the Tribal Trust Funds. The Planning Committee’s 
                                                 












recommendations in respect of the fields of agriculture and animal husbandry, road 
construction, improvement of water supply to inland villages and schools, and the 
construction of modern structures at each tribal headquarters were meant to be covered 
by the estimated expenditure. The Committee also recommended the building of a new 
hospital at Katima Mulilo and clinics in outlying areas and the introduction of a bus 
service upon the completion of roads in the territory. A major recommendation was the 
construction of the Ngweze ‘Black’ residential area (discussed below). It was the 
Planning Committee’s Recommendations and not Odendaal, as intimated by Kangumu 
(2000), that put the Eastern Caprivi Strip on a fast pace of infrastructural development. 
The concept of development should be applied with caution in this context. As Zeller 
correctly points out, the Odendaal Recommendations were not concerned with social 
services and agricultural development, but large scale-scale infrastructure projects such 
as proposed dams for electric power generation and irrigation schemes.45 This slightly 
differs from the more social emphasis of the Planning Committee. In both cases, though, 
the envisioned development was planned for the people and not with the people. They 
were not participatory in nature. Regardless of the good intentions, non-participatory 
projects excludes a social angle to development as it removes the aspect of ownership and 
acceptance.  
 
Growth of Katima Mulilo and Social Control  
 
The implementation of projects recommended by the Planning Committee required 
increased personnel both from the Union and locally, such as additional Magistrate and 
Native Commissioner; agricultural officer; a senior superintendent of works and his two 
assistants, one for roads and services such as water supply, and the other for general 
maintenance.  It also necessitated an increased demand for office and accommodation 
space. The other factor was the rapidly increasing population of Katima Mulilo with 
people migrating from rural parts, since this period also marks an intense shift from a 
subsistence livelihood to a cash economy. Arrangements were begun in November 1964 
                                                 












for the layout of the town in all its new dimensions, which were just 7 or 8 miles in length 
with a width varying from 1 to 3 miles. It included the administrative headquarters and 
the area set aside for White settlement; the Ngweze Village, a residential area set aside 
for Blacks; the trading post at the Katima Mulilo rapids that belonged to William (Bill) 
Finaughty; the mission with its hospital and schools, including the Namwi Island. The 
‘new’ Katima Mulilo and its environs were declared a nature reserve even before 
construction could take place. As such, no people were allowed to reside, cultivate or 
keep stock in the nature reserve except those living either at the Ngweze Village, at the 
mission, at headquarters or at Finaughty. Dogs were not allowed to be in the nature 
reserve except on a permit embodying strict conditions on control. The cutting of live 
trees without permission and hunting were not allowed. In March 1965 a construction 
company from Southern Rhodesia, Lewis Construction, arrived to start work on the 
Ngweze Village and the Headquarters that included the area set aside for white 
settlement. At the same time another team arrived from the Transvaal Provincial 
Administration to carry out the work of constructing the Mpacha aerodrome. 
 
Ngweze46 Village Development 
 
As stated, Lewis Construction was entrusted to construct the Ngweze Village, the first 
‘formal’ residential area set aside for Blacks along a watercourse (mulapo) bearing the 
same name. Work proceeded quickly.  A number of locals were employed as learner-
artisans and others in lesser capacities so that by January 1966 about fifty houses were 
ready for occupation. To maintain ‘health standards’ in the village -  in reality to effect 
social control - the Administration recalled John Matali Milinga from retirement in 
March 1966 to be the first ‘superintendent’ and disciplinarian of the Ngweze Village. Part 
of his work involved ensuring that rules were adhered to, amongst them being that no 
structural additions were to be made, no nails hammered into walls, and that all visitors 
were to be reported.  
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When Mr. John Matali Milinga finally retired in about 1968, control of the Ngweze 
Village was vested in an Advisory Board which was formed in 1968 and had its first 
meeting on the 19 October 1968 at Ngweze Bantu Community School. The Board 
worked in conjunction with Mr. Morule, appointed Supervisor of Ngweze Bantu 
Township. The first elected office bearers were: Mr. J.M. Sechocho: Chairman; Mr. I.M. 
Selebogo: Vice-Chairman; and Mr. D.K. Ntuntu: Secretary. The Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner and his Assistant, the Circuit Inspector of Bantu Education, the 
Superintendent of Works, a Representative of the Bantu Investment Corporation and the 
Police were also invited to these meetings.47 As if this was not enough of a control 
measure, a traditional council system was introduced in Ngweze Township. These were 
representatives of the chiefs in the township, functioning as a kind of ambassadors. It 
consisted of headmen from both the Masubiya and Mafwe (Bayeyi) tribal groups who 
were to administer (traditional) justice to their respective peoples. If a case involving 
members from the Mafwe (Bayeyi) was brought to this court, it was heard by the 
headmen from the Mafwe side only, and vice versa. If a case involved members of 
different groups, however, then it was taken to the Native Commissioner’s Court. Cases 
heard in this court were subject to review or appeal at each respective traditional 
headquarters of their people, even while they (the people) were resident in the town. The 
traditional court (chiefs’ representatives) was responsible, among others, to issue permits 
for visitors to Ngweze township and when visitors wished to stay longer, the matter was 
referred to the Native Commissioner. There was, however, conflict between the Advisory 
Board and the traditional court in Katima Mulilo. While the latter were required to attend 
Advisory Board meetings, they boycotted them, claiming that the Board had taken away 
their powers despite the fact that they were the chiefs’ representatives. This was resolved 
only with the intervention of the Native Commissioner.48 
 
The construction of Ngweze Village should be viewed, with all its good intentions, as just 
                                                 
47 The ordinary members who served on this committee over time include: Mr. Kabunga, Mr. Masule, Mr. 
Simasiku, Mr. Ramoba, Mr. Mabuku, Mr. Sikabala, and Mr. Morule. 
48 Minutes of Meeting of the Advisory Board held at the Court House on the 13 February 1970, at 4 pm. 












another form of social control. It occurred at a time when the authorities were confronted 
with the rising tide of nationalism, directed from the Mafulo informal village, where 
Kruger says there was no form of control. In fact Mafulo was demolished after the 
completion of the Ngweze Village and its residents moved to the new township where the 
CANU activists were either kept out, or closely monitored. Two other villages that were 
within the boundaries of the newly designed town of Katima Mulilo were removed to 
localities outside. As the town began to define itself, ordinary people were pushed more 
and more to the margins. As Kruger concedes, the idea of  declaring Katima Mulilo a 
nature reserve, ‘apart from the idea of preserving the natural order…it was schemed to 
prevent loose settlements moving in to no good purpose – an inevitable development 
unless checked from the beginning’.49 The declaration of spaces as exclusive 
‘conservation areas’ or ‘military zones’ as a form of social control (cordon sanitaire), 
was widely used by the Apartheid regime. In the Caprivi itself, a classic example is that 
of Western Caprivi. The area was proclaimed as a Nature Park in 1963 and upgraded to a 
Game Reserve in 1968 but declared a South African military zone and closed to civilians 
before any activities could start.50 
 
However, despite the vow to prevent informal settlements around Katima Mulilo, a 
number of them sprang up. Just outside Ngweze Village an informal settlement 
developed at the site where Lewis Construction camped during the construction of 
Ngweze Village, and was incidentally named Lewis after that company. Lewis informal 
settlement was only demolished after independence when its residents were moved to 
Chotto, the biggest informal settlement in Katima Mulilo at present. Lewis Construction 
Company’s corporate stamp on Katima Mulilo did not end with Ngweze village. The 
company was also contracted to build Katima Mulilo headquarters and the area set aside 
for white settlement. This way Apartheid South Africa’s policy of segregated residential 
areas was transplanted to the emerging urban landscape of Katima Mulilo. The 
segregated spatial urban landscape of Katima Mulilo, however, defied the colonial push 
northwards (hinterland) for blacks. In this case headquarters and white settlement 
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occupied the northern end, along the scenic Zambezi River while Ngweze was sited in 
the south end of Katima Mulilo. Apart from the fact that the river was an attraction in this 
arrangement, consideration might also had been given to the fact that if Blacks were to 
reside along the river, it would make uncontrolled crossing into newly independent and 
seemingly hostile Zambia easier, this being where a good number of CANU activists had 
fled. A belt of forest separated the two settlements. This would prove a security risk when 
the armed liberation struggle launched by PLAN (SWAPO’s military wing), was 
intensified since it exposed whites living along the river to constant shelling across from 
Zambian soil. The SADF (South African Defence Force) responded by constructing the 
Katima Military Base, right in the centre of Katima Mulilo in the forest belt separating 
the black residential area from the white. In this way, social interaction between whites 
and blacks was made impossible by a buffer zone created by the military base. This social 
interaction was  considered highly undesirable on the part of the Administration as 
reflected below in a heading in the minutes of the Advisory Board titled ‘Irregularity: 
Movement of Whites in the Bantu Township’:51 
 
Captain Malan [police] replied that this case was under police investigation. The Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner requested that cases of this nature be reported immediately to the police and stated 
that only those who [whites] are permitted by their services would be allowed to enter the Bantu 
Township. 
 
The corporate stamp of Lewis Construction on Katima Mulilo was not limited to 
buildings but affected the social life of the residents of the Eastern Caprivi Strip. The 
Advisory Committee raised objections to ‘unregistered marriages’ which it perceived 
would place a “burden upon the people of Caprivi in future caused by temporary 
marriages between Caprivi ladies and foreign men.”52 The Native Commissioner’s 
response was that this was a matter dealing with custom and tradition in which he was not 
prepared to interfere. He however offered to contact the manager of Lewis Construction 
to impress upon him the fact that before any of his employees leave Caprivi he should be 
asked of his marital status and that the Kuta (traditional court) representatives should 
                                                 













certify such status.53 It could not be found from examined documents that any case 
concerning this was brought, either before the Advisory Board or the Kuta. This is not to 
suggest that such unions did not exist. The writer has cousins who were fathered in this 
way and who were never able to know their father as he left while they were still young. 
The issue of unregistered marriages was broader than the aspect of Lewis Construction in 
the social life of Katima Mulilo during this time and bordered on social control, 
particularly the influx control of women, classified at the time as ‘Unemployed and 
unattached Women’.54 The Advisory Board complained that these women were earning 
their living through the selling of beer and immoral practices. It was resolved that all 
unemployed people should be sent back to their villages as all accommodation available 
was for workers. This was a very male chauvinistic interpretation of the social problem. 
Firstly, it assumes that the ‘immoral practices’ were brought about as a result of women 
being in town, the role of men there being overlooked. Secondly, save for a few, most 
workers of the time were men and therefore the bulk of those forced to go back to 
villages were females. This added to the fact that the majority of expatriate workers were 
themselves male, both Rhodesians working for Lewis Construction and scores of South 
Africans (black and white) who were imported to construct the Mpacha Military Airfield 
by the Roads Department of the Transvaal Provincial Administration. By bringing in 
these men without their spouses, the Administration laid a foundation for immoral 
practices which they now blamed only on Lewis Construction. The Mpacha military 
Airbase is discussed in detail in Chapter Six in a section dealing with the Caprivi as a 
military frontier. It is enough to add here that from an administrative and developmental 
point it was an anomaly to have a sophisticated airbase in an underdeveloped backwater 
like Mpacha. The Airbase, about 15 miles west of Katima Mulilo, was connected to the 
town by a road which was the smoothest and widest in the whole Caprivi Strip at the 
time.55 
 
Apart from Lewis, other informal settlements that developed in the townscape of Katima 
                                                 
53 Ibid.  
54 Ibid. 












Mulilo during this period are: Piggery; Dairy; Coloureds, and Wenela (WNLA). The 
naming of these emergent urban landscapes follows functional designations common in 
African sections of towns. The Piggery and Diary informal settlements developed around 
and were named after projects proposed by the Planning Committee took off in those 
locations to provide pork and dairy products to the residents of Katima Mulilo. On the 
other hand, for places where people lived to carry such names was really a mockery on 
the poor living conditions existent in those areas, filthily unbearable only pigs would 
survive in them. The term ‘coloureds’ was self explanatory, the section of the town 
reserved for ‘mixed’ blood, while Wenela was the site of a migrant labour recruitment 
depot used by the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association. 
 
The Caprivi Legislative Assembly and Caprivi Government 
 
From 1939 when the Union Department of Native Affairs took direct control of the 
Eastern Caprivi Strip to 1972, administration remained vested in a magistrate who acted 
in consultation with the two chiefs. Under this system of rule the magistrate had limited 
influence in the day to day affairs of the people. The chiefs retained a very large measure 
of authority in tribal affairs. The normal exercise of powers by the chiefs could not be 
termed as autocratic because a full discussion in the Kuta (tribal court) was held in all 
matters affecting the tribe, which had been described by Lord Hailey (in reference to 
Bechuanaland) in An African Survey (revised in 1956) as a ‘sort of parliamentary levee en 
masse of the tribe’.56 Debates in the Kuta, often keen and frankly expressed, were 
regularly attended. The Kuta is an ordinary tribunal for the trial of all cases presided over 
by the chief or his Ngambela (prime minister).  
 
The first stage of constitutional development towards ‘self-government’ or Bantustanism 
was bestowed on the Eastern Caprivi Strip when Mr. M.C. Botha, then Minister of Bantu 
Administration and Development and of Bantu Education opened the first inaugural 
session of the Caprivi Legislative Council on the 15 March 1972 at Ngweze, apparently 
                                                 











at the unanimous request of the ‘leaders’ of the Caprivi in 1971.57 This cast away the old 
order of administration through a magistrate/native commissioner. The officials who 
served as magistrates and their terms in the Eastern Caprivi Strip are as follows: 
 
Name Term Comment 
L.F.W. Trollope 25/10/1939 – 31/12/1945 *See footnote below58 
C.E. Kruger 1/1/1946 – 31/12/1946  
L.F.W. Trollope 1/1/1947 – 12/1/1953  
A.B. Colenbrander 13/1/1953 – 6/12/1956  
M.J. Verceuil 7/12/1956 – 13/1/1959  
D.J. Wium 14/1/1959 – 5/4/1961  
N.W.D. Boshoff 6/4/1961 – 25/8/1963  
A.B. Colenbrander 26/8/1963 – 29/10/1963 Temporarily there waiting next 
fixed appointment 
C.E. Kruger 30/10/1963 – 1/4/1968  
P.N. Hansmeyer 2/4/1968 -31/7/1971  
J.J. Rossouw 1/8/1971 – 31/1/1972  
E.L. Gregory 1/2/1972 – 23/3/1972 Thereafter Chief Director in the 
new order 
 
Table 9: Native Commissioners who served in Eastern Caprivi during the South African period 
 
The Legislative Council of the East Caprivi ‘Homeland’ consisted of both chiefs and 
representatives from the Masubiya and ‘Mafwe’ tribal groups with its seat in Ngweze. 
                                                 
57 See Opening Address by the M.C. Botha, Eastern Caprivi Legislative Council at Ngweze; see also 
‘Verrigtinge van die Eerste  Sessie van die Tweede Wetgewende Raad van Caprivi 21-23 September 1976’. 
 
58 Leslie French Watts Trollope did not resign from the service as is stated to Kruger, he was dismissed 
from the service evidently ‘owing to inefficiency – never kept any books or accounts. A brilliant man but 
too lazy’(Entry of 25 December 1952, Log Book of the Holy Family Mission, Katima Mulilo, Caprivi 
Strip, SWA/Namibia, Book I, 1943-1994, p. 31). When his replacement arrived to relieve him, he expelled 
him from the Eastern Caprivi Strip for not having ‘appropriate permits’. He eventually left on 25 December 
1952 and took up an appointment with the Southern Rhodesian Immigration Department overseeing the  
transport of men from Barotseland, wishing to take up work in Southern Rhodesia, to the Victoria Falls and 
all matters related to enlistment. Later he served as Manager of the Uleze and also as Manager of the Boat 
Club. He died on 28 July 1965 of  a heart attack at Mwandi Hospital (old Sesheke, Northern Rhodesia) 
while on his way to visit Kruger at Katima Mulilo. He was buried at Katima Mulilo in the grounds between 
headquarters and the mission under a Muchenje Tree (Diospyros mespiliformis) in the grounds of the 












The Legislative Assembly had an Executive Council to give effect to its decisions which 
was composed of Chief Josiah Mutwa Moraliswani of the Masubiya, elected as first 
Chief Councilor, his portfolio Authority Affairs and Finance; Chief Mamili of the Mafwe 
as councilor for Justice; Simasiku Simwanza for Agriculture and Works; David Siukuta 
for Education. The Administrative link with Pretoria at this time was a Commissioner-
General, E.F. Potgieter, appointed to ‘guide Caprivi to self-government’. The seconded 
staff who were directors of departments were: Maytham as the Chief Director; Louis Nel 
for Education; Paul Fouche for Agriculture and Works; and Nic (N.J.) Badenhorst for 
Justice. This was the state of things until on 19 March 1976 when a new Constitution 
ushered in a ‘Caprivi Government’ with complete symbols of ‘state’: an anthem, a flag 
and coat of arms. In this way, the Caprivi and its identities were inaugurated and the 
territory now became a fully fledged South African Bantustan up to 1980 when AG8 
(Legislation concerning the three-tier ethnic system of central, regional and local 
government) brought the region administratively back into (SWA)Namibia.  
 
The process to bring back the Eastern Caprivi Strip into the administrative armpit of the 
SWAA started with the Turnhalle Constitutional Conference (1975-1977). A delegation 
from the Eastern Caprivi Strip attended sessions of the Turnhalle Conference in 
Windhoek under a loose grouping called the ‘Caprivi Alliance.’ The Caprivi Alliance 
transformed into the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP), founded in November 1977 by 
members of the Masubiya and Mafwe tribal authorities with the two chiefs as leaders. 
The party joined the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) in 1977 under the leadership 
of Mafwe chief Richard Temuso Muhinda Mamili. One can conclude therefore, that an 
identity specific to the Caprivi was already being dismantled by the time it reached 
fruition in 1976 since the Turnhalle process brought the Caprivi back into mainstream 
SWA politics. 
 
The Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP, of the DTA) stood unopposed in the 1980 elections 
held for the newly created Caprivi Second Tier Legislative Assembly after the 











the 20 seats in the Assembly were divided as follows:59 
 
 Elected Seats: Eight elected seats – divided equally among the two tribes; 
 Nominated seats: Six seats for each tribe, with the two chiefs automatically receiving a seat each; 
 Executive Committee: Composed of the two chiefs as rotating Chairmen and with equal 
representation for each tribe. 
 
It is necessary to remark on the historical continuities which characterize the identities of 
the Caprivi. An important aspect of the fruition of the Caprivi Identity is the transition 
from tribal to political representation (see above). It is apparent from the above that the 
constituencies for political representation still carried along the historical divide of two 
tribal groupings, the Mafwe and Masubiya. It is this historical continuity which paralyzed 
the functioning of the East Caprivi Second Tier Government, and indeed the greater 
source of sore points (see Chapter Six) in the Caprivi and not necessarily the involvement 
of the chiefs in politics as argued by other writers.60 A proposed amendment to AG29 in 
1985 sought to change representation from the two-legged tribal formula to 
representation by elected political parties after repeated attempts by the Administrator 
and other emissaries from Windhoek failed to heal the breach between the two composite 
constituencies of the Caprivi. The amendment, tabled in the National Assembly in 
Windhoek, was being considered by the Administrator-General when UN Resolution 435 
took centre stage. Another aspect to record about the two-legged Caprivi which occurred 
during the transition from tribal to political representation, especially with the 
establishment of the Legislative Assembly in 1972, was the withering away from the 
Mafwe identity of the sub-identity of Bayeyi. Whereas previously that identity was 
known and written in official documents as Mafwe (Bayeyi), since 1972, this was 
dropped. (see chapter 2 for detailed discussion). 
                                                 
59 Adapted from Pütz, von Egidy & Caplan, Namibia Handbook and Political Who’s Who, Windhoek: 
Magus, 1989: p. 420. 
60 See Pütz, et al, Ibid., who argue that the source of complication in Caprivi politics has been the 
involvement of chiefs in politics who are traditionally not supposed to align with any political party. For 
me, this is a narrow definition of the problem. The traditionally ethnic rivalry between the two tribal groups 
predates the transition to political representation from tribal formula. Their view that previous Mafwe Chief 
















The discussion in this chapter dealt with two issues: firstly, the evolution of colonial 
administrative control in the Caprivi Strip, particularly the eastern part, the territory that 
lies east of the Mashi/Kwando River, and secondly, how this helped shape the process of 
the creation of Caprivi identities. With regard to the first issue, it was observed that 
colonial administrative identity in the Caprivi Strip dates back to its creation in 1890 in 
an agreement between Germany and Britain which guaranteed the former access to the 
Zambezi. Four phases were identified in the Caprivi colonial administrative identity. In 
the first phase (1890-1909), the Caprivi Strip was administered as a German sphere of 
influence. Because of this, it was argued, it took almost nineteen years before Germany 
decided to set an administration in the territory. The theory that this was due to the fact 
that Germany lost interest in this ‘poor’ territory during this time was refuted. Rather, it 
was the nature of spheres of influence that do not vest territorial rights in the holder, that 
are areas reserved for future action. A holder could decide not to occupy a sphere of 
influence after-all. Another misconception refuted is the usual argument that the territory 
turned into a no-man’s land during this time. The territory still rightly belonged to its 
indigenous inhabitants, under subjugation, of the Aluyi. Perhaps what was lacking was an 
effective European administration during this time. An administrative tool for spheres of 
influence was periodic reports, which Germany received (1904; 1905). 
 
During the second phase (1909-1914), the German Resident Captain Streitwolf managed 
to establish a local administration based on two tribal authorities, the Mafwe (Bayeyi) 
and the Masubiya. This laid the foundation for two-legged Caprivi identities, a status quo 
that was maintained in subsequent phases of the colonial administrative identity. 
Otherwise Germany colonial administrative identity of the Caprivi Zipfel was featureless. 
A pertinent aspect of the third phase (1914-1939) is the transferability of the Caprivi. 
Often it was offloaded onto the next territory (Bechuanaland, SWAA, and Union Native 
Affairs) arguably because of history and geography (remoteness). The colonial 











superintendent, was inspection tours which were very irregular. Otherwise a yearly police 
patrol across the territory to outlying posts accounted for control during this phase. The 
last phase (1939-1980), can be usefully divided into two, a Bantu Reserve (1939-1962) 
when the Eastern Caprivi suffered total neglect and a Bantustan (1964-1980) when a shift 
in administrative identity occurred, characterized by intense focus but also a transition 
from tribal to political representation. 
 
The second part of the objectives was to see how colonial administrative identity helped 
shape Caprivian identities. Two important colonial administrative characteristics of the 
Caprivi emerged: one that it was swampy, feverish (malarial) and consisted of wandering 
‘bushmen’, and as thus it was not suitable for white (read human) settlement. Secondly, 
that ‘historical’ and ‘geographical’ factors made it difficult to administer. The result was 
that it was administered as a separate whole within a complex, being pushed more to 
neighbouring territories than as part of SWA. Even the provision of services such as 
education or health were either entrusted in the hands of such adjacent territories or left in 
the hands of missionaries who themselves were headquartered in those territories. The 
result of this was that an image of the Caprivi emerged: unhealthy, remote and separate. 
The inhabitants were administered to feel more a part of Barotseland and Bechuanaland 
than SWA. When events so dictated, the Caprivi was forced to cut ties with those 
territories, either to be ‘independent’ (read Bantustan), or brought back into mainstream 
SWA. By this time however, the Caprivi Identity had already emerged and people had 






















Germany managed to acquire an ‘access corridor to the Zambezi’ through a territorial 
swap as part of the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty with Great Britain.1 However, its high-
flying colonial utopia of a rail link or shipping route via the Zambezi co necting German 
Southwest Africa (DSWA) and German East Africa became a ‘dream frustrated’2 partly 
because the Zambezi was not navigable in some parts because of its many rapids. She 
managed, though, to poke her nose deep into the interior of southern Africa and cut like a 
dagger through two British territories, the Bechuanaland Protectorate and Northern 
Rhodesia. In this way, Germany was able to keep in check British influence and 
expansion by being a neighbour next door in southern Africa. The Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
thus became Germany’s frontier into unknown British territories, not merely an access 
corridor to the Zambezi. 
  
This frontier identity of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel would later transform the place from a 
mere backwash on the Zambezi to one of utmost strategic military importance during SA 
rule and independent Namibia’s ‘Socio-economic Tail-Light.’3 This chapter will examine 
the different ‘frontiers’ which are embedded in the Caprivi, as perceived and defined by 
different state and non-state actors in its history. This identity stretches over many 
centuries and is multi-faceted. Focus here will be limited to labour migrancy as an aspect 
of frontier identity, lawlessness and no-man’s land as aspects of frontier identity, military 
                                                 
1 For detailed discussion see Chapter Two of this Dissertation. 
2 Louw, W., ‘Caprivi: A Dream Frustrated’, in S. Davis and Sey Davis (eds.), SWA ANNUAL, 1979, 
Windhoek: SWA Publications. 
3 This argument is made by Zeller, Wolfgang and Kangumu Kangumu, Bennett, in their forthcoming paper 
‘From Apartheid Bantustan to Namibia’s Socio-economic Tail-Light: Caprivi Under Old and New Indirect 
Rule’, in Melber, Henning, (ed.), Cross-examining Transition in Namibia: Socio-economic and Ideological 












frontier identity for both PLAN (Peoples’ Liberation Army of Namibia) and the SADF, 
and lastly, refuge as an aspect of frontier identity particularly during the pre-colonial 
period. 
 
The construction of the frontier identity was initially fed by the (mis)conception that the 
territory of the Eastern Caprivi was not an end – but a means to an end, a transit or nodal 
point. This was largely a perception of ‘uselessness’. During SA rule, the quality of 
‘usefulness’ emerged strongly, particularly in the confrontation against the advance of 
‘Black Africa’. The definition of frontier adopted here is that which implies extremity, 
the extreme limit of settled land beyond which lies wilderness.4 Embedded in here is the 
disregard of the native population, their existence and wishes. ‘Unsettled’ refer to lack of 
European settlement and ‘wilderness’ was the opposite of western civilization. 
 
The Mfecane and Refuge as an Aspect of Frontier Identity 
 
The Aluyi5 had subjugated the people of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel before the arrival of 
the Makololo, to whom they also fell victim. For the Aluyi during this time, the territory 
was utilized mainly as a granary, hunting and fishing ground.6 As Venning put it: ‘What 
makes the strip of value to Lewanika [of Barotse] is on account of the grazing, reed 
cutting, fishing and suitability of certain areas for making winter gardens’.7 The Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel was thus a ‘frontier of plenty’ for the Aluyi at this stage. 
 
With the advent of the Mfecane movement (also known as Difagane8), the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel transformed from a land of opportunity for the Aluyi to a source (frontier) 
of danger posed by the migrating hordes of Makololo under Sebetwane and the Matebele 
                                                 
4 Soanes, Catherine & Stevenson, Angus (eds.), Concise Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 571. 
5 Now commonly known as Lozi or Barotse. Together with the Makololo, they are discussed in Chapter 
One. 
6 The use of certain Caprivi Islands for fishing by Northern Rhodesians continued even during the colonial 
period in what became defined over time as ‘Barotse Privileges’. See discussion in Chapter Two. 
7 J.H. Venning (undated), ‘Newly Acquired Country between Zambezi and Mashi Rivers.’ (Manuscript, 
NAN: A.589). 
8 Difagane is an Nguni word for ‘forced migration’. See Monica Wilson and Leonard Thompson, The 











of Mzilikazi. The Mfecane started as a social, political and military revolution in the 
1800s and resulted in the creation of the Zulu Kingdom under Shaka Zulu. The 
movement produced conquest, warfare, population flight and social dislocation.9 As 
Omer-Cooper correctly observes, the Mfecane is: 
 
one of the greatest formative events of African history, (which)…permanently modified the ethnic 
map of much of Bantu Africa and thereby played an important part in establishing the framework 
of political and cultural life in a number of modern African states.10 
 
Sebetwane was assisted to cross the Zambezi at Impalila Island by Chief Liswani of the 
Masubiya on a promise that he would give the latter part of the war booty (cattle and 
people), on his way to conquer the Toka-Leya (Chief Liswani’s arch-enemies) before he 
overran Barotseland and established himself at Naliele. Nothing came of his promise to 
Chief Liswani. Instead, Sebetwane consolidated his rule, incorporating Chief Liswani’s 
area of influence. This, however, was counter-productive for state formation in a period 
characterized by territorial feuds. Indeed, this was a very restive period in the history of 
pre-colonial central southern Africa, marked by military confrontation, murdering, 
pillaging, treachery and alliance building. Sebetwane found an immediate foe in Chief 
Liswani. The latter formed an alliance with Mzilikazi and invited a Matebele army to 
attack Sebetwane. A joint force of Chief Liswani and the Matebele army harassed 
Sebetwane several times to an extent that he became strongly distrustful of the Masubiya. 
The Makololo of Sebetwane called Chief Liswani to Naliele with the promise that they 
would give him the cattle which Sebetwane promised him but instead murdered him in 
cold blood.11 A latter invading army of the Matebele was destroyed on its return from 
Barotseland by a cunning move on the part of one Simalumba of the Masubiya. When the 
Matebele army reached the village of Simalumba, he undertook to take them across the 
Zambezi, but instead of doing so he landed them on an island – Sikachila. As the last of 
the Matabele were being taken over to the island, Simalumba capsized the canoe and 
                                                 
9 P. du Toit, State-Building and Democracy in Southern Africa :A comparative study of Botswana, South 
Africa and Zimbabwe, Pretoria: HSRC, 1995, p. 75. 
10 J.D. Omer-Cooper, The Zulu Aftermath: A Nineteenth-Century Revolution in Bantu Africa, Evaton: 
Northwestern University Press, 1966, pp. 4, 174. 












swam back to the bank. The Matebele who were not used to the conditions on the island 
and were unable to get to the mainland, consequently died from exhaustion, starvation 
and disease. The remnants were killed by the Aluyi on the island, which became known 
as ‘Sioli sa Matebele’ (Island of the Matebele).12 
 
The death of Chief Liswani and the demise of this contingent of Matebele army cleared 
the path for Sebetwane to establish his headquarters at Linyanti (Sangwali today) in the 
what became known as the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. In this way he felt safe from the 
constant danger posed by the Matebele of Mzilikazi (his natural enemy) because he was 
well protected by the swampy boundary rivers. The territory therefore provided a natural 
refuge or hiding place for him and his vast herds of cattle. Ironically, his people were 
reduced by illnesses in this river-bounded frontier of refuge. This provided the Aluyi with 
a perfect opportunity to reclaim their sovereignty in Barosteland and the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel in 1864. After reasserting their control, the Aluyi posted representatives in the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel to guard against the return of the Makololo and prevent attacks 
from possible enemies such as the Matebele and the Batawana of Ngamiland. Once 
again, the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel became a buffer zone, the southernmost frontier of 
Bulozi. 
 
The Eastern Caprivi Zipfel had provided a sense of security – refuge – for its inhabitants 
over generations. While it is accepted that people habitually moved either away from 
diseases or other calamity, even in search of food, often within the bounds of the then 
under-populated Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, they would simply move to another corner to 
avoid looming danger. This way they kept clear of attacks from invading parties. It is 
believed that the majority of Matotela (Totela) fled away from the cruel rule of Sepopa of 
the Aluyi into the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel to hide in the thick Hukwe veld (forests) as a 
deterrence for an attack. Chief Liswani II (Nkonkwena, Mutola Lizuku) of the Masubiya 
                                                 
12 Lozi Language. Unpublished notes on Interview with Chief Chikamatondo of the Masubiya on the 
subject of his position as Chief of the Masubiya Tribe and having a bearing on the repeated claims by one 













established his headquarters at Impalila (Mparira) Island because he did not want to live 
in the same village with Isuswa, Sebetwane’s emissary, who was posted there following 
the murder of Chief Liswani I by the Makololo. The island became his place of refuge. 
When Sepopa pursued him, Chief Liswani II left Impalila Island with his people into 
Bechuanaland Protectorate (Chapter Two). 
 
More recently, when the German Captain Streitwolf13went to the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
to establish an administration there, he apparently found a territory ‘deserted’. The 
inhabitants did not follow their Lozi overlords as was widely accepted, they went into 
hiding either on islands or swampy areas or in the thicket of the forests. The Aluyi, and 
possibly the British, had warned them of the cruelty of the approaching Germans who 
had the 1904-1907 Herero-Damara-Nama Genocide hanging over their heads. People in 
the territory were used to migrate in order to survive. This migration transcended 
contemporary boundaries. When danger loomed on the north bank of the Zambezi 
(Northern Rhodesia, Zambia), people moved across to the south bank (the Caprivi), or 
simply into Bechuanaland Protectorate (Botswana). The rivers formed natural barriers 
(frontiers) in this equation and the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, being the rivers’ depression, 
formed a natural place of refuge. 
 
Outlaw Frontier, 1890 – 1909 
 
A detailed catalogue of ‘lawlessness’ in the Caprivi Zipfel between 1890 and 1909 has 
been provided by Maria Fisch and others.14 During this time, the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
turned into an El Dorado15 for shady characters, criminals or prisoners who went into 
hiding and a happy hunting ground for both part-time and professional trophy hunters. In 
some instances these ne’er-do-wells competed with the locals as hunting guides for 
                                                 
13 The Masubiya called him Kambungu while to the Mafwe he was known as Katara Matunga, one who 
surveys the land. 
14 Fisch, Maria, 1999, The Caprivi Strip during the German colonial period, 1890 to 1914 [with a chapter 
on the boundary dispute up to the present], Windhoek: Out of Africa, pp. 43-51. See also Zeller (2000), 
Pretorius (1975), Trollope (1940, 1956/7). 











Englishmen who lived in Sesheke and Livingstone.16 The locals benefited from the meat 
which resulted from hunting trips. There were other Bechuanaland nationals and SA 
Boers involved in this trade, particularly after a number of them were uprooted during the 
South African War. Fisch states that most of the Boers entered the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
via Kazungula and Linyanti and that their number was put at fifty in 1904 and continued 
to increase. 
 
It is believed that they made fortunes from hunting, farming and smuggling of arms and 
ammunition. Rothe (1906: 1-34) is quoted by Fisch that one could make a profit of 
approximately 4 000 Mark every season. Game was plenty in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
partly, according to Streitwolf, because the territory was Paramount Chief Lewanika’s 
private hunting reserve until 1895 (Streitwolf 1911: 227f). The other fact is that the area 
was very sparsely populated at this time and therefore game was virtually undisturbed in 
its habitat. Indeed, this is partly why the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel became an ‘outlaw 
frontier’ because criminals could hide and carry on their activities without the prying 
eyes of the people. 
 
Intertwined with the concept of lawlessness is often the description of the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel as a ‘no man’s land’.17 This is because there was no official European presence in 
the territory at this time. The native population was disregarded in such a definition, 
probably because most commentators describe them as ‘spineless’, ‘little serfs’, and 
‘slaves’ of the Aluyi. Basically, they were considerd of no consequence. Still, even the 
Lozi presence was not recognized in this instance and, indeed, if the Lozi state had such 
effective grip on the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, it is doubtful whether such acts would 
continue undeterred. The fact that the chief had to receive a third of every annual hunting 
licence paid in British territories18 would have made Lozi chiefs expel these outlaws or 
compel them to obtain hunting licences. The likely scenario is that Lozi chiefs either 
benefited from such trade indirectly without the knowledge of British authorities or their 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Trollope (1956/7) 












grip on the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel is grossly exaggerated. More than any other time, this 
is when Lozi rule over the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was supposed to be at its peak and more 
organized. 
 
In any case, the outlaws managed to find a safe haven, a river bounded frontier where 
they were not subjected to restrictions and were out of reach of the long arm of the law. 
In this frontier, they acted as the law and therefore made sense of the assertion in this 
paper that indeed the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel had the attribute of ‘refuge’ as part of its 
Frontier Identity. 
 
Migrant Labour as an aspect of Frontier Identity 
 
Any study of labour extraction in central southern Africa during the pre-colonial and 
colonial period should recognize the following factors, the first being the highly mobile 
nature of the inhabitants. People moved freely from one part to another across what are 
now contemporary political boundaries. Movement was ignited either by bad harvests, 
family squabbles, high flood levels, or outbreaks of cattle diseases.18 Secondly, especially 
for the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, artificial boundaries split some tribes whose people 
occupied both banks of a river. Thirdly, the general rise in labour shortages in Southern 
Africa in the early 1900s restricted agricultural, mining, infrastructure, and industrial 
development.19 Finally, a factor as regards the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel that was present in 
the pre-colonial past was the abundance of food in fish, game and fruit. An entry in 1940 
Annual Report recognizes this fact: ‘There is very little economic urge for the Strip 
Natives to leave their homes to seek work elsewhere. Their subsistence needs can all be 
met from local resources and taxation is not on a scale to force them to go out and work’.  
20  
 
However, a number of able-bodied men periodically left their homes to seek work 
opportunities outside the territory.  Many of these made use of arrangements in respect of 
                                                 
19 Pretorious 1975 p.10 
19 Zeller, 2000, p. 40. 











contract/organized labour. It will be shown that the Eastern Caprivi Strip became a 
sought-out frontier for labour supply during the colonial period and that this ‘going away’ 
and ‘coming back’ reinforced a ‘Caprivianess’. It will also be shown that the routes to 
contract work travelled north, east and south and excluded the west (SWA). Had this not 
been the case the ‘Caprivians’ at that early stage could have been ‘Namibianised’. 
 
Labour extraction from the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel dates back to pre-colonial times. From 
the writings of Livingstone, Pinto, Arnot, Colliard, Jalla, Bertrand, Gibbons, Harding, 
Hamilton and others, descriptions of forced labour and slavery are vividly expressed. 
Consider the following, provided by Capt, Bertrand (circa 1895), about slavery as 
practised by the Lozi: 
 
 The (Lozi) chiefs can carry off a child from a family who… are not Lozi; the child then becomes 
a slave. All his labour he gives to his master who has the right of life and death over him…The 
King and his elder sister, Queen Mokwai receive every year as tribute a number of children of 
both sexes who become their servants…. They give those they have no need of to their chiefs or 
other persons.” “ A Morotsi (Lozi) can never be a slave…. All the kings’ subjects’ excepting the 
Barotsi are liable to enforced labor.21 
 
Slave trading by Mambari from Angola was stopped in 1889. Mainly as a result of 
pressure, Lewanika issued a Royal Proclamation in 1906 which freed 30 000 slaves.22 
The practice of slavery continued, however, albeit illegally. Writing in 2006, Andrew N. 
Matjila observes that up to the late 1970s guns from the ‘period of the Mambaris’ were 
still found in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. The Mambaris were armed men and their 
assistants who captured slaves in the territory and chained them to the long line of people 
on their way to the Dar [Dar-es-Salaam].23  Their final destination was the Americas. It is 
possible therefore that slave-trading took place in this secluded frontier on the Zambezi 
even though not much research on this topic has been undertaken as yet. 
 
                                                 
21 Bertrand,. A., The Kingdom of the Barotse, T. Fischer Unwin, 1899, pp.274, 276. 
22 Pretorius, 1975, p. 37. See also Clay, G., Your Friend, Lewanika, London: Chatto and Windus, 1968, pp. 
140-141. 











While the Caprivi Zipfel was not a major issue in the negotiations which resulted in the 
1890 Anglo-German Treaty,24 it nevertheless held prospects in the view of the German 
colonial lobby for natural resources and human labour. The negotiations came at a time 
after the 1885 agreement between Germany and Portugal on the northern border of 
DSWA was heavily criticized within the Germany colonial lobby for blocking further 
expansion north-east where resources (natural and human) were believed to be in 
abundance (Zeller, 2000: p. 35). Streitwolf concluded soon thereafter that the potential of 
the Caprivi Zipfel lay in its human population which he estimated to be between 10 000 
and 12 000 in 1909 but that the carrying capacity of the land was at least 100 000 people. 
Even though the leading newspaper of the time (DSWAZ No. 9, 1911) described the 
territory as a ‘labour recruitment district’, no concrete plans for commercial exploitation 
were made (DSWAZ No. 100, 1911, in Zeller 2000: 38). 
 
Scouting for labour recruits in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel by agents of organized labour 
dates back to 1909. In that year, Streitwolf encountered British agents of the Labour 
Agent Bureau in Bulawayo (Southern Rhodesia) who tried to recruit Fwe (Mafwe) on 
Germany territory. Von Frankenberg reported in 1911 to have encountered a British 
agent who had recruited Mbukushu in western Caprivi for work on the South African 
mines (ZBU 118 and ZBU 1010).25 The earliest recorded formal request to recruit 
labourers for mine work from the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel dates back to March 1928.26 In a 
letter addressed to the Government of the Bechuanaland Protectorate under whose 
administration the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel fell at the time, the Northern Labour 
Organization (NLO) requested permission to recruit labourers from the territory for mine 
work and other industries in SWA. The organization was already recruiting in the 
adjacent Batawana Reserve in Bechuanaland. The Secretary for SWA supported this 
                                                 
24 Zeller describes it as a ‘by-product’ in the course of a far more important exchange of territory (2000, p. 
35). 
25 Zeller, 2000: p. 40. He cites Fisch, 1999, pp. 108, 126. 












move by adding that the NLO represented a variety of credible companies in SWA such 
as the Otavi Minen Gesellschaft at Tsumeb and the SWA Company at Grootfontein.27  
It proved difficult to find evidence to suggest that the Northern Labour Organization 
recruited from the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel even though it was granted permission to do so 
and had in fact erected a camp on the west side of Manyeha. There is reference to its 
involvement in the Caprivi found in the Report: ‘Caprivi Zipfel: Handing Over to the 
SWA Administration’, signed by J.W. Potts, Resident Magistrate of Bechuanaland. In 
this report, dated 26 October 1929, the following appears:  
 
He explained that the Administrator intended to proceed through the strip by motor transport and, 
if possible, to proceed to Livingstone by a route said to have been cut and blazed by Mr. Balme 
the representative of the Northern Labour Organization in the Caprivi Strip.28  
 
It appears that Mr. Balme was established in the western and not eastern part of the 
Caprivi Zipfel. It even becomes more difficult to speculate on the possible factors which 
inhibited the NLO from recruiting in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. One possible explanation 
for such inhibition could be competition between the Northern Labour Organization and 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association (WNLA). This can be gleaned from a letter 
to the Chief Native Commissioner in Windhoek, signed by the Native Commissioner of 
Rundu, regarding the transfer of the Western Caprivi Zipfel to the Union Native Affairs 
Department, from which I quote in length: 
 
The Witwatersrand Native Labour Association is at present getting numbers of recruits from the 
Portuguese portion of the Okavango area, and these are sent to the Rand via the long and 
expensive route – Mohembo, Shakowe (Shakawe), Maun and Franscistown…It would…simplify 
matters for the administration if the portion of the Western Caprivi Zipfel east of Beacon No. 5 
was handed over to the Union Government. In this event the WNLA may obtain permission to 
establish a recruiting depot anywhere in the Western Caprivi Zipfel, and it will then become a 
much closer competitor to the Northern Labour Organization, which has the recruiting ‘rights’ in 
the Portuguese portion of the Okavango area, and a recruiting Concession in the Okavango Native 
Territory. WNLA, if established on or near the Okavango River, should come to a working 
arrangement with the Northern Labour Organization in regard to the division, exchange etc. of 
                                                 
27 Letter from the Secretary for SWA to the Government Secretary of Bechuanaland Protectorate dated 2 
March 1928 and one from the Managing Secretary of the Northern Labor Association to the same dated 9 
March 1928 (in Kangumu, B., Ibid.). 
28 The Administrator, Mr. Werth and his party, were advised not to take this route because the spoor cut by 
Mr. Balme in 1929 for the greater part of the way passed through Angola. Instead they attempted to 
traverse the Western strip from Bagani to Bwabwata Police camp on the Portuguese border and thence to 












recruits from western and south eastern Angola. If this is not done, the labour supply for SWA 






Map 6: Sketch showing Frank Balme's Camp at the Kwando River. 
 
 
It is clear from the above that the WNLA and the NLO were in direct competition for the 
Portuguese portion of the Okavango area. In fact the idea of transferring a portion of the 
                                                 











Western Caprivi Zipfel to the Union Department, was Gemmill’s proposal (of WNLA), 
aimed at affording him facilities in western Caprivi closer to this area. This is shown in a 
letter Gemmill wrote to the Secretary for Native Affairs entitled ‘The Caprivi Strip in 
Relation to the Native Labour Supply of the Union’: 
 
On the Western Caprivi side the flow of Angola natives through the strip to Mohembo, the WNLA 
station in Northern Bechuanaland, situated at the point where the Okavango River enters 
Bechuanaland, is rapidly increasing and within four years has grown to as much as 1, 000 per 
month. This route is greatly favored by the Angolas, and a very large output through it is to be 
expected, but so long as the Western Caprivi remains under the SWA control, the position is 
insecure, and it is therefore most desirable that the Western Strip, like the Eastern, should be 
administered by the Union Government.30 
 
Such a facility would have changed the route taken by the WNLA’s migrant labourers 
destined for the Rand. William Gemmill’s (of WNLA) idea was to convey his recruits 
over the much shorter and less expensive route – envisaged to be through the western and 
eastern Caprivi Zipfel on the military road to Katima Mulilo, and from there down the 
Zambezi River by barge to Kazungula.31As regard remoteness of the envisaged route, 
Gemmill had the answer: 
 
It is true that the conditions for road communication between the Eastern and Western Strips are 
bad, but just as WNLA has made a road from Katima Mulilo in the Eastern Strip to the Quando 
(Kwando) River, so a road could be made through the Western Strip from the Kwando to the 
Okavango. In any case, air transport will make communications easy. The probable administrative 
scheme would be a Union Headquarters at Katima Mulilo, with subordinate administrative stations 
at the Quando and at Andara, on the Okavango. The extra cost of this could be recovered by the 
imposition of a small traveling pass fee on the WNLA output.32 
 
The WNLA’s fight for monopoly of labour over the Caprivi frontier was also a concern 
for the authorities especially since it involved a transfer of administrative powers. Not 
certain about how to proceed, Mr. D.L. Smit wrote to Mr. Forsyth (SWAA) to solicit his 
views before formally engaging the SWAA: ‘It is not quite clear in my mind why 
Gemmill should be so anxious that we should take over this additional territory. Can you 
                                                 
30 Dated 19 October 1944 (Manuscript, NAP). 
31 Native Commissioner (Rundu) to Chief Native Commissioner (Windhoek), dated 18 November 1942, p. 
2. 












throw any light on this aspect of the matter?’33 In a scathing and almost personal tone, 
Mr. Forsyth replied on 22 October 1942,34 quoted here in length: 
 
It is with much surprise and some amusement that I learn of Gemmill’s proposal. We always had 
the sneaking suspicion that when he declined to take through the Northern Labour Organization at 
Grootfontein the surplus labour from Ovamboland, the Okavango and Angola, it was because he 
wished to take the stream of Angola labour which we in SWA had created by dint of hard work 
over a long period and much judicious expenditure. We felt that he would sooner or later 
endeavour to get into closer contact with Angola and now he seems to be attempting to do so. If he 
could have a station closer to Runtu (Rundu) things would, of course, be much easier for the 
WNLA. However, from the purely labour aspect the question seems to be ‘How can the Angolan 
labor be used to the best advantage from all points of view?’. 
 
The WNLA’s aggressiveness for the Angolan market could partly be because it was not 
allowed to recruit, at least legally, SWA ‘natives’, these being reserved for the mines and 
industries in the country. As shown on the map below, the WNLA had in the past 
recruited migrant laborours in SWA, from both the central and northern areas. Migrant 
workers would either travel from Gobabis through Ghanzi to Maun, Nata35 and thence to 
Francistown. The other route was from Oshikango through Ondangua, Tsumeb, and 
Grootfontein, Karakuwise thence to Maun, Nata and on to Francistown. The third route 
was from Oshikango to Runtu (Rundu), Andara, Mohembo, Shakawe through Maun, and 
Nata to Francistown. Migrant workers who undertook the latter route did so mainly to 
evade the authorities who were bent on preventing them from enlisting for the Rand 
mines. In most cases, they paraded as Angolan nationals to be accepted by the WNLA. 
This aspect was highlighted by the WNLA in their communication to the Secretary for 
Native Affairs titled ‘Natives from South West Africa’: 
 
I have the honour to refer to certain discussions which have taken place between your Department, 
the South West Africa Administration, and this Association, in regard to the engagement by the 
Association of South West Africa natives for employment on the Witwatersrand gold mines. …As 
the result of these discussions it has been agreed that, provided the SWAA places no obstacles to 
the passage, across the Caprivi Strip, of ANGOLA natives on their way to Mohembo, the 
Association, on its part, will do everything in its power to ensure that no native resident in the 
Territory of South West Africa shall be engaged by it. The arrangement is to come into force as 
from 1st January, 1940, and in the meantime no active steps will be taken by the Association to 
attract South West Africa natives to Mohembo. The practical difficulties associated with the 
restriction are recognized by all concerned. It may not be always possible for the Association to 
                                                 
33 D.L. Smit to Mr. Forsyth, dated 19 October 1942 (Manuscript, NAP). 
34 Manuscript, NAP. 
35 For the Basubiya (Bekuhane) of Botswana, Nata is supposed to be Nanta, meaning finish or boundary. It 











avoid the engagement of a native from South West Africa who purports to be a native from 
Angola, but the Association will do everything in its power to exclude South West Africa natives 
from engagement. 
 
On the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel side, WNLA reception depots were established in adjacent 
territories before the territory of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was taken over by the Union 
Government. These were placed at Katima Mulilo in Northern Rhodesia across the 
border at a place with the same name and another at Kazungula in Bechuanaland at the 
confluence of the Chobe and the Zambezi River. The existence of these stations depended 
on the goodwill of Northern Rhodesia and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. In the event of 
interference by those governments, the WNLA was conscious that a station in the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel could take their place with quite satisfactory results. The government of 
Northern Rhodesia suspended the WNLA from recruiting people in Barotseland and 
operating on its soil in about 1942 or 1943.36 Recruits from those areas however 
continued to be engaged by WNLA by traveling to the station at Kazungula. As a 
replacement, the Association just simply moved their station to Katima Mulilo in the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. Migrant labourers from Barotseland, Angola and beyond37 could 
thus cross into Eastern Caprivi Zipfel for recruitment by the WNLA. The total output of 
migrant labourers from this region was put at 6, 000 per annum in 1944 and was steadily 
increasing.38 From the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, Kruger gives a figure with a monthly 
average of 30 in 196239, but by 1975, Pretorius records a figure of 300 per annum40 which 
is about 25 per month. The slight drop can be attributed to two factors: firstly, the 
Zambianization policy implemented at independence rendered it difficult for people from 
the Eastern Caprivi Strip to find employment in that country. And secondly, job 
opportunities through government driven projects in the Eastern Caprivi Strip increased.  
 
  
                                                 
36 Recrutiment was suspended probably owing to local demand for labour for the war effort. The 
suspension was for two years only. 
37 There is evidence showing that the WNLA recruited from as far as the Congo. See, for example: 
Musambachime, M.C., ‘Bantu Ba Anglais: The Function and Role of Northern Rhodesian (Zambian) 
Workers in Katanga (Shaba) from 1911-1940’, Paper presented at the School of Education, University of 
Zambia, October 1992. 
38 Gemmill to Secretary: Native Affairs, dated 19 October 1944 (Manuscript, NAP). 
39 Kruger, C.E., ‘History of Caprivi Strip’, Chapt. 9, p. 10 (NAN, A472). 













Map 7: XXXX: Routes of WNLA migrant labourers from SWA to the Rand Mines 
 
 
It was, in turn, difficult to employ ‘non-Strip-natives’ or ‘alien natives’ as they were 
differently called, because the administration required employers to reverse the trend of 
preferring the latter to the locals. Still, in 1975, about 4% of the total population of the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel (1000 males) was estimated to be outside the territory on migrant 
work at any given time though the actual figure could ultimately be higher.41 The 
strategic location of the Caprivi Zipfel as a frontier for tapping migrant labourers from 
Angola put the WNLA at loggerheads with another potential competitor, the Government 
of Southern Rhodesia. The latter requested the Union Government in 1945 to grant it the 
lease of land in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel to establish a labourers’ rest camp, despite the 













fact that it was already running a similar site in Northern Rhodesia. The site requested 
was about seven acres, an increase from the initial one acre. The WNLA and the Gold 
Producers’ Committee fiercely protested against this move, arguing that the Government 
of Southern Rhodesia wanted to preserve the labour resources of the Northern Territories 
for its exclusive use and that therefore the attempt to lease a site in the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel was another link in the chain to prevent such labour reaching the Union.42 They 
particularly stressed that the Government of Southern Rhodesia in the meantime had 
cordoned off its border with the Union to make it difficult for labourers from Southern 
Rhodesia to be engaged on the Rand. The Union Government sought legal advice in this 
matter and it was found that there were no legal grounds to deny the Government of 
Southern Rhodesia the right to lease a site (indicated on the map below) in the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel. 
 
Even though the above site was granted, there are no records to indicate that it was taken 
nor could it be conclusively established what the inhibiting factors might have been 
which prevented this from happening. One factor is probable, this being the labour stand-
off that existed at the time between the Government of Southern Rhodesia and the 
Portuguese Government.43 The two governments entered into an agreement in 1934 
whereby the Southern Rhodesia Government was to recruit 15, 000 labourers from 
Portuguese East Africa. Instead about 75, 000 were clandestinely recruited from the area. 
When the Government of Southern Rhodesia asked the Portuguese for a recruiting station 




                                                 
42 Letter from the General Manager of WNLA to the Secretary for Native Affairs dated 28 April 1947 
(Manuscript, NAP). 
43 Kangumu, B., 2000, p. 74. 















Map 8: Map showing site allocated to the Southern Rhodesian Government for a camp in the 
Eastern Caprivi Strip. 
 
For Northern and Southern Rhodesia, the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was more than just a 
conduit (frontier) for labour. In a reversal of the thinking of the colonial lobby in relation 
to the Germans, who considered the Caprivi Zipfel their link from West to East Africa, 
legislators in the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia perceived the Caprivi Zipfel 
as that country’s link to the west coast. A motion brought by a Mr. C.S. Knight was 
introduced and discussed as far back as 1932 for the Caprivi Strip to be added to 
Rhodesia and extended to the western ocean. It was believed that this could happen in the 
event of the then envisaged amalgamation of the two Rhodesias which could not afford to 
depend on outlets (port facilities) controlled by other powers. Mr. Knight expressed the 
undesirability of the Walvis Bay route which ran through barren country. The idea was to 
establish a port at the Kunene mouth or thereabouts, which he described (obtaining a 











the people who occupied the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. According to the lawmaker ‘…there 
was no white population on that Strip, and the natives comprised only a few nomads, so 
that no injustice would be done anybody’. 45 Another member of the Legislative Council, 
a Mr. Kennedy Harris, supported the motion. However nothing seems to have come out 
of this motion beyond the deliberations in the Legislative Council. The issue would 
resurface again in June 1951 in the House of Assembly through a Mr. H. Eastwood, a 
Labour member for the Bulawayo District, who urged: ‘The Caprivi Strip was a no-
man’s-land and the Government of Southern Rhodesia should stake a claim to it 
immediately’.46 
 
Having outlined in detail the nature of frontier labour disputes involving the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel and argued that the market was Angola, it might be logical to examine the 
nature of the Angolan market and also the benefits which accrued to it from migrant 
labour. Angola was one of the relatively densely populated countries in Southern Africa 
at this time. The total population of Angola was estimated to be well over three million 
and the area with which the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel formed a sought-after frontier was 
estimated to have about 1, 600, 00 people. About 400, 000 male adults could thus be 
directly tapped from this area through the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel.47 The WNLA planned 
to extract a total output of 40, 000 migrant workers per annum from this area. 
 
For the local economies migrant labour was a source of income for most families. 
Labourers were subjected to compulsory deferred pay and repatriation at the completion 
of their period of service. ‘Every labourer returned from the mines with about £10 cash 
besides goods.”48 For the young men, it was adventure and prestige, a chance to acquire 
wealth, particularly bride-wealth. Since they would become migrant labourer to get 
money for lobola, migrant labour turned into a form of initiation, a preparation for 
marriage and therefore manhood. Of course there were also other social impacts such as 
                                                 
45 The Bulawayo Chronicle, Saturday 24 December, 1932. 
 
46 SAPA, June 1951. 
47 Letter from Gemmill of WNLA to Secretary for Native Affairs dated 19 October 1944 (manuscript, 
NAP). 











societal break-down when men go away and leave their households in the care of their 
wives.49 Infrastructure development was another contribution which the WNLA made to 
the economy of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel especially the making of roads. To give sense 
to the pioneering work of the WNLA in this respect, the following quotation about 
transport facilities in Katima Mulilo in 1939 will suffice: 
 
The transport available to the officials included, on land, a scotch cart drawn by oxen and two 
mules for riding and by river, a barge paddled by a crew of 12 to 14 men and a small out-board 
boat that was mostly used for occasional nearby trips. There were no roads at this stage apart from 
sledge tracks and footpaths and indeed no motor vehicles, these being introduced only in 1940 by 
the Special Company of Native Military Corps that was formed in the Caprivi Strip after the 
outbreak of the Second World War.50 
 
The WNLA was instrumental in making the road from Katima Mulilo to Kwando, linking 
eastern and western Caprivi, another from the Northern Rhodesia border bypassing 
Katima Mulilo headquarters to their depot near Namwi Island, and in surveying a road 
linking Katima Mulilo with the pontoon service at Mahundu near Luhofu (now Ibbu) 
which was then the crossing point into Bechuanaland before the construction of the 
Ngoma Bridge. A vital instance in this regard was the WNLA’s transnational engagement 
in those parts: a classic is the Katima Mulilo-Singalamwe road ending at Manyeha 
crossing (now Kongola Bridge). This road ran along the surveyed northern boundary with 
Northern Rhodesia and at some poin s it ran into Northern Rhodesia and into the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel – an international road indeed. The government of Northern Rhodesia, 
expressed concern about this transgression, although not very vociferously. Both 
accepted this as inevitable because the WNLA was involved in both countries and 
probably because this road acted as a firebreak to both territories. Since motor transport 
was not certainly to be relied on at the best of times as a way to get out, the WNLA river 
transport was crucial in the development of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. As illustrated by 
the map below, to get to the outside world, a person traveling from Katima Mulilo would 
travel by barge/boat to Kazungula, from there by road through Kachikau, Nunga, Nata, 
Francistown, Palapye and on to Pretoria or alternatively, through Kachikau, Maun, 
                                                 
49 For a detailed discussion on the social impact of migrant labor on northern Namibia, see Ndeutala 
Angolo Hishongwa, The Contract Labor System in Northern Namibia. 












Palapye and then Pretoria. The other route would be from Kazungula to Livingstone then 
by rail through Bulawayo in Southern Rhodesia and then Francistown to Pretoria. An 
even easier way to travel was by airplane on the weekly (at times bi-weekly) WNLA 
flights from Katima Mulilo to Francistown and Pretoria. An airstrip made by Jack 
Ashwin of WNLA had existed at Katima Mulilo since the beginning of World War II. 
According to Zeller and Kangumu, ‘it became the most important direct traffic link to 
both SA and SWA and was also used for military and air training exercises by the SADF 
and SAAF. Both goods and people, including migrant laborers to the Rand mines were 
transported to and from Caprivi by Air.51  
 
 
In concluding this section on frontier labour migrancy, it is important to reiterate the view 
expressed above of the role of transport systems in identity formation. It is stated that the 
routes for migrant labour from the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel faced north, and especially east 
and south (see above map). The Eastern Caprivi therefore developed in a peripheral 
enclosure – its outside interaction pointed away from SWA of which it was politically an 
integral component, to neighbouring territories of which geographically it was an integral 
component. These countries were conscious of SA’s administrative control of the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel, although the Caprivi was a long way away from the administrative centre. 
Even when residents ‘went’ away on migrant work, they had to return (note compulsory 
repatriation upon expiration of contract work) to the Caprivi. It is argued here that 
migrant labour through the Northern Labour Organization to other parts of SWA was a 
missed opportunity to instill in ‘Caprivians’ a sense of SWA ‘national’ identity at that 
early stage of the country’s development. While the Apartheid policy of fragmentation 
would have required migrant workers from the Caprivi to still ‘come back’, the situation 
would not be as it turned out – that former President Sam Nujoma, a nationalist – would 
meet a person from the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel for the first time only in 1964 - 74 years 
                                                 












after the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was appended to DSWA - in the person of fellow 





Map 9: Map showing WNLA road and water transport system from Caprivi to Pretoria 
 
 
Military Frontier as an aspect of Caprivianness 
 
The death of two South African policemen on the border between Caprivi and Zambia must bring 
to every thinking person in this economically prosperous country the shocking realization that the 
Republic is involved in a Titanic Struggle [my emphasis]. The next few years may prove to be 
decisive for our country’s future and the survival of Whites in Southern Africa. 
                                
                                                 











So declared the influential government mouthpiece – Die Vaderland.53 This comment 
came in the wake of the widespread landmine explosions in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
blamed on PLAN, SWAPO’s military wing. Two points stand out monumentally clear in 
the above quotation: Firstly, that the war of liberation in Namibia, as elsewhere in 
southern Africa, had strong international foreign policy dimensions, which pitted the then 
two superpowers, the Soviet Union and USA, against each other in Africa during the cold 
war. For Apartheid SA and her apologists, SWAPO and other nationalist movements 
were just ‘communist-cum-Soviet Trojan horses’: thus SA presented herself as an ‘anti-
communist bulwark and bastion of white-Western values.’54 For the USA and its allies, 
Soviet expansionism and communism were greater evils compared with Apartheid. With 
the fall of the Portuguese regime in Angola and Mozambique, precipitated by the 25 
April, 1974 coup d’etat in Portugal and world wide advances against imperialism in 
Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia), the USA was forced to abandon its earlier 
policy towards southern Africa. As recommended by the National Security Study 
Memorandum 39 (NSSM39), the view that ‘whites are here [southern Africa] to stay and 
the only way that constructive engagement can come about is through them. There is no 
hope for the blacks to gain the political rights they seek through violence, which will only 
lead to chaos and increased opportunities for the communists.’55 What needed to be done, 
and soon, was to at least delay transition to majority rule in South Africa itself and install 
neo-colonialist regimes in neighboring territories. As Moleah correctly tells us: 
‘imperialism found itself not only on the defensive but on the run.’56 Secondly, the above 
quotation put the Caprivi Strip at the centre of SA’s growing confrontation with 
advancing ‘Black Africa’: ‘the Eastern Caprivi Strip is our frontline…’, declared the 
Johannesburg Star.57 
 
It is this perception of the Caprivi Strip as a ‘frontline’, which is the concern in this 
section. The section will trace a strategic shift in the perception of the territory from a 
                                                 
53 Quoted in Katjavivi, 1986, p. 268. 
54 Moleah, 1983, p. 260. 
 
55 Ibid., p. 159. 
56 Ibid., p. 155. 











useless corridor to a useful one,58 ‘with far greater political significance than the German 
Chancellor could ever have foreseen.’59 Due to its wider frontage with Angola and 
convergence of Botswana, Zambia, Zimbabwe and Namibia, the Caprivi Strip was 
described by Uniform, the newspaper of the SA Army, as the ‘…most sensitive point of 
South Africa’s finger in Africa.’60 For Apartheid SA, the Caprivi Strip was a first line of 
defence against the advance of Black Africa, a training base for her military forces as 
well as a springboard for attack and destabilization against the frontline states. An even 
better description is provided by Brigadier HJ Zinn of the SADF when he accompanied 
the Minister of Defence to the Eastern Caprivi Strip in 1954. In a special article written 
for Kommando (September 1954, p. 6),61 Zinn described the Caprivi Strip as an important 
‘launch-pad and shock absorber in case of unrest/attack in surrounding areas which has 
totally different landscape than that of the Union.’ For Black Africa, the Caprivi Zipfel is 
‘Freedom Alley’, Ian Forsyth wrote in the Cape Times. He continued: ‘Strategically, this 
narrow finger is today one of the most significant areas in the whole of Africa. For the 
terrorist, whether he is based in Zambia, Angola, or even Northern Botswana, it 
represents a soft underbelly which might be waiting to be hit hard.’62 Resultantly, this 
small finger or corridor became one of the most heavily militarized areas in the whole of 
Southern Africa, basically, a military frontier. 
 
It would be far-fetched to argue that the above military strategic shift can be traced back 
to World War I. Even though there were people in the territory who served in this war, 
this was not peculiar to the Caprivi Zipfel. What is peculiar, though, is the fact that the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, apart from being the first German loss of territory in WWI and the 
first Allied occupation of enemy territory in the war, was administered continuously as a 
military/police state right to the verge of the outbreak of WWII. On the outbreak of WWI 
British troops from Southern Rhodesia collected at Sesheke (Northern Rhodesia) and 
formally took control of Schuckmansburg, the German post in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. 
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The German resident surrendered without a fight on 21 September 1914. It is reported 
that he was arrested and removed from office – ‘ironically while enjoying a cup of tea 
with his counterpart, the Northern Rhodesia Commissioner at Sesheke.’63  
 
A police post under the Bechuanaland authorities was established at Schuckmansburg to 
administer affairs in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel while various outposts were created for 
the Western Caprivi. In 1929 the SWAA resumed control of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, 
again, through police superintendents. The first was Superintendent W.S. Chadwick, the 
hunter and writer,64 but he stayed a few months only and was replaced by Sergeant E.P. 
Brittz who was the sole European official in the area until 1 August 1939 when the Union 
Department of Native Affairs took over. On 25 October 1939, Mr. L.F.W. Trollope 
assumed duty as Magistrate and Native Commissioner with Mr. C.E. Kruger as his 
assistant in both capacities. 
 
Their roles would soon take on a military flavour. Shortly after the outbreak of WWII a 
Special Company of Native Military Corps was formed in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. Its 
main purpose was to protect the Victoria Falls bridge connecting the two Rhodesias, 
which the Allied Forces anticipated would be a strategic enemy target in WWII. Mr. 
Trollope was appointed Commanding Officer with the rank of Captain and Mr. Kruger 
2i/c with the rank of Lieutenant. The European members were: Lieutenant L.D. 
Thompson, 2nd Lieutenants H.H.L. Smuts, A.W. Leppan, J.M. Whittle; Warrant Officer 
E.S. Edminson; Staff sergeants H.E.F. Hillebrand, V.P. Barrell, E.M. Bassingethwaite, 
J.A. Smuts, A.J. Potgieter, H.J.H Stewart, P. Hansmeyer, J.M. van Helsdingent. Some of 
the ‘Caprivian’ non-commissioned officers were sent on courses to the Union. The 
courses were mainly in ‘driving’ and ‘first aid and hygiene’. European members attended 
courses at Voortrekkerhoogte and Zonderwater from time to time. Not much activity took 
place during the war period in the area of which the Caprivi Zipfel formed a part. The 
military company was kept busy by improving the east-west landing strip made by 
                                                 
63 See Fossé, J.L., 1996, p. 71, who quotes from Curson, 1947:124. Apparently while they were at the table, 
the host called to receive an urgent message, which was simply: the two nations were at war. 












Superintendent Brittz at Katima Mulilo, widening sledge tracks to allow use by motor 
transport and the clearing of the Northern Rhodesia-Caprivi boundary ‘cut-line’ which 
ran from the Katima Mulilo rapids to the Mashi River of stamps and bushes. The 
intelligence section covered neighboring territories and carried out reconnaissance 
surveys in the territory for the character of the country and road systems. Meteorological 
observations were taken daily and passed to the S.A.A.F. Meteorological Section by radio 
– on call sign ZUBC. This military company was disbanded in 1943. 
 
The late 1940s to the 1950s were relatively quiet on the military front in the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel. There was however, increased utilization of the airstrip by the SADF and 
SAAF for military and air training manoeuvres, as well as for border patrols. In fact, 
these training exercises were part of a scheme for air training in SA, which began as far 
back as 1937.65 The scheme was greatly expanded after the outbreak of the war when the 
United Kingdom was offered facilities for training R.A.F. aircrews in SA. Schools were 
immediately opened in SA at Baragwanath, Randfontein, Kimberley, East London, 
Oudshoorn, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth. At its peak 36 Air Schools had been 
established necessitating new airfields with extensive hangar and housing facilities. By 
31 December 1945, 33,347 men had been trained as pilots, observers, navigators, bomb-
aimers and air-gunners. Of these 20,800 were R.A.F., 12,221 were S.A.A.F. and 326 
Allied personnel.66 At the same time, plans to build a Tropical Military Training School 
in the Caprivi Zipfel were accelerated in the 1950s, it being the only territory under Union 
control where soldiers could train under tropical conditions. Plans to establish such a 
school culminated in a visit by Mr. F.C. Erasmus, Minister of Defence, the Chief of Staff, 
and the Under-Secretary for Defence to the area in 1954 for discussions. Writing in the 
same year, the Magistrate and Commissioner at the time, A.B. Colenbrander, urged for 
interest in the development of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, adding: ‘There is no question of 
its strategic and tactical value in time of war in my mind.’67 
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A police post was established at Katima Mulilo in 1961 with responsibilities, among 
others, for border patrols and counter-insurgency. It consisted of a dwelling house, an 
office with single quarters under the same roof, a store, garage, and one or two cells for 
detaining wrongdoers. It was manned by two white personnel,68 a sergeant and a 
constable and was assisted by four or five black units.69  
 
It was two events in the 1960s that had a significant bearing on the future of the Caprivi 
and the continuing development of a ‘Caprivianness’. These were the formation of the 
OAU (Organization of African Unity) and the outcome of the ICJ (International Court of 
Justice) case against South Africa in respect of its South West African responsibilities.  
The formation of the OAU Liberation Committee was a signal, at least in principle, that 
independent African states will not stand idle while the rest of Africa was still colonized. 
It was a source of great inspiration. While SWAPO believed the ICJ ruling will be in its 
favour, military training of PLAN combatants, which began in 1962, continued.70 The 
ICJ’s announcement came on 18 July 1966 to the effect that it had no power to decide on 
the matter. SWAPO was extremely disappointed and the PLAN combatants, who had by 
this time set up camp in Northern Namibia, immediately launched the armed struggle on 
26 August 1966. In a statement released the same day, SWAPO announced its 
preparedness to take up arms, thereby acceding to the OAU’s Liberation Committee’s 
pre-condition for assistance: ‘We have no alternative but to rise in arms and bring our 
own liberation. The supreme test must be faced and we must at once begin to cross the 
many rivers of blood on our march towards freedom…’71 The launch of the armed 
struggle can be interpreted as having its immediate origin in the negative judgment of the 
ICJ.72 This is strongly reflected in a SWAPO publication of 1968: 
 
As long as we waited for the judgment at the ICJ in The Hague, the training of fighters was a 
precaution rather than a direct preparation for immediate action…We hoped the outcome of the 
case would be in our favor. As long as we had that hope, we did not want to resort to violent 
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71 Quoted in Vigne, R., Op.cit., 1973, p. 29. 












methods. However, the judgment let us down, and what we had prepared for as a kind of unreality, 
suddenly became the cold and hard reality for us. We took to arms, we had no other choice. 73 
 
While accepting the ICJ failure as the critical reason for taking up arms, SWAPO was 
generally disillusioned with the UN for the failure of the world body to take immediate 
action against SA. A shift away from petitioning as a tool was in the offing. As early as 
1963, Sam Nujoma, president of SWAPO, wrote to Andimba Herman Toivo ja Toivo 
expressing his displeasure with the UN and the failure of petitioning: 
 
During my stay…in Dar-es-Salaam I petitioned the UN many times. When nothing happened it 
dawned on me that the freedom of our country will never come about through peaceful neans…74 
 
The Caprivi Strip was the only area of occupied SWA which was closest to PLAN’s 
Kongwa camp in Tanzania, for Angola was still occupied by the Portuguese at the time of 
the launch of the armed struggle. The territory thus inevitably played a central role in the 
development and formative years of the armed liberation war. PLAN established contact 
in the territory, made easier by the 1964 merger between CANU and SWAPO. Helao 
Shityuwete, a member of one of the first groups that passed through the Caprivi Strip, 
writes in his autobiography about Joseph Nawa who met them on the border and whom 
they briefed concerning their mission.75 To win the support and confidence of the locals 
was vital in guerrilla warfare. PLAN combatants were able to acquaint themselves with 
the terrain and identify enemy troop movements while disguised as civilians. In this way 
they could stay for longer periods in the country without being detected. Of course 
logistically, this was advantageous because the fighters went into the field with only what 
they could carry and light arms, since their bases were far removed from the operational 
zone. They relied on the locals for food, water and other necessities; assistance, which 
SWAPO acknowledges, was forthcoming.76 What this required from the combatants was 
a gun in one hand and a manifesto in another. This was in line with the stated principle of 
the movement that ‘it is politics that leads the gun.’77 PLAN combatants were effective 
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armed political militants, as can be discerned from the following account by the SA 
Minister of Police, issued in October 1968 about ‘a new threat’ on Namibia’s northern 
borders, where literally hundreds of trained men were waiting to enter the country: 
 
They were using new tactics. In the past, men had crossed the border heavily armed, using their 
weapons to terrorize the local inhabitants. Now they were coming unarmed, avoiding clashes with 
the police, and attempting to influence chiefs and others to cooperate with them.78 
 
This support for the combatants by the locals in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel led to brutal 
police reprisals and culminated in the October 1968 Singalamwe massacre discussed in 
detail in Chapter Seven. About sixty-three people were killed and hundreds rounded up 
for interrogation and torture. Scores fled into neighbouring territories, many, especially 
children, dying en route.  
 
A much heavier blow was dealt to PLAN79 on 18 May 1967 when Tobias Hainyeko, its 
first commander, was killed on the Zambezi River by the SA Police (SAP) while drawing 
their fire in the process of enabling the guerrilla party he was conducting to cross the 
Zambezi river into the Caprivi in safety. He was engaged against two SAP officers – 
Warrant Officer P. Grobler and Constable A. Jacobs, who were accompanied by an 
African Constable K.L. Chaka. Warrant Officer Grobler and Constable Chaka were badly 
wounded from Hainyeko’s bullets and were immediately removed by helicopter to a 
military hospital near Pretoria. They were presented with the SAP Star for Distinguished 
Service which was the SAP’s second highest decoration. This account, however, is 
contrary to Sam Nujoma’s version. He contends that Hainyeko shot dead Grobler and 
wounded another who later succumbed from injuries. 80 Nujoma’s version could not be 
verified by any other source. It is highly unlikely that his version could be correct. What 
could be established concerning the injuries is that Grobler was penetrated by a bullet in 
his lung and in fact it was Chaka who had underwent an emergency operation. It could be 
that Chaka was more seriously injured compared to his senior officer. In his book on 
PLAN’s combat operations, Oswin Namakalu chose not to reveal whether there were any 
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SA, 1968 (Johannesburg, SAIRR, 1969), p. 64. quoted in Katjavivi, Ibid., p. 267. 
79 Then known as SWALA - South West Africa Liberation Army. 











deaths apart from Hainyeko’s, except to state that a third officer was also shot.81 Tobias 
Hainyeko was on a mission to investigate conditions in the Caprivi Strip in order to 
determine how to improve communications between the operational headquarters in 
Tanzania and PLAN’s fighting units in Namibia. SWAPO’s account is that the local 
manager of the Caltex Company, which operated the Zambezi River Transport, betrayed 
Hainyeko to the SAP.82 Shityuwete, Nujoma and Namakalu however point fingers at his 
deputy, Leonard Philemon Shuuya ‘Castro’. Castro was apparently detained by the South 
Africans in February 1966 and then planted back in SWAPO as an agent.83 Castro briefly 
succeeded Hainyeko until he was arrested and handed over to the Tanzanian authorities 
that, in Nujoma’s words "kept him away while the struggle continued.” 84 Castro was 
released 17 years later, and settled abroad. 
 
PLAN’s ‘hit and run’ tactics at this stage of the war has been usefully described by Susan 
Brown.85 From her account it can be concluded that the SADF’s losses in this phase were 
5 dead and 35 wounded. To this could be added the 10 dead and 10 wounded in the 23 
August 1978 PLAN bombardment of Katima Mulilo. She records a much higher figure of 
casualties on PLAN’s side. For example, of the two large PLAN groups which entered 
the Caprivi in 1968, a total of 178 had been killed or captured and the remaining 
combatants withdrew into Zambia.86 This however, could be only SA official figure. As 
can be expected, a review of PLAN, SWAPO and international media sources on SADF 
casualties’ paints a different picture as reflected in the diagram below: 
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No. Name of battle/ attack Place Commander Date Casualties Equipment captured Source 
1 Attack on SADF Convoy 
between Kongola and 
Libebe 
  2 April 1971 (Just) many  Namibia News-vol.4, 
No.3-10, March- October 
1971 
2 Ambush of 
SADF  
Armored car 
Katima Mulilo  19th April 1971 4 officers and 
2 NCO’S  
Killed 
  
3 Landmine Explosion Between KM  
And Singalawe 
  15 killed  Namibia New, vol. 4  
No. 3-10 
March- October 1971 
4 Guerrilla  
attacks 






 News, Vol.4, No. 11-12 
Nov-Dec 1971 
5 Landmine explosions   22 February 1972 18 dead  Mr. BJ van der Walt 
Administrator, in Daily 
Telegraph 








Belgian made FAL, 
308 and light machine 
guns, British made 
LMG’s ‘Bren’, 
ammunition a radio 
transmitter., etc 
SWAPO Communiqué 
No. 2 (1973), in Namibia 
News, vol.6, No.5-6, 
May- June 1973 
7 Capture of Singalamwe 
base 




Six land rovers, two 
trucks and five Danish 
radios 




8 Landmine explosion Caprivi  15 October 1975 One  Namibia News, vol. 8, 
Sept-Dec 1975 
 











The above statistics were provided by SWAPO war communiqués in its various 
publications mainly the Namibia News (1971-1978), and could therefore as easily be 
interpreted as that movement’s war propaganda as could SADF statistic for its 
propoganda. On both sides there was a deliberate willingness to conceal the number of 
their dead. For SA the aim of this was to portray their frontline-, the Caprivi Strip, as 
being under their control. The little information which was divulged was just enough to - 
and calculated to - instill a sense of insecurity mainly in white South Africans who 
continued to endure and sacrifice their lives in this border war. Secondly, many of what 
was reported were casualties in respect of policemen not members of the SADF.  Also, 
these isolated incidences occurred on the Zambian border. This was to deny, firstly, the 
fact that SADF had been involved on this frontline during this period, and secondly, that 
PLAN operated from inside Zambia thereby justifying ‘hot pursuits’ into that country 
which was a violation of its territorial integrity.  
 
In respect of SWAPO, the portrayal of heavy casualties on the part of SADF was mainly 
intended for the international community, to show that the armed struggle was as 
effective a tool for liberation as political or negotiated settlement in its ‘two-edged 
sword’.87 Also, it was intended to encourage Namibians, especially the youth, to go into 
exile and join PLAN while at the same time creating a favourable environment for 
combatants to operate from inside the country and for locals, especially,  to provide 
shelter, food, and water. If SWAPO’s statistics are anything to go by it will be noted that 
generally accepted view that SA suffered its worst casualties up to that time during the 
August 1978 Katima Mulilo attack88 is challenged. A rundown of the above figures put 
SA’s deaths and casualties at 103, and does not include major attacks such as the Katima 
Mulilo attack, and the casualties of two attacks on Singalamwe, etc.89 
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88 See Kangumu, Forgotten Corner of Namibia, 2000. 
89 For a discussion of major PLAN combat attacks see the recently published book by Oswin O. Namakalu, 
Armed Liberation Struggle: Some Accounts Of Plan’s Combat Operations, Windhoek: Gamsberg, 2004. 
One weakness of Namakalu’s work is that even though his exposition is a useful catalogue of encounters, it 
is very silent on casualties. This is probably due as much to a lack of proper statistics in the ‘hit-run’ nature 












The war casualties on this frontline during this period are often interpreted in terms of 
military personnel, installations and equipment only. Hardly ever does one come across a 
study of the impact of the war on the civilian population and such a study is long 
overdue.90 An exception is the October 1968 Singalamwe massacre, which was reported 
by SWAPO in 1974 (discussed in Chapter Seven).  
 
This opens up into the next aspect of the military frontier: the militarization and use of 
the Caprivi Strip as a springboard or launch-pad for attacks and for the destabilization of 
neighbouring states dotting the frontier line. The SADF aggression and intervention in 
Angola and Zambia had been widely discussed by others.91 The SA response to the 
escalating war against SWAPO took various forms: from complete denial of losses on the 
battlefield, militarization, the détente campaign to win regional governments to her side 
and the nationalization of the liberation war through the creation of the South West 
Africa Territorial Force (SWATF). The Caprivi Strip became one of the most heavily 
militarized areas in southern Africa at this time. On the western side, the SADF had three 
major army bases and two military training bases: Buffalo (also known as Bagani), 
Omega, Chetto and the Fort Doppies and Hippo training bases. On the eastern side of the 
Caprivi Strip, four major bases dotted the frontier: these being the Mpacha airbase, 
Katima base, the WENELA base92 and the Katounyana military base. In total, nine major 
military bases were strategically located in the Caprivi Strip. This excludes smaller bases 
and airfields such as the one located at Bukalo and Impalila Island on the Zambezi and 
Chobe Rivers. It was from these military facilities that SA both trained the 
Reconnaissance Commandos (Recces, Special Units) such Koevoet, the Barotse 
surrogates and the Inkatha movement from KwaZulu Natal in SA, and launched attacks 
                                                 
90 My colleagues Dr. Jeremy Silvester and Ms. Martha Akawa are currently (2006) conducting research 
under the auspices of the Archives of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Liberation Struggle (AACRLS) 
examining the impact of the war on the Namibian civilian population both inside and outside Namibia. 
Hopefully this would address this aspect of the war in the Caprivi strip and not suffer from the usual 
historiographical anomaly of treating the Caprivi strip as separate from the rest of Namibia. 
91 See among others: Moleah, A.T., Namibia: The Struggle for liberation (1983), Steenkamp, Borderstrike, 
(1983), Grundy, Soldiers without Politics (c1983), Breytenbach, They live by the sword (1990), Stiff, The 
silent war (1999). For a focused discussion in relation to the Caprivi Strip, see Kangumu, B., 2000. 
92 Situated right on the border between Namibia and Zambia, where the Witwatersrand Native Labor 











on Angola (Operation Reindeer – code name for the attack on Kassinga) and Zambia 
(Operation Dingo). 
 
Operation Dingo involved training a group of dissidents from Zambia’s western province 
(Barotseland) at Fort Doppies in the Western Caprivi from 1971 to 1977. The Barotse of 
western Zambia historically regarded their area as a separate state but this wish was 
ignored by British imperial rule at its close, a state of affairs which was upheld by the 
nationalist government of Kenneth Kaunda. A crack-down on protesters led many to 
cross into Angola, prominent among was one Adamson Mushala,93 who led a group for 
training in Caprivi and thus the group became known as the ‘Mushala group’. Their 
training was jointly coordinated by PIDE (Portuguese security police) who flew them into 
Caprivi, the Bureau for State Security (BOSS), and the Recces. The aim was to 
discourage Kaunda’s government from offering rear bases to SWAPO and the ANC 
(SA’s African National Congress). It is reported that this worked to some extent 
following the Detente talks between Pretoria and Lusaka, which led to the brutal sacrifice 
of Mushala’s group.94One day the group was loaded into a truck by operatives of BOSS 
before the completion of their training, apparently to be deployed into Zambia for an 
urgent operation. It was later discovered that they were put into boats on the Zambezi. 
These headed across the river into the waiting arms of Zambian Defence Force members 
who opened fire on them. This happened while both Mushala and Jan Breytenbach, their 
chief instructor, were away. Although they regrouped back at Fort Doppies, SA cut ties 
with the group in 197795 and Mushala was killed in combat against Zambian soldiers in 
1982. 
 
Operation Reindeer was, until then, SA’s most brutal campaign against SWAPO in 
Angola after its failed invasion of 1975/6. About 800 died on the 4 May 1978, and 
                                                 
93 The link between Adamson Mushala and Barotseland secessionism was however not very clear. It is 
possible that he had little or nothing to do with Lozi secessionism since he was Kaonde and recruited in a 
Lunda area. It is also possible that the SADF would capitalize on the existence of secession in Barotseland 
through utilizing their agents such as Mushala to destabilize Zambia and not necessarily to aid secession. 
94 See Stiff, The Silent War, 1999, p. 41. 












SWAPO decided to reciprocate with Operation Revenge, the 23 August 1978 attack on 
Katima Mulilo. It appears that SADF and PLAN knew that an attack by the other was 
imminent. While PLAN wanted to take revenge very soon, it received intelligence 
information that SADF planned an incursion into Zambia scheduled for 26 August 1978. 
Namakalu reports that increased reconnaissance flights and above-normal enemy 
activities on Zambian soil were observed at this time.96 Also, that a top-secret aerial map 
of all known PLAN bases marked as targets which fell into the hands of the SADF in the 
planned operation was obtained by PLAN commanders. These bases were evacuated, and 
because of the SADF’s ‘hot-pursuits’, they were not inhabited after the attack. PLAN had 
to strike first. From this perspective, it can be argued that Operation Revenge was also a 
pre-emptive strike. SA intelligence reported a heavy PLAN military build-up across the 
border and a significant visit to western Zambia by Sam Nujoma, the President of 
SWAPO, in a move, which was seen in SA circles as aimed at boosting the morale of the 
soldiers before the attack.97 The other theory linked the tour to a planned visit to those 
parts by Marti Ahtisaari, the newly appointed UN Commissioner for SWA. In  any event, 
an attack on Katima Mulilo during a time when a UN envoy was visiting would have 
given it the necessary publicity especially, at a time when the UN Security Council was 
about to meet and discuss the question of Namibian independence. 
 
The following entry in the Log Book98 of the Holy Family Mission at Katima Mulilo 
describes the 1978 attack: 
                                                 
96 Namakalu, 2004, 76. 
97 Steenkamp, Borderstrike, 1983, p.149. 
98 Entry of 23rd August: Log Book of Holy Family Mission, Katima Mulilo, Caprivi Strip, SWA/Namibia, 
Book I, 1943 – 1994. The mission also maintains a second log book on Pius XII Girls School, which was 
established to enhance the attendance of the girl child in school. According to the database of the National 
Archives in Pretoria, an Accession (Reference A 409) of primary materials is held by the Roman Catholic 
Mission Katima Mulilo containing the following in one volume: Diaries of Roman Catholic Mission, 
Katima Mulilo, 1975-1983; Correspondence of Holy Family Mission Katima Mulilo on: Occupancy, 
Mafwe schools, Kuta, Hospital, 1944-1978; Notes on Katima Mulilo, 1960-1983; Manuscript: How Civic 
Action has helped Kizito College, 1975-1984; Extract from Zambezi Mission:A History of the Capuchins in 
Zambia, 1931-1981, on Holy Family in Caprivi, 1944-1982; and, Photographs of Roman Catholic Church, 
Katima Mulilo. Unfortunately, none of the above could be found during my fieldwork at the Holy Family 
Mission at Katima Mulilo except for the two Log Books. Father George, with whom I had discussions, 
maintained that he was not aware of the existence of such materials. I got the impression that their archive 
was not well organized. This is a real concern in Namibia where a lot of private archives are virtually 
unaccounted for and not usually accessed by researchers; or else probably they were not comfortable to let 











The mission was awakened at 1:00 am by a fierce rocket attack by the Zambians from across the 
river at Sesheke. The sisters got the girls to be wrapped in their blankets under their beds and 
prayed with them until the attack ended at 4:30. Major du Toit and his men call at the end of the 
attack to see if everybody was all right. No damage was done on the mission, although some small 
missiles landed nearby. However, heard next day that bedroom where our civil-action-soldier 
teacher’s sleep was it by a rocket and ten killed (all S.Africans) RIP. Ours teachers escaped injury. 
 
The perception that the attack was carried out by the ‘Zambians’, as displayed above, was 
reinforced by the fact that it was carried out from Zambian soil.99 This was not the case. 
However, the attack was undertaken with the knowledge of the Zambian authorities. It 
took place at about 01:15 am, just fifteen minutes after a routine broadcast by Radio 
Zambia carried a news report stating that the war against SA was about intensify. This 
was intended to forewarn the civilian population on both sides of the Zambezi in case of a 
SA retaliation, which indeed took place. There were no civilian casualties reported in this 
attack, which concentrated mainly on Katima and WNLA bases. Two factors might 
account for this. The first was the precise planning/calculations not to cause civilian 
casualties on the part of PLAN combatants when attacking.100 Apart from the few 
missiles, which landed near the Holy Mission reported above, only one other stray 
missile was reported to have landed in the civilian residential area of Ngweze, and which 
caused damage to the primary school there. The second is that bunkers/bomb shelters, 
were constructed around Kaima Mulilo (both in the White and Black sections) in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
99 According to Namakalu (Op.cit., p. 75), the original plan was to attack from Namibian soil but this was 
shelved as more information came in on the location of bases and the enemy’s routine patrols and other 
observations. Another consideration was that the heavy weapons and ammunition used during the attack 
was carried by shoulder. 
100 The impact of the attack on the civilian population is yet to be researched. It is reported that some 
residents of Katima Mulilo fled under the cover of the night and walked for miles to their villages of origin, 
some reaching Bukalo and Ngoma on the Namibian-Botswana border. It is told how parents left behind 
their children, how men wore their wives’ skirts and dresses in the rush of things, and how one mother 
picked up a pet dog thinking it was her infant child. It is not clear how Katima Mulilo was selected for 
Operation Revenge, in light of the fact that PLAN’s theatre of war had already shifted by this time. 
Likando (Op.cit., 1989: 149-50) briefly tells us about the ‘behind the scene’ planning of Operation Revenge 
and places it in the wider conflict (what he terms ‘Owambo tribalism’) between those PLAN fighters from 
the Caprivi and their Oshiwambo counterparts. He states that the aim was apparently to ‘destroy’ the town 
by shelling it indiscriminately and the advice to select enemy targets was perceived as treacherous. He 
further reports continued misunderstandings between the fighters even after the attack. These were resolved 
only by the intervention of the leadership. Apparently a delegation led by Albert Mishake Muyongo 
accompanied by Lemmy Matengu and some junior PLAN officers had to travel to the frontline to establish 
the tenacity of the reported clashes. While dissatisfaction might have existed between the two groups, it 
could not be established from any other source whether it was to the extent as reported by Likando. In any 
case the fact that no civilian casualties were reported shows that the aim could not have been to inflict 











preparations for the attack. These structures, which are largely dilapidated at present are a 
vivid testimony to the strike, and give Katima Mulilo the impression of a border town in 
a military frontier. The day following the attack high government officials from SA flew 
to Katima Mulilo. These included General Viljoen, General Gleeson Geldenhuys, and the 
Administrator for SWA, Judge Marthinus Steyn. The Super Felon101, which was carrying 
them, was nearly struck by an anti-craft shell and two mortar bombs, which were fired 
from Sesheke.102 Reinforcements were called in from SA and Grootfontein and the 
SADF, as expected, pursued PLAN fighters inside Zambia for up to a hundred kilometers 
north of the cutoff line. 
 
Two other aspects of the military frontier in the Caprivi Strip deserve brief mention: the 
impact of the war and militarization on the San population in West Caprivi and the 
Winning Hearts and Minds (WHAM) project in the Eastern Caprivi. SA’s intention was 
to nationalize the war of liberation, turning Black on Black. For this reason the so-called 
‘Bushmen’ Battalion was the first to be formed in 1974103 in what came to be known later 
as SWATF (South West Africa Territorial Force). The SWATF was ethnically based and 
spread along the operational zone. The Caprivi Strip was designated as Sector 70 of the 
operational zone and housed two full battalions: 201 Battalion (‘Bushmen’) at Omega 
and 33 Battalion, later named 701 Battalion, at Mpacha near Katima Mulilo. The medium 
of instruction in the Mpacha battalion was English as opposed to Afrikaans which was 
used in Omega. The San (Kxoe) who fled from Angola were received in West Caprivi by 
the SADF in a reception camp built for them.104 West Caprivi was proclaimed as a nature 
park in 1963 and upgraded to a Game Reserve in 1968.105 The area was however declared 
a SA military zone and closed to civilians before any activities could start.106 A number 
of San families were forcibly removed from the Angolan border where a one kilometer 
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wide strip was proclaimed as a free-fire zone.107 By concentrating the San in army camps, 
their traditional way of living that of hunting and gathering, was destroyed. They 
however possessed one vital skill badly needed by the SADF: tracking. Sixteen San 
volunteers plus one white officer and six national servicemen initially kick-started the 
recruitment of the Kxoe into the SA Army at the Omega base in West Caprivi.108 Their 
numbers in the army steadily increased to about a thousand strong force composed 
entirely of San troops under white SA commanders. As trackers they moved in front of 
patrols and armoured vehicles thereby exposing themselves to landmine explosions. In 
short, they were used as human shields for the mainly white SA Army. Their families 
lived with them at the Omega base bringing the number of those involved to 5, 000 or 
eighty per cent of the population of West Caprivi.109 Those who were not fit for 
recruitment in the army, such as women and older men, were employed as labourers, 
dressmakers and cooks. SA kept the existence of the Omega base secret until 1977 when 
the SADF started using it extensively for propaganda purposes as a prime example on 
how the army was winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of people. It was also claimed that care 
was being taken not to westernize these San soldiers, by encouraging them to return to 
the bush from time to time to hone their tracking skills110, and in a way, to learn how to 
be ‘Bushmen’ again. Apart from Omega, other San families were resettled at Fort 
Doppies near the Botswana border and the Chetto army base. The Chetto Army base was 
also used by UNITA. In fact, the SADF used the base only from 1976 to 1983 and 
UNITA started using it since then until just before Namibian independence.111 Contrary 
to SA denials, the war cost her immensely in human terms as can be deduced from the 
writings of Breytenbach, a long serving SADF officer in West Caprivi: He writes: 
 
It is difficult to cast my mind’s eye back to the Caprivi, where I see rows and rows of white 
crosses, many of them marking the graves of men I had known intimately. There are hundreds of 
them, all identical, at the heads of little heaps of earth on which wives, children and friends used to 
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lay bunches of indigenous flowers and personal relics from the daily lives of the fallen heroes. 
Apart from those buried at Buffalo, there are many other unmarked graves in Angola….112 
 
The mass exodus of young people into exile to join SWAPO in the mid-to-late 1970s and 
the PLAN advances on the battlefield forced SA to rethink its strategies. Concurrently 
with military force, the colonial state turned its attention to the WHAM (winning hearts 
and minds) project.113 Alongside sister organizations in northern and central Namibia 
such as Etango in former Owamboland, Ezuva in Kavango, Waaksaamheid en Belange 
Organisasie vir Namibia in central Namibia, there was established in Caprivi the Caprivi 
National Service or, more specifically, the Namwi Foundation. Through these 
organizations, SA waged its dangerous socio-psychological war in and on Namibia. The 
Namwi Foundation was a pseudo-cultural organization founded under the wing of the 
SADF to promote, among others, an exclusive geographical and ethnic loyalty and to 
distance Namibians from SWAPO. Through cultural, sporting and religious activities, the 
Namwi Foundation promoted tribalism and allegiance to the ‘homeland’ as a further 
scheme in the divide and rule policy applied in the country. Those who were in school at 
this time remember being taken to Nambweza near Lisikili in the Eastern Caprivi Strip 
basically for indoctrination using a passive and negative attitude towards the liberation 
struggle waged by SWAPO. More recently (up to 1989), the famous annual Easter Soccer 
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It is generally accepted that the creation of a Caprivianness was a by-product of 
Germany’s wish to have access to the Zambezi River. An addition to this theory is 
advanced in this chapter, being that Germany aspired to be a neighbour in southern 
Africa adjacent to, and by poking her nose deep into, the British sphere of influence 
where resources – both natural and human - were believed to be in abundance. The 
Caprivi thus became the frontier which bordered unknown British territory. It was this 
Frontier Identity of the Caprivi, which was the focus of this chapter. It was concluded 
that there are multi- frontier identities embedded in the Caprivian identities. The 
discussion was thus limited to the following: refuge as an aspect of frontier identity, 
labour extraction as frontier identity, military frontier identity and lastly, the Caprivi as a 
frontier for outlaws. 
 
Refuge as an aspect of frontier identity dates back to pre-colonial times. During that 
period, the inhabitants of the now Caprivi moved in order to survive, either to another 
part of the territory or simply across the rivers. Movement was usually away from 
looming danger or in search of food. The rivers that bounded the Caprivi served as a 
natural refuge for its inhabitants. With the advent of Lozi/Rotse subjugation, the latter 
regarded the Caprivi as a granary, as well as hunting and fishing ground. In this way the 
Caprivi became their frontier of plenty. This however changed with the rise of the 
Mfecane/Difagane movement in the Eastern Cape (SA) in the 1800s. Migrating hordes 
under renegade generals of Shaka Zulu (Mzilikazi and Sebetwane), trekked northwards. 
Sebetwane’s Makololo reached the Caprivi in the 1820s. He soon formed an alliance 
though short-lived with the Subiya chief, Liswani, who assisted him to cross the Zambezi 
on his north-bound journey of conquer and plunder. Sebetwane conquered the 
Rotse/Aluyi/Lozi and established himself at Naliele as supreme leader in those parts, 
including the area, which fell under Chief Liswani’s influence. The Caprivi then turned 
into a source of danger for the Rotse. Even Sebetwane was not safe, for he feared 
constant harassment from Mzilikazi of the Matebele, his natural enemy. Indeed, angered 











Mzilikazi’s army and mounted a joint attack on Sebetwane. For this act, considered 
treacherous by Sebetwane, Chief Liswani was invited to Naliele and killed by the 
Makololo. It was then that the way was cleared for Sebetwane to establish himself at 
Muzumani (which he named Linyanti, today known as Sangwali) in the Caprivi, thereby 
recognizing its characteristic of being a safe haven. Ironically, it was this safe haven, 
which diminished the numbers of his people due to illnesses and led to their total 
annihilation after the death of Sebetwane. At the close of Makololo rule (at its weakest), 
the Rotse re-captured the Caprivi and subjugated its people until the advent of European 
colonialism. Between 1890 and 1909, the Caprivi was regarded as a haven for criminals 
or prisoners who went into hiding and it was a happy hunting ground for trophy hunters 
because there was no official European administration in the territory. For this reason, it 
is argued here, it turned into an outlaw frontier. It has been described as a ‘no-man’s 
land’. This should not be condoned since it disregards the presence of the indigenous 
people of the Caprivi. 
 
With the advent of European colonialism, the aprivi became a frontier for organized 
labour extraction in central southern Africa. Labour agents of organizations such as the 
Labour Agent Bureau based in Bulawayo (Southern Rhodesia), the Witwatersrand Native 
Labour Association (WNLA) and the Northern Labour Organization (NLO, SWA) 
competed for recruitment rights and the setting up of recruitment camps in the Caprivi. It 
was established though that the attraction was not necessarily the Caprivi, which was 
sparsely populated, but Angola, which was one of the most densely populated areas in 
southern Africa at the time. The Caprivi therefore was described in this equation as a 
frontier for extracting Angolan migrant labour. A closer look at the routes of migrant 
labour and road systems at the time revealed that the Caprivi‘s external interaction 
pointed away from SWA, to the north, east and especially south to the Rand mines. It was 
argued that the idea for the Northern Labour Organization to hire from the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip for SWA was a missed opportunity to Namibianize the Caprivi. People 
from the Caprivi ‘went and came back’ to the Caprivi due to compulsory repatriation at 
the end of their service. It was also argued that labour extraction in the Caprivi, in fact, 











especially from Angola, chained people to long lines on their way to the west coast for 
shipment to the Americas and occasionally to Dar es Salaam (east coast). Slavery under 
the Rotse/Lozi, which was just as cruel, was also discussed. 
 
Lastly, the chapter discussed in great length the military frontier identity of the Caprivi 
Strip. It was found that the Caprivi Strip was regarded by SA as its military frontline –
central to the survival of whites in southern Africa. As the confrontation in southern 
Africa became situated in the East versus West Cold War, SA presented her racism and 
Apartheid as anti-communist and itself as a bulwark and bastion of white western values. 
As a result, the Caprivi Strip became a trench, and a first line of defence, a training base 
for its forces especially special units, and a launch-pad/springboard for attacks and the 
destabilization of the countries dotting the frontier – the frontline states. It was SA’s 
shock absorber in case of attack from outside. The military strategic importance of the 
Caprivi Strip was traced back to WWI when it became the first enemy territory to fall 
into the hands of the Allied forces. Since then, it was continuously administered almost as 
a ‘police state’ right to just before the outbreak of WWII when it was transferred to 
Pretoria for same strategic reasons. At the outbreak of WWII a Company of Native 
Military Corps was formed in the Caprivi Strip with the purpose of protecting the 
Victoria Falls bridge which the Allied forces feared would be a natural enemy target in 
the war, but the Company was disbanded in 1943 without complaint. The SADF and 
SAAF continued to use the Caprivi Strip for air training exercises and border patrols 
through-out the 1950s and plans existed at that time for the construction of a tropical 
military training school in the territory. A number of military installations (bases and 
airfields) were in place in the Caprivi Strip from where SA conducted its Operation 
Reindeer (Angola) and Operation Dingo (Zambia). 
 
For black Africa and especially SWAPO, the Caprivi Strip was Freedom Alley. For 
PLAN, SWAPO’s military wing, the territory represented a soft underbelly which was 
waiting to be hit hard. Indeed the Caprivi Strip was the theatre of war in the formative 
years of the armed liberation struggle. PLAN successfully employed hit and run tactics 











bombardment. To conclude, the chapter also examined the WHAM project as an 
alternative to military force by the SADF. It was discussed that in regard to the Eastern 
Caprivi Strip, the SADF formed the Namwi Foundation to spearhead its dangerous socio-
psychological warfare. Thus the Caprivi Strip was engaged and perceived by SA as a 






























Section one of this dissertation established that Caprivi identities were established over 
the course of a century in the service of very ambiguous colonial objectives that revealed 
and emphasized the uniqueness of the place and its history. It is this uniqueness that 
produced these identities because of the divergent views/perceptions regarding the 
Caprivi: either as useless or useful and the constant shifting of these perceptions during 
colonial rule. A continuity, however, underlies these changes in perceptions, that is, the 
desire to keep the Caprivi remote and separate from the rest of the Mandated Territory for 
most part of the colonial period. Hence the one of the Caprivi is an identity of 
separateness. Section Two will focus on internal perceptions and reactions to the Caprivi 
(responses to identity, Chapter Seven); in relation to each other (rival histories, Chapter 
Five); and lastly, the identity of people, as ‘Caprivians’, and asks whether this is 
expressed and/or manifested in secession (Chapter Nine)? 
 
From the colonial administrative perspective, the successive powers accepted that the 
Caprivi, on the micro-level (internally), was inhabited by two tribal groups only, namely 
Mafwe (Fwe) and Basubia (Subia); that they had equal status; and that each one owned 
its separate tribal area. However no officially recognized internal boundary line separated 
the two tribal groups. According to some scholars1it is this lack of an officially 
recognized internal boundary line which is [was] the cause of numerous struggles and 
tensions between the two groups, resulting, among others, in open tribal clashes (1992 
and 1993). The real cause, I argue, is the basis upon which the Caprivi was premised. 
Firstly, the Caprivi, as described in this dissertation, emerged out of social upheavals as a 
                                                 
1 See Maritz, Chris, ‘The Subia and Fwe of Caprivi: Any Historical Grounds for a Status of Primus Inter 












direct result of the involvement of outsiders in the Caprivi, beginning with the Aluyi 
(Lozi), Kololo, Lozi, Germans, and later the South Africans. This interaction with 
outsiders was accompanied by severe cultural erosion and the disappearance of many 
customs that could distinguish the people of the Caprivi from that of their subjugators. In 
short, they lost their distinctness to such an extent that it became difficult for the 
colonizers to distinguish between the cultural traits of the people of the Caprivi and those 
of the Aluyi or Makololo. Not surprisingly, the colonial administrators chose to label 
them just as of ‘Lozi’ origin. What this meant was that these people had no historical 
background apart from being ‘serfs’ of the Lozi and Kololo. In fact Kruger (1963: 4) 
states the following in the case of the Masubiya:  
 
Their independence and status as a recognized separate tribe dates back (in historical times at any 
rate) to the German Resident appointed Chikamatondo, a chieftainship supported and strengthened 
from the time of the Mandate. They themselves name four chiefs before Liswani (circa 1830) but 
it is doubtful if there was ever entirely independent status…. 
 
Thus in constructing a Caprivianness, which is supposedly based on ‘historical’ grounds 
(which is the history of the Lozi), the colonial administrators disregarded local history 
and neglected to trace the path of historical development beyond Lozi rule as a starting 
point in showing how the present has grown out of the past. Such a quest could have 
revealed much about the migration and settlement history of the present inhabitants of the 
Caprivi, which I am inclined to link with what Maritz, after Cohen and Middleton, call 
‘indigenousness;’.2 This I consider, although an extension of the first, the second or other 
cause of tensions in the constituencies of Caprivianness. That is, when the identities of 
the Caprivi were being formed, it had no historical basis apart from subservience to the 
Lozi, and thus the more important question of ‘being first’ in the territory remained and 
still remain unresolved in the historical and political discourse of the area. As noted by 
Kopytoff, ‘being the first settler in an area gave one a special kind of seniority, it gave 
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one the right to ‘show the place’ to those who came later’.3 Instead of assisting the 
Caprivians to come to terms with this aspect of their history, the colonial administrators 
maintained the Lozi status quo. The present was more important: Epstein notes with 
reference to the Copperbelt in Zambia: ‘a critical issue is how that identity is to be 
maintained over a number of generations.’4 The Caprivian identities were maintained by 
denying their historical past beyond Lozi rule; by recognizing only two tribal groups 
which were supposedly equal and hence submerging those identities that were grouped 
together under the Mafwe identity; and by showing how different the two groups are 
from each other. It was premised on divisiveness and the denial of the past in 
constructing the present. The constituent elements of the Caprivi identities were not 
afforded the opportunity to stress and select certain values from their past ‘to make 
positive identifications with their forebears’.5  
 
The discussion on migration and settlement history in the Caprivi is out of the scope of 
the present study. The extent to which these issues will be tackled here will be limited to 
assisting me to catalogue the different instances of tensions in the Caprivi identities, such 
as the internal boundary and user-rights of land; and the appointment of teachers, 
positions and promotions in the public service (both before and after independence).  
 
The dispute over ‘indigenousness’ between Mafwe and Masubiya 
 
Two sets of conflicti g claims to indigenousness (rival histories) over Caprivi can be 
found.6 The Subia (Masubia) reasons that the present Caprivi formed part of an historical 
Subia Kingdom which was supposedly conquered by their chief, Nsundano I; that he 
named his kingdom Itenge with himself as munitenge (governor, ruler or owner of Itenge: 
mwinetenge); and that within Itenge were to be found groups such as Totela, 
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Mambukushu and Fwe who were all subject to the authority of munitenge (see Chapter 
Two).7 The Subia further reason that the Fwe as a tribal group does not include the 
Totela, Yeyi, Mambukushu and Makwengo (Barakwengo or San), but that these 
groupings were supposed to be independent from the Fwe; that the Subia is the legitimate 
owner of the Caprivi; that the Subia tribal chief is the ‘paramount chief’ of the territory 
(or supposed to be), and that, under these circumstances, there cannot be a border 
between the two tribal groupings because the whole territory is supposed to belong to the 
Subia. 
 
Contrary to Subia claims, the Fwe reasoned that the Subia, after they revolted against the 
authority of the Lozi king, Sipopa, during the nineteenth century when the Lozi re-
asserted their control after the overthrow of the Makololo, fled the Caprivi and later came 
to Mamili (then representative of the Lozi king at Linyanti), to ask for a space to live. 
Mamili, after consultation with Lewanika, designated a living place for the Subia in the 
eastern corner of the present Caprivi. The Fwe reasoned furthermore that ‘the Germans’ 
(probably Captain Streitwolf, whom they called Katara Matunga - one who surveys the 
land) drew a border between the Fwe and the Subia and that Resident Streitwolf 
recognized Mamili as tribal chief in 1909 and ‘extended his jurisdiction over the entire 
non-Subia area of Caprivi’.8 For the Fwe thus they existed as a tribal group within an 
own territory and forms the Yeyi, Totela, Mambukushu and Makwengo components of 
the Fwe as a tribe. They denied completely that the Subia ever had, or executed, authority 
over the Fwe.  
 
A host of historical issues arise from the two contrasting views presented above, which 
beg analysis. To begin with the Subia as the proponents of indigenousness, the existence 
of a pre-colonial kingdom of Itenge is accepted (see Chapter Two). Contrary to the view 
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held by Maria Fisch9, the name Itenge did not begin with Shamukuni’s 1972 article 
(Fisch actually argues that the earliest mention of Itenge was made by Shamukuni) but 
dates back to at least 1904. In that year Richard Rothe made an expedition to the Caprivi 
Strip and made the following observation: 
 
His promotion (Mamili of Mamili -  others use Linyanti) to the position of head of the German 
Barotses when the country is definitely occupied might, under favorable circumstances, enable us 
to keep those native tribes which are composed of Maijes [Mayeyi] and Masubias (the latter have 
given their name to the country in the native language)….   10  
 
Undoubtedly, the name Rothe referred to which the Subia had given the Caprivi is Itenge. 
Another instance is to be found in February 1909 during the hearings of the so-called 
Masubiya Cattle Case. In addressing Chief Mamili, Lozi Chief Letia is quoted to have 
said: ‘I do not have a case with Mamili…Mamili is our man whom we appointed there to 
represent the Lozi State in Itenge. …the cattle you [Mamili] are now claiming were given 
to you by Lewanika as a Lozi subject and as a Lozi representative in Itenge’.11 Does this 
constitute an admission on the part of Letia, an overseer of the Lozi State in its southern-
most part, that there was an Itenge before Lozi rule? At its formation, CANU was 
fighting to free Itenge, and the present secessionists attempt is to have an independent 
‘State of Itenge’:  these indicate that the name Itenge existed, regardless of its present use 
and /or abuse. Further, the Subia contention that within Itenge other groups such as 
Totela, Mambukushu, Yeyi and Makwengo were to be found, is accepted. In fact 
Shamukuni (1972:163), in his contribution on the Subia refers accordingly that the Fwe 
in the time of the Subia chief Nsundano I, inhabited at Linyanti, thus he accepts a Fwe 
presence in the Eastern Caprivi before the arrival of the Makololo. However whether 
these groups were under the authority of a munitenge could not be established. There is 
no evidence to show that the munitenge appointed headmen in Mafwe areas. Until further 
evidence emerges, one can just affirm Maritz’s conclusions regarding ‘indigenousness’ in 
Caprivi:  
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The available material on the Caprivi does not point to domination of the Fwe by the Subia at any 
point. In fact, both groups were throughout treated as groups of equal status. From the ethno-
history of the Fwe as well as that of the Subia it is clear that there does not exist known historical 
grounds which can be cited to support a claim that the present Eastern Caprivi as a whole 
‘belonged’ to the Subia and that the Subia chief is - or should be - the only chief (or paramount 
chief) of the area. No grounds for a claim on ‘indigenousness’ on the side of the Subia vis-à-vis 
the Fwe could be found.12 
 
However, it could be helpful to make a distinction between dominating a people and 
having territorial control and Maritz does not seem to be sensitive to this fact. The ethno-
history which Prof. Maritz refers to needs contextualization. This is the history which 
does not go beyond Lozi rule. Maritz’s article came in the wake of the Subia Royal 
House Declaration of 19 October 1991 for indigenousness and was based on field-work 
notes he compiled over the years in his capacity as part of the Defence team of the 
Mafwe chieftainship. His conclusions should thus be viewed within those limitations, and 
indeed, he is not presenting anything new but conforms to the accepted official view on 
this matter, to keep the status quo regardless of the ‘past’, which was crystallized by the 
Budack Report but itself really just an extension of Kruger’s view of the matter. I quote 
at length from both: 
 
Assuming there were in the long distant past something of the kind, is one entitled to brush aside 
all that has happened since, say in the last 150 to 200 years, and which has operated against a 
continuation of whatever order there may have been and claim a re-instatement? Surely not! 
Furthermore, he who asserts a relationship of authority over people would be taking a great risk if 
he could not rely on their submission: there would be endless trouble in the land.13 
 
Replicating Kruger’s position is Budack14:  
 
Even the principle of legitimacy should not be considered in the absolute. It is doubtful whether, 
after more than a century of mutual acquiescence in the status quo, there is any good reason for 
disturbing the established order by force. An argumentation culminating in claims for 
unconditional sovereignty over the whole of the country and its people, or even the expulsion of 
some of the inhabitants, will surely lead to armed conflict. Your commissioner finds himself in 
complete agreement with Capt. Kruger when the latter refers to the implications of restoring an 
order that possibly existed several centuries ago15 
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13 Appendix 22b, Para. 93, to the Buddack Report, 1982 (Caprivi Boundary Commission). 
14 Buddack 












The contention by the Subia that the Fwe does not include Totela, Yeyi, Mbukushu and 
Makwengo, really depended on the period. During the period under review, indeed, as the 
Fwe correctly point out, the above-named groups formed part of the Mafwe Identity since 
1909 when Streitwolf recognized Simataa Mamili and elevated his position to chief over 
the Mafwe and all other non-Subia people in the Caprivi. Before that, however, even 
though consisting of groups which were not centrally organized, the identities under 
discussion were not part of the Mafwe. More recently, the Yeyi and Mayuni (BaMashi) 
have successfully splintered off from the Mafwe and reasserted their identities and 
formed chieftaincies independent of the Mamili dynasty (see Chapter Two). However the 
issue of the discourse between the Fwe and the Subia is not limited to the issue of a 
boundary line or indigenousness but also extends to the relative power position within the 
political structures of the Caprivi, as well as economic opportunities and co-operation in 
terms of political parties and groupings. Subjacent to all this is the yet to be researched 
issue of ethnical amalgamation (the merging process) particularly of the Mafwe and its 
constituent elements, and particularly since the Subia contest this identity, among others 
by maintaining that the Mafwe and themselves are but one and the same. The questions 
that ought to be investigated (as according to a research proposal referred to) and which 
are not within the scope of the present study are:16 
 
 Who is the Fwe? Origin, background, course of the amalgamation process; 
 What is the relationship between the original Fwe (as nucleus) and these elements 
which are seen as components of the Fwe (Totela, Yeyi, Mbukushu, Mbalangwe, 
and Makwengo?); and 
 What is the nature of the relationship (in terms of ethno-psychological distance) 
between the components of the Fwe among themselves (interrelationship) and in 
relation to the Subia? 
 
                                                 
16 These are just partially addressed by Pretorius, but he does not delve into the issue of amalgamation 













Two contentions from the Fwe side deserve discussing, firstly, the issue of the Subia 
asking for a living space from Mamili, and secondly, the issue of an internal boundary 
line supposedly drawn by the Germans separating the two groups. It is historically correct 
to state that the Masubia, under chief Nkonkwena, or Liswani II (Mutola Lizuku) fled 
Impalila Island, his royal residence around 1876 to settle at Rakops near the Makgadigadi 
Pan in what is now Botswana and stayed there as guests of Khama III of the Ngwanto 
(see Chapter Two).17 This was due to the fact that after the overthrow of the Kololo, in 
which the Subia played a crucial role, the latter did not want to submit to Sepopa and 
rightly claimed their independence status. The Lozi had to re-impose their authority on 
the Subia and other tribal groups such as the Toka who had stopped paying tribute to 
them. For the Subia of Sesheke, one way to avoid the tribute was to flee south into Itenge 
which made it difficult for Sepopa to collect tribute from them. Flint, on the strength of 
Holub, reiterates that less than a quarter of the subject tribes were actually paying any 
tribute to Sepopa.18 It should be noted that Lozi hegemony over surrounding tribes at this 
time was either insecure or had lapsed.19 As a consequence of his cruelty and autocratic 
manner of rule, Sepopa was overthrown by a rebellion organized by a commoner, Maata, 
and Mwanawina II was installed as King.  Thereafter Lozi headmen were placed in the 
Caprivi. Fearing a similar fate to what happened to Sepopa, chief Nkonkwena then 
decided to seek refuge in present day Botswana. The significance of this rebellion is that 
not only did it obtain much support from the Subia20 but it was organized and broke out 
in Itenge (Caprivi). The role of Mafwe-Mayeyi-Totela in these conflicts is not clear. For 
this reason I turn to Pretorius for an explanation: 
 
Apparently the Fwe-Yeyi area was not as deeply involved in the bloody feuds of the two decades 
following Sekeletu’s death and the massacre of the Kololo as the politically-minded and ambitious 
Subiya.21 
 
                                                 
17 See also Maritz (1996), Shamukuni (1972), and Pretorius (1976). 
18 See footnote 78 of Flint, L., ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa: Citizenship and Subjectivity in 
Barotseland and  Caprivi’, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 36, Issue 2, 2003. Flint 
quotes from Holub, Seven Years in south Africa, p. 146. 
19  Pretorius, 1975, p.20. 
20 See E.G. Tabler, ‘Introduction’ in E.G. Tabler (ed.), Trade, and Travel in Early Barotseland (London, 
1963), p. 8 and Holub, Seven Years in South Africa, pp. 284-285. 












Among the group that went to Botswana were the late chief Liswani I‘s three sons, 
Munihango, Chika and Maiba, significantly joined by Chikamatondo, a commoner, to 
whom I will return shortly. It is from this group that a section returned which seem to be 
at the centre of Fwe claims. It could not be established anywhere, though, that this group 
reported to Mamili, then not a chief but a representative of the Lozi. In any case, even if 
they did, it was because of his position as representative of the Lozi that they would 
report to him in order for him to announce their arrival back to the Lozi Paramount chief. 
Can one therefore say it is the Mafwe chief who gave the Subia a place to live? As can be 
expected, the Subia’s version of this event is different; that upon their return from 
Bechuanaland, the group under the leadership of the elderly Chikamatondo went to 
Barotseland where they were received by Lewanika who had succeeded Mwanawina as 
paramount chief of the Lozi.  
 
When some of the members of the group expressed the desire to return to their former 
land (now the Caprivi), Chikamatondo was made headman by the Lozi and sent with the 
group in recognition of his record of bravery.22 The evidence favours the latter. Firstly, 
many have commented on Chikamatondo being placed in a position of authority by the 
Lozi.23 Indications are that his appointment emanates from this sequence of events. 
Secondly, lest it be forgotten, Paramount Chief Lewanika was none other than the father 
of Letia, the Lozi appointee at Mwandi (Sesheke) who was a prince and an important 
member of the royal family and headed the sub-khuta in the Masubia areas. He adopted 
the name Lubosi when he was installed in 1878, but changed it to Lewanika (the uniter), 
which was logical according to Flint because he was at the ‘helm of a nation riven by 
splits and intrigues, where few of his recent predecessors had died a natural death.’24 
Thus it would be illogical for the Subia to fear to approach Lewanika directly if they 
needed a space to live, after-all not only was he the father of their sub-chief but also knew 
them personally because they were blood relations, as Paramount Chief Lewanika’s son, 
Letia, was a Subia on his maternal side, just like the maternal relations of Mwanawina 
                                                 
22 Notes on Interview with Chief Chikamatondo and others on the subject of his position as chief of the 
Masubia tribe and having a bearing on the repeated claims by one Mulwaliswani to Chieftainship  












and Sepopa.25 Interestingly, why would the Subia report to the Lozi representative 
Mamili if Letia was still sub-chief at Sesheke? One possibility would be that Letia was by 
this time Yeta III and had succeeded his father Lewanika, in which case it would make 
sense since there was no other chief left than the Lozi Mamili. The other would be the 
route of travel which the Subia took from Bechuanaland which could allow them to pass-
by Linyanti, in which case they would be obliged by custom to pay a courtesy visit to 
Mamili’s court. 
  
It should be noted too that as I argued against Subia authority over the Fwe, there is also 
no evidence to suggest that Simataa Mamili ever exercised authority in the Subia areas as 
Fisch would make us believe, that since he (Mamili) was the only chief (not even chief at 
the time) left in the Caprivi after Nkonkwena had fled, he exercised powers over an 
extensive district that extended from Ngoma in the east to Lizauli in the west.26 Ngoma is 
nearly in the mid-south extreme of the Subia area. Fisch does not back her assertion with 
any sources. It is probable, though, that Mamili might have been the headman over 
certain Subia who resided in Mafwe areas. It is also likely that the oral tradition 
cultivated by the Fwe in this regard referred to the movement of one group of Subia only. 
It is difficult to measure whether all the Subia left the Caprivi during the 1876 flight. 
 
The Internal Boundary Issue 
 
Closely related to the contest for indigenousness in the Caprivi was the issue of whether 
there existed an internal line of division and whether this was at all demarcated. To re-
cap, the colonial administrative discourse recognized two separate tribal identities of 
equal status each within its own tribal territory. However, the two tribal identities shared 
an ill-defined line of division and which led to various controversies. The two were at 
opposing ends of the issue, once again. As stated above, the Fwe reasoned that the 
                                                 
25 Ibid.  
 
 












‘German’ drew a border between themselves and the Subia while the Subia reasoned that 
since they are the legitimate owner of the territory (Caprivi) and that their chief is 
supposed to be the paramount chief, there cannot be a border because the whole territory 
is supposed to ‘belong’ to them. 
 
History of the Internal Boundary Dispute 
 
Even though witnesses to the Budack Commission (appointed in 1982 to enquire into the 
boundary dispute) from both the Fwe and Subia recited past controversies regarding the 
border dispute during the German period, it proved difficult to corroborate such claims 
without any evidence. The earliest recorded reference to the boundary line between the 
Fwe and Subia is found in a letter of 25 July 1930 from Superintendent Brittz of the 
SWA police, then posted at Schuckmannsburg as resident representative of the SWAA, to 
the Secretary for SWA in which he stated:27 
 
I have the honour to advise that Chiefs Chikamatondo and Mamili have interviewed me regarding 
the boundary between their areas, but they both give different names of places which are supposed 
to form the boundary between the two areas, which Captain Streitwolf made when he was 
stationed here. The Chiefs have asked me to make enquiries if there are any records at Windhoek 
which may give the names of the places which form the boundary which Captain Streitwolf 
mentioned to them when he cut the boundary between the two areas. Chief Chikamatondo claims 
that the boundary commences at Katima Mulilo Rapids, whereas Chief Mamili claims that the 
boundary commences at Musuma about 25 miles further eastwards down the Zambezi River.” 
 
It can be noted from the above that the discord at this stage was not so much the existence 
of a boundary between the Fwe and Subia but the course of the actual demarcation line. 
Does this constitute an acceptance from the Subia chief, Chikamatondo, that indeed a 
boundary existed between them?  The response which came from Windhoek dated 16 
October 1930 stated the issue thus: 
 
…an exhaustive search through the records of the late German Administration has failed to 
discover any report of the supposed fixing of a boundary line between the above tribes by Captain 
Streitwolf. In 1911 there was published in Berlin a book by that officer on the Caprivi Zipfel. 
There are references in this book to the absence of any fixed boundaries between the three (sic)    
 tribes, and the author indicates that it would be a very difficult matter to define such a    
 boundary.28 
 
                                                 
27 Quoted in Budack, 1982, p. 25, see also Kruger 1984, p.13. 











In fact Buddack reveals there is not even the slightest reference in the book to any 
demarcation of an internal boundary. On the contrary, Buddack continues, Streitwolf 
when referring to the Masubiya, Mayeyi and Mafwe, stressed:  
 
Alle diese drei Stämme wohnen recht durcheinander, ohne Stammesgrenzen und ohne jede 
Stammeseinheit (The three tribes live interspersed, without tribal boundaries and without any 
tribal cohesion) 29 
 
If indeed a boundary was demarcated during the German period before the outbreak of 
World War I as the Fwe asserted30, perhaps it would have been done by Viktor Herr von 
Frankenberg und Proschlitz, the Resident who took over from Streitwolf and served from 
1911 until 1914. Again there was no reference to any demarcation of a boundary in Herr 
von Frankenberg’s many reports and correspondences to his superiors. Moreover, von 
Frankenberg compiled a map of the Caprivi in 1912. In it he defines the ‘residential area’ 
of the Masubiya tribe as being identical with the Zambezi flood plain to the east of an 
imaginary line starting at “Lifumbera’s (Lifumbela’s) kraal’ (at or near present 
Kalimbeza), crossing the Lilonga mulapo (watercourse) at approximately 17° 41`S. and 
24° 28`E. (i.e. to the northwest of Bukalo, the tribal headquarters of the Masubiya), and 
eventually ending at a place called ‘Livesa’ (approximately at 17° 54` S. and 24° 31` E.) 
on the Chobe/Linyanti River.31 Von Frankenberg did not indicate the tribal area of the 
Fwe on this map. 
 
It is not clear from the records the source of the imaginary line on which von 
Frankenberg based his map. At least it shows that the inhabitants had an idea, whether 
imaginary or not, on which they based their boundary. Therefore the non-existence of a 
legally or officially drawn boundary line should not be taken to mean that there was no 
form of territorial rights in a traditional form and interpretation. Rather the problem here 
seems to be its expression which is influenced by mutually exclusive claims. In 
examining the Fwe claim, Budack notes though that the boundary shown on von 
                                                 
29 Streitwolf 1911: 118, translated by Kuno Budack, 1982, p. 25. 
30 Budack, 1982, p.21 












Frankenberg’s map does not conform to the course of the demarcation line as advocated 
by the Fwe. Also he found lots of inconsistencies and disagreement among Fwe 
informants with regard to those present at the time of demarcation and even the points of 
reference of the said boundary as shown on the map below. Budack’s conclusion on this 
issue was as follows: 
 
Considering the inconsistencies contained in the oral traditions, and the lack of sufficient 
documentary evidence, your commissioner is, to his regret, unable to accept without doubt that a 
tribal boundary between the Mafwe and the Masubiya areas was officially demarcated by the late 
German administration. He is, therefore, not prepared to attach great importance to informal marks 
such as heaps of stone, scars on trees, or dilapidated wooden poles that were adduced by some 
informants as bearing testimony to the actual course of the alleged demarcation line. On the flimsy 
evidence at his disposal, your commissioner feels compelled to abandon the idea of using this 
reputedly historical line of division as the basis for a fair solution to the present dispute. 
 
The boundary issue should be placed in the wider perspective of settlement patterns and 
population density in the Eastern Caprivi at the time. Whereas there was little pressure in 
the past for the sparsely populated people to require the demarcation of a boundary, this 
changed with the times. In the case of the Masubiya who represented about 40% of the 
population and occupied only about one third of the Eastern Caprivi Strip, an area which 
was mostly swampy and subject to annual flood inundation, the population density was 
much higher than in the western areas settled by the Mafwe, a situation that led Budack 
to conclude: 
 
…thoroughly convinced that any further restriction of the Masubiya living space by demarcating a 
boundary along the lines suggested by their opponents, will inevitably lead to endless perpetuation 
of the present trouble.32 
 
Regardless of his conclusion, Budack went forth and recommended a line of demarcation 
(which he called temporary) that corresponded ‘fairly well to what the Mafwe holds as 
the correct delineation of the borderline, except that it included Kalimbeza and the 
present ‘tribal headquarters’ of the Masubiya, Bukalo, in the Masubiya area.’33 The 
authorities were reluctant to endorse Budack’s recommendation. One consideration 
would have been possible counter-claims made especially by the Mayeyi and other 
                                                 
32 Quoted in Fossé, 1996, p.116. 












groups against the Mafwe. Were Eastern Caprivi to be parceled out in such manner, it 
would have been reduced to cross-roads of internal boundaries, and become a recipe for 





Map 1: Map of Eastern Caprivi showing a proposed internal boundary line between the Fwe and 
Subia, drawn by the Mafwe legal team in preparation for a Case in the High Court of Windhoek 















Katima Mulilo: A Communal Capital 
 
It was discussed in Chapter Three that Katima Mulilo served as the administrative centre 
of the Eastern Caprivi Strip since 28 January 1935. According to the above proposed 
boundary demarcation line clearly it resorted under the Mafwe chief. It is also noted in 
Chapter Three that when Katima Mulilo proper was designated in about 1964 and 
construction begun in all its new dimensions, it was reserved as government land. There 
was no question therefore regarding the status of Katima Mulilo at the time of the Budack 
Commission in 1982. In the early 1990s, however, Katima Mulilo became the centre of 
violent tribal clashes between the Mafwe and Masubiya, and later between the Mayeyi 
and Mafwe. However, the commissioner applied himself to this issue too. By this time 
Katima Mulilo proper (administrative centre and white residential area) was 
complemented by Ngweze, Mafuta, Mission, Wenela, Piggery, Dairy, and housed the 
Legislative Assembly, various government departments, the official residences of the 
chairman, vice-chairman (which were chiefs), and other members of the executive 
committee. It also had two senior secondary schools, a post office, police and army 
headquarters, a Roman Catholic Church, Seventh Day Adventists, supermarkets, bottle-
stores, and filling stations. Economically, general employers included Katima Farm, 
Eagle Maize mill of the First National Development Corporation and also location of the 
African open market.  
 
As regard the population, Budack found out that Katima Mulilo was habited by nearly 16 
per cent (excluding the whites) of the entire population of the Eastern Caprivi Strip, or 
5,945 out of a total figure of 37,419.34 The majority of the people in Katima at the time, 
Budack found out, were Masubiya in an area considered to be under the Mafwe, as 
reflected in the diagram below:35 
 
 
                                                 
34 Based on the August 1981 census figures, in Budack, 1982, p. 31. 














ESD No. Fwe  Subia Yeyi Totela Other Total 
Katima 
Mulilo 
0001 61 39 4 5 3 112 
Ngweze 0002-
0008 
945 2506 217 8 130 3806 
Mafuta 2001 367 810 37 26 129 1369 
Mission 
station 
2002 167 291 41 5 26 530 
Katima 
Farm 
4001 55 26 31 11 5 128 
Total  1595 3672 330 55 293 5945 
 
Table 11:  Table showing the August 1981 Katima Mulilo Census Figures. 
 
It was important, therefore, to declare the town as a communal capital due to its 
economic, political, social and religious importance, and Buddack recommended just 
that. Buddack recommended further that the town be exempted from the jurisdiction of 
any tribal government and that it should be administered by a village management board 
elected by those inhabitants entitled to vote. The board was to be placed under the direct 
control and jurisdiction of the Administration for Caprivians, or the S.W.A. Central 
Government. 
 
Bukalo, Seat of Munitenge Royal Establishment  
 
The tribal headquarters of the Masubiya shifted from Kabbe in 1969 following a decision 
by the tribal council meeting held on the 19 June 1968, which was attended by the Bantu 
Affairs Commissioner, Mr. P.N. Hansmeyer. The main reason for the transfer was that 
Kabbe was inaccessible especially during the annual inundation of the eastern flood 
plains. This was not the first time the Subia made use of Bukalo, though. Oral tradition 
has it that the correct name should be ‘Buikalo’, a resting place; that was used by their 
chief as a stop-over when travelling to Mahundu, another royal residence. Although the 











Commissioner, it met with protest and aroused the issue of the boundary in the Mafwe 
Kkuta (court). Buddack reports that all but late chief Simasiku Mamili rejected the idea 
of shifting the Subia tribal headquarters to Bukalo. In the end the Fwe accepted the matter 
as a fait accompli. The issue, however, kept resurfacing over the years in different forms. 
At the time of the Buddack boundary commission, the Fwe had put forward what would 
seem as a compromise proposal on the issue, which was to leave the Masubiya tribal 
headquarters undisturbed while extending the Mafwe jurisdiction further to the east. This 
Buddack found impracticable36, as it meant the Subia tribal authority would operate from 
a ‘recognized’ Mafwe tribal area of influence. Buddack recommended that the status of 
Bukalo should remain as it was, as part of Subia territory and east of his temporary line of 
boundary demarcation.  
 
The Lake Lyambezi Area 
 
The main economic activities that took place around Lake Lyambezi, or Muntu Njo 
Buswa to the Subia, were fishing and the cultivation of fields. When the lake is full of 
water, about two thirds of its total area extending over more than 30 000 ha is covered by 
reeds while the remainder (about 10 150 ha), consists of an open surface of water.37 
Fishing in the lake attracted people from all walks of life and of different tribal 
groupings, the majority at the time of Buddack’s visit being Masubiya followed by the 
Mayeyi due to the two groups’ ancient tradition of freshwater fishing, then the Mafwe 
and Matotela. Even though most of the fishermen did not fish throughout the year, 
returning to their villages during planting and harvesting season, a number of fishermen’s 
villages around the lake, as well as temporary fishing camps on the shore and on some 
islands sprang up. According to a survey done by Dr. van der Waal in 1980, the income 
per fishing day was R4, 75 while the maximal annual production was 98, 7 tons.38 A 
fishing cooperative existed on the lake, with a freezing room and the organized marketing 
                                                 
 
37 Van der Waal, 1976: 7, quoted in Buddack, 1982, p. 33. 












of the fish. Still, the majority fished for their own consumption while a third, according to 
Buddack, sold fish commercially.39  
 
A dried up Lake Lyambezi (as it is presently) revealed fertile soil for agricultural 
purposes. Lake Lyambezi formed part of the maize producing axis of Sikanjabuka, 
Luhofu (Ibbu), Mahundu and Zilitene. However it was not only people from those areas 
who cultivated lands there for there was a seasonal concentration of farmers from 
different corners of the Caprivi. As can be expected, the concentration of people led to 
competition with one another, numerous controversies, and even more serious clashes. 
Under the prevailing circumstances there was no regulation pertaining to fishing 
especially, and since the tribal authority did not interfere there was no local authority to 
which fishermen could report. 
 
The fishing and cultivation rights soon got entangled in the wider issue of ownership of 
the lake and the resurrection of the boundary line between the Mafwe and Masubiya. 
Buddack recommended that the lake be proclaimed as a communal territory and placed 
directly under the authority of the Administration for the Caprivians. To settle local 
disputes and to regulate fishing on the lake, Buddack recommended the establishment of 
a Lake Lyambezi Fishery Board to be elected by all fishermen active in the area.40 In 
more recent times, a government initiated sugar-cane project at Lake Lyambezi grounded 
to a halt when it was caught up in the land rights fiasco, masked as lack of consultation, 
and led PIDICO, the company awarded the tender, to pull out. 
 
On the surface, Buddack’s proposals to put the Administration for Caprivians on top of 
all regulatory issues dealt with above seem workable but it should not be forgotten that 
similarly, that institution was ridden and paralyzed by the issues of indigenousness, 
paramountcy and land rights. In the ‘thick of things’ of the Administration for Caprivians 
were the chiefs who alternated as chief minister and ministers in the cabinet (see below) 
                                                 
39 Budack, 1982, p.35. 












and were involved in the Legislative Council and day-to-day running and administration 
of affairs required of a minister.  
 
Caprivi Politics and the Issue of Indigenousness 
 
The colonial state granted the status of ‘indigenousness’ to two groups, Mafwe and 
Masubiya. As illustrated above, this continued to be a source of trouble throughout the 
history of the Caprivi.  
 
The Mafwe Kuta 
 
The troubles that engulfed the Mafwe Kuta in 1961 had much to do with the 
interpretation of the concept of indigenousness as it applied to what constituted a Mafwe, 
that is, as it included within its ranks Yeyi, Totela, Mbukushu, Mbalangwe and 
Makwengo. In short, at the core of it was the question of how Fwe became the nucleus of 
their identity, and how the elements composing the identity viewed themselves in relation 
to the nucleus (centre), and their status as peripheral. In 1961 Mr. Jackson Mazazi 
Lukonga was at the forefront of questioning indigenousness among the Mafwe. In 
February of that year, he wrote letters to a couple of Indunas (headmen) under Chief 
Mamili of the Mafwe. In those letters, the writer discussed the dismissal of the 
Ngambela, the Secretary of the Kuta, and two ordinary members.41 On the 2 July 1961, 
tribesmen in attendance at a Kuta meeting forced the dismissal of the Ngambela 
(Musiyalela), the Secretary (Benjamin Mamili) and two ordinary members of the Kuta 
(Mutimani and Mwala).42 Among the accusations leveled at the dismissed Kuta officials 
were that the Ngambela had done nothing for the people in his 21 years of service, that 
the two headmen did not respect the chief, and as far as the secretary was concerned, that 
since he was of royal blood he was not suitable for the position since it was reserved for 
                                                 
41 Letter dated 24 February 1961 from Jackson M. Lukonga, addressed to Induna Lisita, Induna Sangwali, 
Batubaja, and many others (NAN: LKM 3/3/1, N1/1/3, Chiefs and Headmen Caprivi Zipfel). 
42 Letter from the Bantu Affairs Commissioner to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and 











commoners. They also complained that the chief’s family was over-represented in the 
Kuta. 
 
However, Jackson Lukonga’s intentions were broader than the dismissal of these 
officials, as indicated in his letter: ‘…And then later on we shall install a new chief who 
is Thomas M. Kabende – because he is the one we see to be clever to be a chief…also 
that he is suitable to be a chief’.43 In a letter of complaint dated 2 August 1961, addressed 
to the Magistrate, Chief Mamili identified those behind the dismissals as Joel Mwilima, 
Mutumuswana, Lota Mifilifili, Isaac Simanyonga and Alfred Siloiso. The link between 
this group and Jackson Mazazi Lukonga appears to be Alfred Siloiso, a close relative (or 
brother) of Jackson Lukonga. The motive behind dethroning the chief is summarized by 
Lukonga in one of his letters: 
 
I have some matters to talk to you – and would like to ask how you feel about these big troubles 
affecting us as slaves which do not come to an end from the time when people were being 
captured to the present time. We have, now, observed that this is caused by you elderly people as 
you do not take heed when we, your sons, advise you. I myself I would like to tell you that we 
would like to have a Muyeyi (Yeyi) or Mufwe (Fwe) chief. If you still want to be under the rule of 
the Malozi do so as you like – and of course, I am not trying to cheat you – and warn you that 
anything you will see in future should not surprise you – and think that we, your children, are not 
good – and I also would like to let you kn w that chief Mayiba (Maiba) is treating his people very 
well because he is also Musubiya (a Subia) – and a person not related to the tribe cannot treat well 
people of a different tribe.44 
 
As summarized by the Bantu Affairs Commissioner when Mr. Jackson Mazazi Lukonga 
visited him at headquarters in February 1964, the latter was against what he perceived as 
a Lozi ruling dynasty: 
 
…after expressing a number of complaints about Chief Mamili [he] asked permission to go 
amongst the people getting their opinions about the chief, claiming that the Mafue and Mayeyi 
sections of the tribe did not want the ruling Mamili family. Since then it has come out that prior to 
the visit to this office he had actually written to a number of headmen openly seeking their support 
against the chief, at least this is what was said at Linyanti.45 
 
                                                 
43 Lukonga letter, Op cit. 
44 Letter to Induna Sangwali of Sangwali, dated 24 February 1961 (NAN: LKM 3/3/1, N1/1/3, Chiefs and 
Headmen Caprivi Zipfel) 
45 Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development, 29 March 1964 











The quotations above serve to show that in some quarters people believed that the status 
of indigenousness was wrongly conferred on the Lozi, and not ‘true Mafwe’. A 
distinction between the Mafwe ruling dynasty and the constituent elements of being a 
Mafwe is called for, as it translates into a contest for indigenousness between the chief’s 
family, and the followers. The Bantu Affairs Commissioner interviewed an unnamed man 
in another district of the Mafwe chief about this issue, and this is what he got: 
 
A few days later in another part of the tribal area I asked an old village head of the Mafue section 
whether any one from his area had attended the meeting and whether they were pleased with what 
had there been said and received the reply that some words had been good, some not: as to the 
latter they (the Mafue)  did not want to be subject (“Batanka, rather Batanga” – “slaves” ) to the 
Mamili family who traditionally had no right to chieftainship in these parts; he acknowledged 
Lewanika’s day and the Makololo before him (when there were regional indunas) but not that 
Mamili has or had independent status as chief in these parts. (The original Mamili was, of course, 
a Mukololo Induna at present-day Linyanti); when the Malozi turned on the Makololo and pretty 
well exterminated them (the men) in the 1860s Simataa was made headman and he assumed the 
name of his Mukololo predecessor Mamili and had jurisdiction in those parts. Other regional 
Indunas or representatives were placed, amongst other places, up the Zambezi River not far from 
Katima Mulilo (Mwanota) and up the Kwando River some miles north of the Caprivi (Seruka, 
Seluka)….It was only when the Germans came in 1909 that Mamili was elevated to the rank of 
chief. The old man wanted the ‘White Man’s rule”.46  
 
Clearly, the old man was involved in a deconstruction discourse aimed at the Mamili 
family’s claim to the ‘nucleus’ and indigenousness of a Mafwe Identity. This 
differentiation is still being questioned and playing itself out in the current troubles in the 
Caprivi, including secession (Chapter Nine). As late as 1994, in a letter writer to a local 
newspaper, Michael Allan Munyandi, assessed the crisis situation in the Caprivi in the 
following terms, and addresses the difference between ‘True Mafwe’ and Mbalangwe: 
 
I am writing to express dismay at the manner in which the Mafwe people are being negatively 
portrayed as being the cause of the tribal squabbles in the Caprivi region….The cause of the 
present troubles in the region is between the Mbalangwes at Linyanti and the Masubia at Bukalo, 
namely, the Mamili and Moraliswani tribal Khutas (courts). They are waging a power struggle in 
the region to determine which tribe should take overall administration. The people of Namibia 
must be made to understand that chief Mamili and Mishake Muyongo are not Mafwe, but 
Mbalangwes. The true Mafwe people are those living at Kongola, Choi, Sesheke and Singalamwe 
up to Imusho and Sinjembela in Zambia. And collectively, they share the same Sifwe language. 
Therefore, the Mbalangwe clan’s association with the Mafwe people is in dubious nature. Maybe, 
Mafwe elders should clearly explain to us, the young generation, their association with a tribe 
which speaks a mixture of Lozi and Subia. …The Mafwe elders should also work to restore our 
                                                 












lost identity and culture. We live in a democratic society and this domination and intimidation of 
one tribe by another must not be allowed to continue.47 
 
Nothing much seems to have become of Jackson Mazazi Lukonga’s efforts to question 
indigenousness within the Mafwe identity. His relative, Alfred Siloiso, was fined £50 or 
£30 plus twenty cattle for his participation in this affair.48  The authorities interpreted this 
as an element suggestive of an emerging nationalism, at a time when CANU’s influence 
was in the air, and ordered Jackson Mazazi Lukonga to do nothing of the kind, adding 
‘Mazazi Lukonga has had some association with office bearers of the Caprivi African 
National Union’ (p. 1) and that the situation was difficult to assess, …what with 
advanced political thought also playing its part.’(p. 2)49 
 
Self-Government and indigenousness 
 
Mindful of the preceding troubles in the 1960s in regard to the issue of indigenousness, 
the Mafwe consolidated themselves in 1972 at the time of the establishment of the 
Caprivi Legislative Council. The first move was to ensure that its double-barrel form of 
the people’s name was revised.  The appellation Mafwe (Bayeyi) had previouslty been 
changed to Mafwe only with the Bayeyi component being completely dropped. 
Protestations about this by the Mayeyi did not yield results. Secondly, a Mafwe element 
that was featured in the symbols of the Caprivi government: the flag and coat of arms, 
and on identity cards. As shown below, two elephants representing the authority of the 
two chiefs were superimposed in the centre of the white panel of the flag.   
 
                                                 
47 “Mafwe suffer unfair abuse” by Michael Allan Munyandi. Letter to the Editor, New Era, 16-22 June 
1994. 
48 Anonymous letter dated 21 May 1961, addressed to the Native Commissioner. 
49 Bantu Affairs Commissioner to Secretary: Bantu Administration, dated 29 March 1964. Just to add that 
indeed Jackson Mazazi Lukonga was a member of CANU and fled into exile in 1964. He is one of the 















Figure 1: Flag of East-Caprivi adopted in 1976 
 
Apparently the symbolism represented peace, and on the coat of arms and identity 
documents, it was accompanied by the words Luyemi Hamoho, translated literally as 
‘Together We Stand’. Ironically, it is this symbolism that was very divisive. Firstly, it 
only accommodated Mafwe and Masubiya, and even when some Mayeyi had already 
voiced their desire to keep their independence, this symbolism ignored their wishes. 
Secondly, this symbolism did absolutely nothing to unite the Mafwe and Masubiya as one 
group, particularly against the colonial oppressors. Indeed its very purpose was to keep 
the two separate for the benefit of indirect rule. 
 
The symbol however was challenged constantly. One such challenge came from Chief 
Moraliswani of the Masubiya. After serving his term as Chief Minister he refused to hand 
authority over to his Mafwe counter-part in 1976, as per the constitutional provision. 
Chief Moraliswani invoked the whole issue of indigenousness, arguing how he could 
hand over to Chief Mamili who is supposed to be his junior. The Administration, 
however, would not have any of this and eventually, after prolonged discussions which 
nearly derailed the realization of self-government, Chief Mamili assumed the position of 
Chief Minister. The Masubiya position was that the constitutional provision that stated 
that one chief would automatically replace another after a term without an election was 











found to be a good leader during his term, the electorate could chose to re-elect him or 
her. As good as it sounded, the issue behind this argument was just that the Masubiya 
believed their chief to be the ‘first settler’ and therefore owner of Caprivi. In this case, 
however, the issue remained the implementation of what was agreed to in 1972, the 
rotation of the chiefs. If it came to an election, the Mafwe were still assured of more 
votes since they still included Yeyi, Totela and other groups within their ranks. 
 
Chief Moraliswani decided henceforth to challenge the issue of indigenousness through 
the court of law, partly as a result of a disappointment with the Buddack Commission 
report. He lodged an application in the Supreme Court in Windhoek in 1983 (with an 
appeal to the Appellate Division in Bloemfontein, SA). The application was rejected on 
the grounds that it would not be consistent with the prevailing legislation.50 It should be 
noted that once again a case that is embedded in history was not judged on historical 
grounds but rather on ‘prevailing legislation’. Chief Moraliswani and his people could 
not in time raise enough money to appeal the courts decision. Perhaps this accounts for 
the unilateral ‘Royal House Declaration’ of the Subia on 19th October 1991, which 
decreed that Moraliswani was Paramount Chief on the basis of indigenousness. But the 
1990s were turbulent years in the history of the Caprivi. The Mafwe responded by 
rejecting Masubia teachers in their schools and  there were widespread demonstrations 
against the promotion of certain officials, which on 31 October 1991 led to the 
appointment of Judge Levy to investigate protests with reference to promotion of certain 
officials.51 The protests continued and the situation was exacerbated by the Mayeyi 
decision in 1992 to break-away from the Mafwe, installing their own chief in August 
1993 (Chapter Two).52  
                                                 
50 Maritz, ‘The Subia and Fwe’, 1996, p. 177. 
51 See Levy, ‘Commission of inquiry into the cause of resistance by certain members of the Caprivi 
Community to the appointment of certain senior public servants [Education]’, Levy Report, Windhoek (not 
dated). 
52 A personal note about this period: On 8 August 1993, while a teacher at a Secondary School in one of the 
tribal areas, my colleagues and I were caught up in the tribal conflict between the Mafwe, Masubia and 
Mayeyi. A group of about 12 young men came to our school and demanded what we were doing in their 
schools, and that we had no right to be there. The group further claimed that they had the right to do 
whatever they wished with us or take us wherever they wished. Fortunately a group of local parents 
congregated at the school and told the young men from a different village to leave us since if we left, the 












The Katima Declaration on National Reconciliation 
 
The product of government intervention during this period was the peace agreement, 
known as the Katima Declaration on National Reconciliation of May 1993. The 
declaration provided that:53 
 
 There should be mutual recognition of each other as chiefs of equal status, their 
royal courts as well as their subjects; 
 Each tribe shall be entitled to call its supreme traditional leader by whatever 
traditional or ancestral title or name provided that title does not purport to impose 
a form of superiority of one tribe over another; 
 There shall be mutual recognition of each other’s area of jurisdiction based on 
existing tribal districts; 
 It is a prerogative of government to appoint or post public servants to any part of 
Caprivi without reference to tribal or ethnic origin; 
 The conference accepted the freedom of the inhabitants of Caprivi to reside in any 
part of the region subject to government policy on reconciliation, the payment of 
tribal land levies and the seeking of permission from the relevant tribal authority; 
 It also agreed that respect for traditional chiefs in Caprivi shall be accorded to all 
chiefs on an equal basis irrespective of the tribe one belongs to; 
                                                                                                                                                 
chase us away, the education of their children was more important. That was on a Sunday. The following 
Monday at noon the locals had to hide us on one of the islands until midnight, when we started off on foot 
to Katima Mulilo, a journey of about 100 kilometers, without food and water. The next morning, Tuesday 
10 August 1993, we were so exhausted from the journey, lack of food and water that we decided to risk 
stopping passing vehicles instead of avoiding traffic by walking through the thicket of the forest. The 
trouble was that we could stop a vehicle full of people sent to hunt for us since we were in a ‘wrong’ tribal 
district. Fortunately for us, one car stopped.  It belonged to a Yeyi, who immediately took us to Katima 
Mulilo. The path to Katima was cleared of illegal roadblocks by the police special field forces from 
Windhoek and Grootfontein shortly before we passed, therefore our journey was uneventful. Despite our 
protestations, the Ministry of Education sent us back after and almost two months long break due to these 
tribal clashes. Colleagues in some other schools lost their lives in these clashes. That epsode was, for us, a 
close encounter with the issues concerning on an element of Caprivi dentity. 












 In the event of a dispute arising between the two royal courts, the same shall be 
settled peacefully in accordance with applicable traditional procedures. 
 
A close scrutiny of the provisions of the Katima Declaration reveals that in fact nothing 
new was added to alter the neglect of the historical basis on which the issue of 
indigenousness so much rests. As with the colonial governments before it, the Namibian 
government was more interested in national reconciliation. For the government, its 
prerogative to post public servants to any corner of the Caprivi is enshrined while for the 
Fwe, their demand for their chief to be of equal status with the Subia chief is also 
guaranteed. For the Subia, the basis for the Royal House Declaration was not realized, at 
least not to the extent of government recognition which does not confer such status under 
the provisions of the Traditional Authorities Act, or even by the Fwe for whom it was 
really intended. However, the Katima Declaration unconsciously confers upon 
Moraliswani the status of munitenge when it provides that each tribe should address its 
supreme leader by ‘whatever ancestral title’ provided the title does not purport to impose 
a form of superiority of one tribe over another. The title of munitenge, however does just 
that, it still purports the ownership of Itenge and therefore indirectly still claims 
indigenousness. The Fwe have since countered this with an equally exclusive title for 
their chief by adopting the Lozi ‘Litunga’ which is really the term for paramount chief. 
The contest for indigenousness has taken a conceptual framework.  
 
Equally, the Declaration’s decree that there should be mutual recognition of each other’s 
area of jurisdiction based on ‘existing tribal districts’ can be seen as yet another problem. 
It is these existing tribal districts that are partly the source of friction, since there is not 
one that recognized, but many, and these are highly contested. A number of questions 
need to be asked. Which one did the declaration recognize and on what basis? Does the 
declaration recognizie and entrench an imaginary line of division, as had been the case 
previously? Who is the keeper of this imaginary line? In short, the declaration stopped 
short of adopting the Buddack recommendation to draw a ‘temporal’ line between the 
two tribal areas, understandably, as Fossé argues, to do that is to err in anthropological 











cultural distribution ignores the contingent nature of ethnicity.54 Fossé makes this point 
on the strength of Fardon55 who a decade earlier made the following observation about 
anthropologists and ethnic boundaries: 
 
Since ethnic boundaries do not necessarily coincide with cultural distributions, and since these 
boundaries are situational, when looked at in contemporary terms, and unstable, if looked at 
historically, then it follows that it is counterproductive for anthropologists to try to legislate 
regarding their locations. 
 
To reiterate what is mentioned above, this would be difficult a task to even attempt in the 
Caprivi. It now has four traditional authorities instead of the two discussed here and it has 
become a quagmire.56 Instead of one virtual or imaginary line of division, there are now 
four; whether all rest on indigenousness still needs to be seen. The Yeyi and Mashi 




This chapter discussed rival histories in the Eastern Caprivi Strip mainly between two 
identity classifications of the colonial period, namely, Fwe and Subia. The colonists 
decreed and recognized only the above two ethnic categories which were presumed to be 
of equal status with each owning its separate area of influence (tribal territory). No 
                                                 
54 Fossé, L.J., ‘Negotiating the Nation in Local Terms: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eastern Caprivi’. MA 
Thesis, University of Oslo, 1996, p. 119. 
55 Fardon, Richard. ‘African Ethnogenesis: Limits to the Comparability of Ethnic Phenomena’, in Ladislav 
Holy (ed.), Comparative Anthropology, Blackwell, 1987, p. 176. 
56 As if to conclude the chapter  in a ‘Caprivi way’, I woke up to a headline in a local daily titled ‘Masubia 
Win Land Dispute’ (New Era, Tuesday, 20 February 2007). The report had it that through a presidential 
decree, the disputed land over Muyako near Lake Lyambezi was handed over to the Subia. The President, 
through the Minister of Local Government, Housing and Rural Development, informed the relevant tribal 
authorities of his decision at a local lodge in Katima Mulilo. The report says the President acted on the 
advice of the Council of Traditional Leaders that ‘conducted protracted investigations’ as provided for by 
the Council of Traditional Leaders Act of 1997 (Act No. 13 of 1997), as amended by the Council of 
Traditional Leaders Amendment Act of 2000 (Act No. 31 of 2000). The report continued: ‘Though the 
victors at Muyako greeted the announcement with song and dance, their rivals were not amused. They 
barred an NBC crew dispatched to the meeting.’ The Mafwe Kuta responded in the same newspaper 
through a letter to the Editor in which they said they ‘will not sit idle’ and let the Masubia ‘grab their 
ancestral land.’ In late 2006 Mafwe tribesmen were arrested in Lake Lyambezi by the Namibian Police for 
cultivating fields in the Masubiya area. The Fwe maintain that they were not trespassing on Subia land but 
that they were cultivating fields in Mafwe territory. They accuse a Subia policemen of abusing authority in 
arresting the said farmers. Muyako village is on the fringes of Lake Lyambezi and encompasses a large 











attempt was made to demarcate or officially recognize the line of division that separated 
the two groups, this not being necessary at the time probably because of the sparse nature 
of the population density. While some scholars argue that it is this lack of a clearly 
defined internal boundary that is the cause of endless struggles and tensions in the area 
which at a certain stage resulted in open tribal clashes, I argued here that rather the cause 
of tensions is the basis on which what constitutes the identities of the Caprivi was 
premised.  
 
Firstly, these identities emerged out of social upheavals as a result of outside intervention 
in the Caprivi, beginning with the Lozi, the Kololo, and then the Europeans. This 
interaction resulted in severe cultural erosion and the disappearance of many customs that 
could distinguish the inhabitants of the present Caprivi from that of their subjugators, in 
short, they lost their distinctness. Secondly, and therefore, when the processes of 
constructing the Caprivi was put in motion, it was naturally based on what the outsiders 
had bequeathed to the people of Caprivi, in this case, ‘Loziness’. The people of Caprivi 
were regarded as having no history of their own beyond Lozi rule. The colonial 
authorities’ construction of what it was to be a Caprivian was therefore based on 
apparatuses left by the Lozi, the traditional authorities. However the Lozi intervention 
had deprived many communities of their local leaders up to the time of colonization, and 
since the Lozi declined the offer to remain in the Caprivi, the colonial administrators 
modified the tribal structure by grouping certain ethnic identities under an alliance and so 
reducing tribal structures to only two. What is more, it is the Lozi representative in the 
Caprivi who was elevated to a position of chief of this ethnic alliance while on the other 
side, they chose a commoner (someone not of royal blood), to be chief. These were 
inventions since they did not conform to custom. 
 
This is certainly not how the inhabitants had wanted to be perceived: to owe their status 
to Loziness, which effectively meant the Lozi could still make a better claim to the 
Caprivi than they. The locals desired to be perceived as indigenous, but the question 
remained, which of the two officially recognized identities was more indigenous than the 











tensions in the Caprivi and has successfully paralyzed the Caprivi for most part of its 
existence. To justify indigenousness, each group presented a rival and mutually exclusive 
version of historical development. The Subia reasoned that the present Caprivi formed 
part of their pre-colonial kingdom of Itenge in which the other groups settled under the 
authority of the munitenge, ruler or owner of Itenge. This is the basis of their claim to 
indigenousness. Contrary to this, the Fwe reasons, it is they who gave land to the Subia 
upon their return from Bechuanaland where they had fled after a revolt against Sepopa 
which forced the Subia to leave the Caprivi. This was between 1864 and 1876. 
 
Since then the issue of indigenousness had been expressed in a variety of forms. For the 
most part of the colonial period, it was in a form of an internal boundary between the Fwe 
and Subia. The Fwe reasoned that an internal boundary was demarcated during the 
German rule of the Caprivi, while the Subia claim that no such line was cut and that it 
was in any event not necessary since the whole of the Caprivi belongs to them. There is 
no evidence to suggest that an official cutoff line demarcating the tribal spheres of 
influence of the two groups was ever made. A commission of inquiry was appointed in 
1982 to look into the boundary dispute between the two groups, its recommendations 
were not implemented but both groups rejected its report. In the early 1960s 
indigenousness was a contentious concept among the Mafwe, with certain groups and 
individuals claiming that the ruling Mamili dynasty was not indigenous and not true 
Mafwe. The colonial administration would not have contenance and therefore a Mafwe 
identity was consolidated further in 1972 when the Yeyi label was dropped officially 
from the identity,  their becoming known  as Mafwe instead of Mafwe-Bayeyi. This was 
at the time of the establishment of the Caprivi Legislative Assembly when again, only 
two identities – Subia and Fwe - were allowed representation in the house. A provision 
for the two chiefs to alternate in the position of Chief Minister was entrenched in the 
Caprivi Bantustan. Chief Moraliswani was the first to serve and when the time came to 
hand over to Chief Mamili, he refused to do so, again raising the issue of indigenousness 
and thereby sparking a constitutional stalemate. In the end, the colonial administration 












The issue of indigenousness would be taken to court; revoked in land rights especially 
pertaining to the use of Bukalo, Katima Mulilo and the Lake Lyambezi. The contest for 
indigenousness did not die with colonialism. In 1991, the Subia issued a Royal House 
Declaration for indigenousness which the Fwe never accepted and led to tensions that 
resulted in the refusal of public service appointments, thereby leading to the appointment 
of a commission of enquiry into the matter (the Levy Commission); tribal clashes and 
eventually a peace conference on the Caprivi which produced the Katima Declaration of 
National Reconciliation. Briefly put, rival histories based on indigenousness paralyzed 


















The responses to the creation and consolidation of the Caprivian identities within the 
Caprivi were varied: the colonial subjects learnt over time to work with, around and 
against the imposition of foreign rule in their territory. This chapter examines three major 
events which show both consent and dissent: firstly, the results of the ‘incorporation’ 
referendum conducted in 1946; secondly, the public hearings conducted by the Odendaal 
Commission; and lastly, the rise of regional nationalism in the Caprivi Strip, specifically 
the formation of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU).  
 
The last two, both taking place in the first half of the 1960s, would have far reaching 
implications and actually mark a turning point in the history of the Caprivi: the Odendaal 
Commission provided a roadmap towards the inauguration of a Caprivi ‘government’- 
complete with symbols of state such as an anthem, a flag and a coat of arms. This was the 
apex of the processes leading to the attainment of a single Caprivi identity. On the other 
hand, CANU represented the most organized association yet to emerge from the Caprivi 
Strip through which this single identity was challenged. 
 
Sources of Discontent Prior to 1946 
 
During 1937 Major Leslie French Trollope1, then Additional Native Commissioner in 
South West Africa, undertook an inspection tour of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. He found a 
people ‘better off than most natives’ and a territory where ‘famines and droughts are 
unknown’; where food in abundance was present in game, in fruit and in the river. 
                                                 













However he reported that there was no doubt that the ‘natives of the strip [were] 
discontented and that that feeling [was] vocal and was being aired and discussed amongst 
themselves’.2 In fact a written request had already been lodged with the Chief Native 
Commissioner for South West Africa by Chief Chikamatondo3 of the Masubiya for the 
replacement of Sergeant Brittz4 by another officer. Chief Chikamatondo and his people 
accused Sergeant Brittz of lowering the selling price of mealies from 10/- to 3/- per bag, 
and that on one occasion he had told them of what had happened to Chief Ipumbu5 when 
he opposed the administration. Trollope describes the people’s attitude towards Sergeant 
Brittz as being ‘antagonistic’. Similarly, Eric W. Louw, Chief Native Commissioner for 
Northern Areas of the Union Government, reported in 1939 that the people do not like the 
superintendent.6 The people had suggested in their request that the Northern Rhodesian 
system of leaving an officer in charge of an area for a short time only was the better 
course. Superintendent Brittz had served for a continuous period of ten years in the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. 
 
The native population believed that restrictions on the sale of arms and ammunition and 
the killing of hippos and elephants were all Sergeant Brittz’s doings, since these were 
mainly ’verboten’ orders. All the same, being the only visible representative of the 
administration in the strip, Sergeant Brittz had to bear the odium for the non-fulfillment 
of the promises which Major Du Preez made in 1929. Shortly after the Bechuanaland 
administration was replaced by the South West African administration in 1929, Major Du 
Preez undertook an inspection tour of the Caprivi Strip during which he apparently made 
                                                 
2 Trollope, L, ‘Inspection Report: Eastern Caprivi Zipfel’, 16 November 1937, p.19 (NAN: SWAA, File. 
No. 2267, A503/4). 
3 It will be remembered that it was he whom Captain Streitwolf installed as regent Chief of the Masubiya in 
1909 at Schuckmansburg, in place of Chief Liswaninyana, who was still young. In 1939, he was about 90 
years of age and had been blind for many years and left the administration of the tribal affairs to his son, 
Mubusisi. 
4 Resident or representative of SWA in the Eastern Caprivi: Locals called him Brittz Namatama owing to 
his big cheeks. 
5 Iipumbu ya Tshilongo was chief of Uukuambi. In 1932 he refused to obey orders from the Hugo Hahn 
‘Shongola’ (whip), SA Native Commissioner for Owamboland. For this act of rebellion the SA air force 
bombed his palace at Onatshiku and was captured in the process and was deported to Kavango region. 












promises which were never honoured by the administration. The promises are said to 
have beeen: 
 
 That traders would come from Windhoek and open stores; 
 That there would be hospitals; 
 That there would be more schools; and 
 That more arms and unrestricted ammunition would be supplied by the Superintendent. 
 
Trollope believed the reasons for discontent with the administration at this time to be 
partly geographical and partly historical. Geographically, the Strip lies between, and was 
in the closest of contact with, the then protectorates of Bechuanaland and Barotseland. 
Between 1922 and 1929 the administration of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel was handed over 
to the Bechuanaland authorities. During that period the people of Caprivi enjoyed all the 
privileges of their counterparts in Bechuanaland, which could n t be continued by the 
South West Africa Administration. The privileges included the buying of arms and 
ammunition, stores, schools and the sale of cattle.7 By Trollope’s admission, at the South 
West African Administration take over, most of the stores closed down, the market for 
cattle collapsed because these were previously sold through Bechuanaland, and of course 
in pursuance of the policy of game preservation, the authorities restricted the amount of 
ammunition to be sold and forbade the purchase of any fresh firearms. 
 
 In comparing their conditions therefore, the ‘strip natives’ did not compare themselves 
with those of South West Africa  in relation to whom they were well off8, but with those 
in Barotseland or of Bechuanaland. Obviously the administration of South West Africa 
did not appear in too favorable a light with the ‘strip natives’. One discontented ‘native’ 
addressed Trollope in the following manner to show his disappointment: 
 
We were first under the Barotses...we were happy. Then we were given to Germany. They sent 
Capt. Streitwolf here. When he came many people ran away as we heard they were cruel and 
would kill us. But they did nothing to us and left us alone. Then the Bechuanaland government 
took us over and gave us many things including arms, ammunition, stores, schools and the sale of 
our cattle. Then the S.W. Government took us over. What have you done for us?9  
















Reading the signs of the times even at this early stage, Trollope sounded a caution 
regarding the developing questioning attitude of the ‘natives’. It would be unwise, he 
wrote, to totally ignore troubles which the authorities in the Rhodesias had been having 
lately. Such troubles, he believed, had the flavour of Communism and were connected by 
the authorities with the literature of the ‘semi-religious Watch Tower movement’10. Even 
though he conceded that he was not suggesting any communist peril in the Strip he 
pointed a finger at a few educated natives who had been to Rhodesia, and one of whom 
was present at one of his meetings. Nothing much had changed by 1946 when the 
‘incorporation’ referendum was held. The Eastern Caprivi Strip, however, was now under 
the South African Department of Native Affairs, represented by one government officer 
and an assistant. It is against this background that the next section examines the 
referendum. 
 
The Proposed Incorporation of SWA into the Union 
 
In 1946 the Union of South Africa set out to seek the approval of the United Nations 
Organization for the incorporation of the Mandated Territory of South West Africa into 
the Union of South Africa. The Legislative Assembly of South West Africa, representing 
the European voters, had unanimously asked for incorporation.11 The Prime Minister of 
the Union of South Africa instructed that the ‘native’ inhabitants of South West Africa 
should also be consulted and that the result be reported to him. As the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel was administered by the Department of Native Affairs of the Union, such 
consultation was carried out by the representative of the said department in the Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel, the Native Commissioner.  
 
The people were summoned to their respective tribal headquarters: the Mafwe at Linyanti 
on the 24 May and the Masubiya at Kabbe on 27 May 1946. After a lengthy address (a 
                                                 
10 Ibid., p.19. 
11 Letter from Mr. J. Neser, newly appointed Secretary for South West Africa, dated 19 March, 1946, to 












duplicate of the one used by all native commissioners in Okavango, Ovambo and the 
Kaokoveld, but adapted slightly to suit the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel) detailing mainly 
German atrocities in South West Africa and the two world wars, the Native 
Commissioner withdrew from the gathering to let the people reach a decision and then 
report to him. In both instances, the two Kutas replied in the affirmative, and were made 
to sign a Memorial which read in part as follows:12 
 
  ‘We, the undersigned, the Chief, Ngambela13, Members and Secretary of the Kuta14...and our 
people, wish the following matters to be made known to the peoples of the world: 
1. That our people have been happy and have prospered under the rule of the Government of the 
Union of South Africa and that we should like that Government to continue to rule us; 
2. That we do not wish any other Government or people to rule us; and 
3. That we would like our country to become part of the Union of South Africa.’ 
 
On the surface, the response to incorporation seems to be that of consent. However, such 
a response should be seen as a product of the processes of consultation used and also the 
alternatives which were given to the people. Firstly, as noted above, the address and 
memorials used during the consultations were similar to the ones used by native 
commissioners in Ovamboland, Okavango, and the Kaokoveld, adapted only slightly to 
suit the conditions in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. The significance of this is that it 
indicates predetermined responses, to which the people were just supposed to affix their 
signatures.  
 
Indeed, Trollope reports that ‘in each case the Chiefs wished to give an offhand reply, 
similar to the final statement...’15 Before the people in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel could 
decide, they were told that the Native People in the Kaokoveld, Ovamboland and 
Okavango have ‘wholeheartedly expressed their desire to become part of the Union of 
South Africa and to remain under its flag’.16 Even though they were administered 
separately, it would seem this move was designed to show how unwise it would be for 
                                                 
12 Adapted from a copy of a Memorial marked as Annexure ‘‘C’’, attached to an affidavit report recording 
the events, signed by C.E. Kruger on 30 May 1946 before Mr. George Billing, District Commissioner, 
Sesheke, Northern Rhodesia. 
13 Prime Minister 
14 Traditional Court 
15 Trollope in a letter to Mr. W.J.G .Mears, Secretary for Native Affairs dated 7 July 1945 (NAN: LKM 
3/1/1, file No. 14/1/7).  
16 Address by the Native Commissioner to both the Masubiya and Mafwe Kutas, on 24 May and 27 May 











them to decide otherwise. Indeed, in deciding in favour of incorporation, the people of 
the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel showed a willingness to be in tandem with the rest of South 
West Africa, of which their territory was an outpost, and thereby undermine the identity 
of separateness.  
 
As for the alternatives, Kruger’s summary is most telling: ‘It was a matter of a simple 
choice between remaining with South Africa or accepting other named alternatives...’,17 
This shows the deceit involved in the process, the difference between ‘incorporation’ and 
deciding to ‘remain with South Africa’, which would not necessarily mean the same 
thing. The official attitude to this incorporation referendum is best revealed in Trollope’s 
letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs where he says: 
 
I saw the Chiefs, Ngambelas and Kutas of both tribes and as tactfully as I could put the matter to 
them explaining most carefully that they were in no sense being asked to give a decision in the 
matter - indeed that if they so desired they could entirely ignore the matter and give no reply at all. 
 
Now what were these alternatives which required tact in order to explain them to the 
people? Firstly, it was explained to the gatherings that there could be no question of the 
return to German rule. The people were reminded in the Native Commissioner’s address 
of the chaos created by the German occupation of South West Africa: ‘that native tribal 
organizations had been smashed by the Germans; that they had been left without proper 
land which they could call their own or their home; that their cattle had been taken away 
from them, that they were prohibited from owning large stock; and lastly, for the Herero, 
that they had been scattered far and wide and that they had lost heart and felt themselves 
enslaved’.18  
 
Even though none of the above conditions applied to Germany’s Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, it 
should be remembered that when Streitwolf19 arrived in the Caprivi, he found it 
apparently ‘deserted’, the inhabitants and particularly their Lozi Overlords, having fled 
                                                 
17 Kruger, CE, ‘History of the Caprivi Strip 1890-1984’, Salt River, 1984, p.4 (NAN: File No. A472). 
18 Address by Native Commissioner, Ibid., op. cit., p.1. 












from the approaching German rule, having heard most probably from the British in 
Northern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland how cruel German rule was. This incident was still 
fresh in the memories of surviving elderly tribesmen. The following four options were 
put forward as put forward by the administration: 
 
 Return to Barotseland domination; 
 Amalgamation with Bechuanaland; 
 Re-absorption in South West Africa; or 
 Continuance of Union Administration. 
 
It would be noted that the terminology used above is ‘continuance’ with Union 
administration and not incorporation. Trollope reports that in conveying their wishes (the 
acceptance of  an alternative four above), the people made no comment on the other 
alternatives with the exception that they, in particular, looked on any return to Malozi 
rule from Barotseland with fear. A closer inspection shows that, in fact, the people were 
not given any options. They could not return to Barotseland enslavement, a yoke they had 
always wanted to free themselves from. Nor could they choose to amalgamate with 
Bechuanaland since it was explained to them during the Native Commissioner’s address 
that though they were happy under Bechuanaland administration eventually legal 
difficulties with the Mandate system made this arrangement fall away. Re-absorption into 
South West Africa was not considered an option either, both from the government’s 
position as well as that of the inhabitants.  
 
It could be recalled that the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel had been transferred to Pretoria in 
1939 due to its ‘geographical features’. However, as clearly spelt out above, people were 
generally too unhappy with the South West Africa Administration to consider a return to 
that administration. Moreover, the Native Commissioner had stressed in his address how 
different people of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel were from those in the rest of South West 











these South West African Natives...’20 Given such limited choice, acceptance of the 
continuance of South African rule was the most logical conclusion. At the same time, a 
caution was sounded by the Chief of the Masubiya, Moraliswani Maiba.21 He said, even 
though we desire to be under the Union Flag, ‘we do not know what lies in the future but 
if things do not please us we will complain’.22 It would be seventeen years before they 
were afforded a real chance to complain about their conditions at the 1963 Odendaal 
Commission public hearings. 
 




A Commission of Inquiry appointed by the Republic of South Africa to look into South 
West Africa affairs was announced on 21 September 1962 through the Official Gazette 
Extra-Ordinary of South West Africa, No. 2430. The notice published the terms of 
reference of the commission as follows: 
 
Having regard to what has already been planned and put into practice, to enquire thoroughly into 
further promoting the material and moral welfare and the social progress of the inhabitants of 
South West Africa, and more particularly its non-white inhabitants, and to submit a report with 
recommendations on a five-year plan for the accelerated development of the various non-white 
groups of South West Africa, inside as well as outside their own territories, and for the further 
development and building up of such native territories in South West Africa... 
 
As a general observation on the terms of reference, it is perhaps important to point out 
that the Commission was specifically asked to carry out its work within the context of 
‘what has already been planned and put into practice’. The planning content would 
therefore be informed and conform to the Apartheid oriented socio-political structure. 
Indeed, the commission argues for the rightness and appropriateness of separate 
                                                 
20 Address by Native Commissioner, Ibid., p.1 
21 Maiba Moraliswani succeeded Chikamatondo as chief of the Masubiya in 1946. 
22 Adapted from a copy of a Memorial marked as Annexure ‘‘C’’, attached to an affidavit report recording 
the events, signed by C.E. Kruger on 30 May 1946 before Mr. George Billing, District Commissioner, 












development in different contexts in the report to the exclusion of any other possibility in 
line with the strategy of development. The Commissioners did not ever try to challenge 
the basic assumptions of separate development or to examine critically the assumption on 
which Apartheid thinking was based: the thesis that racial differences imply cultural and 
spiritual differences. Apartheid was believed to be the sacred principle of organization 
which could ensure harmonious development. 
 
The Public Hearings at Katima Mulilo 
 
The Odendaal Commission conducted public hearings over two days at Katima Mulilo: 
Tuesday February 5, 1963 and Wednesday February 6, 1963. The Commission heard oral 
testimonies from 328 witnesses with the following representational break-down: 
 
 Mafwe Tribe: Chief Mamili and his Chief Councilor, Ngambela David Mutonga 
and about 191 followers. 
 Masubiya Tribe: Chief Maiba Moraliswani and his Chief Councilor, Ngambela 
Kalundu Munihango, the Secretary of the Kuta Sipensa Lifumbela and about 124 
followers. 
 Native Constable Robert Nchindo 
 Dr. H.J. van R. Mostert, Medical Officer of the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
 Roman Catholic Hospital: The Priest-in-Charge Rev. Father Curron, Father 
George, Sister M. Patricia, and Sister Celsa. 
 Mr. Jack Ashwin, Manager of Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
(WENELA). 
 Mr. Finaughty, Store owner and resident of the Caprivi for 20 Years. 
 
As a general comment on the public hearings, it is perhaps relevant to point out that the 
two chiefs and their people were interviewed in one sitting. Apparently due to poor roads 
the Commission could not visit the traditional headquarters of each chief. Typical of large 
gatherings, only a handful participated in the deliberations. Of the 320 present at the 











interviewed more Europeans than people of the Eastern Caprivi. This formed the basis of 
their recommendations. It is not surprising that the recommendations of the Commission 
are very much different from what the people demanded. A matter of considerable 
interest, however, is the fundamental shift from the general grievances of the late 1930s 
and 1940s to more specific calls for the removal of the Union government from the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel. Of the 10 respondents who expressed their opinions before the 
commission, only one restrained others from calling on the South African government to 
leave the Caprivi Strip. The unanimous and vocal call was for the Caprivi to be entrusted 
in the hands of another government which would have the people’s interests rather than 
the protection of wild animals at heart. The people mentioned such governments as 
Russia, America, Rhodesia, Ghana, `UNO’23, and even the Queen’s government as 
willing to assist them to be independent. The more radical of them believed the people of 
the Caprivi could govern themselves.  
 
The public hearings were marked by notable absences. All respondents from the African 
community who gave evidence before the Commission were men. Considering the nature 
of male dominated traditional authorities on which representation was based, it would not 
be far from the mark to conclude that the hearings were a male affair. This is in 
consideration of the fact that people had to travel long distances to Katima Mulilo to 
attend the hearings. Naturally, in those days, women would stay home. Unsurprisingly 
enough, the complaints to the Commission were about elephants, hippos, arms and 
ammunition, and the sale of cattle. 
 
A notable absence, however, remains the political elite or the intelligentsia, particularly 
the teachers. It appears that the Commission believed that the grouping of people in a 
tribal formula was more representative of the population of the Caprivi, even though it 
emerged from the hearings that the educated young men were influencing the turn of 
                                                 
23 When told by one of the Commissioners that the UNO is not a government but a grouping of different 
governments, the Ngambela of the Masubiya, Kalundu Munihango, replied that it is even better because 












events in the Caprivi. CANU itself was about to be launched though it was still operating 
as an underground movement. One political ‘upstart’, as the authorities called him, 
managed to hand in a written submission which castigated the government for lack of 
proper roads, schools, hospitals, lack of markets for products and cattle, and so forth. 
 
Regardless of the impact of the Commission’s recommendations on the course of 
development in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel, the people used the public hearings as a 
platform to call for the removal of the South African administration from Caprivi. This, a 
signal of things yet to come, marked the beginning of the rise of modern politics in the 
Eastern Caprivi, where a new order comprised of young intellectuals aspired to replace 
the old order, the regime of the chiefs in cahoots with the Pretoria administration. What 
forces, both internal and external, were at work to supplant the old order? 
 
The Caprivi African National Union (CANU)24 
 
The formation of the Caprivi African National Union in the late 1950s owes much to both 
internal and external factors. For the people of the Caprivi, the rise of nationalism was in 
response to a ‘government which had forgotten us’25, which was doing nothing to 
improve the lot of the people in terms of health, education, markets, roads, and was more 
interested in the preservation of game than the wellbeing of the people. For the 
intellectuals in CANU it was prompted by the desire to replace an oppressive and racist 
regime with one in which the people of the East Caprivi Zipfel were their own masters. 
For the white South African regime, the formation of CANU and the desire to be 
independent was driven from outside, what is termed below as ‘the changing world 
beyond our borders’. The discussion on the rise and demise of CANU will be preceded 
by a paragraph dealing with the situation in Northern Rhodesia (later Zambia) as 
perceived by South African colonial officials in the Eastern Caprivi. 
 
                                                 
24 This section draws much from a Chapter on the Formation of CANU in my MA Thesis submitted at UCT 
in 2000. In fact, this is more of an expanded and revised version of that chapter. 












The Changing World Beyond our Borders 
 
Introducing their book, Namibia’s Liberation Struggle: The Two -Edged Sword, Leys and 
Saul correctly states that the Namibian liberation movement constituted one front of a 
much broader struggle against white minority rule in Southern Africa between 1960 and 
1990.26 It was in the early 1960s that armed resistance broke out in Angola, that the 
Sharpeville massacre took place in South Africa, these events following on Ghana’s 
independence under Kwame Nkrumah. CANU’s founders concede that they were greatly 
influenced by other nationalist leaders such as Kenneth Kaunda, Joshua Nkomo, Kamuzu 
Hastings Banda, Jomo Kenyatta and further afield, Ben Bella of Algeria, Nasser of Egypt 
and particularly by events such as the independence of Ghana and the Belgian Congo 
under Patrice Lumumba.27 “Everyone was caught in the whirlwind of African 
nationalism”‘28, recalls Muyongo. It is no coincidence that Kruger, long serving Native 
Commissioner29 in the Eastern Caprivi, writes in his memoirs about the rise of 
nationalism in the Caprivi that it was an attempt to inflict a new order which was 
generated from outside with the aim of supplanting the South African government. He 
believed that the attempts were encouraged in Zambia by UNIP and in Angola by other 
movements.30 Indeed, the Caprivi African National Union (CANU) shared offices with 
UNIP at Sesheke in Zambia and the party’s first membership cards were printed in 
Lusaka with the assistance of the Zambian government. 
 
Undoubtedly, prominent personalities in UNIP such as Nalumino Mundia,31 a former 
teacher in the Eastern Caprivi Strip, and Munukayumbwa Sipalo, UNIP’s Secretary-
General, made relations between CANU and UNIP easier. In his autobiography, Sam 
Nujoma, who was in Lusaka at the time of Simbwaye’s visit, comments that Simbwaye 
                                                 
26 Leys, Colin & John Saul, Namibia’ Liberation Struggle: The Two-Edged Sword, London: James Currey, 
1995, p.2. 
 
27 Personal interview with Mr. Albert Ndopu, 16 April 2006. Mr. Ndopu is a founding member of CANU 
and served as the organization’s Secretary for Publicity. 
28 Biography of Albert Mishake Muyongo, Namibia News, Vol.3, No.1-3, Jan/March, 1970, pp.9-12. 
29 He served three terms, being recalled from retirement at some stage. 
30 Kruger, C., History of Caprivi, Chapter 12, p.1 











was in ‘...in close touch with UNIP in what was then Northern Rhodesia’32 and that ‘the 
struggle in then Northern Rhodesia led by UNIP inspired the Caprivians to form their 
own party since they had no contact with Windhoek’.33 One Jackson M. Lukonga, in a 
letter to Induna Sangwali of the Mafwe Tribal Authority34 enquired what the latter makes 
of UNIP: ‘..I would like to know how (what) you think about UNIP-and I want to advise 
you that UNIP is alright because it is fighting for us to gain freedom.’35 This close 
association between CANU and UNIP led commentators to believe the two organizations 
have joined forces.36 The harsh response the South African officials meted out to CANU 
and its supporters was therefore also partly influenced by events in adjoining territories. 
This is apparent in Kruger’s’ remarks: ‘When one measures what is now being asked 
against the killing of well over 500 people in Northern Rhodesia in the last few weeks it 
hardly seems drastic’.37 Fears by the officials that the Caprivi would be a hunting ground 
for political agitators from across the border38 were not entirely misplaced. The 
Magistrate/Native Commissioner frequently received letters from such people, originally 
from the Caprivi but based in adjacent territories. Andrew Masuku Simubali of Bulawayo 
in Southern Rhodesia directed a highly critical letter to the Native Commissioner in May 
1965. Referring to the latter as a settler not worthy to rule East Caprivi, the letter raised 
the following concerns among others: 
 
 Inadequate schools; 
 Lack of trained agriculturalists; 
 Lack of properly trained police equivalent to the B.S.P. (British South Africa 
Police); 
                                                 
32 Nujoma, S. Where Others Wavered: The Autobiography of Sam Nujoma, London: Panaf, 2001, p.135. 
33 Ibid., p.136. 
34 The current setting is that Sangwali now belongs to the Mayeyi Chieftainship since their break-away in 
1992. 
35 Letter dated 24 February 1961 (Manuscript, NAN, LKM 3/3/3, File No. N1/15/2). 
36 Kruger in a submission to the Department of Native Affairs requesting the removal of Brandon 
Simbwaye and Vernet Maswahu from the Eastern Caprivi to some other part of South West Africa. (15 
August 1964), p.2. (NAN: BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II). 
37 Ibid., p.4.  
38 Magistrate A.B. Colenbrander of the Eastern Caprivi in letter to the Secretary for Native Affairs, dated 













 Lack of market squares for selling fish and vegetables; 
 Lack of proper roads; 
 Lack of representation in Pretoria. 
 
As a result of changing relations between the territory of East Caprivi and her 
neighbours, the South African Government decided to establish a police post at Katima 
Mulilo in 1961. The Native Commissioner at the time, Boshoff, opposed the move as 
being not necessary. A dwelling house, office with single quarters under the same roof, a 
store, garage, and a cell for detaining wrongdoers or those suspected of it, was then built, 
just above the Commissioner’s office. The police post was manned by one Sergeant and a 
Constable from South Africa, assisted by four or five Black units. The security 
responsibilities would later be transferred to the Army. The independence of Zambia in 
1964 resulted in the severance, if not explicitly, by that new government and its agencies 
of practically all ordinary friendly relations which so characterized every annual report 
which native commissioners stationed in the Eastern Caprivi Zipfel commented on. 
 
The above section endeavoured to establish a link and show the influence of 
neighbouring territories on the rise of nationalism in the Eastern Caprivi. It would, 
however, be wrong to conclude that were it not for such outside influences, nationalism 
in the Eastern Caprivi would not have emerged. Kruger, in fact, admitted that while the 
attempt to inflict a new order on the territory of East Caprivi was generated from outside, 
there was ‘appreciable internal activity by agents and their tentative converts, [with the 
aim of] supplanting of the South African government.’39 While the rise of nationalism in 
other parts of Namibia emerged largely out of the inhumane contract labour system and 
systematic land dispossession, neither of these conditions was prevalent in the Eastern 
Caprivi.40 The next section examines the conditions that led to the rise of nationalism in 
Eastern Caprivi, the formation of CANU and the subsequent political repression which 
led many to flee into exile. 
 
                                                 
39 C.E. Kruger, in B. Kangumu, ‘A Forgotten Corner of Namibia: Aspects of the History of the Caprivi 












The Formation of CANU 
 
The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) existed as an underground movement at 
least since the end of 1958.41 Its history is rooted at the Holy Family Mission at Katima 
Mulilo where two of the organizations founders, Brandon Simbwaye and Albert Ndopu 
were teaching. It is here at the Holy Family Mission that CANU held secret meetings in 
Brendan Simbwaye’s house (which still stands to this day) at night to avoid police 
detection. The first mention of CANU in the media seems to be in 1961 when in Lusaka, 
the African Mail of 17 October 1961 reported that a nationalist organization was about to 
be launched in the Caprivi Strip. The report mentioned that the chief architect behind the 
move was Mr. George Liswaniso Mutwa.42 On the 19 May 1962 the Native 
Commissioner for the Eastern Caprivi received a copy of a letter the Senior Information 
Officer for South West Africa had written to Albert Meshake Muyongo, then a young 
man of about 20 years old and a teacher at Kanono Bantu Community School in the 
Eastern Caprivi Strip. The letter was in reply to one in which Muyongo had asked certain 
questions of a political nature.43 CANU was formally founded on 7 September 196244 
with the following elected office bearers: Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye as President, 
Crispin Simasiku Mulonda as Vice-President, Thomas Muyunda as General Secretary 
and Albert Zacharia Ndopu as Publicity Secretary. A re-organization to cater for tribal 
inclusiveness which was effected in May 1964 expanded the CANU Executive 
Committee and the new structure was as follows: Brendan Simbwaye as President, Albert 
Mishake Muyongo as Vice-President, Crispin Simasiku Mulonda took over as General 
                                                 
41 Personal interview with Mr. Adrian Waluka Simubali, 16 April 2006. Mr. Simubali is a founding 
member of CANU, with the executive responsibility of Treasurer. 
42 Kangumu, ‘Forgotten Corner’, 2000, p. 43. 
43 Kruger, C.E., History of Caprivi, chapter.12, p.3 
44 Personal interview with Mr. Albert Zacharia Ndopu, Katima Mulilo, 17 April 2006. Mr. Ndopu is a 
founder member of CANU and colleague of Brendan Simbwaye. He was a CANU Executive Committee 
member serving as Secretary for Information and Publicity. Different writers put the formation of CANU at 
different dates: Kaire Mbuende (Namibia, the Broken Shield, 1986, p.154) writes that it was formed in 
1962 while Peter Katjavivi provides two different accounts in separate publications, 1963 in his book A 
history of resistance in Namibia, 1988, p.51, and 1964 in an article published in Brian Wood (ed.), Namibia 
1884-1984, 1984, p.575. Ernest Likando, a CANU activist, opts for early 1963as the date of formation in 
his unpublished manuscript, ‘The Caprivi Strip: A historical Perspective’, 1989, p.139 (The manuscript is 
held by the National Archives of Namibia. A copy is in the possession of the author). Pütz, J, H. von Egidy, 
P. Caplan (Namibia Handbook and Political Who’s Who, Windhoek: Magus, 1989, p.90) states that the 











Secretary, Albert Ndopu as Publicity Secretary, Vernet Maswahu as Education Secretary, 
Alfred Tongo Nalishuwa as Youth Secretary and Gideon Matengu as Transport 
Secretary. When Alfred Tongo Nalishuwa was arrested in July 1964, his position of 
Youth Secretary was taken by Mr. George Mutwa. Other political leaders in CANU were 
Joseph Nawa (now residing at Simungoma in Zambia), Siloiso Lukonga (a former 
Ngambela45 at the Mafwe Kuta), Jonathan Mutabi, Charles Mubuyaeta Mubiana, Samuel 
Musialela and Mr. Matongo (at present a member of the SWAPO Elders’ Council). On 
this day (7 September 1962), the following decisions and resolutions were taken: 
 
 The name CANU was chosen for the organization; 
 The political slogan ’LyaZwa Twaa’ was formulated; 
 That the drafting of the Constitution of the organization be embarked on; 
 That membership cards were to be printed; 
 That the formation of the organization be kept secret in fear that the South African 
government would ban it before it is formally launched and publicized in Caprivi; 
 That recruitment drive for membership be strict and targeted to avoid infiltration 
and leakage of information to wrong people; and 
 That CANU would work hand in hand with UNIP. 
 
In its 1964 Constitution, CANU as a revolutionary movement vowed to ‘promote 
independence for South West Africa and the Caprivi, to establish democracy and ensure 
an equitable distribution of land and wealth’.46 CANU campaigned, more generally, to 
terminate South Africa’s rule in the Caprivi and  more specifically against the 
introduction of Bantu Education in the Caprivi through Bantu community schools, the 
introduction of Afrikaans in Caprivi schools, the intention of the South African 
Government to take over mission schools and hospitals, the restriction of movement of 
people to and from adjacent territories, the restriction on hunting yet officials even from 
                                                 
45 Prime Minister, second in command after the chief in traditional authorities in Caprivi. 
 
46 Pütz, J, H. von Egidy, P. Caplan, Namibia Handbook and Political Who’s Who, 1989, p.91, see also 
Fossé, L. J., ‘Negotiating the Nation in Local Terms: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eastern Caprivi’, 











South Africa hunted and shot animals at will during Safari tours, in what came to be 
known as shooting for the pot. CANU also advocated doing away with the name Eastern 
Caprivi Zipfel, to be replaced with the name Itenge.47 Even though the movement was 
operating underground at this time, a successful politicization campaign was carried out. 
CANU divided the Eastern Caprivi into 5 political zones, with Katima Mulilo serving as 
the main centre, as follows: from Katima to Singalamwe; from Katima to Linyanti; from 
Katima to Ngoma, on to Impalila Island; from Katima to Ikaba and then Katima Mulilo 
and its surrounding areas. Often, with no transport available, members travelled on foot 
to different parts of the Caprivi to address meetings, most of them taking place at night. 
Within this short time, CANU managed to draw up a constitution for the organization, 
draw up a format of the membership card which was printed in Lusaka with the 
assistance of UNIP and sold them to members, and, very significantly, sent a petition to 
the United Nations in New York with regard to the plight of the people of the Eastern 
Caprivi. Since the first petition was confiscated by the authorities, this one was drawn up 
in Lusaka in February 1964 with the assistance of individuals such as Mr. Josephat 
Siyomunji (a relative of the former Regional Governor for Caprivi Bernard Sibalatani) 
and Mr. Jalarth Mutoyongwa Sinvula (at present residing in Ndola Rural, Zambia). 
 
At the end of 1963, Brendan Simbwaye48 left the Caprivi for Lusaka, Northern Rhodesia, 
to seek support for CANU’s cause from the United Nations which was then involved in 
Zambia’s transition to independence, and also to cement already existing ties with UNIP, 
which, as mentioned above, assisted with the printing of the first CANU membership 
cards and the organization’s constitution.49 Subsequently, CANU membership cards 
numbering ten thousand were printed by P.P.S. Ltd, Lusaka and the first one was sold to 
President Kenneth Kaunda of UNIP.50 The membership card (fig.1, below), according to 
                                                 
47 The name Itenge is presumed to be the pre-colonial name of the Caprivi Region. For a discussion of the 
pre-colonial Kingdom of Itenge, see Chapter Two of this dissertation. 
 
48 It is not clear whether Simbwaye went alone on this trip. Likando writes that he was accompanied on this 
trip by J.M. Sinvula and Thomas Muyunda. This information is not corroborated by any other source. 
49 Bennett Kangumu Kangumu, ‘Heroism: A Glance at Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye’, New Era, 25 
August 2006, p.8. This article was written to coincide with Heroes Day (August 26) Celebrations, which 
were held at Katima Mulilo. 











Kruger, was issued upon payment of a fee of three shillings and sixpence (3/6) for a man, 
two shillings and sixpence (2/6) for a woman and one shilling and sixpence (1/6) for 
children. There was a card making provision for annual subscription.  
 
                                                                                 C.A.N.U. 
                                                                             Membership Card 
                                                                                 No......... 
Forward to Freedom 
Let us Unite Now 
 
                       ..............................Branch 
                       ..............................Secretary 
                       ..............................Date 
H.Q. C.A.N.U. House, P.O. Sesheke, Katima Mulilo, Northern 
Rhodesia 
 
Members Name: Bwana.......... 
Residential Area:..................... 
                                            
Figure 2: Specimen (front) of a CANU membership card, adapted from Kruger. On the back was written 
Caprivi African National Union, Caprivi Strip, South-West Africa, and the slogan Lyazwa Twaa! Printer: 
P.P.S. Ltd, Lusaka 
   
Because of political repression which followed the arrest of Simbwaye, many people who 
bought CANU membership cards either destroyed them or hid them in places where they 
were difficult to find. Being in possession of the card would land one in jail. Attempts to 
get a copy of the card proved futile. It is reproduced above to give an idea of what it 
looked like. It should not be surprising that the Post Box address on the card is for 
Sesheke, Northern Rhodesia. The Eastern Caprivi Strip was using that postal agency even 
for official purposes for there was no post office in the territory at the time. 
 












It was in Lusaka in his deliberations with the UN and UNIP that Simbwaye was 
introduced to SWAPO. He was advised that it would be better to broaden the scope of 
CANU’s aims and objectives to reflect a nationalist cause, that is, the independence of 
the rest of South West Africa. He was told that the UN would only support broad based 
nationalist movements fighting for the liberation of the whole country and not smaller 
parties based on tribalistic or regionalistic ideals. He was advised that there were 
representatives of SWAPO in Lusaka with whom he could hold discussions to see how 
they could work together.51 Nujoma writes that he met Simbwaye in 1964 and suggested 
to him that they should merge ‘in order not to have too many political parties.’52 
According to Simubali, Simbwaye could not commit to such an idea before consulting his 
colleagues back home53 and therefore his reply was that he would first ‘discuss the 
proposal with his colleagues..’54 Simbwaye returned at the end of March 1964, but as the 
authorities were already looking for him for leaving the territory illegally and for 
fermenting political problems in Caprivi, he was advised to remain on in Sesheke 
(Northern Rhodesia). In May, when CANU members in the territory had finished selling 
the membership cards and recruited many to their cause, Simbwaye crossed into Caprivi 
to prepare for the first CANU public meeting. Meantime he reported on his successful 
trip but indicated that he would go back and sit down with Sam Nujoma to discuss 
matters.55 
 
CANU began to engage the authorities even before it was publicly launched. Early in 
January 1964, two young men appeared at Native Commissioner Kruger’s office and 
identified themselves as Vernet `Mussolini’ Maswahu and Simasiku Mulonda. Kruger 
describes the two as disrespectful young political upstarts for they put themselves on the 
only chair in the office (half a chair to each) without waiting to be offered it. They had 
with them a constitution for a political organization called the Caprivi African National 
Union. Their mission was to ask that the constitution be registered and that the office 
bearers named in it be allowed to propagate the stated objectives. These objectives were 
                                                 
51 Interview with Adrian Waluka Simubali, Bukalo, 16 April 2006. 
52 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p.136 
53 Simubali interview 
54 Nujoma, op.cit.  











along the lines of the formation of an independent government for the Caprivi to come 
into being under the supervision of the United Nations. Kruger describes the CANU 
Constitution ‘as fluent, typewritten and having been drawn by elements outside the 
Caprivi.’56 Indeed Sam Nujoma reveals in his autobiography that the CANU constitution 
was printed with the assistance of Munukayumbwa Sipalo, who was then UNIP 
Secretary-General and who later became Minister of Health in the first UNIP 
government, and Nalumino Mundia, a former teacher in the Caprivi together with 
Simbwaye, who later became Prime Minister in Kaunda’s government. More than once 
Vernet Maswahu and Simasiku Mulonda refused to leave the Commissioner’s office after 
they were told that there was no such thing as registration of a constitution of that kind 
and that they would be sent for in a months’ time after studying the document and its 
implications. They were in the meantime not supposed to engage in any activity to further 
their scheme and particularly to be careful about disrespect towards constituted authority. 
The police were informed to keep track of these men especially as regard to the holding 
of meetings prohibited by regulation and tribal law unless specially permitted.  
 
Before the month was up, the young men came back, wanting a reply. When they were 
reminded that they were to be sent for, Kruger recalls that they were ready with 
something else, shifting from one thing to another but always with the same badgering 
tactics to ‘create a situation that they could turn to their advantage, testing government 
authority and hoping for an opening’57 The laws applicable to the Caprivi at this time 
were those of South West Africa up to 1939, with nothing relevant to the new situation. 
In the instances where administration was being undermined, the only provision available 
therein was about meetings where a maximum punishment for contravention hardly fitted 
the new circumstances. As a last resort, the Administration Proclamation of 1928 
provided for removal under Ministerial Order to another part of the territory when any 
behaviour amounted to a serious undermining of constituted authority. 
  
                                                 
56 In Kangumu, ‘Forgotten Corner’, p.44. See also Nujoma, S. op.cit. 
 











Meanwhile increased activities with ‘subversive’ intent, particularly the advent of CANU 
and its schemes, were reported to Pretoria with a recommendation that a statement (a 
draft of which was submitted) be made at both tribal headquarters at meetings of 
tribesmen assembled to hear. Pretoria gave its blessing to this line of action.  As a first 
step a meeting was arranged with the Masubiya Khuta at Kabbe and CANU was 
informed they would get their answer there. Whilst it was hoped that the declaration 
which was made at the huge gathering assembled would discredit CANU as an 
organization composed of young men with ‘no credentials’, and influence the people 
against being taken in by it, Kruger concedes that there was little noticeable reaction 
except that the Ngambela put it to him that the CANU representatives present had asked 
whether they could address the meeting. This request was denied. 
 
The Northern News of Northern Rhodesia reported on 8 May 1964 that a new political 
party had been formed in the Caprivi Strip and that it had offices in Lusaka. The report 
quoted the founder and President of CANU, Brendan Simbwaye, as the source. CANU 
also maintained offices at Sesheke, which is immediately across the border adjacent to 
Katima Mulilo. It was also the UNIP offices in this region. In the Caprivi Strip, CANU 
had its headquarters at a place called Mafulo, meaning an encampment where they had 
what Likando58 refer as `Freedom House`, a thatched house they used as an office for 
administrative purposes. This small house was given to CANU by an old man named 
Maxwell, who had a number of them from where he ran his small business.59 This was 
not, however, the first CANU office in Katima Mulilo. According to Adrian Waluka 
Simubali, the first CANU office was at Mahohoma Township behind the Holy Family 
Mission in a small brick house which was not then occupied. The original house was 
thatched and belonged to an old man called Soja who had built it with the intention of 
starting a small business of selling fat cookies – something that did not materialize.  
Crispin Mulonda’s father had a hawker’s license so CANU members used it under the 
pretext of running a business from this small house. This is where meetings were held 
until Brendan Simbwaye and Albert Ndopu left their teaching positions at the Holy 
                                                 
58 Likando. History of Caprivi, 1989, p.140. 











Family Mission and moved to Mafulo.60 Mafulo, which could well be the first proper 
African township of Katima Mulilo, was originally a site chosen for the rest camp of the 
chief of the Mafwe and his councillors when visiting headquarters, and then still served 
this purpose.61 It was situated about 3 miles from headquarters just off the road to 
Finaughty’s62 shop leading on to the Northern Rhodesia border where there were large 
shops and a facility for cashing cheques. The Caprivi Strip inhabitants as well as 
government agencies, were using Northern Rhodesian currency at the time. Because of its 
location, Mafulo attracted many people from adjacent and surrounding places, for the 
purpose of  ‘doing a bit of trading by way of tea-rooms, others selling fish, produce or 
wares brought from the countryside, and others doing nothing in particular’.63 Not much 
control existed in Mafulo, and that state of `lawlessness` was particularly conducive to 
CANU’s objective of mobilization and the spread of ill-will towards the administration 
and Kruger writes that they (CANU) made the most out of it. He recalls at Mafulo 
placards on trees declaring ‘“Down with Verwoed’, ‘Go Home Boers’. A lot of CANU 
politicians moved into Mafulo’s residential area, including Brendan Simbwaye after 
resignation from his teaching post.  
 
CANU’s Subversive Activities against the Authorities 
 
CANU’s launch was preceded by a student strike at the Holy Family Mission School at 
Katima Mulilo in March 1964. According to the authorities, the ‘night disturbance’, as 
Kruger terms it was set going by two CANU members. This resulted in their arrest as 
well as that of four bigger school boys who had taken part. The CANU members were 
sentenced to a term of imprisonment and the boys to a caning.64 Kruger ascribes the 
causes of the strike to the fact that a number of CANU office-bearers were dismissed 
from their teaching posts at schools managed by the Roman Catholic Mission for their 
political involvement and ‘questionable loyalty’. The two CANU members who were 
                                                 
60 Ibid. 
61 The rest camp for the chief of the Masubiya was at a site not far from Namwi Island and next to 
Kambinda’s village, east of Katima Mulilo, (Interview with Adrian Waluka Simubali, 16 April 2006). 
62 Bill Finaughty was a trader who had lived in the Caprivi for 20 years by 1963. 
63 Kruger, History of Caprivi, 1984, p.8. 











accused of involvement and were arrested were Adrian Waluka Simubali and Alfred 
Tongo Nalishuwa. CANU and the learners maintain that the strike was held to demand 
for improvements especially in the way the hostel was run. Even though learners paid 
hostel fees, they were not provided with mattresses and therefore slept on the floor or on 
traditional mats they brought with them from home; they used to cook for themselves in 
the hostel and the quality of food was very bad: almost rotten fish and cabbage, porridge 
without sugar (learners had to resort to adding salt and fresh lemon juice from lemons 
that they picked in the garden to make their porridge tasty). Sugar was only occasionally 
provided to the girls but even then only in small quantities. Meat was only provided to 
the learners once a week, every Saturday, otherwise during the course of the week 
learners had to fend for themselves. According to former learners interviewed, some of 
them who had no relatives or parents in Katima Mulilo would be forced to go fishing in 
the Zambezi after school to provide for their needs.65 These were the grievances which 
led to the strike. 
 
In any event, the school environment was a fertile breeding ground for CANU. As an 
organization started by teachers, it would have profound influence and its recruitment 
systematically targeted schoolboys who were taken to Zambia and were probably induced 
thereto by some promises. Reports from headmasters about missing children abounded. 
In a letter dated 27 March 1965 and another one dated 29 March 1965, Mr. A. Kasu, head 
of Nakabolelwa Community School reported that two scholars had run away from his 
school to Zambia with CANU members. The two scholars, Boniface Chandu Sekelo and 
Sinvula Shantambwa (Santambwa), were led by Godfrey Kawana Mwananawa of Ikaba. 
The report named six other boys who were planning to follow: Robson Musialike, Alfred 
Simataa Kabajani, Kangumu Nechenge, Milinga Munguni, Shoni Musipili and 
Nkonkwena Mukena Musialike.66 In 1964 when books and other materials were sent to 
the newly-established Bantu Community School at Kasheshe, about 30 kilometers west 
of Katima Mulilo, people refused to accept them saying Simbwaye had told them not to 
                                                 
65 Personal interview with Adrian Waluka Simubali. (16 April 2006). Former learners interviewed are 
Fidelis Mayumbelo (15 April 2006), Konard Kaela Machinga (16 April 2006) and a group interview 
consisting of Michael Matengu, Sylvester Matengu and Ignatius Matengu (14 April 2006). 











accept the school or Bantu education. The administration had to rely on the assistance of 
the traditional leaders. In a letter to Chief Moraliswani Maiba, Kruger writes: 
 
I have had reports that a man named Godfrey Kawana Mwananawa, acting as a CANU agent, is 
persuading children at school in the Caprivi to leave the particular school on a promise that they 
will be educated in Zambia. I hear also that Chaka of Muyako is helping – that he wrote a letter. It 
is said that this matter was reported to you and that you are dealing with it. I shall be glad if you 
will let me know what is happening. I wish just to mention that anyone leaving his country 
without proper authority commits an offence and anybody helping him to do that is likewise liable 
to punishment.67 
 
It is discussed elsewhere in this dissertation that colonial administration in the eastern 
Caprivi Strip was not actual and direct but persuasive and indirect.68 As such, the 
confidence of the chiefs and their people was an essential quality to both the colonial 
officials and the political intelligentsia. While the administration sought to use tribal 
gatherings, as in the case discussed above, to discredit CANU as an organization 
composed of young men ‘without any credentials’, CANU too knew that it needed the 
support of the chiefs in its endeavour to unseat the Pretoria government. As early as April 
1964, the two traditional authorities of the time were influenced by CANU to both submit 
formal complaints against the administration about all kinds of things and employees of 
the administration also did the same about their conditions of service.  
 
In the same year, another shocking revelation awakened the administration. There came a 
letter from the Department of Bantu Affairs in Pretoria with papers sent from Pretoria’s 
representative at the United Nations. Among the papers was a petition69 addressed to the 
United Nations and signed by both chiefs and one or two of their Kuta members asking 
that the South African government be replaced by a United Nations body. Kruger, in his 
disbelief, investigated the matter and found out that indeed the petition had been signed 
on behalf of the two chiefs (who themselves could not read or write English) in their 
presence by one or two of their councillors. He blamed the move on CANU and its 
associates. In some instances, CANU resorted to making traditional institutions 
                                                 
67 Undated letter from Kruger to Chief Moraliswani Maiba of the Masubiya, reference no. N1/9/3 (NAN, 
LKM 3/3/3, File No. N1/15/2) 
68 Trollope, Inspection Report, op. cit., p.15. 












ungovernable for the administration. A case in point is the trouble which engulfed the 
Mafwe tribal authority and led to the dismissal of the Ngambela, David Siukuta. During 
May 1964 Ngambela Siukuta was called to an irregular hearing at Mafulo attended by 
one regular Kuta member, Induna Chunga. The Ngambela was allegedly subjected to 
threats, thrown out of office and warned not to go near the tribal headquarters at Linyanti. 
Fearing for his life, the Ngambela resorted to spending nights in hiding in the forest. This 
was not the first time the said Kuta experienced such trouble. As early as 29 July 1961, 
tribesmen in attendance at a meeting obtained the dismissal of the Ngambela 
(Musiyalela), the secretary (Benjamin Mamili) and two ordinary members of the Kuta 
(Mutimani and Mwaala). Davidson Mubonenwa was appointed as Kuta Secretary and 
Solomon Kanyanso and Solomon Nkando in the places of the two ordinary members. The 
new Ngambela was David Siukuta. The Chief complained then that by submitting to the 
tribesmen the administration damaged the authority and position of the chieftainship, 
retorting:  
 
..you have taken my powers and gave it to my people-who took off my three Indunas from their 
work without my consent. I am the one who chose them to help me in this native court-and have 
the power to dismiss who make wrong.70 
 
Even though the administration was warned that the people who caused these troubles at 
Linyanti Kuta in 1961 were also ‘planning to take out these people who come from South 
Africa who are ruling us’,71 the administration did not find any direct link between this 
event and CANU. However, the administration seems to have regretted this later. This 
time the police were ordered to arrest immediately those perceived to be behind the 
dismissal of the Ngambela, brothers Jackson Mazazi Lukonga72 and Alfred Siloiso 
Lukonga pending a trial by the Kuta. In a letter to the Secretary for Bantu Administration 
and Development, the Bantu Affairs Commissioner describes the two as having a critical 
turn of mind and having had some association with office bearers of the Caprivi African 
                                                 
70 Letter from old Chief Simasiku Mamili of the Mafwe to the Native Commissioner dated 7 September 
1961 (NAN: 3/3/1, N1/2/1). 
71 Letter from K. Band and M. Kunana to the Native Commissioner dated 2 January 1963. (NAN: 3/3/1, 
N1/2/1). 
72 Jackson Mazazi would indeed play a crucial role in CANU politics, went into exile and was part of 
CANU leaders in SWAPO, serving on the the Committee of SWAPO until 1980 when he was expelled 











National Union.73 For the Commissioner, this is what confounded the problem: ‘what 
with advanced political thought also playing its part.’74 A clear reference to CANU’s 
involvement in the `throwing-out’ of the Ngambela at Mafulo is made by the Bantu 
Commissioner in a letter dated 15 August 1964: to Induna Chunga of Linyanti,  
 
I hear...that you and others are supporting a letter written by CANU. Did you support your chief 
...or did you side with the rabble that threw out the Ngambela at Mafulo? Were you sitting on the 
important chair at Mafulo when the Ngambela was called by these men, through you, and did you 
respect him? You will answer these things, Chunga, you and the others with you. What is this 
nonsense I hear about the chief selling the country to the white men?” 
 
A meeting of the whole Kuta was arranged with the chief and the Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner went to the tribal headquarters at Linyanti a day before, accompanied by 
Constable Bosman of the police, in whose care the two prisoners were, and the 
Ngambela. In the late afternoon they were astonished to see a 3-ton lorry pull up. It was 
transporting a score or more of shouting and singing CANU members duly organized for 
the occasion to join those living thereby. The Commissioner put it to the assembled Kuta 
members as to whether they were prepared to see justice done by, firstly, upholding the 
Ngambela and then proceeding to the trial of the two men. To his disappointment, ‘not 
one of the Kuta members present was prepared to agree’.75  
 
The exception was the chief who agreed with Commissioner Kruger but this was of no 
help. Consequently, the only option left was to withdraw, at which point Constable 
Bosman released the two men from his custody. They were immediately and heroically 
surrounded by their jubilant supporters. Kruger saw this as ‘another gain, if shallow, for 
the CANU upstarts’.76 
 
                                                 
73 Letter from Bantu Affairs Commissioner of the Caprivi to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and 
Development, dated 29 March 1964, p.1. (LKM 3/3/1, N1/2/1). 
74 Ibid., p.2 
75 Kruger, History of Caprivi, 1984, p.8. 











Cattle Sale77 as a Contested Terrain 
 
The nature of indirect rule in the Eastern Caprivi Strip was such that government 
representation comprised only of one officer plus an assistant. Therefore the development 
of nationalism in that part of Namibia did not benefit from the usual trends or routines of 
resistance and defiance such as labour unrest and stay-aways, boycotts of services (for 
there were none), etc. The economy was highly rural and subsistence. To show defiance, 
CANU had to get the better of the administration even in less obvious spheres such as a 
cattle sale, designed, with all intents, for the benefit of the people. It will be recalled that 
the people of the Eastern Caprivi bitterly complained about a lack of markets for the 
disposal of their cattle. During the Bechuanaland regime cattle from the eastern Caprivi 
Strip went freely into Bechuanaland for sale as there was veterinary control of the area. 
When the South West Africa Administration took over in 1929 this market was closed as 
the Bechuanaland authorities feared the introduction of lung sickness from Barotseland 
via the Strip.  
 
To illustrate the above point, just as the authorities managed to obtain permission to 
export 800 head of cattle from the Strip to Bechuanaland after a struggle of eight years, 
lung sickness was detected the very week that the permit arrived and the export was 
stopped. Following the South African take-over, there was no outlet for stock from the 
strip and therefore no trading in cattle that by 1939 Louw found that the area was 
becoming overstocked.78 Any sale there was remained insignificant and illegal. A small 
avenue for disposal was through the Barotseland traders who would buy cattle in 
Barotseland for sale for rationing purposes to the saw-mills which operated in the 
province. As the movement was from one infected area to the other, they were permitted 
                                                 
77 For a detailed discussion of the Barotseland Cattle Trade, especially at the Zambezi Saw Mills to which 
many cattle from the Eastern Caprivi were sold for consumption, see Hugh Macmillan’s An African 
Trading Empire: The Story of Susman Brothers & Wulfsohn, 1901-2005, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005. 
 











to purchase cattle from the Strip.79 Stock control and inoculation was therefore dependent 
on what was taking place in adjacent territories. 
 
A market for surplus cattle, therefore, had always been of great concern to the 
administration. Protracted negotiations to buy cattle in bulk from the strip were 
concluded with the Northern Rhodesia Cold Storage Commission in 1963, and when 
arrangements were finalized for a two-day sale in April, a weighbridge was installed at 
Katima Mulilo with necessary kraals and races so that the transaction was one of a fixed 
rate by exact weight. The commission related their offer to what they paid across in 
Northern Rhodesia, making allowances for additional costs such as placing the cattle in 
quarantine and the risks involved in driving them across to Livingstone through Impalila 
Island. The representative of the Commission arrived an afterno n before the appointed 
date, so did herds of cattle around the sale pens.  
 
The atmosphere during the day of the cattle sale, according to Kruger, was oppressive 
because of the way CANU agents ‘were mingling with the crowd in a way that suggested 
they were up to no good’.80 Indeed, when the prices for the first cattle were announced, 
they were flatly rejected and following that no single beast was offered. Upon 
investigation, it emerged that people were not satisfied with the price offered which was 
far below that paid across the river in Barotseland. A few days later, someone brought a 
Northern Rhodesian newspaper to Kruger wherein prices paid by the Cold Storage 
Commission in Northern Rhodesia were published. He (Kruger) was astonished to find 
that they were considerably higher than what they offered in the Caprivi. Kruger 
remarked: ‘I don’t believe the CANU agents, in their ignorance, knew the difference – if 
they did so much the worse. But their scheming had all the appearance of getting the 
better of the administration, leading the people generally, in their confused state, to a 
belief that I myself was not to be trusted’.81 Subsequent events would prove that the 
CANU `agents’ knew the difference and that they were not ignorant. After the break-
                                                 
79 Mr. Bennett of Mulobezi applied for permission to buy 1000 head of cattle for cash in the strip in 1937 
for this purpose. (Trollope, 1937 ‘Report’, p.24). 
 












down of this cattle sale, CANU decided to bypass the administration and negotiate with 
the Northern Rhodesia Cold Storage Commission on behalf of the people, to which end 
two men were sent to Livingstone to see what they could find out. This was only revealed 
to Kruger in a letter from the representative of the Cold Storage Commission there.  
 
A cattle sale provided a perfect opportunity for a clash between CANU and the 
administration. For once, albeit momentarily, CANU managed to make Kruger, a 
representative of an oppressive regime, feel oppressed, powerless. This open defiance of 
authority enhanced CANU’s position and spread its influence to rural areas. It was not 
uncommon, Kruger wrote, when travelling outside Katima Mulilo to hear even small 
children shouting ‘Kwacha’, a word denoting freedom or waking up from colonialism, as 
one passed through the villages, with no one doing anything to restrain them.82 There 
were common references to ’the boers’, and in a song people called upon ‘the boers’ to 
go back to their country, telling them ‘we are not afraid of your guns’, Kruger recalled.83 
Most likely, the song being referred is the famous CANU song: Cenjela maburu 
cenjelaa, CANU ci ya sika lya zwa twaa. Cenjela cenjela maburu cenjelaa, CANU ci ya 
sika lya zwa twa: Lya zwa Twaa, Lya zwa Twaa.84 Because of such defiance, the 
administration was eager to assert its authority. Until then, Kruger believed, ‘CANU has 
had pretty well a free hand in their disruptive activities’, continuing, ‘I am firmly of 
opinion the time has come to act against them. This, it is thought, is a crucial stage in 
Caprivi affairs: if we do not act now when will we do so?’85 This marked the start of a 
clampdown on CANU and its activities in the Caprivi and a ruthless political repression 
that would leave CANU leadership and their followers either in detention, in hiding or on 
the run. The focus of the next section is therefore on political repression in the Caprivi 
and particularly the arrest, detention and disappearance of Brendan Kangongolo 
Simbwaye, CANU’s founder, together with Vernet Maswahu, another missing CANU 
leader. 
                                                 
82 Ibid. P.7 
83 Kruger, in a Submission requesting the ministerial removal of or an order banishing Brendan Simbwaye 
from the eastern Caprivi, dated 15 August 1964, p.2. (NAN: BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II.) 
84 Translates as `Beware Boers beware, CANU is here. The sun has risen and is bright denoting awakening. 
Interview with Mr. Fidelis Mwiya Mayumbelo at Bukalo, 15 April 2006. 











CHAPTER EIGHT   
AFRICAN RESPONSES TO THE CAPRIVI IDENTITIES: 
REGIONAL NATIONALISM (CONTINUED) 
 
Political Repression and Simbwaye’s Disappearance 
 
The advent of CANU benefited from an absence of legal provisions to contain its 
subversive activities, the laws applicable to the eastern Caprivi Strip being those of South 
West Africa up to 1939, with nothing relevant to the new situation added since. However, 
political repression in the Caprivi found expression in two provisions of administrative 
law. The first was the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928 (Proclamation no.15 of 
1928, South West Africa) read in conjunction with section three of the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel Administration Proclamation, 1939 (Proclamation no. 147 of 1939). Paragraph (d) 
of section one of the above proclamation (1928) provided for removal under ministerial 
order to another part of the territory (SWA) in the event of behaviour amounting to a 
`serious’ undermining of authority. This, however, was meant to be a last resort. The 
second provision was the prohibition of gatherings in ‘native’ areas unless specifically 
permitted by the tribal chief or the Native Commissioner. This was enacted in 
Proclamation No. 198 of 1953, which sought to impose severe penalties upon any person 
who holds a meeting without the prior knowledge of the chief and the approval of the 
Native Commissioner. In an Identical Minute issued with the concurrence of the 
Secretary for Justice on 4 July 1958, the Secretary for Native Affairs reminded all 
officials of the Department of Native Affairs that: 
 
Because attempts are being made nowadays to undermine the authority of the chiefs and the 
government, often through the medium of unlawful gatherings and meetings, it is imperative that 
the provisions of Proclamation No. 198 of 1953 should again be brought to the attention of all 
chiefs and headmen. ….The Department has reason to doubt whether the chiefs really understand 
the implications of, and the firm support given them by, this legal enactment.1 
                                                 
1 Minute issued by the Secretary of Native Affairs dated 4 July 1958 entitled ‘Control of Meetings or 
Gatherings in Native Areas’. It was addressed to all officials of the Department of Native Affairs, all 
Magistrates, Additional and Assistant Magistrates and full time Special Justices of the Peace. (BAD, File 











If the chiefs in the Caprivi Strip did not understand the implications and ‘firm’ support 
given by the above proclamation, surely this was not the case with the police and the 
Native Commissioner. The police informed the native commissioner that they had 
information that Simbwaye would address a meeting at Mafulo where quite a large 
number of supporters had gathered and that they were determined to make arrests if 
indeed they found a meeting in progress since no permission had been given as required 
by tribal law as well as by regulation. According to CANU activists, even though 
permission for the meeting was requested several times, this was refused by the Native 
Commissioner2. Despite this refusal it was decided that the meeting would go ahead.. 
 
At Mafulo, Sergeant Hartmann and his son-in-law Sakkie Bosman of the police 
accompanied by a score of Black askaries3 found a CANU meeting in progress, the first 
public rally4 at which the organization was to be launched and the political programme to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
2 Adrian Waluka Simubali, personal interview on 16 April 2006. See also Notes of Conversation between 
Brendan Simbwaye and Advocate Israel Goldblatt of 2 October 1964. In this entry, Goldblatt states that 
Brendan Simbwaye told him that he asked the native commissioner three times for permission to hold a 
political meeting but this was refused. These notes by Israel Goldblatt, which includes other stuff on and 
from Clemens Kapuuo, Kutako, etc, are held by the Basler Afrika Bibliographien which hopes to publish 
them in yet undecided format. They were kindly provided to me confidentially by Dag Henrichsen of BAB. 
3 Black policemen of the time were known as UG, and wore clothes marked as such, possibly Union 
Government. People teasingly called them ‘Useless Government’. The ones who were present at 
Simbwaye’s arrest are: Francis Lilungwe Ilukena, Raymond Mowa Mwilima, Leonard Kachenje Chaka, 
Lawrence Nchindo, David Lopa Mbeha, Moffat Matali, Nfwile (Personal interview with Albert Zacharia 
Ndopu). Ignatius Mazambani Mat ngu added the following names to this list: Wilson, , Nathan, Lubembo 
and Muyonge (personal interview, 16 April 2006). 
4 There is confusion as to when this meeting took place. CANU activists interviewed separately maintain 
that it was in mid July (Albert Ndopu and Ignatius Matengu), with the later even stating that Simbwaye was 
arrested on the morning of 15 July 1964 which would also be the date of the meeting. Ignatius Matengu, 
apart from being a CANU youth, was a nephew to Simbwaye and was in fact staying with him at the time 
of the arrest. The Native Commissioner, Kruger, believes the meeting took place in the second half of 
August 1964. This is supported by Albert Mishake Muyongo, CANU’s Vice President, in a biography he 
submitted to SWAPO and published in SWAPO’s publication Namibia News, vol.3, No.1-3, 
January/March 1970, pp. 9-12. However, instead of a meeting, Muyongo rather tells us that it was a mass 
protest demonstration (the biggest demonstration of its kind and the first in the Caprivi) covering the entire 
Caprivi Strip, and that the demonstrators marched on the headquarters of the South African Government at 
Katima Mulilo. This assertion could not be supported by any evidence, oral or otherwise. Similarly, 
Muyongo’s assertion that CANU convened a conference in March 1964 where over 2,500 delegates from 
all corners of the Caprivi Strip attended could not be corroborated by any other source. He maintains that 
this is where CANU was born and where Simbwaye was elected President and himself Vice-President. It 
would be recalled that these elections took place in Brendan Simbwaye’s house at the Holy Family 
Mission. Indeed it is doubtful that such a big gathering would be feasible at that time and therefore 












be outlined. This public rally was to be addressed by the president of CANU, Brendan 
Simbwaye. When the the police arrived it was Alfred Tongo Nalishuwa who was 
addressing the meeting and he was picked first, followed by Brendan Simbwaye, the only 
two arrested at that meeting.5 Even though people followed the police car, shouting and 
protesting, there occurred no casualties during this event.6  
 
The trial of Brendan Simbwaye and His Co-accused 
 
The case against Brendan Simbwaye and the two others, Vernet Maswahu and Alfred 
Tongo Nalishuwa, charged with holding a meeting without authority, was brought to 
court at Katima Mulilo.7 The court, attended by an unusually large crowd according to 
Kruger, was heard by Assistant Magistrate/Native Commissioner Bezuidenhout on the 
bench while Sergeant Hartman was the prosecutor with Kruger there to give evidence 
that no authorization was given for the meeting as the administrative head. Upon the 
charge being duly read and the accused called upon to plead, no answer was forthcoming 
upon which a plea of “not guilty’’ would have been entered. The accused were therefore 
asked if they wished to put any questions. Simbwaye ignored the presiding magistrate 
and declared in a loud voice that ‘he did not recognize the court, that they wanted to be 
                                                 
5 Albert Meshake Muyongo incorrectly states in his biography cited above that Vernet Maswahu and 
Brendan Simbwaye were the ones arrested at the meeting. Contrary to this, Maswahu would join Simbwaye 
and Nalishuwa in detention after he was arrested on his way to take a petition (which got confiscated) to the 
United Nations in Lusaka, According to Adrian Waluka Simubali, after the arrest of Simbwaye, they wrote 
a petition which was given to Vernet Maswahu to take to Zambia. He was to depart with a WENELA 
(Witwatersrand Native Labour Association) vehicle which was going that way on the same day. As he left 
to wait for the vehicle at the Mission, someone among his followers,, an informer, alerted the police who 
came and arrested Vernet Maswahu. 
6 However, Kruger writes that UNIP published a far-fetched account of the brutality on the part of the 
administration with two killed. Muyongo supports this by stating that two were killed after police opened 
fire and scores of others injured. He might have been the source of UNIP’s report. For his part, Ernest 
Likando (1989, p.140) records violent clashes in which nine Black militants and two ‘Boers’ were killed. 
As stated, no evidence of such casualties has been discovered yet. 
7 Adrian Waluka Simubali maintains that there was no court hearing held at Katima Mulilo for Simbwaye 
and the others. He stated that when they went to see Native Commissioner Kruger about the case, they were 
told to come back on a Monday for the hearing. On the appointed Monday, they were told by Black 
policemen that the three prisoners were smuggled out at night to an unknown destination. However, 
according to Simbwaye in a conversation with Advocate Israel Goldblatt on 2 October 1964, he was 
sentenced to pay a fine of £4 on each count of the case against him. This concurs with Kruger’s assertion. It 
would seem that perhaps Mr. Simubali missed the trial or maybe the trial was held secretly, which is 












tried internationally on an international level’, continuing, ‘that they would only submit 
to the United Nations’8. This statement was echoed by his co-accused.  For this, the 
accused were immediately sentenced to one month imprisonment for contempt of court 
without the option of a fine. At the end of the prosecution the accused declined to offer 
any statements, repeating their recognition only of the United Nations, upon which they 
were found guilty and sentenced.9 On the main count they were fined £2.00 for holding 
an illegal meeting and Simbwaye was fined another £2.00 for having left the country 
without a permit. 
 
Even before sentencing could take place, Kruger had already reached a conclusion to 
banish Brendan Simbwaye and Vernet Maswahu from the eastern Caprivi Strip. In a 
submission for presentation to the Minister arguing for the rem val in terms of South 
West Africa Proclamation 15 of 1928 (see footnote No. 88), he exhibits a total dislike for 
Simbwaye whom he describes as: 
 
Generally obnoxious and trouble seeking...aggressive in his talk and approach, recognizes no 
status in White officials, openly says (to Kruger) they will not have a Transkeian Bantustan here 
(in Caprivi). He declined to accept (at the court hearing) the Court’s directions on procedure and 
his whole bearing was one of contempt. They are (with Maswahu) fanatical types with whom it is 
almost impossible to reason.10  
 
If anything, Kruger felt threatened about the assumed importance of the new elite in 
society and the subsequent influence they might have on the people and events in 
Caprivi. In his memoirs he recalls his encounter with Brendan Simbwaye when he came 
to his office: “I found him robed in some exotic cloak11 and headdress sitting prominently 
outside on a chair offered by one of the staff as a gesture to his assumed 
                                                 
8 Kruger, in a Submission for Removal in terms of South West Africa Proclamation 15 of 1928 of Brendan 
Kangongolo Simbwaye and Vernet Sibanda Maswahu, dated 15August 1964. (BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II). 
A copy is in the possession of the author. 
9 It appears from the charge sheet that the sentencing took place on 28 August 1964 in the Bantu 
Commissioner’s Court, who was also the District Magistrate at Katima Mulilo in the Case No. 16/64 
(NAN: File no. 1566, Storage Unit 1/1/12, Archival Group LKW 1/2/22, 1945 – 1969). 
10 Most informants do not have this picture of Simbwaye however. They describe him as deeply religious, 
quiet, kind and most often than not, engaged in prayer. Slow to anger, in fact most do not remember him 
involved in an argument, not even with his peers or learners. 
11 Most informants describe Simbwaye’s dress code as similar to Kwame Nkrumah’s, who undoubtedly had 












importance...demanded acknowledgement of party or reason for not so doing. Refused to 
accept answer that no statement would be made at that time”.12 He continues, “He 
assumes flamboyant attire, robes, etc., and walks about with an assumed air of great 
importance”. At the adjournment of the court hearing apparently about 60 supporters 
(Kruger describes them as a mob) who attended shouted and chanted and the behaviour 
was generally unpleasant “with Simbwaye raising his hands in the air and waving in the 
style of a martyr and hero”.13 
 
In an impromptu trip to Pretoria, Kruger reported on what has taken place in the Caprivi 
Strip and also requested a Ministerial Removal Order against Simbwaye and Maswahu - 
to some `suitable’ (read far) place elsewhere in South West Africa to follow on the 
completion of their terms of imprisonment until, as he would write later, ‘common sense 
returned.’14 It was also decided at that Pretoria meeting to approve Kruger’s application 
for the three to serve their sentences at Grootfontein in South West Africa and not at 
Katima Mulilo where facilities were inadequate. Before they could gather together the 
money for the fines, the three prisoners were received by police from Rundu at the dead 
of the night at Manyeha crossing, now Kongola, the boundary between the eastern and 
the western Caprivi Strip for escort to Grootfontein. At Grootfontein, Simbwaye told 
Advocate Goldblatt, they were told that the sentences were for three months instead of 
one.  He was handcuffed and taken to Windhoek where they served one month and then 
were released.15 At their release from prison, a Ministerial Order of Removal was served 
on Brendan Simbwaye and Vernet Maswahu, whilst the third prisoner, Alfred Tongo 
Nalishuwa, was brought back under escort to the Caprivi which he immediately left for 
Zambia.16 Below is the Order of Restriction served on Simbwaye by the Honorable 
                                                 
12 Kruger, History of Caprivi, p.6. See also submission for removal. 
13 Ibid 
14 Kruger, 1982, p.18. 
15 Smbwaye in a discussion with advocate Goldblatt on 2 October 1964. (BAB: Goldblatt Notes). 
16 Even though Kruger believes he never returned to the Caprivi and that he was last heard to be somewhere 
in North Africa, Alfred Tongo Nalishuwa lived the rest of his life shuttling between Zambia and the 













Michael Daniel Christian De Wet Nel, Minister of Bantu Administration and 
Development of the Union Government:17 
 
‘To Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye, a Native of the Masubiya in the district of Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel in the territory of South West Africa. 
 WHEREAS I am satisfied that you are engaged in activities likely to undermine duly 
established authority and the maintenance of law and order in the district of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel 
in the territory of South West Africa, and to cause dissension, unrest, violence and lawlessness in 
the said district; 
 AND WHEREAS your said activities have resulted in a request from the Masubiya tribal 
authority for your removal from the said district of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel; 
 AND WHEREAS I am satisfied that your presence in, or at any place within easy access 
of the said district of Eastern Caprivi Strip in the territory of South West Africa is inimical to the 
peace, order and good government of the Natives in the said district; 
 AND WHEREAS I deem it expedient in the general public interest that you be removed 
from your present place of residence in the said district of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel; 
 NOW, THEREFORE, under and by virtue of the powers vested in me by paragraph (d) of 
section one of the Native Administration Proclamation, 1928 (Proclamation No. 15 of 1928) 
(South West Africa) read with section three of Eastern Caprivi Administration Proclamation, 1939 
(Proclamation No. 147 of 1939) (South West Africa), I do hereby order you, the said Brandon 
Kangongolo Simbwaye, that within two days of the service of this order on you, remove yourself 
from your place of residence in the said district of Eastern Caprivi Zipfel to Ohopoho in the 
district of Kaokoveld in the territory of South West Africa, subject to the following terms, 
conditions, and arrangements:- 
a) At Ohopoho you shall reside at a place to be indicated to you by the senior officials 
of the Department of Bantu Administration and Development of Ohopoho. 
b) Until such time as this order is withdrawn you may not return to the Eastern Caprivi 
Zipfel except with written permission of the Secretary for the Bantu Administration 
and Development. 
Given under my hand at Pretoria on the 24th day of September One Thousand Nine Hundred and 
Sixty Four 
 











                                                 
17 Extracted from a press release issued jointly by CANU and SWAPO announcing their ‘merger’ in 
















Figure 1: Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye, founder president of CANU and Vice-President of 
SWAPO and on whom the above restriction/banishment order was served. 
 
 
As a general comment on the restriction order, it is misleading to suggest that the 
Masubiya tribal authority requested the removal of Simbwaye from the eastern Caprivi 
Strip, not at this stage and indeed there is no evidence to suggest, support and confirm 
that this was the case. On the contrary, Kruger admits in his submission presented to the 
Minister requesting the restriction order to be issued that ‘I have reason to think that the 
chiefs would favour their removal though they have not been directly asked’.18 The two 
                                                 











days given to Simbwaye and Maswahu within which to report to Ohopoho meant that 
they did not return to the Caprivi Strip but were taken to their new place of abode at 
Ohopoho, the beginning of their life in perpetual detention. 
 
The Simbwaye-Goldblatt-Kapuuo Connection19 
 
Not much is known about the duo’s time at Ohopoho except in Simbwaye’s 
conversations with Goldblatt. On 2 October 1964, Simbwaye was accompanied by 
Clemens Kapuuo20 to see Goldblatt, probably to get advice on the removal order. 
Goldblatt’s conclusion was that indeed section 1 (d) of Proclamation 15 of 1928 read 
with section 3 of Proclamation No. 147 of 1939 permits removal and empowers the 
Minister to make that order and therefore the removal was perfectly ‘legal’. As with 
many Apartheid laws, the Minister was somehow placed above the law: Section 2 of the 
Proclamation (No. 15, 1928) had a provision stating ‘that the Minister shall not be subject 
to any Court of law for or by reason of any order, notice, rule or regulation professed to 
be issued or made or of any other act whatsoever professed to be committed, ordered, 
permitted or done in the exercise of the powers and authority conferred by this 
proclamation.’ Therefore it was futile for Simbwaye to launch a court challenge against 
the removal order. Simbwaye and Maswahu were given R5 each with which to buy 
blankets, cloth, and R4 per month while at Ohopoho. Even though the Minister wrote to 
Simbwaye that close relatives could join him at Ohopoho and that items of personal 
property could be brought from the Caprivi Strip to Ohopoho at government expense, this 
promise seem never to have been fulfilled. In a letter to Goldblatt written while in the 
Windhoek Central Prison dated 18 July 1966, Simbwaye accused the government of 
rescinding on its promise in that since he put a claim on 10 October 1964 for books such 
as the Universal Home Lawyer, works on politics and government and a bookshelf to be 
brought from the Caprivi Strip, no reply to this was received. 
 
                                                 
19 From information kindly provided by Dag Henrichsen of BAB, Basel. 
20 It is not known how Simbwaye and Kapuuo met, but Kapuuo might be the one who introduced 












In this letter, he complains about a number of other things: that he is illegally and 
inhumanely restricted to Warmbad with no adequate supplies of food, that he had to 
resort to begging since the monthly £2 for food which government provides is not enough 
compared to the high cost of living at Warmbad and the standard of living he had in the 
Caprivi Strip; that even though government bought one pair of trousers, one shirt, two 
small blankets at 14 s each for him, he was not provided with shoes and had no bed. He 
retorts: ‘I have to use a sack as a blanket…And yet the law which had removed [me] 
from Caprivi Strip was supposed to compensate me in full’.21 Goldblatt adds that 
Simbwaye told him that he was badly beaten by the White Police and had shown the 
marks and his torn shirt to the magistrate.22 It appears that Simbwaye and Maswahu were 
starved as a way of forcing them into submission. In a meeting with an official of the 
Bantu Affairs Department, Advocate Goldblatt was told that Simbwaye could get 
employment under the government and would be paid R18 for working in the location 
doing unspecified work but apparently, there was nothing that could be offered him by 
which his experience as a teacher could be made use of.23 This was not to be for 
Simbwaye had already made known his stance to Goldblatt: ‘The administration 
ascertains that I should get employment, and who can employ a politician?”24 
 
It is not known when and under what conditions Simbwaye and Maswahu got transferred 
to Warmbad. When Simbwaye found himself in the Windhoek Central Prison for a 
second time, he asked Captain Slabbert, the officer in charge of the gaol, to write to 
Clemens Kapuuo, a prominent member in the circles of the Herero Chief’s Council. 
Kapuuo then sent a message to Goldblatt informing him that Simbwaye was in solitary 
confinement in the Windhoek Central Prison. When Goldblatt contacted the prison 
official to arrange to see Simbwaye, he was told that the instructions from Bantu Affairs 
were that Simbwaye was to receive no visitors.25 With the assistance of an official at 
Bantu Affairs whom Goldblatt knew from previous interviews on behalf of Kapuuo, he 
convinced the prison official that he would see Simbwaye as a professional advisor and 
                                                 
21 Simbwaye in a letter to Goldblatt dated 18 July 1966. (BAB, NAN: BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II). 
22 Goldblatt Notes, 27 June 1966. (Held by BAB). 
23 Goldblatt in a letter to Simbwaye dated 23 July 1966. (BAB, NAN: BAD, File No.V5, Vol. II). 
24 Simbwaye to Goldblatt, dated 18 July 2006. (BAB, NAN: BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II).  











not just a visitor but even then, only in the presence of a prison official and the 
instructions were that he confine himself to Simbwaye’s appeal. He was thus able to see 
Simbwaye for one and half hours on 27 May 1966 at 10 o’clock. The prison official 
explained that Simbwaye was not in solitary confinement but was kept separate from the 
other prisoners (as if there is any difference) as he was regarded as a political agitator, 
being the reason why he was removed from the Caprivi Zipfel. He was also informed that 
provided Simbwaye behaved himself he would receive a remittance of two months of his 
sentence and which rendered the appeal unnecessary and the application for bail pending 
appeal useless.  Goldblatt enquired of Simbwaye as to why he was in jail, and about his 
appeal? 
 
On 14 October 196526 Simbwaye was sentenced in the Karasburg magistrate’s court for 
common assault and malicious damage to property. He was given a jail term of 70 days 
of which the first four weeks were in solitary confinement and with a spare diet.27 He 
served the jail term at the Keetmanshoop prison. As he would tell Goldblatt later, he was 
convicted for assaulting a woman, a sister’28 The incidence took place when the woman 
referred tried to prevent Simbwaye from sitting in the ‘whites only’ section of a church in 
Warmbad. Simbwaye denied this, maintaining that he couldn’t have gone to a Dutch 
Reformed Church in the first place since he was born a Catholic and had married a 
Catholic. He was discharged from Keetmanshoop prison on 4 December 1965 and went 
back to Warmbad. The same day, he was seen talking to some people who had come to 
his small hut. A White policeman came up to him at the time and demanded an 
explanation but nothing happened. Four months later, on 8 April 1966 he was arrested on 
a charge of contravening Section 20 of Proclamation 15 of 1928 which prohibited the 
promotion of any feeling of hostility between Non-Europeans and Europeans. He was 
                                                 
26 Goldblatt records the date as 6 October 1965. However, the date of sentence indicated on the court papers 
(docket), is 14 October 1965. Perhaps Simbwaye remembered the day on which the trial began and this is 
what he conveyed to Goldblatt. The docket papers are found in the National Archives of Namibia on file 
no. 1566, storage unit 1/1/12, archival group LKW 1/2/22, 1945 – 1969. 
27 Bennett Kangumu, Archival Research Report: The life history of Brendan Kangongolo Simbwaye, A 
missing SWAPO Vice-President, February 2006, p.11. (This report was submitted to the Steering 
Committee of the Archives of Anti-Colonial Resistance and Liberation Struggle, AACRLS, a project of the 
National Archives of Namibia. 











accused of fermenting racial strife. Simbwaye explained during the trial that he was 
complaining about a lack of food and his poor living conditions in general, and answered 
questions which he was being asked by those present. A state witness, Constable Mteka, 
testified that Simbwaye was ’fighting the government, and that he uttered the following 
to those present: 
 
Julle is te sleg, julle is toe. Julle moet vergaderings hou en saamstaan. Julle moet veg teen die 
boere. Julle kan klippe en ysters vat om te veg. Julle moet die boere met klippe vrek gooi. Ons sal 
Windhoek brandsteek en sal al die boere vrek maak. Die wat oorbly, sal onder ons werk, en self 
vir ons kinders `baas’ sê. Julle moet teen die witmense veg, en ons sal julle wapens gee. Januarie, 
sal julle ander dinge sien. Julle en die Roomse Vader is mos toe. Bantoestans is dood, Angola, 
Sudwes-Afrika, Mossambiek en die Republiek sal in Januarie val. 29 
 
He was sentenced to six months imprisonment on 14 April 1966 and sent to the 
Keetmanshoop prison where he served two months and then transferred to Windhoek 
Central prison hence his second meeting with Goldblatt. His case was sent for automatic 
review and was confirmed by Badenhorst J. on 21 April 1966. While Simbwaye and 
Maswahu’s banishment to Ohopoho was ‘perfectly legal’ according to Goldblatt, this 
seems not to be the case with their removal or transfer to Warmbad as no Ministerial 
Order was issued to this effect. Addressing this issue, Goldblatt wrote to Simbwaye: 
 
If your removal was effected without an order by the Minister it is in my opinion illegal, and if 
you will be again removed, as you fear, to some other place, again without a proper order, it will 
also be illegal.30 
 
Simbwaye’s fears were not without grounds, for the pair would shortly31 find themselves 
isolated on a remote farm (Halt Farm No. 379) near Welwitschia (now Khorixas) in the 
former Damaraland Reserve, probably about 1968 and most likely without a proper 
                                                 
29Testimony of Constable Mteka, state witness in the prosecution of Simbwaye in the Karasburg 
magistrate’s court, April 1966. For reference, see Bennett Kangumu, Archival Research Report, op.cit, 
p.10. 
 
30 Goldblatt to Simbwaye, dated 26 March, 1968. (BAB). 
31 The earliest reference to Simbwaye in Welwitschia seems to be June 1968, when the Damara Council 
registered a concern with the Bantu Affairs Commissioner with regard to his presence in Damaraland. See 
for example Letter from Bantu Affairs Commissioner to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and 











Ministerial Order.32 Fate would separate them there for Vernet Sibanda Maswahu would 
be sent to the Windhoek State Hospital on 15 July 1969 for a mental referral. Nothing has 
been heard of him since then. Simbwaye’s stay in Damaraland was not all welcome, at 
least not in the books of the Damaraland Bantu Affairs Commissioner, H.F.J. de Bruin. 
The Commissioner argued in several letters to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in 
Windhoek and to the Secretary for Bantu Administration and Development in Pretoria for 
Simbwaye to be removed from his jurisdiction. He declared that Simbwaye was 
politically active and had contacts with people of influence (judging from letters which 
pass through his office to and from people such as the Herero leader Clemens Kapuuo). 
Furthermore, he was fluent in Afrikaans and as Damaras spoke Afrikaans he would easily 
influence them, especially learners at the High School with whom he mingled at the local 
stadium when he came to town.  De Bruin added that the Damara Council had made 
representations to him on 25 April 1972, asking for the removal of Simbwaye, a repeat of 
a request they made in June 1968; that in any case if Simbwaye is permitted to travel to 
the Caprivi he will immediately cross into Zambia where his wife was. The police 
expressed concern about permitting Simbwaye to travel to the Caprivi Strip at this time, 
explaining:  
 
Met die huidige situasie wat in die Oos Caprivi heers, is dit vanuit `n veiligheidsoogpunt beskou, 
glad nie gewens dat hy daarheen verwyder word, en weer by sy mense geplaas word nie. My 
hoofkantoor is daarmee eens dat Simbwaye in Damaraland moet aanbly soos aanbeveel, totdat die 
huidige politieke klimaat verbeter het.33 
 
Despite police reservations, and representations from the Chief Bantu Affairs 
Commissioner34 against the move, the Secretary for Bantu Administration and 
Development signed a permit for Simbwaye on 9 August 1972 to travel to Katima Mulilo 
through Rundu on a six month visit. The question is why? In 1972 the Caprivi Legislative 
Council was established – and were therefore mindful of the fact that the government was 
                                                 
32 There is no evidence that was found during this research that indicate why Simbwaye and Maswahu were 
transferred from Ohopoho to Warmbad and Damaraland; neither was any reason given for their removal,  
most likely without a banishment order being issued. 
33 Letter from J.G. Myburgh of the South African Police to Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in 
Windhoek, dated 25 May 1972. (BAD, File No. V5, Vol. II). 
34 He did so again in 1972 arguing that there was no guarantee that Simbwaye would cease to work against 
the government of SA if permitted to go to Zambia. See letter dated 25 February 1972 addressed to the 











keen to make Simbwaye denounce the struggle and cooperate with the authorities. 
Perhaps they wished that such ‘progress’ towards ‘self-determination’ as they saw it, 
would win him over to their side. This issue was first tested on Simbwaye by the Bantu 
Affairs Commissioner of Damaraland, who relates: 
 
Ek het Brandon persoonlik al gevra wat hy dink van die Tuisland ontwikkeling. Hy het erken dat 
wat hy sien watt e Welwitschia gedoen word `n goeie ding is maar dat hy nooit met die 
Hoofmanne in die Caprivi sal kan saamwerk nie, omrede hulle die Blanke regering steun. Hy 
verklaar egter dat indien hy ooit teruggestuur word hy liewers na Zambia toe sal gaan waar hy baie 
vriende het.35 
 
Indeed, this is what he told people in the village in 1972, that the authorities offered him 
to denounce politics in return for freedom but that he had replied that ‘he will never stop, 
until when they cut and separate his head from the rest of his body will he keep quiet. 
That he doesn’t see the future of the country the same way as the current rulers see it.’ 36 
Another related issue which might have significantly influenced the decision to send 
Simbwaye to the Caprivi could have been the visit of the United Nations Special 
Representative, Dr Alfred Escher,37 to Namibia in October 1972. Part of Dr Escher’s 
mission was to visit the eastern Caprivi Strip to ascertain facts on the reported massacre 
(discussed elsewhere in this chapter) which occurred there in October 1968 and political 
repression in general. However, there is no evidence to suggest that Simbwaye was 
presented to the UN official during his visit to the Caprivi Strip nor suggesting that Dr 
Escher enquired about him. In any case people were prevented from getting an audience 
with Dr Escher, except for the late Pax Imbuwa Sibungo and Mr. Solomon Puzeli38 who 
were direct victims of the 1968 event. Apart from the two, Gilbert Mutwa managed to 
secretly hand in a document explaining the 1968 massacre and giving a broad overview 
of the general political climate in the Caprivi.39 
 
                                                 
35 Bantu Affairs Commissioner for Damaraland in a letter to the Chief Bantu Affairs Commissioner in 
Windhoek, dated 12 February 1971. (NAN: BAD, File No.V5, Vol. II). 
36 Personal interview with Pastor George Matali, a nephew of Brendan Simbwaye, at Kabbe (Caprivi), 16 
April 2006. 
37 Dr Escher’s report would be rejected both by SWAPO and the United Nations. 
38 Mr. Puzeli, who is still alive, lost his arm during the political repression in 1968. 











The conditions of the permit which was granted to Brendan Simbwaye specified that the 
visit was for six months only, that he report to the Commissioner in the Caprivi and also 
in Welwitschia upon his return. He was also under the impression that he will be taken 
back to Welwitschia, for he told people in the village how maize was growing in his 
garden and how worried he was since no one was taking care of the plants. This was 
never to happen. The police took him to the village apparently to say goodbye to his 
mother. When they came back for him that was the last time he was seen. It is not known 
whether he reached Katima Mulilo or not, whether he was killed or indeed escaped as the 
authorities claim. Since then, numerous stories about his disappearance or death 
abound.40 What is known is that he disappeared while on a visit to his home area and 
presumed dead but no one knows how he died and whether he was buried at all. 
 
The final expulsion of CANU from the Caprivi Strip did not take the form of ‘banning’ 
the party, as often remarked by activists and commentators41 alike. It has proved difficult 
to find proof of official government regulation or directive banning CANU from the 
Caprivi Strip. However, this took the form of wide-spread victimization of CANU leaders 
(with dismissal from teaching positions at the Holy Family Mission schools) and the 
harsh clampdown on its supporters and activities, for, as Fosse correctly observes, the 
non-violent, active and peaceful campaign had become ‘too successful’ for the 
                                                 
40 SWAPO’s latest account is published in its book ‘Their Blood Waters Our Freedom: Glory to the Heroes 
and Heroines of the Namibian Liberation Struggle, Windhoek: 1996. On page 317, there is the following 
about Simbwaye: ‘According to the Simbwaye family, Brendan Simbwaye, who was recorded as missing 
in 1964, was brought to his home village of Malindi by the South African Police in December 1971. He 
was permitted to spend a short period of time with his family and was then taken back into police custody. 
When subsequently informed that he was free however, he apparently demanded to be transported home 
and was taken by police vehicle to the Namibia/Zambia border and ordered to cross to Zambia. His last 
words were “I am going but don’t follow me”. He had barely walked a few metres when he was shot in the 
back. Simbwaye’s body was apparently buried in Zambia, although his grave has never been identified. A 
different version was established during fieldwork. Most of the informants believe he is dead, that he was 
never buried because his body was thrown into the Zambezi river, this from a former policeman who is also 
a relative of Simbwaye and one who was present when they last took him from the village, which is 
Limbeza instead of Malindi as wrongly reported by SWAPO. The general consensus seems to be that he 
was killed by the South African Police. A different version was alleged by the Allegemeine Zeitung 
newspaper in 1980. Quoting an article in the Johannesburg Star newspaper, the AZ alleges that Simbwaye 
was killed by SWAPO. 
41 See for example, Pütz, Von Egidy, Caplan, Namibia handbook and Political Who’s Who, Windhoek: 
Magus, 1989, p.44.; Fosse, `Negotiating The Nation in Local Terms: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Eastern 












authorities.42 Kruger himself concedes that ‘certainly the agents (of CANU) had sold 
their prospectus to a good many who were seen to go along with them; some may not 
have been happy  with what the future offered as they saw it’.43 
 
The first such clampdown occurred on the night of 28 August 1964 at Mafulo following 
the trial of Simbwaye and the two others. It was a clash44 between the employees of the 
administration and CANU supporters. Apparently the former had reached the end of their 
patience for being taunted for working for the White man. In the process, the CANU 
office and dwellings of CANU officials and supporters at Mafulo were set on fire, 
causing a great number of them to either cross the river into Zambia or flee Katima 
Mulilo to lie low in the villages. CANU supporters took refuge mainly at Katima 
Mulilo45 (Northern Rhodesia), Sesheke and Mwandi.  
 
Seizing this opportunity to cleanse the Caprivi strip of CANU, the administration held a 
series of meetings with traditional authorities and village heads to ‘clear the air’, as 
Kruger put: ‘to declaim against young men having been elevated to the status of all-wise, 
as might be deduced from the support CANU had received.’46 Fearing that CANU would 
now direct their activities from Zambia, the Commissioner wrote to Chief Moraliswani 
Maiba: 
 
There are certain young men of CANU who, as you know, have been creating trouble here, doing 
and saying things to try and poison the minds of the people against the government. You will 
understand that we cannot allow this sort of thing to go on. Recently they started trouble at the 
Mafulo village but when our men turned on them they ran away to Katima Mulilo in Northern 
Rhodesia. Now I hear they have moved to Mwandi and it is believed they will try to cause trouble 
in the Caprivi by crossing at or near Schuckmansburg. My policemen are being instructed to arrest 
them if they cross over for they are wanted here to answer to the things they have done. I shall be 
glad if you will send an Induna (headman) with the police car that is going to Schuckmansburg 
                                                 
42 Ibid. 
43 Kruger, History of Caprivi, 1984, p.21. 
44 Kruger describes it as an uprising by administration employees against CANU and the mob of supporters 
who remained at Mafulo. 
45 There is a place in Zambia with the same name, not far from Namibia’s Katima Mulilo. Reference thus is 
made of Katima Zambia and Katima Namibia/Caprivi to differentiate these two Katimas. 
 











and arrange that the Silalo (district) Induna there and trustworthy village heads and people will 
assist my men if they ask for it.47 
 
The additional magistrate, Mr. Bezuidenhout and the Sergeant of Police, Mr. Hartmann, 
departed for Schuckmansburg to seal the Caprivi-Northern Rhodesia frontier against 
CANU insurgency. In letters sent to Bantu Police Guards (BPG), they were instructed to 
go to this frontier ‘about certain work I wish you to do in connection with CANU trouble-
makers’.48 This marked the end of CANU in the Caprivi Strip, a movement which did not 
live beyond its official launch. It would join SWAPO in exile, in a ‘fateful merger’, that 
saw the expulsion from SWAPO of nine CANU members, including Albert Mishake 
Muyongo. 
 
The 1968 Singalamwe (Mayala village) Massacre 
 
With the dispersal and detention of CANU leaders and the flight of its supporters, police 
brutality was re-directed to ordinary inhabitants of the Caprivi Strip who were supposed 
to provide information about CANU, which was now in cahoots with SWAPO. 
Following the death of Tobias Hainyeko (first PLAN commander) near Namwi Island at 
the Zambezi River in Caprivi Strip on 18 May 1967, the clamp-down was stepped up. It 
culminated in Apartheid South Africa’s flagship monument of brutality in Caprivi Strip, 
the infamous and much publicized Singalamwe Massacre of 1968.49 Information about 
                                                 
47 Kruger, in a letter to Chief Moraliswani Maiba, dated 8 September 1964. (NAN, LKM 3/3/3, File No. 
N1/15/2). 
48 Letters sent by the Native Commissioner, Kruger, to the following Bantu Police Guards: Senior BPG 
Anderson Manwela, BPG Robert Ntelamo, and BPG Bonaventure Sambi, dated 8 September 1964. (NAN, 
LKM 3/3/3, File No. N1/15/2). 
 
49 The latest acknowledgement of this massacre, the first in independent Namibia, was made by President 
Hifikepunye Pohamba of Namibia in an address to the nation responding to the demands of the Committee 
of Ex-PLAN Combatants which is pressuring government for compensation for their role in the liberation 
war. He happened to repeat mention of the massacre at Katima Mulilo on August 26, 2006, during 
commemorations of Heroes Day. A critique of this massacre is to be found in Kenneth Abrahams’s Film 
Review of ‘This is Namibia’ by Per Sandén and Peter Berg, from Swedish TV, of 24 May 1978. In an 
attack, almost personal, on Sandén, Kenneth Abrahams accuse him of being a well-known SWAPO camp-
follower who functioned as semi-official SWAPO representative in Stockholm while the then 
representative, Ben Amathila was away. The Singalamwe massacre appeared in Sandén’s film “The 
Liberation Struggle in Namibia” which appeared in 1974. While Abrahams acknowledges that the massacre 
might have taken place since after Cassinga nobody doubts that such things occurred, he argued that the 











this massacre first came to the attention of the world in a testimony presented to the Ad 
Hoc Working Group of Experts of the Commission of Human Rights by Peter Katjavivi, 
then SWAPO Representative in the United Kingdom and Western Europe. According to 
Katjavivi, the massacre took place in October 1968 when the South African troops killed 
about 63 people. In the process, 350 people were arrested, and 2000 forced to flee the 
area. Of the100 small babies that accompanied their parents in the flight to Zambia, 53 
died of starvation and disease on the way. The massacre allegedly happened in the 
following manner: 
 
“First the headman of the village was dropped from a helicopter, as a warning of what would 
happen to anyone who withheld information about SWAPO freedom fighters or who gave support 
to the freedom struggle. Next the area was strafed and bombed, and then troops moved in, using 
fixed bayonets on anyone still alive in the village – thus adding a further chapter to the South 
African mission of civilization in Namibia.”50 
 
In his memoirs, Kruger acknowledges the flight of people as a result of this incidence 
even though he does not mention the massacre. His version51 is that a group of ‘terrorists’ 
entered at the locality where Namibia in the Caprivi Strip, Angola and Zambia have a 
common beacon. This group ransacked Finaughty’s shops at Singalamwe and Sibbinda. 
Then the police force reacted quickly in pursuit, seeking out also possible local 
collaborators. Regrettably, he adds: 
 
Numbers of villagers down at the Mashi left their homes to cross the border northwards, either 
into Angola or Zambia there to remain, amongst them Mano of Nkongola,…and also Wankie.52 
 
A Swedish television team from Sveriges Radio visited the Caprivi Strip allegedly at the 
invitation of SWAPO, consisting of two reporters, Per Sandén and Rudolf Spee of TV2. 
The reporters offered an interview to a staff reporter from the Argus Group Office in 
                                                                                                                                                 
For Abrahams, the showing of two skulls could not be regarded as evidence. But there are witnesses to this 
massacre which are still alive. For example, Mr. Puzeli, mentioned above, lost his arm in one of these 1968 
so-called security sweeps in Caprivi strip. While Kenneth Abrahams accused Per Sandén of blurred 
objectivity because of his close association with SWAPO (He happens to be in Namibia at the moment, 
apparently working on the SWAPO Archive), he could also be accused of not being objective in his 
assessment of whether the massacre took place because of his dislike of SWAPO after he fell out of favor. 
He was writing in 1978 in Namibia Today. 
50 Namibia News, Vol.7, No.6/7, June/July 1974, p.4. 
51 Kruger, History of Caprivi, 1984, pp. 24-25. 
52 Ibid., p.25. For a discussion of this incidence of Finaughty’s shops, see also Likando, ‘History of 











London, who travelled to Stockholm to attempt to establish the veracity of the report. 
They claimed to have indeed been in the Caprivi Strip during January/February 1974. 
One night they were taken to the site by Peter Nanyemba near Kalonga where they saw 
about 30 skeletons lying around. Even though they refused to be drawn on whether there 
were any shallow graves, signs of violence or anything pointing to unnatural death, they 
revealed that they found remains of huts, cooking utensils and skeletal remains above the 
ground. Some remains showed signs of being burnt as did the surrounding bushes and 
vegetation. Apparently Nanyemba told them that the massacre took place during 
September 1973, and not October 1968 as alleged by Katjavivi, who explains the 
confusion about the dates by averring that there had in fact been two massacres, one in 
1968 and the other in 1973.53 This security sweep claimed the lives of Simeon Muyongo 
(Mishake’s father), Judea Lyaboloma, Benjamin Bebi and Maxwell Kulibabika while 












                                                 
53 Correspondence from the South African Legation in Stockholm to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
Pretoria, dated 24 July 1974. See also telegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria to the 
same in Cape Town, dispatched on 30 July 1974. (NAP, File No. TES 2751, F11/243). 
54 He was charged with holding an illegal meeting and was given a suspended sentence. Later he would be 
em54 Kruger, History of Caprivi, 1984, pp. 24-25. 
54 Ibid., p.25. For a discussion of this incidence of Finaughty’s shops, see also Likando, ‘History of 
Caprivi’, 1989, p.145. 
54 Correspondence from the South African Legation in Stockholm to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in 
Pretoria, dated 24 July 1974. See also telegram from the Department of Foreign Affairs in Pretoria to the 













Figure 2:  Remains of Mayala village, site of the 1968 Singalamwe massacre in the Caprivi after a 
visit by the South African forces, which apparently petrol-bombed the village using helicopters.55 
 
 
CANU: 1964 AND AFTER 
 
The arrest of Simbwaye in 1964 threw CANU into disarray and total state of confusion: 
‘we didn’t know how to proceed; we didn’t have a clear beginning’.56 What remained of 
the leadership then met and decided that the logical cause would be to follow up on the 
talks with Sam Nujoma of SWAPO which Simbwaye had initiated. This task was given 
to Albert Mishake Muyongo and Crispin Mulonda who then departed to Lusaka in 
September 1964.57 Once in Lusaka, Mishake Muyongo wrote a letter to Sam Nujoma 
who was then in Dar es Salaam asking him to meet for talks.58 According to Muyongo, 
                                                 
55 Photograph reproduced from Namibia News, Vol. 7 No. 6/7, June/July 1974, p.3, and was provided to 
SWAPO by the Swedish Television Team. 
56 Adrian Waluka Simubali, personal interview, 16 April 2006. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Mishake Muyongo, in a Biography submitted to SWAPO, in Namibia News, Vol.3 No.1-3, 
January/March 1970, p.11. Note that Muyongo does not state that he was sent by the CANU leadership to 
follow-up on the talks, and in fact he does not mention that the talks had already been initiated by 











this meeting took place between himself, Sam Nujoma and Jacob Kuhangua, then 
Secretary-General of SWAPO59 while Sam Nujoma writes that he met Muyongo, Crispin 
Mulonda and Joseph Nawa and ‘…repeated my proposal for uniting the two parties, and 
we finally formalized the merger of SWAPO and CANU under the name of SWAPO’.60 
The ‘merger’ was announced in Lusaka on 5 November 1964 in a joint press statement 
by CANU and SWAPO and signed by Albert Muyongo (Vice-President of CANU) and 
Sam Nujoma (National President of SWAPO). The press statement read in part:61 
 
We the under-signed members of the South West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO) and 
Caprivi African National Union (CANU) do hereby declare that, for the interest of our people and 
freedom and independence of our Fatherland South West Africa CANU and SWAPO cease to 
exist as separate organizations. We further resolve that CANU and SWAPO merge and unite as 
one organization with the following aims and objectives:- 
 
a) To fight relentless for the total liberation of South West Africa from the yoke of 
the South African imperialism; 
b) To foster the ideal of Pan-Africanism and to rally the African masses into a 
cohesive national organization; 
c) To strive for the creation of true democratic Government in South West Africa, a 
government that would serve the interest of all the people of our country 
irrespective of their color, race, ethnic origin, religion or creed. 
 
Following the ‘merger’, Simbwaye was made Vice-President of SWAPO but since he 
was under arrest inside the country, Mishake Muyongo was appointed as Acting Vice-
President in his place.62 According to later CANU leadership, the merger between the 
two parties was rejected by some in the party.63 It might be important to clarify why there 
                                                                                                                                                 
to free Namibia, wrote a letter to Sam Nujoma, the President of SWAPO who was then in Dar es Salaam 
Tanzania, asking him to meet him for talks of a united front." 
59 Ibid. 
60 Nujoma, Sam, Where Others Wavered, p.136. 
61 Extracted from a joint press release by CANU and SWAPO of 5 November 1964, signed by Muyongo 
and Nujoma, p.5 (Copy in possession of author). 
62 It is unclear who else got positions in SWAPO from CANU as a result of the merger. Two others, 
Lemmy Matengu and Jackson Mazazi Lukonga are reflected at their dismissal from SWAPO in 1980 as 
former members of the SWAPO Central Committee (SWAPO Information Bulletin, No.4/80, July 1980, 
p.4). Indeed, it is not clear whether the Vice-Presidency was always going to be reserved for CANU within 
SWAPO as long as the ‘merger’ existed. 
63 Fossé, ‘Negotiating The Nation in Local Terms’, 1996, p.155. There was a misunderstanding as to the 
functioning of the merger. Some CANU members believed that the party still existed as an entity within 
SWAPO while another group believed that the two organizations were supposed to dissolve to form a new 
one, with a new constitution and under a new name. This misunderstanding, according to Likando, led to 
the arrest and detention of Gilbert Mutwa of CANU in Tanzania’s Maximum Prison (Likando, ‘History of 
Caprivi’, 1989, p.142). Likando further writes that on 29 November 1965 a Commission was appointed and 











was a ‘merger’: Did SWAPO really need CANU? Apart from the fact that unity of the 
Namibian people for a common cause was requisite for a successful campaign to 
overthrow the South African regime from Namibia, it should be remembered that 
internationally, both SWAPO and SWANU were canvassing for support, especially from 
the United Nations and the Organization of African Unity. This support depended firstly 
on unity within national liberation movements and, secondly, on how representative such 
an organization was of the people in a given country. With the formation of the OAU 
Liberation Committee, preparedness to take up arms became important. Up to this time 
SWAPO had not yet been officially recognized as the sole and authentic representative of 
the Namibian people by the United Nations. CANU was important to SWAPO in two 
other ways: Firstly, CANU had a good and well-established relationship with UNIP of 
Zambia through personalities such as Munukayumbwa Sipalo (UNIP Secretary-General) 
and Mundia Nalumino (a former teacher in the Caprivi Strip together with Simbwaye) 
who went on to become Zambia’s Prime Minister in the government of Kaunda, long 
before SWAPO leaders went to Lusaka. Zambia, being the only independent African 
country with a frontier touching South West Africa, was crucial in the logistical 
development of the Namibian armed struggle and therefore the support of the Zambian 
government was vital. That frontier comprised the Caprivi Strip and the area would 
indeed play a crucial role in the early and formative years of the armed liberation 
struggle, as Nujoma would remark in 2001:  
 
Since many of these comrades were living along the Zambezi River, they were especially skilled 
in rowing canoes. They made important contributions to the struggle by imparting their skills to 
their fellow freedom fighters. Thus SWAPO fighters were enabled to cross the Zambezi, Kwando 
and Kavango rivers into the interior of the country with their arms and ammunition.”64 
 
 The alliance would eventually collapse in July 1980 when Mishake Muyongo and eight 
others: Lemmy Matengu, Jackson Mazazi, Ignatius Matengu, David Mutabelezi, Dennis 
Kachilombwa, Ernest Likando, Benjamin Mabuku and Calvin Songa, were expelled from 
SWAPO at the Extra-Ordinary Session of the Central Committee of SWAPO held from 
                                                                                                                                                 
review structures to accommodate CANU’s concerns. He does not tell us however what became of this 
Commission, and, in any case, this could not be verified by any other source. 
64 Nujoma, Where Others Wavered, p.137. For a detailed discussion on the role of the Caprivi Strip in the 












17-19 July 1980 at (N)Dalatando,65 Kwanza Norte, in Angola. They were expelled 
apparently for engaging in ‘counter-revolutionary and secessionist activities aimed at 
dismembering Namibia’s National territory. They have actively been advocating and 
organizing for the breaking away of our Eastern Region-Caprivi-from the rest of the 
country.’66 In a lengthy Editorial in its mouthpiece, SWAPO Information Bulletin, 
SWAPO castigated Muyongo  thus: 
 
On one hand, he was happy to occupy the position of Acting Vice-President of SWAPO and enjoy 
the authority and prestige which went with that position and on the other hand, Muyongo was not 
ashamed to indulge himself in tribalistic and regionalistic activities. Specifically, Muyongo had 
always sought to build up a personal following within SWAPO on a tribal basis. He wanted and 
expected all SWAPO members from Namibia’s eastern region of Caprivi to be loyal to him 
personally and to regard him as their tribal, rather than national representative within the SWAPO 
leadership. Those Caprivi members of SWAPO who failed to demonstrate personal loyalty to 
Muyongo had to face tribal ostracism or exclusion from his personal favor. Muyongo was always 
hesitant to make personal sacrifice when that was demanded of him in the interest of the liberation 
struggle of Namibia. It can be recalled, for example, that when the Provisional Headquarters of 
SWAPO were located in Dar-es-Salaam in the early 1960s, Muyongo preferred and actually opted 
to stay with his family and friends in Lusaka. Again, when he was recently confronted with a 
unanimous decision of the Central Committee to shift his residence from Lusaka to Luanda where 
the Movement’s Provisional Headquarters are now located, he refused to do so.67 
 
The “New CANU” 
 
Muyongo and his accomplices did not attend the Central Committee meeting to answer to 
the charges leveled against them.68 Instead, he issued a press statement on 7th August 
1980 in which he announced the revival of what Richard Kapelwa called ‘a tribal and 
regional mini-party known as CANU’ to ‘fight for the liberation of Itenge – the term he 
always used when referring to the Eastern Region – and not Namibia’.69 Now that CANU 
                                                 
65 Two spellings are provided in one publication, Dalatando and Ndalatando. 
66 Declaration of the First Extra-Ordinary Central Committee Meeting of SWAPO held at Ndalatando, 
Kwanza Norte in the People’s Republic of Angola from 17-19 July 1980, in SWAPO Information Bulletin, 
No.4/80, July, 1980, pp.3-4. 
67 Ibid., p.1 
68 Even though invitations were extended to all members of the Central Committee to attend, Muyongo, 
together with two others, Lemmy Matengu and Jackson Mazazi, both members of the Central Committee, 
refused to attend this Extra-Ordinary Session of the Central Committee convened specifically to deal with 
documents which ‘revealed’ the intention of Muyongo to secede the Caprivi from the rest of Namibia. 
Likando maintains that the reason why they did not attend was because they received information that they 
were going to be murdered (Likando, ‘History of Caprivi’, 1989, p.150). 
69 Richard Kapelwa, ‘Letter to the SWAPO Regional Chairman of Eastern Caprivi’, in The Combatant, 











was a ‘tribal mini-party’, it is not clear whether the expulsion of Muyongo meant the 
scrapping of the merger of 1964. What is known, however, is that many CANU 
supporters continued with the war for liberation under the banner of SWAPO. According 
to Muyongo, repeated charges of discrimination and tribalism, the suppressed role of 
CANU in SWAPO and disagreements with the SWAPO leadership over strategies in 
negotiating between the Western Contact Group, SWAPO and South Africa after the 
passing of UNSCR 435 in 1978 were some of the sore points in his relationship with 
SWAPO.70 He accused the SWAPO leadership of failure to deal adequately with internal 
problems and predicated severe future problems for SWAPO. 
 
It was to be his revived CANU that would soon be engulfed by severe problems. No 
leadership was chosen at the time of the revival of the party. Attempts to do so were seen 
by Muyongo as undermining and subversive against him and led to the sidelining of his 
two top aides, Chibeya Siseho Simasiku and Lemmy Matengu, whom he accused of 
plotting to assassinate him.71 Zambia refused to acknowledge an official CANU presence 
and Muyongo returned to the Caprivi in June 1985 through the Ngoma Border Post, 
possibly from Senegal.72 A party congress held in May 1982 elected a leadership which 
Muyongo refused to accept and led to his first expulsion from the party, readmitted in 
1985 and expelled again over the question of the merger with the DTA. In 1985 CANU’s 
application to join the Multi-Party Conference (MPC) was rejected. Muyongo 
reconstituted the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP) into the United Democratic Party (UDP) 
and led it into the DTA.  After some internal squabbles, CANU split and joined alliances 
(NPF and UDF) to enter into elections under UN Resolution 435 and marked the end of 
an era. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Member of the political Bureau of the Central Committee of SWAPO. He is from the Caprivi Strip. At 
independence, he served as Namibia’s first Minister of Works, Transport and Communications. Richard 
Kapelwa passed away in May 2007 and is the first ‘Caprivian’ to be buried at Heroes Acre in Windhoek. 
70 Fossé, ‘Negotiating The Nation in Local Terms’, 1996, p.155. See also Pütz, Von Egidy & Caplan, 1989, 
Namibia Handbook, p.90. 
71 Likando, ‘History of Caprivi’, 1989, p.157. 














The discussion in this chapter centered on the different ways in which the people of 
Namibia’s Caprivi region responded to the creation and consolidation of the Caprivi 
identities. These identities were constructed through state formation and were premised 
on the assumption that since the people of Caprivi Strip ‘have not affinities either of 
language or blood or otherwise with other South West Africa natives’ and since they 
occupy a different geography, they should be administered separately and indeed, have a 
separate identity from that of the rest of South West Africa/Namibia..  
 
It was observed that the people learnt over time to work with, around and against the 
imposition of these identities on their lives, which was done through the medium of 
traditional elites and institutions. For most part, colonial administration in the Caprivi 
Strip was not actual and direct, but persuasive and indirect – preferring to subjugate the 
people through their own traditional institutions. Tr ditional elites acted as agents of the 
successive colonial administrations, and with the rise of regional nationalism, competed 
with the intelligentsia, mainly teachers, for the control of the masses. In its quest to 
silence dissent, specifically CANU, the administration endeavoured to show that it was 
merely doing so to preserve tradition or ‘duly constituted authority’, that is, the rule of 
the chiefs through which its subjugation found expression and therefore created 
unnecessary friction between the traditional elite and the nationalists. 
 
To show both consent and dissent, the discussion used three illustrations: firstly the 
attempts by South Africa in the mid 1940s to incorporate South West Africa as a fifth 
province. The people of Caprivi were involved in a referendum to decide on this issue. 
Even though the result shows consent, a closer examination revealed that people were not 
clearly informed on the difference between ‘incorporation’ and continuation of South 
African rule. Given the options, they chose to continue being under the ‘Union Flag’, but 
sounded a warning that ‘we do not know what lies in the future but if things do not please 
us we will complain’. Significantly, people rejected the identity of being ‘Lozi” as it was 











upon such a return with ‘fear’. Part of the reason why the concept of Caprivianness 
emerged was the belief that the people of the Caprivi region were more ‘Lozi’ than South 
West African due to historical factors, language and cultures which implied that they 
would be happy to return to Barotseland. It was shown that the identity of being Lozi was 
rejected by some at various points. 
 
Secondly, the discussion examined the Odendaal Commission public hearings which 
were held at Katima Mulilo (Caprivi) over two days in February 1963. A fundamental 
shift was noted at the hearings. Instead of the general grievances of the 1940s and 1950s 
directed mainly at government officials in the Caprivi Strip for not allowing people to 
buy arms and ammunition, restrictions on killing of game, and lack of stores and market 
for the disposal of cattle, and the usual call for their transfer, a unanimous call for the 
withdrawal of the South African Government from the Caprivi Strip was vocal. 
Interestingly, this came from the traditional elite (chiefs) who served as South Africa’s 
medium of power dissemination, for the Commission refused to meet any other group 
except Europeans resident in the Caprivi Strip. On average, it was found, the Commission 
interviewed more Europeans than ‘Caprivians’. Their recommendation was a roadmap 
for the consolidation of the Caprivi identities through a legislative council (1972) and a 
Caprivi government (1976). 
 
Lastly, the discussion examined in great detail the rise of regional nationalism in the 
Caprivi Strip, specifically the formation of the Caprivi African National Union (CANU). 
It was concluded that CANU constituted the most organized association to emerge in the 
Caprivi Strip through which the South African rule of Caprivi Strip was challenged. The 
response of the administration to the rise of CANU was harsh and swift. The party did 
not exist in Caprivi Strip beyond its first public meeting. A harsh clamp down on its 
leaders and supporters alike left many under detentions such as Brendan Simbwaye and 
many others on the run. Police brutality in what was regarded as security sweeps aimed at 
the population resulted in a massacre in 1968 in which scores of people were killed and 












This dispersal of CANU leaders and supporters would aid the nationalists in their quest to 
disintegrate the Caprivi Identity. Once outside, they joined forces with SWAPO and 
realized that their struggle was part of a broader cause to free the rest of South West 
Africa of which they were an integral territorial component and that they form part of a 
‘Namibian Identity’ in the making. Consequently, this would open the Caprivi Strip as a 
strategic front for the Namibian liberation war. A regional cause which started with 
CANU’s desire to deconstruct the Caprivi Identities as constructed by South Africa now 
and create a new identity of ‘Caprivianness’ took  on a national outlook, with the war 
against South Africa not only in Caprivi Strip but in the rest of Namibia making use of  
the Caprivi Strip strategically and militarily. Similarly, the banishment of Brendan 
Simbwaye and Vernet Maswahu to other parts of South West Africa put them in touch 
with other nationalist leaders such as Herero leader Clemens Kapuuo. By removing them 
to Ohopoho (Opuwo), Warmbad and Welwitschia (Khorixas), the administration 
reinforced and exposed them to a greater South West Africa and therefore indirectly 
aided their crusade to dismantle the view of Caprivi as constructed by  all powers that had 














SECESSION: THE IDENTITY OF PEOPLE AS 




In the early morning hours of 2 August 1999, separatist rebels calling themselves the 
Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) launched armed attacks on a Police station, army base 
and NBC (Namibia Broadcasting Corporation) building at Katima Mulilo. Five officers 
and three soldiers were killed, while five separatists were killed and eight captured.1 The 
group advocating for the secession of the Caprivi region is led by former SWAPO Acting 
Vice-President and leader of the former official opposition, the DTA (Democratic 
Turnhalle Alliance), Albert Mishake Muyongo, now leader of the UDP (United 
Democratic Party). Muyongo and his group reportedly want Caprivi to secede from 
Namibia as he feels there is nepotism and tribalism in the SWAPO-led Government and 
that he believes the four northern regions of Oshikoto, Oshana, Omusati and Ohangwena 
(formerly Ovamboland) are being developed at the expense of other regions.2 During 
1998 and early 1999, scores of people including the marginalized San fled the Caprivi 
into neighboring Botswana as refugees fearing repercussions after government unearthed 
a scheme to secede the Caprivi from Namibia. The Namibian government requested 
Botswana to extradite those responsible but this request was turned down for fear that the 
refugees’ human rights might be violated if returned. The two governments however 
agreed to the voluntary repatriation of refugees. Scores have since returned. While the 
Namibian Defense Force managed to quell the resistance in just a few hours and 
                                                 
1 On their website (see below) the secessionists dispute the figure of casualties provided by government and 
other sources. According to their information all those who were in Mpacha military base and those who 
were arriving in the morning very few survived. That at Wenela (WNLA) military base and Katima Police 
station  many were killed; three were killed at the Katima Mulilo shopping centre and  killed at the 
Katounyana (Special Field Force) Base. The secessionists’ claim could not be verified by any other source. 
At best it appears to be propaganda aimed at the international community. 
2 Chrispin Inambao, ‘Governor joins Caprivi Exodus: Botswana launches manhunt’, in The Namibian, 











normalcy seems to have returned to the Caprivi, the issue of secession is still very much 
alive in Namibian courts where over a hundred suspected secessionists are being tried for 
treason, sedition, murder and the illegal possession of firearms. 
 
At the heart of secessionist attempts is the battle for a Caprivi Identity’, as Muyongo put 
it ‘We are Caprivians….Nobody will make Namibians out of us – not even by force’.3 
The intention to occupy the NBC radio station by the rebels was to announce ‘that 
Caprivians were no longer considered Namibians, but Caprivians’.4 Those being tried for 
treason questioned the Namibian courts’ jurisdiction to try them since they were not 
Namibians. The Caprivi Identity now becomes a spatial or geographical: own identity in 
a historically own territory. For the secessionists, the question of Caprivi ‘is not of 
secession, it is a question of the area regaining its original status as a country’.5 In the 
advent of secessionist attacks on government installations at Katima Mulilo on 2 August 
1999, Maria Fisch published a useful, albeit historical, justification of secession in the 
Caprivi Strip, titled The secessionist movement in the Caprivi: A historical perspective.6 
Therein lies the question to be examined in this chapter: does secession in the Caprivi 
Strip have a historical basis (which is really Fisch’s argument)? And if so, which history? 
I will argue that the secessionist movement in the Caprivi Strip has a historical 
construction (mainly by apartheid SA) or perspective as Fisch contends, but that 
secession does not have a historical basis or justification. This is because the historical 
argument on which it is based is flawed in many respects, which is largely the history of 
Lozi subjugation in Caprivi. Rather, I will conclude, the Caprivi Identity is a normal 
process of ‘negotiating the Namibian nation in local terms’,7 which is a blend of ethnicity 
and nationalism, and secession, is just an extreme expression of this process. 
                                                 
3 Brigitte Weidlich, ‘Muyongo hits out at Govt: Charges not even force will deter secessionists’, in The 
Namibian, 11 September 2006, p.1. 
4 History: Caprivi Zipfel: The controversial strip (Part III), posted on 23 August 2005, at  
File://E:\CapriviFreedom  - history.htm; source: www.caprivifreedom.com;  
http://www.caprivifreedom.com/news.i?cmd=view&nid=818. Website accessed on 20 November 2006. 
This is the official website of the Caprivi secessionist movement. 
5 History: Caprivi Zipfel, the Controversial strip (Part II). Ibid. 
6 Fisch, Maria, The secessionist movement in the Caprivi: A historical perspective, Windhoek: Namibia 
Scientific Society, 1999. 
7 Expression borrowed from a thesis title by John Leif Fossé, ‘Negotiating the Nation in Local Terms: 












This chapter will critically examine the basis for secession in  the Caprivi region, which 
rests primarily on two arguments, the fact that Caprivi has ‘historically never been’ part 
of Namibia; and the fact that SWAPO, then a liberation movement, pledged in 1964 to let 
‘Caprivians’ attain self-rule at independence when CANU (Caprivi African National 
Union) and SWAPO merged. The third motivation for secession often mentioned, that of 
under-development or neglect of the Caprivi region by the SWAPO Government, will be 
discussed only in minor detail. 
 
A Peripheral Identity, Caprivi Under Colonialism 
 
A prosecution witness in the second treason trial, Sackey Akweenda,8  added his voice in 
describing the Caprivi region as a creation of colonialism, ‘its peculiar shape the result of 
deals and treaties that colonial powers – Germany, Portugal, Great Britain and later also 
South Africa – concluded with each other’.9 It is this peculiar shape which became the 
curse of the Caprivi apparently as it rendered it difficult to administer which resulted in 
the territory being tossed from one administration to the other. Some academics described 
the colonial creation of the Caprivi Strip ‘…as one of the most bizarre results of the 
scramble for Africa’10 while others concluded that the Caprivi represented an unfortunate 
anachronism which should have been amputated from the former South West Africa at 
the creation of the League of Nations Mandate after World War I and assigned to 
Botswana and Zambia.11It is this line of argument which feeds the secessionists’ thinking 
that Caprivi historically never belonged to Namibia. My argument in this chapter is that 
indeed Caprivi was part and parcel of South West Africa since 1890, just that it was kept 
on the periphery of mainstream political, cultural and social happenings in greater South 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
8 Author of International Law and the Protection of Namibia’s Territorial Integrity: Boundaries and 
Territorial Claims, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997. 
9 Werner Menges, ‘Second treason trial provides a lesson on border history’, The Namibian, 21 November 
2006, p.7. 
10 Pretorius, J., The Fwe of Eastern Caprivi: A study of their historical and geographical background, tribal 
structure and legal system, with reference to Fwe family law and succession (MA: Stellenbosch) 1975:47. 












West Africa. I am yet to be shown any country in Africa which is not a creation of 
colonialism and, especially in Southern Africa, one which evaded the imperialist 
expansionism of the British, Germans and the Portuguese. 
 
The peripheral status of the Caprivi was ambiguous as both useless and useful and this 
shifts during colonial rule. For most part of German and South West Africa 
Administration rule, the Caprivi was largely viewed as a useless piece of land, a 
problematic vast disease-bearing flood plain which was not suitable for white settlement. 
For this reason, the SWAA offloaded the territory onto the Bechuanaland Protectorate 
Administration and later onto the Union Native Affairs Department. This changed 
because of its military strategic importance, being located between Angola, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana, the Caprivi constituted the main infiltration route for SWAPO 
in the early stages of the liberation war, as well as a convenient base for SA to launch 
aggressive attacks on neighboring states. As a result, Caprivi became one of the most 
heavily militarized regions of Southern Africa. Contrary to arguments that Caprivi was 
never part of Namibia, the war served to integrate the territory into Namibia to a very 
much larger degree than before, especially in terms of infrastructural development. 
Because of its military importance, Caprivi became a very useful South African 
Bantustan in south central Africa. All the same, Caprivi was deliberatively kept 
peripheral during this period in economical, political, cultural  sense, and especially in 
relation to the process of nation-building, for as I argue, precisely because of military 
purposes. The intention of the SA government was to keep the area isolated and 
inaccessible from outsiders who might question its use for military purposes against the 
provisions of the Mandate System which prohibited any part of the Mandated Territory to 
be used for such purposes. 
 
Whereas the rest of South West Africa was nominally ‘independent’ or indirectly 
administered by South Africa, the Caprivi Strip was administered directly from Pretoria. 
Even radio, one of the most common means of communication in those days,12 was 
                                                 
12 The other being letters writing. This should however not be overemphasized given the low literacy rate of 











strictly controlled by the South Africans. This was followed by the ‘self-government 
homeland’ status between 1972 and 1980 when the Caprivi had its own national anthem, 
flag, coat of arms and a constitution. This, I argued elsewhere, was the highest point, of 
the Caprivi Identity (read secession). It should be mentioned that although the Caprivi 
was administered directly from Pretoria, the legislation which was applied in the territory 
was that of the South West Africa Administration. It was this long period of isolation and 
special status of the Caprivi which accounts for feelings of ‘Caprivianness’ as opposed to 
‘Namibianness’. Three events account for the integration of ‘Caprivians’ into mainstream 
Namibia before independence: the liberation war, the Turnhalle Conference and AG8, 
legislation that introduced the three-tier ethnic system of central, regional and local 
government. Even then, as it is argued here, the Caprivi was never independent during 
this period. It was just closer to South Africa than to the rest f Namibia, which was 
referred to as South West Africa, that is, as some country other than their own, among 
people in the Caprivi region’.13  
 
Territorially, Caprivi remained part of Namibia throughout its colonial history. It would 
be remembered that the reason why the Caprivi was withdrawn from the Bechuanaland 
Protectorate Administration was because the Mandates Commission ‘discovered that the 
territory was being administered by the wrong power’ and demanded that it revert to 
SWA. The territorial boundaries of Namibia have been defined by the German-
Portuguese Treaty of 30 December 1886 and the Anglo-German Treaty of 1 July 1890. In 
terms of the mandate that was granted to South Africa, any changes to the boundaries of 
the territory that South Africa had to administer had to be approved by the League of 
Nations. There is no evidence to suggest that any step to alter the status of the Caprivi in 
relation to the territorial integrity of SWA was effected during colonial rule. The 
Namibian Constitution in turn states that the national territory of Namibia shall consist of 
the whole of the territory recognized by the international community through the organs 
of the United Nations as Namibia. According to Akweenda, this would include the 
                                                 












Caprivi Strip.14 Therefore the secessionist argument that Caprivi has historically never 
been part of Namibia is difficult to appreciate. This leads me to look for the basis of this 
argument in the pre-colonial period. A starting point logically is the secessionists’ 
presentation of their history which they date back to 1600 with the Caprivi being part of 
Bulozi or Lozi Kingdom. The Lozi were defeated by the Makololo of Sebetwane in the 
late 1820s but were able to regain control in the early 1860s (see Chapter Two). This was 
the state of affairs until Europeans appeared on the scene in the 1890s. According to this 
history, the Caprivi was never an independent entity and therefore for the secessionists to 
advocate its independence on historical grounds, leads one to ask the question which 
history? 
 
It is apparent, then, that it is the history of the Lozi, and indeed, according to the 
Masubiya, the ruling Mamili dynasty that wants to revert to Lozi suzerainty in the 
Caprivi. Fisch has it that Muyongo actively promoted the slogan ‘Revival of the Lozi 
culture in Caprivi’ during the final years of his political career.15 This is not surprising in 
light of the following. Firstly, the Mafwe Chieftainship, the ruling Mamili dynasty to be 
specific, are descendants of a Lozi representative in Caprivi, Simataa (Imataa) Mamili, 
who was posted to Caprivi in 1864 to guard against the return of the Makololo and others 
such as the Matebele of Mzilikazi. It was Simataa Mamili whom the Germans found at 
Linyanti in 1909 and made chief of the Mafwe, including all other non-Subiya speaking 
inhabitants of the Caprivi. Therefore the secessionist movement is really grounded by 
Lozi nostalgia by the descendants of Simataa Mamili in Caprivi. The second is the claim 
of Barotse support for the secessionist cause in Caprivi. It was reported in the media at 
the time of the secessionist attack on Katima Mulilo that the Lozi of Zambia’s western 
province were crossing into the Caprivi to ‘help separatist rebels fight for the regions’ 
secession from Namibia’, a leader of the Barotse Patriotic Front (BPF), Imasiku 
Mutangelwa, was quoted in Lusaka.16 Mutangelwa called on ‘all Lozis worldwide to 
                                                 
14 In Werner Menges, ‘Second treason trial provides a lesson on border history’, The Namibian, 21 
November , 2006, p.7. 
15 Fisch, 1999: 22 
16 Tabby Moyo, ‘Claims on Barotse support surface’,  












contribute materially to the cause of the Caprivi secessionists’, adding, ‘We are ready to 
defend our democracy, brothers and the UN charter’.17 The Caprivi rebels, who attacked 
Katima Mulilo are believed to have entered Namibia from south-western Zambia. The 
Lozi of Zambia had been fighting for their ‘independence’ since Zambia’s independence. 
Rendering support to the Caprivi secessionists was really intended as a wake-up call to 
President Fredrick Chiluba of Zambia. In fact, Mutangelwa warned the Zambian 
Government of Fredrick Chiluba at the time to ‘take a leaf’ from what was happening in 
Caprivi. When Mutangelwa was served with an order to report to the police over 
statements he made that Zambian Lozis18 were moving into Namibia to re-inforce Caprivi 
secessionists, he sought refuge at the residence of the South African High Commissioner 
in Lusaka and requested South Africa to grant him political asylum.  
 
It is significant to record that Lozi cultural influences are not very welcome in Caprivi, as 
can be seen from the following lengthy quote provided by Fossé, taken from a letter to 
the editor of New Era about the origins of the Siyomboka dance: 
 
Allow me to comment on an article in your recent edition which suggested that Caprivians no longer 
perform siyomboka. First, I would like to state that the person who made this claim is not a Caprivian, 
and cannot pass himself as an expert on Caprivian cultures. The person who made this claim is actually 
a Zambian and he should be told that Caprivians will not allow cultural influences from his land of 
origin, especially if such influence has the potential to undermine our traditional way of living as 
inherited from our ancestors. This said, I would like it known that Caprivians are a people with a rich 
traditional base and who show respect to their customs and beliefs. And contrary to the author’s claim, 
the siyomboka was never popular nor was it traditionally taught to people in Caprivi as the author 
claims. Rather, it came into Caprivi, especially into the Musanga area where the author is known to 
have family attachme ts, from the other side of the Zambezi. And the question is: What has a Zambian 
dance got to do with Caprivian cultural way of living, birth, growing up, education and marriage 
system? Caprivi has prominent tribes which have different traditions as well as foundations of respect: 
 
 The Mayeyi tribe has a traditional dance called Shibboli; 
 The Masubiya tribe has a traditional dance called Sipelu; 
 The Mafwe tribe has a traditional dance called Muyaluke; 
 The Mambukushu has a traditional dance called Umpera. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
17 Ibid. 











Namibians have a responsibility to defend their traditions, and to protect such traditions from neighboring 
countries.19 
 
What becomes important is the reaction of other groups in the Caprivi, apart from Lozi 
and the Mamili lineage, to secession. In an article which appeared in the local media on 
this issue titled ‘Secession of Caprivi a minority interest’,20 the writer quoted Chief 
Liswani III of the Masubiya as follows: 
 
A group of people from one village (Linyanti) cannot say they own Caprivi and, apart from 
Mamili, they didn’t even consult the other chiefs about their plans…. (Emphasizing that none of 
his subjects had joined Muyongo’s group, the chief added) It is only from the Linyanti area and a 
few individuals from Kongola, but no one from the Subia tribe has run away.21 
 
In a letter to a local daily, a reader assessed support for the secession in Caprivi as 
follows: ‘It is a well-known fact that the ill-advised ambition of secessionism is 
entertained in only one or two out of the six constituencies in the Caprivi Region. Even in 
such one or two constituencies, it is doubtful whether the most people there support the 
idea of secessionism. The democratic principle dictates that the minority conform to the 
wishes of the majority. The same is true of the few secessionist-minded people in that 
region. It is a pity they cannot be wished away.’22 
 
Limiting the support for secession to the Linyanti area needs further contextualization 
and actually brings in an interesting aspect of identity formation in Caprivi. There exists 
conflict within the Mafwe over who is considered genuine and ‘true’ Mafwe. As shown 
in a quotation from a letter writer in a previous chapter, a distinction is usually made 
between Mafwe residing at Kongola, Choi, Sesheke and Singalamwe (taken to be true 
                                                 
19 ‘Siyomboka is not Caprivian’ by Lawrence M. Simbilu. Letter to the Editor, New Era 28 September – 4 
October 1995, in Fossé, 1996: 181. 
20 Chrispin Inambao, ‘Secession of Caprivi a minority interest’, at  
http://www.namibian.com.na/netstories/november98/caprivi8a.html, accessed on 5 March 2007. 
21 Actually one Subia man, Mr. Tawana of Nakabolelwa, who had long connections with the DTA, is 
known to be among the secessionists facing treason trial in the High Court. 
22 Benjamin Chika Mabuku, ‘Response to Mr. Chrispin Matongo’s Secessionist Outbursts’, in New Era, 15 
September 2006, p. 11. This is very ironic because, as shown in Chapter Six, this letter writer is among 
those expelled from SWAPO in 1980, together with Mishake Muyongo, precisely for secession. Is it 












Mafwe)23 and those inhabiting the Linyanti – Chichimane – Kanono area, usually 
referred to as Mbalangwe. As the writer says, ‘The people of Namibia must be made to 
understand that Chief Mamili and Mishake Muyongo are not Mafwe, but 
Mbalangwe…the Mbalangwe clan’s association with the Mafwe people is in dubious 
nature….Mafwe elders should clearly explain to us, the young generation, their 
association with a tribe which speaks a mixture of Lozi and Subia.”24 This is what Anton 
Bredell had to say about the Mbalangwe language: “It is a sociolectal variety of Cisubiya 
[Subiya] and that Mbalangwe is the name applied to Cisubiya speakers residing in the 
Mafwe area.”25 There is a close interrelationship between the Masubiya and Mbalangwe, 
to an extent shown above that Mbalangwes are taken to be Masubiya residing in Mafwe 
areas. This corroborates the claim by the Masubiya chief that people living in villages 
surrounding Lake Lyambezi such as Lusu, Masokotwane, Zilitene (Kwena), Machita and 
Silumbi, who consider themselves Mafwe, were once all his subjects.26 What is more, 
Fossé concludes, ‘the Masubiya also provided the present ruling dynasty of the Mafwe’.27 
Kruger (1963:3) actually says Simataa is a ‘Musubia placed by the Malozi as headman in 
the western area and who had assumed the name Mamili from his Mukololo 
predecessor’.28 The above shows that secessionist support in Caprivi is the concern of a 
clan, the descendants of the Lozi Simataa Mamili. A major argument in this section has 
been that secession does not have historical justification since the history on which it is 
based is also foreign and not ‘Caprivian’, if you would like. Such a history is 
unacceptable to other groups in the Caprivi, particularly the Masubiya. It would be 
recalled from Chapter Two that the Subia assisted Sebetwane of the Makololo to cross 
the Zambezi on his way to conquer the Lozi; and that the Lozi revolution against the 
Makololo in 1864 was centred in the Subia area. When the Makololo were overthrown 
and the Lozi kingdom restored, the Subia indicated to the Lozi that they became 
autonomous with the end of the Makololo authority. This led to Sepopa, then Lozi King, 
                                                 
23 It is this group which has formed its own chieftaincy, the Mayuni or Mashi Traditional Authority. 
24 “Mafwe suffer unfair abuse” by Michael Allan Munyandi, New Era, 16-22 June 1994. 
25 Anton Bredell, in Maho, Few People, Many Tongues, 1998, p. 51. 
26 New Era, 29 June – 5 July 1995, quoted in Kangumu, Bennett, ‘The Land Dispute between the Mafwe 
(Fwe) and Masubiya (Subia): An historical contextualization’ (unpublished manuscript, 2007). 













to descend on the Masubiya and force a great number of them to flee to Botswana about 
1876. The Masubiya therefore loathe any attempt aimed at restoring Lozi rule in the 
Caprivi. The close association of secession to Loziness therefore automatically excludes 
them from participating. 
  
If secession does not have a historical justification, what accounts for the actions of the 
secessionists? At least two factors are responsible for secessionist tendencies in Caprivi, 
it is argued here. The first is that it is a South African construction due to the special 
status (read peripheral) the Caprivi was accorded during the liberation war, and the 
second has to do with the political fortunes and misfortunes of one person, Albert 
Mishake Muyongo, who has successfully manipulated the existing tribal tension between 
the Mafwe and Masubiya to aid his checkered political career. The result is that Mafwe 
feel marginalized by the present government but importantly, they believe, this because 
of misinformation from the Masubiya.29 Is secession therefore an extension of the tribal 
feud between the Masubiya and the Mafwe? 
 
South Africa’s Construction of Caprivi Secession 
 
It became apparent from the above that the Caprivi enjoyed a special status due to its 
geopolitical potential for the Apartheid regime in Pretoria. To recapitulate,, this was 
because it was squeezed between Angola, where Portuguese colonialism had crumbled 
and SWAPO opened another front in its liberation war; Zambia, which was really a 
logistical hub for many liberation movements in Africa (SWAPO, ANC, ZAPU) and 
whose Western Province not only bordered Angola but it was where SWAPO had a 
number of bases and transit (retention) camps for refugees joining the movement; and 
Botswana, which provided an alternative transport corridor, particularly rail transport, for 
heavy cargo to the Caprivi Strip. Supplies of both men and equipment criss-crossed the 
Caprivi during this period, and the area became a sophisticated military base for South 
Africa from which to launch attacks on Zambia and Angola at the same time being a 
transit point for SWAPO fighters.  
                                                 












The presumed special status of the Caprivi influenced the nature of South Africa’s power 
dissemination in the area and aimed to maintain what Flint terms a ‘clientilist 
population’.30 Such a population was to be different in many respects to other population 
groups in the mandated territory of South West Africa. Firstly, the great divide between 
the Masubiya and Mafwe became the hallmark of administrative policy; that they had 
equal status by right, which was bequeathed by their common Lozi ancestors. Secondly, 
that it was only colonial intervention which disrupted their ‘Loziness’ in 1909 when the 
Germans set up an administration at Schuckmannsburg. This colonial process, Fisch 
argues, ensured that ‘indigenous groups that bore no ethnic, linguistic or historical 
relationship to other Namibian tribes were incorporated into German South West 
Africa.’31 This has been the basis for a Caprivianness, and now secession, the curse of 
being different. Amazingly, adherents of ‘Loziness’ in the origin of Caprivi inhabitants 
chose to ignore the fact that the Mbukushu of Kavango for example, migrated largely 
from the Caprivi where a section which remained still live.  
 
However it was counter-productive for Apartheid South Africa to place too much 
emphasis on this Lozi connection given that SWAPO was housed in Zambia. Instead the 
Caprivi was to be brought closer to Pretoria but allowed to develop on its own which was 
really the construction of isolation. This period was marked by intense focus. Droves of 
officials, including the Prime Minister and his ministers, visited the Caprivi more often 
than before especially during the preparation of the case at the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) brought by Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa. As noted elsewhere, 
the Caprivi was presented as a model Bantustan at this time. The two chiefs of the time 
and their delegation were also accorded a visit to the Union of South Africa. Furthermore, 
scholarships were given to ‘Caprivians’ to further their studies in South Africa. It is 
during this period that the identities of ‘Caprivianness’ are consolidated. This 
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consolidation involved a transition from Eastern Caprivi Zipfel (ECZ) of the 1930s 
through the 1960s to  the East Caprivi of the 1970s during the establishment of the East 
Caprivi Bantustan (Homeland), and eventually its inhabitants were invariably being 
referred to as ‘East Caprivians’ or just ‘Caprivians’, as in ‘Administration for Caprivians’ 
(AG8). 
 
When it dawned on South Africa that Namibia would have to be allowed to succeed to 
independence, the idea of Caprivi as an independent state was given serious 
consideration. It could offer South Africa a vantage point to watch and influence political 
events in neighboring independent African states. In the words of Flint, ‘the South 
African regime renewed Streitwolf’s policy of creating a separate colonial constituency 
but hybridized it so that Caprivi could become a friendly ‘independent’ satellite of South 
Africa in what was rapidly becoming a very unfriendly region for Pretoria’.32 The 
Windhoek Advertiser33 reported that the secession of the Caprivi area and the formation 
of an independent ‘state of Itenge’34 was discussed at a meeting between South African 
President Botha and the two Caprivi tribal chiefs. This was linked to the move by the 
Rehoboth Bantustan leader to declare the area a ‘republic’ thus excluding it from the 
conditions of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 435.  
 
The other option considered by South Africa at the time was to sabotage a SWAPO 
victory at the UN supervised elections, once again with the Caprivi being at the centre of 
such an endeavour since it bristled with South African military personnel. The creation of 
a rebel group along the lines of UNITA35 in Angola and Renamo (MNR) in Mozambique 
was considered to destabilize a future SWAPO Government. Mishake Muyongo was 
apparently approached by the South African government on this scheme which would 
incorporate members of 101 Battalion which operated in the former Ovamboland area to 
                                                 
32 L. Flint, ‘State-Building in Central Southern Africa: Citizenship and Subjectivity in Barotseland and 
Caprivi’, in International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 36, No. 2. (2003), p. 420. 
33 Of 3 January 1989. See also The Namibia of 25 November, 16 December 1988; and one for 13 January 
1989. 
34 Name of a pre-colonial Subia kingdom. 











give a semblance of a broader base.36 It is not surprising that the Caprivi secessionists 
received both equipment and training from UNITA, as reported by the South African 
Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) and other media.37 The Caprivi Strip had been the key 
supply route for UNITA rebels especially by apartheid South Africa. As noted in an 
earlier chapter, UNITA had a military base in western Caprivi. The involvement of 
outside paramilitary forces in Caprivi is not new. In 1987 British media38 reported that 
South Africa was preparing a 200 strong mercenary unit for attacks on the frontline states 
and exiled Namibians and South Africans using a ‘terrorist’ force that contained former 
Rhodesian Selous Scouts, members of the SA-backed FNLA39 and UNITA forces in 
Angola, former members of the Portuguese PIDE (secret police) and members of 
Koevoet. These forces were being assembled, according to the reports, at the Katima 
Mulilo military base in the Caprivi Strip where they were well placed for attacks on most 
of the frontline states and were supported by three companies of the SADF. 
 
Given the above, it is argued here that secession in Caprivi is a direct product of South 
African occupation in that it was this occupation which created and emphasized local 
notions of identity that served to alienate local people from other groups in Namibia. It is 
these localized notions of identity which are expressed as secession in the post-colonial 
era. Indeed, it is here where one should look for the causes of secession instead of the 
pre-South African colonial era normally dressed as historical, social and cultural 
differences between ‘Caprivians’ and other Namibians. 
 
Mishake Muyongo and Caprivi Secession 
 
It was established in the preceding paragraphs that Caprivi secession, usually passed as 
having historical origination, is actually a South African construction especially of the 
                                                 
36 INON (International News on Namibia), No. 66, February 1989. 
37 Quoted by XINHUA News Agency, ’Angola’s UNITA Implicated in Namibian Unrest’, at 
http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1G1-55357402.html.  
38 Morning Star, 27 June 1987 (ublished by the Communist Party of Great Britain); and the BBC of 27 June 
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1980s with its interventionist policy of aggression in Southern Africa. Albert Mishake 
Muyongo was central to the South African plans that conceived Caprivi as a separate 
independent state at the implementation of United Nations Resolution 435. The Caprivi 
secession is therefore, it is argued here, debatably, tied to the political fortunes and 
misfortunes of its leader, Albert Mishake Muyongo. To support this assertion, this section 
will briefly examine Muyongo’s political career as well as his traditional (chiefly/royal) 
heritage. The latter is in answer to the question of ‘how Muyongo, one single individual, 
could have succeeded in contaminating so many people with his ideas and influencing 
them to take up arms – even though, realistically, a secession of the Caprivi from the rest 
of Namibia had no chance of succeeding.’40   
 
There is no better place to search for the political career of Mishake Muyongo than his 
own autobiography which he submitted to SWAPO at the 1969 Tanga Consultative 
Conference where he was made acting vice-president of the movement.41 This will be 
supplemented, and contrasted to some extent, by information extracted from the website 
of the secessionists, presumably also provided by Muyongo, on the history of ‘Caprivi 
Zipfel: The controversial strip – (part one)’.42 In his autobiography, Muyongo traces the 
cradle of his political consciousness to Kilnerton College near Pretoria where he was 
preparing for his university entrance. On arrival there, he found that Afrikaans was one of 
the requisites for entrance to a University in South Africa and since he did not study 
Afrikaans in the Caprivi where Latin was studied in its place at the Catholic Mission 
School where he attended, he approached the Principal of the college and requested to be 
allowed to do Latin in place of Afrikaans. This was turned down. He took Afrikaans but 
apparently passed with very low marks. In 1962 he was due to commence his university 
education at Roma College (Pius XII University College) in Basutoland (Kingdom of 
Lesotho) but as he states, his ‘…political consciousness had reached such dimensions that 
he could not hold it in check any more’.43 As a result, he contends, the ‘…South African 
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42 Posted on June 16, 2005, at file://E:\Caprivi Freedom - History II.htm., accessed on 20 November 2006. 











authorities, in April 1962, virtually deported him from South African territory’.44 In fact, 
he disputes the fact that CANU was formed in the Caprivi, claiming that it was formed in 
Mafikeng, on his initiative after having been influenced by the politics of South Africa, 
together with Mason Liseli Mamili, George Mutwa and Charles Mubuyaeta Mubiana, 
“who welcomed the idea with open arms.”45 Back home in 1962, Muyongo secured a 
teaching position at the Kanono Bantu Community School. It was at this school that he 
reportedly established a teachers’ union, the African Teachers’ Union, purportedly the 
‘first African organization of its kind – in the Caprivi Strip’ and he became its first 
president.46 A few months after its formation, the ten teachers that comprised the union 
reportedly went on strike demanding higher pay, the school remained closed for five days 
until the School Board succumbed to the demands of the protesters. To remove him 
temporarily, Muyongo reports that the school offered him a bursary in 1963 for a 
teacher’s training course in Mafikeng, South Africa, where he remained until the end of 
1963. When he returned he was offered a teaching post at his former school, Katima 
Mulilo Mission School.47  
 
Meanwhile, events in the Caprivi were moving very fast. CANU canvassed for support 
from village to village until most people understood their objectives. Muyongo reports 
that it was after this ‘canvassing’ that a conference was convened in March 1964 
‘representing every corner of the Caprivi Region of Namibia’ and was attended by about 
2, 500 delegates. He further states that ‘it was here that the Caprivi African National 
Union (CANU) was born’ where Simbwaye was elected as the President and himself as 
Vice-President.48 Muyongo’s exposition ends with what he calls ‘the first test of strength 
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between the South African Government and CANU [that] occurred in August of the same 
year (1964)’.49 He continues: 
      
In … mass protest demonstrations, covering the entire Caprivi Strip, CANU challenged the 
authority of the South African Government. Brendan Simbwaye and Mishek led these 
demonstrations from the very beginning. Finally, they marched on the headquarters of the South 
African Government at Katima Mulilo. It was the biggest demonstration of its kind and again, the 
first, in this region of Namibia. There were clashes between the crowd and the South African 
Police. The Police opened fire and two people were killed. Scores of others were injured. 
Simbwaye and Maswahu were arrested (they remain in detention to date).50 Mishek Muyongo 
escaped to Zambia. This was in September 1964.51 
 
Much of what is recited above on Muyongo’s political vita as presented to SWAPO in 
1969 could not be supported by any other source, written or oral, to put it mildly. It is 
difficult to appreciate why South Africa would virtually deport him in 1962, only to 
allow him back in the country the following year, especially after organizing a teachers’ 
protest strike that purportedly disrupted classes for five days. Surely the authorities would 
have taken cognizance of the formation of this ‘first ever African Teachers’ Union’. The 
facts surrounding the formation of CANU are dealt with in a previous chapter Six, 
Muyongo was part of the group that founded the movement, but the claim that he 
initiated it in Mafikeng, is treated here just that – as a claim. Also, there is no record, oral 
or otherwise, of a conference organized in Caprivi during this period, to the magnitude of 
attracting 2,500 delegates. In fact, it is unimaginable that it was allowed to take place, 
while the claim that CANU marched, with Muyongo and Simbwaye at the forefront, on 
the headquarters at Katima Mulilo, to ‘challenge the authority of the South African 
Government’ is also disputed. 
 
Instead of a protest march, as claimed by Muyongo, CANU organized a public rally at 
Mafulo, near Katima Mulilo, at which the party was to be launched by its president, 
Brendan Simbwaye, but he was arrested before this could happen. In fact most 
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informants do not remember whether Muyongo was present at that meeting or not, and if 
he was, how he evaded arrest, being a senior member of the party, remains unclear. There 
is another contradiction, in respect of his escape to Zambia. While in his biography it is 
stated that he went into exile in September 196452, it is reported on the official website of 
his movement that he left on the night of 2 August 1964, after security forces ‘pounced 
on a meeting called to discuss the arrest of Brendan Simbwaye….’53 Does this show a 
willingness to celebrate August 2, on which the secessionists attacked Katima Mulilo in 
1999? The information provided in the résumé to SWAPO is therefore a bit spiced up, 
probably to cement his position in the movement but also, as he was in an acting 
capacity, to show that he had the qualities and credentials to take the place of Simbwaye, 
his senior in CANU. Biographies and autobiographies are important tools in determining 
a person’s nationality. It is interesting to note that Muyongo, in this one, throughout 
refers to the ‘Caprivi Region of Namibia’. At this time, he would agree, he was a 
Namibian. 
 
Once outside (in Lusaka), Mishake Muyongo wrote a letter to Sam Nujoma, the President 
of SWAPO, who was then in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) asking him to meet for talks.54 
The meeting took place in Lusaka where Sam Nujoma repeated the same proposal to 
unite the two parties that he had made to Simbwaye.55 Those present, according to 
Muyongo, were himself, Sam Nujoma as President of SWAPO, and Jacob Kuhangua, 
then Secretary-General of SWAPO.56 Nujoma has it that Crispin Mulonda and Joseph 
Nawa were also part of the CANU delegation to these talks.57  
 
Messrs Nujoma and Muyongo agree on the fact that CANU and SWAPO entered into a 
‘merger’ which was announced on the 5 November 1964 in Lusaka.58 Nowadays, though, 
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the secessionists maintain that CANU leadership did not want this merger, so much so 
that SWAPO had to use the influence of the Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda and 
Nalumino Mundia to convince the CANU leadership into accepting the merger.59 This 
claim is repeated by Fossé who states, without naming his sources (apart from saying that 
later CANU leaderships), that the alliance between CANU and SWAPO was rejected by 
a large majority in the party.60 Flint quotes a statement to the press by Mr. F.M. 
Siomunyi, whom he identifies as CANU’s regional secretary in Livingstone, as having 
stated in December 1964 that ‘the people of Caprivi are not struggling for their 
independence to join up with any of their neighbours…We are dedicated to the freedom 
of Caprivi alone. When we are free, it will be up to the people to decide whether or not to 
join any country’.61  
 
Where Nujoma and Muyongo’s views diverge is firstly on the functioning of the alliance 
and, secondly, on the interpretation and constituent elements of the ‘merger agreement’.  
For Nujoma, the agreement formalized the merger of SWAPO and CANU under the 
name of SWAPO.62 CANU believed that it existed as an independent entity in SWAPO 
or at least that if the two organizations merge into one, their constitutions should be 
reviewed and a new one drafted to pave the way for a new party with a different name. 
According to Fisch, undoubtedly quoting Muyongo, it was agreed that the organizations 
‘should either exist together under a new name, or CANU should retain its name and 
identity’.63 In reality, CANU dissolved into SWAPO. Questions still remain, though, as 
to the exact nature of this ‘alliance’, on which the press release announcing the ‘merger’ 
is silent. For example, how did it come about that the vice-presidency of SWAPO was 
given to CANU? And most importantly, on what terms or conditions? Also, was the 
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position to remain in CANU as long as the alliance was in force? What is telling is the 
fact that the president of CANU held this position for a long time, in absentia, during 
which his deputy acted in his place. The secessionists allege on their website that one of 
the provisions in the agreement was that ‘If the first President comes from SWAPO, then 
CANU must automatically produce the vice president and vice versa’.64 According to 
Likando, the misunderstanding as to the functioning of the ‘alliance’ led to clashes in the 
Kongwa camp (Tanzania) that led to the detention of George Mutwa, one of the CANU 
leaders.65 This is supported by Samson Ndeikwila who, in contributing to the debate on 
arbitrary detentions in the liberation movement, states the following: 
 
The history of arbitrary detentions among Namibians in exile started in 1965 in Tanzania with the 
detention of George Mutwa and Alfred Tongo Nalisa, the leaders of the Caprivian group at 
Kongwa. Their complaint was that the Caprivians were being discriminated against; not regarded 
as full SWAPO members. After the two’s release from detention, SWAPO disowned them and 
they made their way to Kenya.66 
 
It appears that the mistrust between the two main ethnic groups in Kongwa camp, the 
‘Caprivians’ and ‘Ovambos’, continued well into the late 1960s, as can be seen from one 
of the demands of a group in the Kongwa Military Training Camp. They wrote a strong 
memorandum to the SWAPO political leadership in Dar-es-Salaam in 1968: ‘Thirdly, we 
demanded that the rift between the two main ethnic groups, Ovambos and Caprivians, at 
Kongwa Military Training Camp be brought to an end’.67 This mistrust is what is 
reconstituted as ‘Ovambo tribalism’ mainly by the secessionists, but also by some 
scholars.68  
 
A cause for considerable disagreement between Messrs Nujoma and Muyongo, and 
actually a major basis for secession often cited, is the terms of the 1964 ‘Agreement’, in 
which SWAPO allegedly made an undertaking that the Caprivi would be granted either 
special status or complete autonomy after Namibia’s independence. ‘Instead of being 
                                                 
64 File://E:\Caprivi Freedom - History II.htm, p.3. ibid. 
65 E. Likando, The Caprivi Strip: A Historical Perspective, 1989, p. 142 (Unpublished manuscript, in the 
author’s possession). 
66 Samson Ndeikwila, in a letter sent to The Namibian Newspaper, dated 14 October 2006, p. 2 (copy in my 
possession). 
67 Ibid., p. 1 











asked whether we want to be part of Namibia or not, the Namibian government imposed 
themselves on Caprivians. It is therefore that the Caprivi case is [a] question of forced 
occupation. The Namibian government never honored their end of the bargain’, so the 
secessionists argue.69 SWAPO, through its president, Sam Nujoma, the co-signatory to 
the agreement, refutes this version of events, saying that there was always an agreement 
for one nation.70 Nujoma’s version of events seems to be the one supported by a press 
statement issued on 5 November 196471 that announced the ‘merger’. SWAPO argues 
that Mishake Muyongo was a member of the Constituent Assembly that drafted the 
Namibian Constitution, and never mentioned the now controversial promise regarding the 
Caprivi’s status after independence. ‘At best, Mr. Muyongo could have supported the 
idea propagated then by the late Kaptein72 Hans Diergaardt to make Rehoboth an 
independent entity within Namibia. Of course, even the DTA c uld have dumped and 
replaced him with someone with a Namibian agenda.73 Muyongo defends himself as thus: 
 
The question that the Caprivi case was not mentioned in arliament is in the first place not correct, 
because on numerous occasions the president of UDP reminded the SWAPO party to honor their 
agreement. It is also on record that one Caprivian parliamentarian was almost suspended from 
parliament just because he said he represented Caprivians. In fact any Caprivian who mentioned 
the idea of a merger was often labeled a tribalist and received a harsh opposition from SWAPO.74 
 
The above sentiments show that the issue of the 1964 ‘agreement’ remains emotionally 
and politically charged in contemporary Namibian politics. As a result, it becomes 
shrouded in secrecy and near mystery since it is not openly discussed. This state of affairs 
was exacerbated by the government’s decision to ban the United Democratic Party 
(UDP): “No UDP meetings will be allowed in the Republic of Namibia from 1 September 
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[2006]. The secessionist activities of the UDP render it an illegal organization.’75 In early 
2007 Namibians woke to a catchy front page headline in a local daily: ‘Secret’ Nujoma – 
Muyongo document surfaces‘, which proclaimed: ‘A potentially explosive document 
related to the Caprivi, which the SWAPO Party has persisted in saying does not exist, has 
suddenly surfaced in Namibia’.76 The impression was created that efforts were being 
made especially on the part of SWAPO to keep such a document secret, or at least deny 
its existence. The view here is that the said document is a press release which, by its very 
nature, makes it a public document. Researchers on Namibian history had known for a 
long time that the document existed and was held by certain archives and libraries.77 
Rather SWAPO’s contention was that the ‘agreement’ did not make provision for ‘special 
status’ or ‘complete autonomy’ for Caprivi as claimed by the secessionists. Indeed the 
document does not mention anything about a separate or independent Caprivi state. 
Probably this was not ‘all’ the agreement; perhaps, some ‘oral’ undertaking was made.  
Thus according to SWAPO Secretary-General Ngarikutuke Tjiriange: ‘There had only 
been a verbal agreement to merge the two parties…the CANU members then became 
SWAPO members, but there was no talk of a separate Caprivi after independence’.78 
How realistically do you enforce such a verbal agreement, let alone make it a basis for a 
cause such as secession?  
 
It is difficult to dismiss outright that the options being propagated by the secessionists 
were not tabled or even considered during the deliberations that led to the ‘merger’ 
between CANU and SWAPO because of the geopolitical dimension or what was taking 
place in the countries in which the two movements were based. The negotiations between 
the two parties on this issue were bound to be influenced, on one hand, by events in 
Tanganyika and Zanzibar where on April 24, 1964, the United Republic of Tanganyika 
and Zanzibar was declared, being renamed Tanzania in October of the same year. The 
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creation of Tanzania did not mean full integration. Zanzibar retained independent status 
within Tanzania, responsible for local affairs whilst foreign affairs were dealt with by the 
Union Government in Dar es Salaam, to which Zanzibar paid an annual contribution.79 It 
should be remembered that SWAPO was based in Tanganyika during this period and 
would therefore had been well versed with political developments in the host country. 
The CANU-SWAPO agreement came right on the heels of the Tanganyika developments. 
On the other hand, negotiations for the ‘merger’ took place in Lusaka, Zambia, where on 
the eve of Zambia’s independence in 1964, UNIP80 of Kenneth Kaunda successfully 
negotiated to incorporate the nominally autonomous Barotseland state into the new 
independent Zambian state. Kenneth Kaunda and the Litunga of Bulozi (King of 
Barotseland), Sir Mwanawina Lewanika, signed the agreement. The impact of this 
process cannot be underestimated. Therefore the negotiators were torn between the 
Tanganyika (Tanzanian) and the Northern Rhodesian (Zambian) model. As events turned 
out, the Zambian model prevailed.  
 
In the final analysis, the fundamental issue is not whether CANU and SWAPO entered 
into an agreement, or even what was agreed upon, but what was the purpose of the 
‘merger’ agreement, and most importantly, what implications, if any, did that have on the 
internationally recognized territorial boundaries of the  then South West Africa, now 
Namibia. It does not appear that the Agreement was meant to merge Caprivi with 
mainland South West Africa (or perpetuate the separation). Rather the purpose of the 
Agreement was to ‘merge’ the two movements into one organization to fight a common 
enemy, as it turned out, to incorporate CANU into SWAPO. Both parties to the 
Agreement were not at this stage competent authorities to decide on the international 
status of the territorial integrity of South West Africa, that being the preserve of the 
United Nations Organization (UNO). Even SWAPO was not yet recognized as the sole 
and authentic representative of the Namibian people. As a letter writer to a local daily 
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pointedly ask: ‘Who of the two leaders who signed that Agreement was mandated by the 
people of the ‘two countries’, if ever, to conclude and sign such Agreement?’81  
 
After the ‘merger’ between CANU and SWAPO, Mishake Muyongo was made SWAPO 
chief representative in Lusaka, responsible for educational affairs in 1966, being 
promoted to the position of Acting Vice-President at the 1969 Tanga Consultative 
Conference. Two others, Jackson Mazazi and Lemmy Matengu served on the SWAPO 
Central Committee. Tension started building up between Muyongo and SWAPO in the 
mid-to-late 1970s, according to the former, because of the suppressed role of CANU 
within SWAPO82, which led to his expulsion in July 1980. However, according to 
Richard Kapelwa, a fellow ‘Caprivian’, Muyongo and company were expelled because of 
their intention to form a ‘new CANU’ with the aim of seceding the Eastern Region from 
the rest of the country. He continues: 
 
From the availed evidence, it was proved that Muyongo, since his appointment to the position of 
Acting Vice-President ten years ago, he has been fully committed to either overtly or covertly 
keeping alive a tribal and regional mini-party known as CANU-Caprivi African National Union. 
By so doing, Muyongo, Mazazi and Matengu have betrayed the Namibian people in their struggle 
for National Unity.83  
 
Now that CANU had become ‘tribal’ and ‘regional mini-party’ within SWAPO, it remain 
unresolved in historical discourse whether the alliance or ‘merger’ collapsed with the 
departure of Muyongo, even though former CANU members continued fighting for 
liberation under the banner of SWAPO. In fact the same meeting that expelled Muyongo 
and others re-confirmed its support and confidence in the SWAPO leadership which still 
included Brendan Simbwaye. Was SWAPO just expelling Muyongo and his group or was 
it scrapping the ‘merger’ with CANU? 
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After the split, Muyongo revived CANU in Lusaka but no leadership was elected apart 
from him. This move was condemned by other CANU members and attempts to do so 
were interpreted as subversive and undermining. Since then, the story of the ‘revived’ 
CANU and that of Muyongo is filled with intrigue – and characterized by infighting. 
Muyongo sidelined two of his top aides, Lemmy Matengu and Chibeya Siseho Simasiku 
and instead chose to work with Messrs Gideon Matengu Mwilima, Godwin Siyongo and 
David Mutabelezi.84 Muyongo accused the pair of constantly plotting against him. As a 
result, Likando (1989: 158) writes, on 28 March 1981, that Muyongo organized a group 
of CANU youth which he paid to discredit the two. This was apparently after a failed 
scheme hatched by Muyongo and the South African delegation to abduct the two in 
Geneva and secretly take them to South Africa. Muyongo’s note to the South African 
delegation was given to a Mr. Reginald Z. Katembo.85  
 
In mid-October 1982, the Zambian Government invited the CANU leadership in Lusaka 
to discuss the internal crisis within the organization. Mr. Muyongo left for Botswana on 
the scheduled date, but before he left, he went to the Zambian police and alleged that he 
escaped death and that his CANU colleagues Lemmy Matengu and Chibeya Simasiku 
were behind the assassination plot. The two were detained by the police for questioning 
and were only released on the instruction of the then Prime Minister of Zambia, 
Nalumino Mundia.86 Again, on 5 December 1982, Muyongo had an audience with the 
Zambian President where he repeated allegations of assassination attempts on his life to 
the media, especially after what he called the ‘sacking’ of Lemmy Matengu and Chibeya 
Simasiku from CANU.87 A major source of discord between Muyongo and the two seem 
to be not only contest for control of CANU but also Muyongo’s secret contacts with 
Apartheid South Africa. The Sunday Times of Zambia of 14 November 1982 reported a 
secret meeting between Mr. Muyongo and Peter Kalangula of the Christian Democratic 
Alliance [Action] (CDA) that was also attended by UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. The 
same report was also carried out in the Windhoek Advertiser of 20 October 1982. The two 
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(Lemmy Matengu and Chibeya Simasiku) issued a press release on 25 November 198288, 
under pressure from the Zambian authorities that remarked that ‘Muyongo’s recent 
participation in the Pretoria sponsored meeting over the formation of a puppet 
government of national unity was secret and without authority“.89 Shortly thereafter, the 
Zambian Daily Mail of 30 June 1983 reported the expulsion of Mishake Muyongo from 
CANU, who was picked up by the police for questioning. In a headline titled ‘New Twist 
to Namibian Saga: Who is who in the South Africa Link’, The Sunday Times of Zambia 
of 23 July 1983 had it that Mishake Muyongo confirmed he had secret meetings with 
South Africa and revealed all his contacts and activities between 1980 and 1982 during 
interrogation. The Zambian authorities considering him to be a security risk so Muyongo 
was deported to Senegal.90 Contrary to Fisch’s version that Muyongo was deported to 
Senegal alone,91 we now know that he was accompanied by Godwin Siyongo, David 
Mutabelezi and Gideon Matengu Mwilima, according to the secessionists.92 It is not 
surprising, therefore, that this group returned to Katima Mulilo through the Ngoma 
Border Post via South Africa on the 8 July 1985. Mishake Muyongo and his colleagues 
were kept in detention for four weeks at Katima Mulilo while investigations into their 
political activities were being conducted. After his release, he was re-admitted into 
CANU but this did not last long. The Caprivi at this time was plunged in local politicking 
rergarding the tribal land dispute between the Mafwe and Masubiya over whether or not 
there existed an internal boundary between the two groups. After his proposal that CANU 
be dissolved and that a new party with a new name be formed was soundly defeated, 
Muyongo left CANU and merged with the Caprivi Alliance Party (CAP) under Patrick 
Limbo, to form the United Democratic Party (UDP) on the 5 August 1985. UDP’s first 
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congress was held on the 26 August 1985.93 The impression created in some circles that 
CANU was UDP’s predecessor is not correct.94 CANU never dissolved or gave way to 
UDP. Soon after its formation, the UDP joined the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA) 
where Muyongo was made Vice-President in 1987, and with the resignation of Chief 
Kuaima Riruako as DTA President in November 1991, Muyongo took his place. 
According to Maria Fisch, Muyongo never gave up his idea of a separation of the Caprivi 
even now that his party had joined the DTA. He reportedly put forward the topic of 
separation for discussion at a DTA congress in Swakopmund in around 1987, but it was 
roundly rejected’.95 Fisch reasons that Muyongo turned to hoodwinking his colleagues in 
the DTA, pretending to promote national interests while he hoped that if the DTA won 
the 1989 Constituent Assembly elections, there would be improved chances for him to 
realize his secessionist ambitions.96 I tend to argue that secession, or rather the threat of 
it, was something that Muyongo kept in reserve as a political tool (something he was not 
serious about), for use when his political position became threatened, otherwise how does 
one explain the fact that after being expelled from SWAPO and vowing to fight for an 
independent Caprivi, he aligned himself with political developments in South West 
Africa? Why did he prefer to join the DTA other than be on his own, in Caprivi? 
 
Partly, the answer is to be found in what Richard Kapelwa harshly terms ‘a serious 
political weakness’ and Muyongo’s apparent contradictory tendencies.97 He summarizes: 
 
For the last 16 years, Muyongo displayed two contradictory tendencies. On one hand, he was 
happy to enjoy the prestige and political power which go with the position of the Vice-Presidency 
of a nationally powerful and internationally renowned movement – SWAPO. On the other hand, 
he always tended towards tribal or regional cliquism at moments when the revolution demanded a 
bit more from him, especially with regard to his personal comfort. The idea of moving from 
Lusaka to Dar-es Salaam in the 1960s and from Lusaka to Luanda recently has been a problem to 
him. Lusaka was apparently too good for him. Therefore, he has persistently refused to accept and 
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appreciate the necessity for strategic shifts in accordance with the requirements of the struggle at 
given times… 
 
Was joining the DTA just another quest for personal comfort on the part of Muyongo? In 
seeking answers to this question, I move into the aspect of the involvement of traditional 
chiefs in politics, which was also the support base for Muyongo’s political career. In 
explaining this move, Muyongo almost entirely blames the traditional chiefs. He 
maintains that while on one hand his UDP was advocating for an independent Caprivi, on 
the other hand ‘Caprivian’ chiefs “who had been made members of the then council of 
ministers and later the government of national unity were of the opinion that should the 
Caprivi become independent they would loose their positions and the new ‘Caprivian’ 
government would be run by politicians and not chiefs’.98 As a result, Muyongo further 
states, the chiefs chose to remain with Namibia. The impact was that their followers, 
being traditionally inclined, did not want to disappoint their chiefs. The UDP had no 
option than to join the DTA. It follows therefore that the contest was set between 
Muyongo and the traditional chiefs. Two things should be noted, firstly, that the Caprivi 
Alliance Party, which Muyongo incorporated into his UDP, was already a member of the 
DTA, and secondly, that it was under Mafwe Chief Richard Temuso Muhinda Mamili 
that the CAP joined the DTA. It is not merely coincidental that Chief Richard Temuso 
Muhinda Mamili was deposed from the chieftaincy at about the same time (in 1987); 
apparently for “neglect of duty”99, because he spent most of his time advancing political 
issues. Though he was deposed by his people, could it be this rift between him and 
Muyongo that played itself out in the DTA alliance cost him his traditional job?  
 
The dynastic heritage of Mishake Muyongo has been detailed by Maria Fisch. It is 
enough to mention here that he was a member of the Mafwe ruling (more specifically 
Mbalangwe) dynasty, being a direct descendent of Simataa Mamili, the first chief. Even 
though he was definitely entitled to succession, he waived this on two occasions in favour 
of a political career. The first of these was in 1971 when, two years before the death of 
Chief Simasiku, the Mafwe tribal authority dispatched a senior representative to Lusaka 
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to persuade Muyongo to return since the chief’s old age was preventing him from 
executing his duties properly. The second was before Chief Muhinda Mamili was 
deposed in 1987, when Muyongo announced beforehand that he would waive his 
candidature, upon which Boniface Bwima, his younger cousin, was installed. Unlike in 
the case of Chief Muhinda, Muyongo was able to exert strong influence over the young 
Boniface Bwima, to an extent that it was common knowledge that ‘events in the Fwe-
area were directed by Muyongo from Windhoek’, Fisch pointedly argues.100 ‘Muyongo 
simply knew how to manipulate Bwima to execute his instructions’, Fisch adds.101 
Keeping a tight loop on Boniface Bwima Mamili held two advantages for Muyongo. 
Firstly, in a society where people, especially the majority residing in rural areas, heed the 
decisions taken by their chiefs, it goes without saying that they change political 
allegiances when their chiefs do. Thus according to Fossé, patronage and clientilism enter 
into modern political processes, the public service and other spheres of influence which 
essentially are the prerogative of the state.102 This, Fossé further states, allowed 
politicians from the Caprivi an ‘additional power-base and channel of influence.’ It was 
essentially Chief Boniface Bwima Mamili’s people that were Muyongo’s political 
constituency. ‘Mishake Muyongo needs a constituency’, was Petlola’s analysis on ethnic 
disputes in the Caprivi.103 This political constituency was weakened by the decision by 
the Mayeyi to break-away from the Mafwe, to assert their independence. The reduced 
support base saw the DTA loose elections in the Caprivi and move from being majority 
party to one with no seat on the regional and local councils. What is even more  telling is 
that, with the departure of Chief Boniface Bwima, the current chief is a declared SWAPO 
sympathizer, which saw the ruling party win the constituencies under the Mafwe area, a 
previously DTA stronghold. This is partly why the secessionists accused SWAPO of 
being behind the move to install a chief for the Mayeyi. Secondly, by keeping Chief 
Bwima Mamili on his side, Muyongo ensured that he gained the sympathy of the Lozis in 
Zambia’s Western Province. To serve this cause, it is reported that Chief Boniface 
Bwima Mamili undertook several visits to Zambia, with such a frequency that Fisch 
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writes that former President Nujoma had to reprimand him.104 This coincided with the 
slogan ‘Revival of Lozi Culture in Caprivi’ which Mishake Muyongo promoted during 
the final years of his political career.105 As it were, Chief Boniface Bwima Mamili fled 
with Muyongo to Botswana, once it became public that they held secret meetings with a 
South African mercenary hire company (Executive Outcomes), to discuss Caprivi 
secession. Muyongo was dismissed as President of the DTA and banned from the party in 
September 1998. The pair are now granted asylum in Denmark, while their followers are 
either languishing in prison facing treason charges or living in deplorable conditions in 
the Dukwe refugee camp in Botswana. Secession, which Muyongo used as bait for 
political comfort for a long time, now seemed to be the only option available to him, and 
unfortunately for him, is able to be achieved only through violence.  
 
The secessionists deny the argument that they went to South Africa to negotiate with a 
mercenary outfit for the secession of Caprivi from Namibia. Instead they maintain that 
the purpose of their trip to Pretoria was to meet a Mr. Zimmerman who had promised 
development assistance especially in the agricultural sector. In fact underdevelopment of 
the Caprivi is one of the reasons that, they profess, led them to want to secede. It is 
difficult to provide a historical contextualization to underdevelopment in the Caprivi 
without mention of the South African Defense Force (SADF). During the liberation war, 
Caprivi received a fair share of both personnel and equipment, but also infrastructural 
development between the 1960s through to the 1980s. The withdrawal of the SADF in 
1989 also meant the decline in services which the military readily provided. As a result, 
when people from Caprivi begin to question the slow pace of development in the area, 
this is obviously contrasted with pre-independence years. Being an area with great 
agricultural potential, the lack of large scale agricultural projects is a cause for concern. 
Government and development agencies point to the instances of tribal tensions as not 
being conducive to long term investment. The case of the failed Egyptian Development 
Company (PIDICO) that got entangled in the land dispute between the Mafwe and 
Masubiya is usually thrown in the face of critics of lack of development in Caprivi. 
                                                 
















Colonialism, especially South African in this instance, created and emphasized local 
notions of identity that served to alienate local people in the Caprivi from other ethnic 
groups in South West Africa. It was argued in this chapter that it is these localized 
notions of identity which are expressed as secession in the postcolonial era. Because the 
Caprivi was kept on the periphery of political, social, cultural and economic 
developments in the rest of South West Africa, local people feel more ‘Caprivian’ than 
Namibian. This is not to suggest that secession has wide appeal in the Caprivi, in fact its 
support base is very limited. Regardless, however, it takes only a couple of individuals 
committed to a cause such as secession to destabilize an area, especially one as small as 
the Caprivi. 
 
The chapter examined two issues, whether there is a historical justification to secession 
and secondly, whether the 1964 CANU-SWAPO ‘Agreement’ can be a basis for 
secession. The argument that the Caprivi has historically never been part of Namibia and 
therefore should be allowed independent status was found to be without basis. It was 
argued that indeed, since 1890, the territory formed an integral part of South West Africa, 
albeit being transferred either to Bechuanaland or South Africa for administrative 
purposes. Even then, it was established, the laws that were applied were mainly those of 
South West Africa. Even during the pre-colonial period, the Caprivi was under Lozi and 
Kololo rule, and therefore not very ‘independent’. To argue for the return to pre-colonial 
status would mean the restoration of Lozi rule, which I argued, as also a history of 
subjugation, was also bound to be overthrown. Lozi identity in the Caprivi appears in the 
form of nostalgia on the part of the Mamili dynasty, direct descendents of Simataa 
Mamili, the Lozi representative in Caprivi. To think that ‘Caprivians’, apart from the said 
group, which are now identified as Mbalangwes, are Lozi, is a misplaced assertion. In 
fact this is why secession does not enjoy popular support in the Caprivi because other 












Secession was instead ascribed to two factors: the first is that it is a South African 
construction especially of the 1980s with its interventionist policy of aggression in 
Southern Africa. At the close of its rule, South Africa visualized a friendly independent 
Caprivi in a rapidly growing pool of independent and hostile Southern African countries. 
The Caprivi would therefore be a watch tower to monitor developments in the rest of 
Africa, which could pose a threat to that isolated last bastion of Apartheid and white 
supremacy – South Africa.  
 
Secondly, secession was arguably linked to the political fortunes and misfortunes of its 
leader, Albert Mishake Muyongo. It was no coincidence that feelings of ‘Caprivian-
nesss’ took on a radical profile only when he lost political power, something unbearable 
for his ambitious character. Albert Mishake Muyongo had always kept secession in 
reserve, and used it as a political tool whenever he felt threatened politically, for most of 
his political career. He had successfully manipulated existing tribal disputes and divisions 
in the Caprivi especially between the Mafwe and Masubiya to aid his checkered political 
career. Because of his influence as a traditional leader, he made the Mafwe believe that 
they are marginalized by the Government (maybe they are) through misinformation from 
the Masubiya. For the majority of those who participated in the secessionist cause, they 
were merely expressing anger on government for the alleged acts of discrimination 
against the Mafwe. Thus I argued, secession when seen in this context, is just an 
extension of the tribal feuds between the Masubiya and Mafwe.  
 
Similarly, Muyongo made his followers believe that SWAPO gave an undertaking in 
1964 at the time of the ‘merger’ between CANU and SWAPO that Caprivi will be given 
independent or special status at Namibian independence. It was argued here that neither 
Muyongo nor Nujoma was competent to decide on the territorial status of South West 
Africa at the time, that being the preserve of the United Nations Organization. Therefore 
even if such an undertaking could have been made, it was going to be difficult to enforce. 
What is more, it does not appear that the undertaking was made. The so-called merger 
agreement (press release), does not say anything of the sort. The position here is that the 











CANU into SWAPO and not to incorporate Caprivi into South West Africa or even to 
decide to perpetuate the former’s isolation. 
 
That lack of development in Caprivi accounts for secession was not given serious 
consideration in this chapter, partly because developmental history is not my strength, but 
also because it is a matter of opinion. While proponents of this view point to lack of 
projects especially undertaken by government in Caprivi, development agencies (private 
sector) and even government in turn point at the instability in the Caprivi caused by tribal 
divisions as  being an inhibiting factor, not conducive to attract investment. Historically, 
such claims should be located in the context of the special status Caprivi enjoyed during 
the liberation war – being a frontline – it received a lion’s share of military equipment, 
personnel and infrastructure well into the 1980s. With the withdrawal of the SADF and 















This thesis has argued both that a Caprivian-ness exists; and that sustained contestation 
characterizes its existence. This was defined in the Introduction as a set of feelings, 
perceptions and actions that colluded over time, a result of both self-ascription (an 
assertion of who or what we claim to be) and assignment (what others say we are), to 
produce a sense of not belonging. This Caprivian identity, it was suggested, existed in 
two forms, i) as a spatial or geographical entity, usually divided into East and West 
Caprivi in history for administrative purposes; and, ii) as a people – Subia, Mafwe, 
Mayeyi, Mbukushu, Barakwena, Totela, Mbalangwe, and Lozi, otherwise collectively 
known as ‘Caprivians’.  This thesis has sought to determine how  these Caprivian 
identities were constructed in the past; and whether, and if, this construction still 
continues in the present; in what form; and if contestation is inherent in this construction? 
 
It was argued in the Introduction that the creation of the Caprivi, as a space, was a bi-
product of German and British imperial expansionist and interventionist policies in 
central southern Africa in the late 1800s. Through the Anglo-German Treaty of 1890, 
Britain ceded a strip of land giving Germany access to the Zambezi River. Since then, the 
territory that would become the Caprivi Strip has continually shifted and been offloaded 
onto another power to exercise control over the territory and over-lordship over its 
inhabitants. This was, arguably, due to ‘geographical’ and ‘historical’ factors which made 











administered separately for most part of its colonial history: it was neither fully integrated 
into South West Africa nor made part of its neighbouring territories. Similarly, though 
‘Caprivians’ were depicted as different from other Namibians in contemporary 
historiography and ethnographical literature, in that they have closer cultural affinities to 
their kin in Zambia and Botswana than fellow Namibians, they were not fully integrated 
as such either. It was this sense of being ‘different’ and ‘not belonging’ that produced 
what we have described as a feeling of the Capriviannes. ‘Caprivians’ have been, and are, 
Namibia’s ‘other’. 
 
When we focused in Chapter Two on pre- colonial Caprivi identities, the first question 
raised was whether there were any forms of social and political organization in pre-
Caprivi times, especially before the advent of Lozi and Kololo rule. It was argued that 
indeed local identities such as Subiya, Yeyi, Fwe, Mbukushu and Totela existed in pre-
Caprivi period and even before the arrival of the Lozi, but that their social and political 
forms of organization was not very centrally organized, which rendered them vulnerable 
to outside conquering influence. However, it was also shown that local chiefdoms such as 
the Subiya kingdom of Itenge, often a subject of dismissive historiographical discussions, 
existed before the advent of Lozi rule.  
 
The second issue discussed in Chapter Two was the nature of societal relations in pre-
colonial times in the geographical space that is now Caprivi. These took the form of 
contest for the control of both space and people, involving outside powers such as the 











Mzilikazi. Pre-colonial Caprivi offered protection, grazing pastures and winter gardens 
that attracted the above groups. Because of competition for such resources, societal 
relations in pre-colonial Caprivi revolved around conquest and resistance, plunder, 
betrayal and rivalry.  In this regard, two important conclusions were reached. The first is 
that the inhabitants of pre-colonial Caprivi did not resign themselves to the suffering and 
disdain allotted to them by the Lozi and Kololo but attempted to regain their 
independence at various points in their relationship with their enslavers. Thus to depict 
them just as ‘little serfs’ is a misplaced assertion which neglects a basic fact, that 
resistance is part and parcel of subjectivity in state formation and the Lozi and Kololo 
pre-colonial conquest states are no exceptions. The second conclusion proposes that the 
Lozi and Kololo rule and subjugation of the pre-colonial Caprivi should be classified as 
foreign and colonial in nature. Colonial historiography and ethnographic literature often 
tends to dust off the history of exploitation during the pre-colonial period and reconstitute 
it as the history of the territory, and in the process local histories are replaced by Lozi or 
Kololo history. Locals have no history in this scheme of things, save for being slaves 
during Lozi and Kololo rule. This was refuted strongly in the chapter.        
 
The third question addressed in Chapter Two was what role, if any, pre-colonial identities 
played in shaping later ‘Caprivian’ identity. While much can be said about continuities in 
Caprivi identity from the pre-colonial era, especially perceptions of space and people, 
two issues stand out: i) strategic importance; and ii) contestation. Strategically, pre-
colonial Caprivi offered refuge and plenty of game, fruit and fish to its inhabitants all of 











battles for control ensued between Lozi and the locals, Lozi and Kololo, and Kololo 
against the locals. These wars for conquest resulted in displacement since the locals 
simply moved away from danger even if it meant crossing rivers. While identities 
scattered in this way, territorially the space that would become the Caprivi, home to 
Caprivi identity, was shrunk to a panhandle. This shrinking or wrestling control away 
from the locals began during the pre-colonial era, continued during the colonial period, 
and was even greater after independence with the delimitation of regions. Because it was 
strategically located, spatial Caprivi identity was a contested terrain from pre-colonial 
times over people and territory. This was based on difference. ‘Caprivians’ are different 
from the rest of Namibians, fundamentally because they are perceived as Lozi, which is a 
pre-colonial or pre-Caprivi identity. But this identity, it was argued, was not unchanging; 
we cannot ignore factors such as the fusion of ‘Caprivians’ with other Namibians that 
began before independence and continued at the time of the liberation war in SWAPO 
camps and of course included social interaction before and after independence involving 
inter or cross-cultural marriages. 
 
A major assertion in this thesis is that these Caprivi identities were formed largely 
through state formation. To support this analysis, Chapter Three focused on the evolution 
of colonial administrative identity in Caprivi, particularly the eastern part, the territory 
that lies east of the Mashi/Kwando/Chobe River variously known over time as the 
Eastern Caprivi Zipfel (ECZ) or Eastern Caprivi Strip. It was shown that the history of 












Phase one began with the creation of Caprivi in 1890 through the Anglo-Germany Treaty 
of 1 July and concluded in 1909. During this period, there was no official German 
administrative presence in Caprivi apart from occasional fact finding missions. The 
consensus seems to be that Germany lost interest in the Caprivi during this time after it 
became apparent that the Zambezi was not navigable in some parts all the way to east 
Africa due to many rapids. However, it was argued in the thesis that it is possible that 
Germany administered Caprivi just as a sphere of influence, an area reserved for future 
action. Spheres of influence did not, by their very nature, vest territorial rights in the 
occupier and needed enabling treaties to protect and prevent other powers from claiming 
rights in such a territory. Even then, only powers that were signatories to the treaty were 
bound to respect such a sphere of influence.  
 
The second phase began in 1909 when Kurt Streitwolf was sent to establish 
administrative control in the eastern part of the Caprivi and ended in 1914 when the 
Caprivi was taken away from German occupation by the Allied Forces during the First 
World War. Apart from the installation of two tribal chiefs in a primitive form of indirect 
rule, the German period in the Caprivi, the thesis concludes, was uneventful. The third 
phase began in 1914 and ended in 1922 during which time, like the rest of South West 
Africa, the Caprivi was under military rule, but in its instance, a police contingent 
stationed at Schuckmannsburg reported to a resident commissioner at Kasane in the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate. The period 1922 to 1929 constitutes phase four during which 
time the Caprivi was formally handed over to the resident commissioner of Bechuanaland 











South West Africa. The western part of the Caprivi was administered from Maun, also in 
Bechuanaland. This position changed at the behest of the Permanent Mandates 
Commission of the League of Nations that complained that this was tantamount to a 
violation of the Mandate agreement.  
 
The rectification of that anomaly ushered in the fifth phase (1929 – 1939) of the colonial 
administrative history of the Caprivi, and saw the territory incorporated back into South 
West Africa. A member of the South West Africa Police was stationed at 
Schuckmannsburg to exercise administrative control in conjunction with the two chiefs 
appointed in the 1909 set-up. An administrative tool at this time, it was found, was an 
annual police patrol through the territory and irregular inspection tours from officials at 
head office. In August 1939, the Union Department of Native Affairs assumed direct 
administrative control of the Eastern Caprivi Strip until 1980 when the territory reverted 
back to South West Africa Administration under the Second Tier system of government 
until the implementation of the United Nations Resolution 435. The period 1939 to 1980 
thus constitutes phase six of Caprivi colonial administrative identity and can be sub-
divided into two periods, 1939-1964 (the period of the Bantu reserve) and 1964 to 1980 
(the Bantustan period). 
 
Administrative neglect ensured that a sense of isolation and not belonging developed in 
the Caprivi. This neglect began when Germany administered it just as a sphere of 
influence for almost twenty years. Even when an administration was established in 1909, 











administrations. This neglect, for most part, was justified on the basis that geographical 
and historical factors rendered it difficult to administer as part of South West Africa. The 
territory was perceived to be swampy, feverish (malarial) and consisted of wandering 
‘bushmen’, and thus was not thought suitable for white settlement. Consequently, the 
Caprivi was pushed towards neighboring territories administratively, rather than being 
seen as part of South West Africa. At the same time it was not made an integral 
component either of Bechuanaland or Barotseland. In other words, the inhabitants were 
administered in a way that made them feel as though they belonged more to Barotseland 
and Bechuanaland than to South West Africa. So a Caprivian identity emerged based on 
the idea that the territory was unhealthy, remote and separate.  
 
A central question addressed in Chapter Three is how colonial administrative identity 
helped shape this Caprivi identity. What role did state formation play in the construction 
of a Caprivian identity? As the Caprivi changed masters six times in its colonial history, 
being transferred from one colonial authority to the other, its inhabitants were not made 
to feel that they were part of anything. What changed was the nationality of the colonial 
officials who left little imprint on the lives of the people. Neither German nor Afrikaans, 
in the case of   the South African administration, is spoken in the Caprivi. Apart from one 
small brick hut left at Schuckmannsburg, there is no colonial architecture to point out in 
the Caprivi. Colonial history is remembered largely in an intangible form.  
 
A second aspect is the provision of services such as health and education. Up until 1964 











and, later, the Catholic Capuchin Order. These churches had their headquarters in 
Northern and Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland. It is to these countries where cases 
of a serious nature were referred for treatment. In the case of education, the curriculum 
and examinations that were written in the Caprivi before 1964 was that of the Northern 
Rhodesian Education Department. Even officials who inspected schools in the Caprivi 
during this period were from Northern Rhodesia. It is not surprising that many of the 
inhabitants of the Caprivi engaged in migrant labour to those countries. Confusion thus 
reigned in that on the map, and according to international law, the Caprivi was part of 
South West Africa but administratively it rested and depended on the goodwill of 
neighbouring territories. ‘Caprivians’ were orientated educationally away from South 
West Africa. The post office that was used was that of Sesheke in Northern Rhodesia, 
and even the official currency applied in the Caprivi was that of Northern Rhodesia.  
 
A third aspect is the Odendaal Commission’s recommendations for the implementation of 
a Bantustan called East Caprivi. Implementation began in 1972 with the establishment of 
a Legislative Council and it eventually attained self-government in 1976. This was in a 
sense an attainment of an aspect of Caprivi identity in that it gave the inhabitants a flag, 
anthem and coat of arms, all symbols of ‘statehood’. What is more, the term ‘Caprivian’ 
or East ‘Caprivians’ was coined and thus people were administered to feel ‘Caprivian’ 
rather than South West African during this period. This aided in the formation of the 
Caprivi identity. The period from 1964 onwards saw an administrative shift from neglect 
to intense focus, especially in regard to the military sphere, but still the trend was to lean 











that the Caprivi was central in a southern Africa perspective but peripheral from the 
viewpoint of Namibian state formation. 
 
Chapter Four argues that there was a frontier aspect to the Caprivi identites, and that this 
frontier was contested. As early as the pre-colonial period, ideas of a frontier of plenty 
(game, fish, fruit, and grazing pastures) as well as danger (Makololo and Matebele 
invasions) surfaced. To this should be added the idea of the Caprivi as a frontier of refuge 
especially for European vagabonds and poachers between 1890 and 1909. The Caprivi 
became a frontier of migrant labour extraction and a military frontier during the colonial 
period. Labour hire organizations such the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association 
(WNLA), the South West Africa Native Labour Association (SWANLA) and the 
Northern Labour Organization (NLO) vied with each other to establish labour 
recruitment camps in the Caprivi, both west and east. The Southern Rhodesian 
Government was granted permission to establish a transit camp for migrant labour 
recruitment in the Caprivi, even though this was vehemently opposed by the Gold 
Producers Commission in Johannesburg. Hence the Caprivi was a contested frontier for 
migrant labour extraction during this period. It was established that actually the attraction 
for migrant labour was not Caprivi but Angola, one of the heavily populated parts of 
southern Africa at the time. A recruitment camp in Caprivi gave an organization easy 
reach and access to the eastern Angola market. When the labour hire dispute between 
WNLA and SWANLA heated up, it was resolved that WNLA should not recruit in other 
parts of SWA, which should be reserved for SWANLA, but WNLA retained the Caprivi. 











walking on foot for long distances to western Caprivi and parading as Angolans in order 
to be allowed to go to the Rand mines. Even with its small population, East Caprivi still 
managed to send an average of 30 migrant workers per month to the Rand mines, all 
these reinforced Caprivi identities in a variety of ways: migrant labour involved not only 
going away but also coming back home as part of the contract. Migrant workers always 
knew that they had to come back to the Caprivi after completion of their tour of duty, to 
come back ‘home’ where they belonged. That home was the Caprivi. This involved 
deferred remuneration and thus brought income back to sustain the growth of this Caprivi 
identity. The routes of migrant work pointed away from South West Africa to Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia and mainly to the Rand mines. Migrant labourers came back 
speaking a variety of dialects they had learnt in the mine compounds. Had the routes of 
migrant labour pointed to South West Africa, ‘Caprivians’ would have been more 
integrated into Namibian state formation, like many from northern Namibia who even 
chose to ‘break contract’ and not return to former Owamboland. Thus migrant work was 
a lost opportunity to integrate Caprivi into mainstream South West Africa. Instead 
migrancy pointed to countries where ‘Caprivians’ were and remained foreigners.  
 
The military frontier aspect of Caprivi identity became more pronounced from the mid-
1960s with the escalation of the armed liberation struggle in southern Africa. During this 
period, the Caprivi became a dangerous frontier where the war was fought. Young South 
African conscripts were sent to this border area to fight a war as part of their compulsory 
military service. For South Africa the Caprivi represented the last stand against 











East-West confrontation. Because it served as the SADF’s first line of defence against the 
advance of Black Africa and also as a launch-pad for the destabilization of the Frontline 
states, the Caprivi became one of the most heavily militarized places in Africa. For 
SWAPO’s PLAN combatants, the Caprivi became a corridor to freedom, a transit point to 
Windhoek. While on the one hand the war was about the consolidation of the Caprivi 
identity as part of South Africa, since this was the time of the implementation of the 
Odendaal recommendations, on the other the war symbolized a deconstruction of Caprivi 
identities. As discussed below, a sizable number of ‘Caprivians’ joined SWAPO through 
CANU and fought as PLAN combatants, in a way desiring to subordinate or get rid of 
their individualistic identity as a Caprivian, to bring about an independent Namibia. 
 
While on a macro level a spatial Caprivi existed, at the local or micro level the Caprivi 
identities were fragmented and double-edged for most part of the colonial period. State 
formation in the Eastern Caprivi decreed and recognized only two identities, the Mafwe 
and Masubiya. This involved a loss of identity for other groups such as Mayeyi, 
Mbukushu, Barakwengo (San), and Matotela. The latter were forced to identify 
themselves as Mafwe in a single ethnic alliance. The apparatuses of the state, however, 
did not delineate the spheres of influence of the two identities that were created, and 
hence many scholars tend to argue that it is because of this fact that endless tribal feuds 
are prevalent in the Caprivi. It was argued above, however, that the cause of tribal 
conflict in the Caprivi has much to do with the basis on which a Caprivi identity was 
premised – a heritage of social upheaval and conflict based on foreignness. While the two 











the Lozi bequeathed to them. It was pointed out how a Lozi representative in the Caprivi 
was appointed as chief of the Mafwe ethnic coalition and how a commoner was 
appointed regent chief over the Masubiya. This was not, of course, the basis on which the 
inhabitants of the Caprivi wanted to identify, because it meant that they remained 
foreigners in their own territory. They wanted to be perceived as indigenous. So tribal 
conflicts in the Caprivi reflected a concern for indigenousness which resulted in contested 
identities and rival histories to show who came first in the area. The competition for 
indigenousness between the Masubiya and Mafwe resulted in a competition for resources, 
especially land utilization. The colonial state resolved this by arguing that none had 
ancestral claim to the Caprivi since it was the land of the Lozi. After independence, a 
further fragmentation of the Caprivi identity in terms of identity assertion was witnessed 
with the break-away of the Mashi and the Mayeyi from the Mafwe ethnic alliance. As the 
Mashi Traditional Authority claims to be the ‘true Mafwe’ a further split of identities 
may be in the offing. This shows that Caprivi identity was and continues to be contested 
at the local level, reflected in disputes over history. 
 
Africans responded in different ways to the colonial creation of the Caprivi, but the most 
organized response before independence was the rise of regional nationalism. The 
formation of CANU was an expressed desire for freedom or self-rule, but not in the form 
of Caprivi identity or Bantustanism. The nationalists vowed to get rid of the white man’s 
rule and CANU was a vehicle to achieve that objective. At this stage, the notion of 
nationalism was limited to what was taking place in Caprivi, and thus it was argued that 











nationalists constantly interacted with nationalists from say Northern Rhodesia’s UNIP is 
indicative of its desire to break this isolation. It can be concluded that the movement 
threatened a Caprivi identity.  
 
One such threat to a Caprivi identity was realized in 1964 when the state harshly 
responded to the formation of CANU by clamping down on its rank and file which 
caused many to jump the border into what was then Northern Rhodesia. While in Zambia, 
CANU joined forces with SWAPO to embark on a joint assault on Apartheid South 
Africa, thereby realizing that their identity is broader than simply Caprivian, that they 
were part of a larger entity that is South West Africa. This fundamental realization and 
merger ensured that the interaction of those who went into exile managed to outlive the 
discrimination of being ‘Caprivians’; they sacrificed to free the whole of South West 
Africa, not only Caprivi. This interaction that took place in SWAPO camps where they 
lived as refugees together with other South West Africans dispelled the myth of being 
different and hence increased their resolve to disintegrate a Caprivi identity. All the same, 
because of its harsh response to CANU’s threat to a Caprivi identity, the colonial state 
banished Brendan Ka gongolo Simbwaye, its founder president, to other parts of South 
West Africa. This served to put him in touch with other nationalists in South West Africa 
such as Clemens Kapuuo, who arranged for Advocate Israel Goldblatt to attempt to 
secure his release. Thus by banning Simbwaye from the  Caprivi, the state indirectly 
aided the deconstruction of a Caprivi identity because taking him to South West Africa 
affirmed the fact that Caprivi was part of South West Africa. Brendan Simbwaye is still 











to him or where he might have been buried. There are strong indications that his body 
was thrown into the Zambezi River. 
 
In the present certain Caprivians still call for secession from Namibia. In 1999 a group 
calling itself Caprivi Liberation Army (CLA) attacked government installations around 
Katima Mulilo that led to the deaths of several persons. A number of people fled the 
Caprivi into Botswana, where some still remain as refugees at Dukwe. The leaders of the 
secessionists, Mishake Albert Muyongo, who led CANU into SWAPO but was expelled 
in 1980, and former Mafwe chief Boniface Bebi Mamili, were offered political asylum in 
Denmark. More than one hundred men are being tried for treason, sedition and illegal 
possession of arms in Namibian courts in the biggest and longest running court 
proceedings after independence. At the core of secession is the argument that SWAPO 
entered into agreement with CANU in 1964 that at independence Caprivi would be 
allowed to decide either to join Namibia or be independent and that SWAPO seems to 
have forgotten that.  
 
Does the present construction of Caprivi identity (secession) have a historical basis? 
Since 1890, the Caprivi had been part and parcel of South West Africa, even when it was 
being constantly transferred to different masters in its colonial history. Such transfer was 
only for administrative purposes and therefore whether CANU and SWAPO entered into 
an agreement is beside the point since none of the two movements was empowered to 
take such a decision. South West Africa, including the Caprivi was under the United 











taken by anyone other than, and without consulting, the UN. Was the secessionist 
movement a direct result of the construction of Caprivi identity? Apartheid South 
African‘s machinations, especially in the 1980s, helped persuade the now leader of the 
secessionists to lead an independent Caprivi and hence guarantee its influence in a 
southern Africa that had grown increasing intolerant and opposed to Apartheid policy. 
This was designed as part of a Caprivi identity that ensured that inhabitants identify 
themselves as ‘Caprivians’. So the secessionist movement in the Caprivi was a direct 
result of South African colonially localized notions of identities that were entrenched in 
the area. South African colonialism created and emphasized local notions of identity that 
served to alienate local people in the Caprivi from other ethnic groups in South West 
Africa by deliberately keeping the Caprivi on the periphery of political, social, cultural 
and economic developments in the rest of South West Africa. As a result, local people 
were orientated to feel more ‘Caprivian’ than Namibian. This is not to suggest that 
secession has a wide appeal in the Caprivi, in fact its support base is very limited and 
continues to dwindle. However, it takes only a couple of individuals to destabilize an 
area, especially one as small and as far removed from the capital and political centre, as  
is the Caprivi. In this way, the contest for a Caprivi identity, ongoing from pre-colonial 

















Personal Interviews with the following CANU activists 
 
Fidelis Mayumbelo  15 April 2006 (BukaloVillage) 
Adrian Waluka Simubali 16 April 2006 (Bukalo Village) 
Konard Kaela Machinga  16 April 2006 (Bukalo Village) 
Sylvester Matengu  16 April 2006 (Kabbe Village) 
Ignatius Matengu  16 April 2006 (Kabbe Village) 
Pastor George Matali  16 April 2006 (Kabbe Village) 
Albert Zachariah Ndopu 17 April 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Robert Sililo   25 July 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Dan Kachilombwa  27 July 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Benson Kaapala  27 July 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Aggrey Musialike  28 July 2006 (Sizimbukwa Village) 
Boniface Musialike  28 July 2006 (Sizimbukwa Village) 
Charles Sampati Lutokwa 30 July 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Kapalingo Bonny Lifasi 31 July 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
Michael Mudabeti  15 September 2006  (Katima Mulilo) 
Henry Musialike  16 September 2006 (Katima Mulilo) 
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c. Notes on Interview by Cecil Kruger with Chief Chikamatondo and others on the 
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